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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
Quote: Pigs! - I hadn't thought of those. Actually, I don't want to!

Steve

Still used in a 1960s murder to remove the evidence...except for a large femur I believe or some such thing which was how the killer was rumbled...jolly effective...
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Quote:
Renatus post=311525 Wrote:That said, crops planted in October would not be available for harvesting until the following spring, so... it would have been imperative for them to have seized enough to see them through the winter.
True, but they'd have to plant the crops in October all the same, or they wouldn't have any food the following spring! They couldn't live forever off Roman plunder :wink:
I don't think that there is any disagreement between us on this, as I hope the subordinate clause following "so" in my original post acknowledges.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Quote:
Steve Kaye post=311528 Wrote:Pigs! - I hadn't thought of those. Actually, I don't want to!

Steve

Still used in a 1960s murder to remove the evidence...except for a large femur I believe or some such thing which was how the killer was rumbled...jolly effective...
Is this the one you're thinking of?

http://www.hertsandessexobserver.co.uk/B...murder.htm
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Quote:I don't think that there is any disagreement between us on this, as I hope the subordinate clause following "so" in my original post acknowledges.
Ah yes, I see what you mean. Apologies!
Nathan Ross
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Since Fuentes has been mentioned again it might be worth giving a bit more detail on his Virginia Water suggestion. His article here presents what I think is a very convincing case for a location close to London, and to the west - it also demolishes Webster's old idea of the 'cavalry dash' from Anglesey.

Fuentes cites possible destruction evidence of pre-Flavian date from Brentford, Putney and Staines, and thus tracks the course of the rebels westward from London to the Thames crossing. Beyond here, as he says, there is 'no other site along the Roman road to Silchester which can equal the natural strength of Virginia Water'.

His map is below - he explains the relative length of the Roman line with an interesting suggestion of help from Cogidubnus: those 'light armed troops' on the flanks might have been Atrebatic allies rather than Roman auxiliaries. Understandable, perhaps, if Tacitus chose not to mention them!

[attachment=3818]FuentesVirginiaWaterMap.jpg[/attachment]

Problems with this site? The main one that appears to me is the presence of a large stream - the Bourne - apparently running right through the Roman line (although water patterns could well have changed since antiquity with the construction of Virginia Water lake itself).

Here's the contour map on Bing, if anyone cares to puzzle out the lines:

Virginia Water map


Attached Files Thumbnail(s)
   
Nathan Ross
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The following might be of macabre interest.

Volume of 1 dead body = 0.203 cubic metres.
80,000 bodies = 16,294 cu metres = 6.5 olympic-sized swimming pools or 182 London double-decker buses.

No allowance made for crushing.

Considering that the margins of grave pits have to be dug wider than the required volume, to prevent collapse, then that is a lot of digging by a lot of people! And, of course, in many parts of Britain you would soon find yourself quarrying into chalk or limestone.

Of course, we can consider burning before burial but I can't find good figures on how much wood is required to consume a body but, we can all appreciate it must be a lot ("a lot" is euphemism an "absolutely enormous amount").

I suggest that these figures indicate that burial or burning of the dead is very unlikely, and that they were left to rot on the battle field.

Does anyone have, or know of, battle sites where the disposal figures are known?

regards, Steve Kaye

PS - I am allowed out into polite society occasionally but please don't report me to matron - she'll confiscate my slippers again.
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Quote:
Renatus post=311545 Wrote:I don't think that there is any disagreement between us on this, as I hope the subordinate clause following "so" in my original post acknowledges.
Ah yes, I see what you mean. Apologies!
No apology necessary. I was less than clear, concentrating on the issue of survival over the winter.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Quote: The following might be of macabre interest.

Volume of 1 dead body = 0.203 cubic metres.
80,000 bodies = 16,294 cu metres = 6.5 olympic-sized swimming pools or 182 London double-decker buses.

No allowance made for crushing.

Considering that the margins of grave pits have to be dug wider than the required volume, to prevent collapse, then that is a lot of digging by a lot of people! And, of course, in many parts of Britain you would soon find yourself quarrying into chalk or limestone.

Of course, we can consider burning before burial but I can't find good figures on how much wood is required to consume a body but, we can all appreciate it must be a lot ("a lot" is euphemism an "absolutely enormous amount").

I suggest that these figures indicate that burial or burning of the dead is very unlikely, and that they were left to rot on the battle field.

Does anyone have, or know of, battle sites where the disposal figures are known?

regards, Steve Kaye

PS - I am allowed out into polite society occasionally but please don't report me to matron - she'll confiscate my slippers again.

Not sure about battlefield sites as such but any book/article by Jacqueline McKinley on human burials, including cremations, will answer your questions on bodies, methods and remains analysis.
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Quote:
Vindex post=311542 Wrote:
Steve Kaye post=311528 Wrote:Pigs! - I hadn't thought of those. Actually, I don't want to!

Steve

Still used in a 1960s murder to remove the evidence...except for a large femur I believe or some such thing which was how the killer was rumbled...jolly effective...
Is this the one you're thinking of?

http://www.hertsandessexobserver.co.uk/B...murder.htm

Seems likely...although I have got my facts a bit wrong! :roll:

I hasten to add it was not a contemporaneous memory but something I read...
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Vindex: Bodies Thanks for the pointer to Jacqueline McKinley.

Nathan Ross: Virginia Water

Found this site about Staines and Roman roads years ago. There is an interactive map at the bottom of the page - schematic unfortunately. Useful information.

The Virginia Water site is interesting and I include it in my list of possible battle sites at a down-weighted 85/118. Down-weighted because I think there is one large problem with it, namely, the actual siting of the Staines-Silchester Roman road. As you can see on the map you included, Nick Fuentes chose the southern 'spur' out of the Runnymede area (the road with the 1850s siting marked on it). But the evidence for this routing is very sparse and non-existent within the River Bourne valley (the gulley area outbound of the defile). However, there is more evidence, admittedly not conclusive, for the more northern route for the road. Nick's placing of the Roman front depends on the southern road existing and the Brits approaching along it. If the southern road did not exist then the battle was probably not at Virgina Water because an approach via the northern road did not offer a suitable defendable position, defile or otherwise. Indeed, a northern road approach would have allowed a rebel force to quite easily flank an opposition in the broken ground of steep valleys.

Another case against the existence of the southern road relates to road engineering. The land around Staines, and south to Thorpe, is very low, virtually flat and boggy in winter - a flood-plain. And that's the present condition after a lot of drainage and flood control measures have been employed. The situation 2k years ago, with probably quite a few local streams and Thames tributaries crossing the flood-plain, might have been worse. Constructing a southern Roman road across that muddy expanse would, I suggest, require deep foundations, causeways and the on-going elevation of the road surface. All-in-all an expensive exercise requiring considerable maintenance. Conversely, the northern route crosses the flood-plain in a much shorter span and strikes the high, firm ground near Egham. There was still the need for multiple bridges, hence the name Pontes (bridges) but this route would have been much cheaper and easier to maintain. Of course, once onto the higher ground, the road could then progress south-westwards up the gentle, firm gradient. The fact that even this short northern route requires multiple bridges/causeways to cross the flood plain supports the idea that the southern route is essentially a non-starter.

However, I leave Virginia Water in my list because the Roman road network is not very well known and the southern route might exist (it would have sunk by now).

Regards, Steve Kaye
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Hello all
After following this thread for some time, do you think we could start to sumarise the evidence/speculation as 9 pages on this thread is really getting too much to follow....ie, we can eliminate "this" site, there is a possibility of "this" site and it could be "these" sites. I know all of you have contributed vast sums of knowledge and i thank you all and appriaciate that. But i do think its starting to degenerate into "i think its here and you think its there....everyone has thier own ideas.....no one is wrong and as far as we know , no one is right.....but a summary of all the above may bring new ideas to the fore.....I still reckon the second were drunk on westcountry cider, thats why they were absent...lol
Kevin
Kevin
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Quote:do you think we could start to sumarise the evidence/speculation as 9 pages on this thread is really getting too much to follow
It is very long, yes, and has a slightly maddening circular quality Confusedmile: - but fun too, I think... Obviously, none of us are going to produce a definite site without a lot of hard proof, but in keeping with Mike Bishop's original post (which was more about the strategic shape of the campaign, I think, than the actual site), we could summarise our respective positions.

Most of the considerations, of course, involve Paulinus's direction of retreat. I still believe that a northern route would have been preferable (I did favour the Virginia Water site to the west, but it appears a bit too moist!).

So, withour further ado, here's my ten-point summary of the benefits of a northern direction in general, and the Dunstable location in particular:

1) Security. Arriving at London after his march south, Paulinus was faced with a native uprising of unforeseen scale and effectiveness. His first priority would be to take his troops and the refugees in his train to a strong defensive position. The closest of these was the chalk upland of the Chilterns - and the quickest way of getting there was a two day march back up Watling Street...

2) Intelligence. With rebellion all around him, Paulinus could not be sure of any local support. It has been suggested that he might fall back on the lands of Cogidubnus to the west - but while we know that Cogidubnus was loyal (because Tacitus tells us so), Paulinus couldn't be so sure at the time. And even if the king was loyal, what of his people? By marching his troops west, Paulinus would be putting them in open country, in the midst of a native population that could throw in their lot with the rebels at any moment, and depending on the loyalty of a vassal king. The only ground that Paulinus could be certain of was that which he had seen very recently with his own eyes - the line of Watling Street. By withdrawing north, he could maintain his strategic independence and keep his army secure from local threats.

3) Reinforcement. We don't know where II Augusta were, or even where they started from (Exeter? Gloucester?). If they were on the road anywhere near Silchester, Paulinus could have waited for them in London. If they were further west, or stationary at home base, then setting out blindly westwards in the hope of meeting them somewhere on the road would be folly. However, by redirecting their march north-east up the Iknield Way, II Augusta could have come up behind Paulinus's static position at Dunstable. Also, of course, the line was open for reinforcement from the north down Watling itself - the rest of the twentieth and the ninth. Cerialis had escaped his own rout with his cavalry intact: quite possibly he fell back on the Neronian fort at Great Chesterford, only thirty miles north-east of Dunstable. Paulinus could therefore have been reinforced from three directions; no other location gives him this possibility.

4) Morale. Troops tend to become demoralised when retreating. This is true - but Paulinus was certainly retreating whichever way he went! The men of the fourteenth had been based at Wroxeter for (probably) over a decade: they had comrades there, a supply depot, many of them would have had families there, and they would have regarded it as home. By guarding the line of the Chilterns, keeping his army between the rebellion and the road to Wroxeter, Paulinus could keep his troops on ground they knew - a road they had marched many times - and they wouldn't feel they were abandoning their route home either. A march west, on the other hand, into unknown tribal lands that most of his men would never have seen before, would definitely seem like running away!

5) Containment. Paulinus marched south 'through a hostile population'. So there was insurgency brewing in the Midlands - by leaving the area Paulinus would leave this insurgency to erupt into open rebellion, cutting the country in half and threatening his bases in the north. By keeping a force in the Chilterns he could effectively oversee and threaten the hostile natives of the Midlands, containing the spread of further rebellion.

6) Blocking. As an agricultural people, the Iceni and Trinovantes would have had to return to their lands towards the end of summer to plant crops for the winter. So Paulinus knew that they'd have to move north at some point. His 'delay' ('until another season', says Dio - the autumn planting season perhaps?) could have reflected this. By holding a position around Dunstable he could intercept the tribal horde moving up Watling to join the Icknield way, or move eastwards along the Chilterns to block any north-eastern route there.

7) St Albans. Tacitus isn't clear about whether St Albans was destroyed before or after London, but since the rest of his account is chronological and he mentions St Albans second, we'd need some reason to suspect it wasn't destroyed second! Paulinus could have fallen back on St Albans from London, and then moved ten miles further into the Chilterns as the British approached from the south.

8.) Fabius Cunctator. As an educated Roman, Paulinus would have a thorough knowledge of the deeds of past generals. His tactics seem to indicate an appreciation for Fabius Maximus 'Cunctator', whose delaying tactics against Hannibal so resemble his own against Boudica. In fact, if Paulinus actually did destroy London himself (as I've suggested), this would fit with a Fabian 'scorched earth' strategy. But the Fabian delay tactic only works if a general keeps his force in close proximity to the enemy, enabling him to threaten their flanks, maintain intelligence on their strength and block their movements. Marching off into the distance, hoping the enemy will come trailing in pursuit, does not fit with this strategic model. By keeping relatively close to London, on the high ground of the Chilterns, Paulinus could block the enemy and strike at their flanks and rear if they tried to move west.

9) Supply. The burnt Roman grain in the destruction layer in London proves that there were supplies there when Paulinus arrived. He would have taken as much as he could carry when he departed - and, I believe, destroyed the rest himself. So his army would be provisioned, albeit for a short while. He had no immediate need to fall back on native allies (even if he could be certain of them!). Water is more of a problem - but if Paulinus was based around Dunstable he could probably have watered his animals and supplied his men on the low wet ground to the north-west, only moving up to his position on the dry chalk upland when he had firm intelligence of the approaching British.

10) Marching speed. Not Paulinus's but Boudica's, in this case. The British tribal horde was vast and disparate, comprising a number of peoples and probably a number of subordinate leaders. They would have moved very slowly, and possibly not in a straight line either! Colchester, and then London, gave the British firm strategic objectives. After that, Boudica's army was in danger of splitting apart. We know that Paulinus defeated them en masse, so they were still a cohesive force at that point. To suggest a battle location anywhere beyond 50 miles or so of London (at least five days journey for the British) is, I believe, to imagine an unrealistic unity and motivation in the British horde.

:grin:

- Nathan
Nathan Ross
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Greetings

I only came accross this thread the otherday and have to congratulate you all on perhaps the most informed debate about the Brythonic Uprising of AD60 / 61 on the Web.

I must admit that the findings that the battle site had to be within 50 miles of London wipes out most of the current proposed sites but of course does not mean that it is incorrect.

I was wondering if perhaps anyone has a view on whether there were two armies working in concert, with the Iceni and the Trinovantes destroying the forts early in the campaign (perhaps as a practice run against the Romans), the Trinovantes destroying a virtually undefended Colchester and the Iceni then ambushing and destroying a depleted Ninth Legion.

The other point that I have difficulty with is the concept that the Brythons would have advanced on London when they must have known that Seutonius Paulinus would try to bring them to battle in the typical Roman style, leaving their homelands undefended.

They would probably have expected at least one battle group to invade their territory so would have wanted to fight from prepared positions.

What they would not have allowed for was the Romans retreating.

Kind Regards - Theoderic
Deryk
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Deryk welcome to the endless debate, what happens over the next few days is entirely YOUR FAULT, we had managed to lay off for a few months......

As to your points, the main contenders in terms of this thread have been;

Silchester 56 miles
Paulerspury 61 miles
Dunstable 36.5 miles
Arbury 40 miles
Church Stowe 76 miles
High Cross 88 miles
Mancetter 109 miles
mileage according to the AA so a bit of flexibility built in

so only 2 or three fit the bill, so I'd say 50 miles is Nathan's way of ruling out the competition :twisted:

It also assumes the Brits were following the Roman roads, I'd prefer to see them forming up and drawing on more back up to the east and using alternative routes to advance to contact, rather than the "Roman Road Parade" that still seems to be the cornerstone of most campaign models. A deserted London and St Albans could just have been torched by satellite groups to the main force which stayed close to home.

The two army theory may be plausible and not one I had considered, but again gets me thinking about mustering a huge Brit force close to the battle site. The muster could have taken place over a couple of days or longer, even if the Brits were in one large group. The logistics of such a huge scratch force are hard to compute, but they would not have been efficient. For Church Stowe I'm speculating they formed up somewhere like Hunsbury Hill before proceeding en masse to the main event.

The Church Stowe scenario has the advantage of blocking a Roman threat from the North West to a move down the Nene and Ouse Vallies into the East Anglian territories, so such a location may be far from leaving the "homelands undefended". If anyone knows of pre-Roman transport corridors in this area I'd love to know a bit about them as I have previously gone off on one about the importance of the river network to the Brits. I have heard there is some work being done on that area as some sort of "common ground" between tribes for trade but have yet to see this published, I think it came out of a review of Portable Antiquities data. Certainly with Hunsbury Hill, Arbury Hill, Borough Hill and Castle Dykes there seems to be an excess of Iron Age Hill fort type things in the area and the area remains a strategic bottle neck to this day being effectively "Watford Gap".
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YAAY! It's back :twisted:

John, are you really suggesting that the logistic support for the united tribes is provenance for Watford Gap Services???? :wink: Big Grin
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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