Thread Rating:
  • 4 Vote(s) - 5 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
Quote:Aaah - seems I'm not understanding something here... If the legate was with the legion, and Postumus was with the legion too, why wasn't Postumus with the legate?

:unsure:
I am suggesting that the legate was with the main part of the legion in North Wales, while Postumus was in command of the veterans guarding the base fortress in Exeter, Gloucester or wherever it was.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Renatus wrote:

This is an assumption for which there is no evidence. We do not know the manner of Catus’ departure but I suspect that it was clandestine. His absence may not have been generally noticed for at least a couple of days and, even then, the reason may not have been realised. It might have been thought that he was ill or that he had been recalled to Rome or that he had gone to inspect some estate that was to be taken over or even that he had been summoned to see Paulinus for a dressing-down over some misdemeanours of his staff in the east of the province that the populace had only vaguely heard about. Some of the wealthy may have left, not with him but shortly afterwards, but this may well have depended upon their having somewhere to go: estates or relatives in the country, perhaps, or even in Gaul. However, some will almost certainly have stayed for the reasons that I suggested in an earlier post, in the same way that today there are those who refuse to move in the face of some impending natural disaster, such as a hurricane or forest fire. These are the ones, I suggest, who finally decided to leave with Paulinus.

You may well be right “like a thief in the night” springs to mind. Yet he would have left for a reason. Was it that Colchester could be seen to be burning from London, or ships passing perhaps saw the glow on the horizon or someone escaped or was it farther on when perhaps he got a message from Cerealis after his defeat?

Obviously we will never know but even if Catus used every subterfuge under the sun others would have known (I am talking about the rich and powerful here). You are correct in what you say about some staying but many would have gone. There must have been quite a few who perhaps did not understand the seriousness of the situation or who were waiting for Paulinus to arrive and defend them.

What we do know is that he accepted some into his column and I believe that he accepted many but as Tacitus say “Those who were chained to the spot by the weakness of their sex, or the infirmity of age, or the attractions of the place, were cut off by the enemy.”


Renatus wrote:

One may speculate about what caused Paulinus to accept civilians into his column. He may have been so appalled by the atrocities committed by the Britons that he was willing to protect as many as possible from a similar fate, provided, of course, that it did prejudice his strategic withdrawal.

I suspect that his motives were more practical; as I have suggested already, these people would be useful in the work of reconstruction after the suppression of the revolt.


You may be correct BUT and although I have tremendous admiration for Paulinus to be looking at reconstruction before you had actually got the Province back under control would have shown and incredible foresight.

Apart from the humanitarian reasons (which seems unlikely in that age) we still do not really know why he took these people with him.


Renatus wrote:

I’m sorry. I misunderstood you. However, in my own defence, I will set out your previous comments that led me into error:

Deryk wrote:
The Roman Army on the other hand like the Super Powers of today preferred to fight "toe to toe" and the difficulty (as in today's Afghanistan or the Iraq War) was actually getting the enemy to "stand and fight" mainly because the Romans always won because of superior weaponry and tactics.

The one way that the Romans could get people to fight them in a "battle" was to march onto the homelands of their enemies and destroy them until people came and fought them.

In AD60 they had been doing this for 17 years in Britain; the locals would have known this and perhaps we can see this in the way that the Ninth Legion were destroyed on the borders of the Iceni on their way to Colchester in a typical Brythonic ambush.

The Iceni and Trinovantes were prepared and I believe that they were expecting Seutonius Paulinus to march on them perhaps at Colchester and also at Thetford. For them to have marched on London would have left their own lands, which they had literally just taken back from the Roman State open to attack with no one there to defend them.


Deryk wrote:

I think that the very act of SP leaving triggered the attack on London as Pualinus realised it would due to its being undefended. Also the Brythons could leave their homelands because there was no longer a threat to their territories.

Deryk wrote:

To say that the Brythons were “hovering on the outskirts of London” is not my interpretation but that they were in fact defending their borders and ready to move to intercept his column/s on the march.

After 17 years of watching how the Romans operated (which was to march on an enemy’s territory to force them in a battle to defend it) the Brythons had changed their tactics to one of guerrilla fighting and siege warfare. They had obviously been successful at this as the Romans after 17 years still had not conquered the far West or the North . . . The Brythons were expecting the other Legions from the West to join Paulinus and march on their territories to exact revenge, as would have been a typical Roman tactic (exactly what the Ninth did).


Deryk wrote:

I still maintain that for the Iceni and the Trinovantes to have vacated their own homelands would have been suicide if the Ninth, Fourteenth and the Second had invaded from the North, East and South East.

Deryk wrote:

It was not the point of settling back to await retribution but take into account what the Romans normally did. Of course the Ninth did exactly that and SP would have also done so had the rest of his troops turned up.

OK point taken!!!!

I will try to clarify my position:

It is undeniable that the preferred Roman tactic was to fight one army against another and siege warfare. In this case (as you state) they would have gone for the army (horde) that attacked Colchester and would not have gone for the homelands. However that does not mean that the Roman Legions would not have marched through the Iceni and Trinovantes lands, in fact they would have little option.

The difficulty for the Romans was to get people to fight them on the battle field.

The point that I have been trying to make is that the Brythons weakness was the Roman’s strength. In battle the Romans were the best and typically the Brython’s got beaten every time. All their successes were when the Roman Army was not under full battle array. (As was proven in Anglesey and at the following battle with Boudica even when vastly outnumbered).

The successes for the Brythons were when the Roman’s were not expecting them (being on the march or building forts etc.) or in the case of capturing fortresses or towns a form of siege with superior numbers.

So as far as the Brythons were concerned, for them to be in a position where they would not have to face the might of the Roman Army but could ambush them on the march would have been ideal.

The other point about the Iceni leaving their own lands on their way to London via Colchester is that they would have been exposed to being surrounded by the Roman Legions.

Deryk wrote:

The other reason is that the Brythons tactics were more guerrilla tactics where they were highly successful in ambush and siege warfare not massed formations where they knew they were likely to get beaten.

Renatus wrote:

This is where I display my ignorance. Can you give me chapter and verse on this proposition? I am aware of Tacitus’ description of Ostorius Scapula’s campaigns against the Silures.

To back up my point I will use Tacitus – the Annals: “Then the army was marched against the Cangi; their territory was ravaged, spoil taken everywhere without the enemy venturing on an engagement, or if they attempted to harass our march by stealthy attacks, their cunning was always punished.

That Caractacus was only beaten in a fixed engagement speaks for itself

Renatus wrote:

That assumes that the Iceni came down Watling Street, which I doubt that they did.

Deryk wrote:

No reason to doubt that at all.

Renatus wrote:

There is every reason to doubt it. The sources give no hint of any such thing. Your contention, as I understand it, is that the Iceni cleared the Roman forces from their territory and then remained there while the Trinovantes attacked and destroyed Colchester.

Tacitus, in the Annals, describes the Iceni flying to arms in response to the outrages against the royal house and the nobility and rousing other tribes to regain their freedom. He then immediately moves on to the threat to Colchester and its eventual destruction, followed by the threat to London.

There is no suggestion that this was anything other than a continuous process in which the Iceni were involved throughout. In the Agricola, he describes the Britons discussing their woes, taking up arms under the command of Boudica and then, after dealing with the Roman forts, invading the “colony”, which can only be the territorium of Camulodunum.

Dio has Boudica rousing the Britons with two lengthy speeches and then leading her forces against the Romans, sacking and plundering two Roman cities. These can be identified from their descriptions in Paulinus’ speech to his troops as Colchester and London. None of this involves travelling down Watling Street.


The sources can be interpreted in a number of ways (as we have previously agreed).

Here is a scenario that might fit your concerns and fit the texts.

Boudica takes back the Iceni lands by capturing the Roman forts and the Trinovantes do the same. Boudica leaves part of her army to guard her borders and takes part of her army down to Colchester and meets up with the Trinovantes and they capture Colchester. The Ninth is ambushed by the Iceni on their borders by the army that Boudica left.

Boudica and the Trinovantes advance on Chelmsford retaking more of the Trinovantes territory leaving her first army to guard their northern flank.

Paulinus abandons London which releases Boudica’s army from the Iceni lands and this army now advances on St Albans (down the Icknield Way) whilst Boudica and the Trinovantes advance on London.

Boudica and the Trinovantes reach London from the East and Boudica’s other army reaches St Albans.

Both are destroyed.


Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
Reply
Quote:I am suggesting that the legate was with the main part of the legion in North Wales, while Postumus was in command of the veterans guarding the base fortress in Exeter, Gloucester or wherever it was.

Ah, righto, I see what you mean now - apologies for my confusion! Yes, we could imagine Postumus commanding a depot force in the west, perhaps, while the legate was away with the bulk of the legion in north Wales. That would explain a lot.

I do still prefer the idea that the entire Second were in the west, with their move eastwards intended as part of a coordinated three-pronged advance against the rebellion - this provides reason for Cerialis to be advancing with his force of the Ninth independently of Paulinus. He surely would not have done this without orders, and if it was merely an attempt to relieve Colchester Cerialis could not have been blamed for his haste!
Nathan Ross
Reply
Nathan Ross wrote:

I do still prefer the idea that the entire Second were in the west, with their move eastwards intended as part of a coordinated three-pronged advance against the rebellion - this provides reason for Cerialis to be advancing with his force of the Ninth independently of Paulinus. He surely would not have done this without orders, and if it was merely an attempt to relieve Colchester Cerialis could not have been blamed for his haste!

I agree that the Second would have been in the West. I also think that Paulinus would have gone for a three pronged attack the Ninth from the North, the Fourteenth from the West and the Second from the South West (via London). What I find it hard to understand is why the Ninth went so early or was that just a mistake by Cerealis?

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
Reply
Quote: . . . even if Catus used every subterfuge under the sun others would have known (I am talking about the rich and powerful here). You are correct in what you say about some staying but many would have gone. There must have been quite a few who perhaps did not understand the seriousness of the situation or who were waiting for Paulinus to arrive and defend them.
I think that we are in agreement!



Quote:You may be correct BUT and although I have tremendous admiration for Paulinus to be looking at reconstruction before you had actually got the Province back under control would have shown and incredible foresight.

Apart from the humanitarian reasons (which seems unlikely in that age) we still do not really know why he took these people with him.
Not “incredible foresight” but confidence. Paulinus would not have embarked on his withdrawal expecting to be defeated. He was determined to overcome the rebellion and, if (I suspect that he would have said, “when”) he was successful, he knew that there would be a tremendous task of reconstruction before him. Colchester was in ruins, London soon would be, and Verulamium may or may not have been in the same condition by then. He would need all the help he could get in the form of wealth and physical labour to put the pieces back together.




Quote:The sources can be interpreted in a number of ways (as we have previously agreed).

Here is a scenario that might fit your concerns and fit the texts.

Boudica takes back the Iceni lands by capturing the Roman forts and the Trinovantes do the same. Boudica leaves part of her army to guard her borders and takes part of her army down to Colchester and meets up with the Trinovantes and they capture Colchester. The Ninth is ambushed by the Iceni on their borders by the army that Boudica left.

Boudica and the Trinovantes advance on Chelmsford retaking more of the Trinovantes territory leaving her first army to guard their northern flank.

Paulinus abandons London which releases Boudica’s army from the Iceni lands and this army now advances on St Albans (down the Icknield Way) whilst Boudica and the Trinovantes advance on London.

Boudica and the Trinovantes reach London from the East and Boudica’s other army reaches St Albans.

Both are destroyed.
There are difficulties with this scenario. First, according to Tacitus, Cerialis’ legion was routed by the victorious Britons (or, more accurately, ‘the victorious Briton’ (victor Britannus)) as he advanced to the relief of Colchester, immediately after the storming of the Temple of Claudius. The context implies that the same Britons were involved in both events. Secondly, you have previously argued that the most direct route for the Iceni returning to their homelands from London was through Braughing and Bartlow and on to the Icknield Way. Assuming that the army that had been guarding the Icenian border was also making for London, it would presumably take the same route in reverse. This would not take it anywhere near St Albans. Thirdly, there is the time element. If the Iceni and Trinovantes were holding back on their borders until they learned that London had been evacuated, it would take them several days to get to the town, by which time Paulinus would be long gone and well out of reach. Dio states explicitly and it may be inferred from Tacitus that, when Paulinus decided to stand and fight despite his inadequate numbers, the Britons were hard on his heels or, at least, close behind him. This could not have happened if there had been any delay in the rebels reaching London and then proceeding after him.




Quote:I do still prefer the idea that the entire Second were in the west
While this is possible (indeed much of the preceding discussion has assumed this to be the case), there is the problem of the whereabouts of the legate and the tribunus laticlavius. If they were with Paulinus as members of his staff, this would imply that the situation in the south-west was sufficiently peaceful to permit the third-in-command to be left in charge of the legion. This, in turn, would dispose of one of the reasons sometimes put forward to explain Postumus’ inaction, namely, the fear of an uprising of the south-western tribes.




Quote:I do still prefer the idea that the entire Second were in the west, with their move eastwards intended as part of a coordinated three-pronged advance against the rebellion - this provides reason for Cerialis to be advancing with his force of the Ninth independently of Paulinus. He surely would not have done this without orders, and if it was merely an attempt to relieve Colchester Cerialis could not have been blamed for his haste!

Quote:I agree that the Second would have been in the West. I also think that Paulinus would have gone for a three pronged attack the Ninth from the North, the Fourteenth from the West and the Second from the South West (via London). What I find it hard to understand is why the Ninth went so early or was that just a mistake by Cerealis?
In a rapidly changing situation, with troops hundreds of miles apart, co-ordinating such a three-pronged attack would be immensely difficult. Messages can be carried on horseback extraordinarily quickly, if circumstances demand and if there are sufficient remounts and relief riders available, but there is always the danger that they will be out of date by the time that they are delivered. It is quite possible that Cerialis could have left to relieve Colchester before any message from Paulinus informing him of his plans arrived. It is not surprising that Cerialis should take this action without orders from Paulinus. It was probably his responsibility to protect the eastern part of the province anyway but his was the legion closest to Colchester and the situation was desperate, so he acted on his own initiative. Tacitus criticizes him, not for his haste, but for his temeritas which means ‘rashness’, ‘thoughtlessness’ or ‘foolhardiness’. What form this took is not explained but one may infer that it included his charging bull-headed into action without making a proper appreciation of the situation and, probably, taking only half his legion with him; after all, when the crisis was over, it took only 2000 men to bring the Ninth up to strength. Such action is typical of Cerialis. He is one of the more colourful of the Roman commanders and there are several instances in Tacitus’ Histories of his rashness getting him into difficulties. Usually, he managed to extricate himself and his troops by a combination of personal courage, charisma and luck; this seems to be one occasion when his luck deserted him.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
We seem to have a number of conflicting arguments going on here:

Renatus wrote:

There are difficulties with this scenario. First, according to Tacitus, Cerialis’ legion was routed by the victorious Britons (or, more accurately, ‘the victorious Briton’ (victor Britannus)) as he advanced to the relief of Colchester, immediately after the storming of the Temple of Claudius.

It seems that this is again down to interpretation. (Also it might be useful if we were both using the same translation)


Tacitus:

“The temple held out, but, after a siege of two days, was taken by storm. Petilius Cerealis, who commanded the ninth legion, marched to the relief of the place. The Britons, flushed with success, advanced to give him battle. The legion was put to the rout, and the infantry cut to pieces.”

Or Tacitus

“The victorious enemy met Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, as he was coming to the rescue, routed his troops, and destroyed all his infantry. Cerialis escaped with some cavalry into the camp, and was saved by its fortifications.”


I think that both of our interpretations could be accommodated by the above translations. The interesting point is the reference to “Cerialis escaped with some cavalry into the camp, and was saved by its fortifications.”

Which camp was this? Was it near Colchester? In my interpretation it would have been Wixoe or perhaps Great Chesterford.

Renatus wrote:

The context implies that the same Britons were involved in both events. Secondly, you have previously argued that the most direct route for the Iceni returning to their homelands from London was through Braughing and Bartlow and on to the Icknield Way. Assuming that the army that had been guarding the Icenian border was also making for London, it would presumably take the same route in reverse. This would not take it anywhere near St Albans.

I think that you have taken a concept out of context. You are correct in that I said the quickest route home for the Iceni from London was via Braughing and it is. In this case however I am saying that Boudica’s other army went to St Albans instead of going to London via the Icknield way. This would also have had the effect of cutting off SP if he had gone up Watling Street. (Boudica of course in this scenario is advancing on London with the Trinovantes)

The other point is that if SP left to the West and the Brythons followed him towards Staines who burned St Albans?


Renatus wrote:


Thirdly, there is the time element. If the Iceni and Trinovantes were holding back on their borders until they learned that London had been evacuated, it would take them several days to get to the town, by which time Paulinus would be long gone and well out of reach.

Dio states explicitly and it may be inferred from Tacitus that, when Paulinus decided to stand and fight despite his inadequate numbers, the Britons were hard on his heels or, at least, close behind him. This could not have happened if there had been any delay in the rebels reaching London and then proceeding after him.


This does not seem to fit with your previous arguments. For your previous timescales to work and for SP to arrive in London before the Brythons you have consistently said that the “Horde” travelled at around 5 miles every two days.

If SP left with his refugees they would have travelled at least 10 miles per day. We understand from Tacitus that the Brythons destroyed London and this would have delayed them for at least 2 days. SP would have been far away by the time the Brythons left London and would increase the distance between them as time went on.

I believe that what both historians imply is that instead of stopping at London as SP expected they continued to follow him. This is in fact what you have maintained that London had the riches and food to satisfy the Brythons.

Dio

“But as he grew short of food and the barbarians pressed relentlessly upon him, he was compelled, contrary to his judgment, to engage them.”

Tacitus

“The fourteenth legion, with the veterans of the twentieth, and the auxiliaries from the
adjacent stations, having joined Suetonius, his army amounted to little less than ten
thousand men. Thus reinforced, he resolved, without loss of time, to bring on a decisive action.”

Tacitus particularly relies on the point that the Fourteenth was reinforced by veterans of the Twentieth and the auxiliaries and because he had a bigger army he had the men to fight the Brythons.

Renatus wrote:

In a rapidly changing situation, with troops hundreds of miles apart, co-ordinating such a three-pronged attack would be immensely difficult. Messages can be carried on horseback extraordinarily quickly, if circumstances demand and if there are sufficient remounts and relief riders available, but there is always the danger that they will be out of date by the time that they are delivered. It is quite possible that Cerialis could have left to relieve Colchester before any message from Paulinus informing him of his plans arrived. It is not surprising that Cerialis should take this action without orders from Paulinus. It was probably his responsibility to protect the eastern part of the province anyway but his was the legion closest to Colchester and the situation was desperate, so he acted on his own initiative. Tacitus criticizes him, not for his haste, but for his temeritas which means ‘rashness’, ‘thoughtlessness’ or ‘foolhardiness’. What form this took is not explained but one may infer that it included his charging bull-headed into action without making a proper appreciation of the situation and, probably, taking only half his legion with him; after all, when the crisis was over, it took only 2000 men to bring the Ninth up to strength. Such action is typical of Cerialis. He is one of the more colourful of the Roman commanders and there are several instances in Tacitus’ Histories of his rashness getting him into difficulties. Usually, he managed to extricate himself and his troops by a combination of personal courage, charisma and luck; this seems to be one occasion when his luck deserted him.

I would agree with that but I also agree with Nathan that SP’s plan depended on the Ninth being part of his battle group against the Brythons.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
Reply
Quote:In a rapidly changing situation, with troops hundreds of miles apart, co-ordinating such a three-pronged attack would be immensely difficult.


Hmm, very good point. I've used a similar argument against the idea that Paulinus would have ordered the Second to join him somewhere in the Midlands... But all our scenarios, I think, rely to some degree on a level of long-distance strategic coordination. With the rebellion erupting in East Anglia, would it be so difficult for Paulinus to order Cerialis to move towards Colchester and the Second (or whatever was available of their strength) to march on London and wait there until he arrived?


Quote:Tacitus criticizes him, not for his haste, but for his temeritas which means ‘rashness’, ‘thoughtlessness’ or ‘foolhardiness’.

Thanks - another useful clarification. But yes, I think a foolhardy dash is our best interpretation here. Either Cerialis was intended to join Paulinus on his march south, or keep pace with him in a combined advance. By dashing on ahead (to try and grab the glory for himself?) he left himself, and Paulinus' eastern flank, fatally exposed.


Quote:It seems that this is again down to interpretation. (Also it might be useful if we were both using the same translation)

With so much hinging on a single word, I think Michael's strategy of going back to original latin is the best option here. Tacitus says 'the victorious Briton' - so the same people as conquered Colchester defeated Cerialis. Unless the singular refers to 'the victorious British people', perhaps? :-|


Quote:Which camp was this? Was it near Colchester? In my interpretation it would have been Wixoe or perhaps Great Chesterford.

We're assumed that Cerialis was too rash to build marching camps in his advance against an enemy in the field! If he did (and it was usual practice, after all), then the camp in question could have been his own fortification. Warned of an approaching enemy, he deployed his force in front of the camp, but the infantry was overwhelmed and only the cavalry managed to make it back inside the fortifications. If this is the case, the camp could have been anywhere along the road - close to Colchester is most likely.


Quote:you have consistently said that the “Horde” travelled at around 5 miles every two days.

To be fair, that was only my suggestion I think. And the 5 miles per two days was just a low figure, I didn't mean that was their usual marching pace. They weren't an army, is the point - so didn't have a 'usual' marching pace!

Incidentally - question for Michael, returning slightly to the original purpose of this thread: you've mentioned that you favour a site to the west of London, but east of Silchester. So did I, at one point, but lengthy scanning of OS and terrain maps all along the route of the Portway failed to turn up any locations that match the topography as described in Tacitus. There's Virginia Water, but the ground is wet and covered in streams, and a place east of Crowthorne, but it's very tenuous. Can you find an alternative? ;-)
Nathan Ross
Reply
Quote:
[quote="Renatus" post=323615] Incidentally - question for Michael, returning slightly to the original purpose of this thread: you've mentioned that you favour a site to the west of London, but east of Silchester. So did I, at one point, but lengthy scanning of OS and terrain maps all along the route of the Portway failed to turn up any locations that match the topography as described in Tacitus. There's Virginia Water, but the ground is wet and covered in streams, and a place east of Crowthorne, but it's very tenuous. Can you find an alternative? ;-)

Barossa? RMAS training ground...


(and do I win the fewest words in a response award??? :whistle: )
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
Reply
Quote:do I win the fewest words in a response award???


Yes*
Nathan Ross
Reply
*(but now I do... :twisted: )


Meanwhile:
Quote:Barossa? RMAS training ground...

Pretty close to there, actually...

Crowthorne/New England Hill

It's far from perfect, rather stream-ey, lacks easy water supply, not much of a 'plain'... But it's the closest thing to a 'defile' between Virginia Water and Silchester...
Nathan Ross
Reply
Quote: It seems that this is again down to interpretation. (Also it might be useful if we were both using the same translation)


Tacitus:

“The temple held out, but, after a siege of two days, was taken by storm. Petilius Cerealis, who commanded the ninth legion, marched to the relief of the place. The Britons, flushed with success, advanced to give him battle. The legion was put to the rout, and the infantry cut to pieces.”

Or Tacitus

“The victorious enemy met Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, as he was coming to the rescue, routed his troops, and destroyed all his infantry. Cerialis escaped with some cavalry into the camp, and was saved by its fortifications.”
Better still that we work from the Latin and make as literal a translation as possible. This minimizes the danger of our interpretations being influenced by any glosses or bias on the part of the translator.

In this case, the Latin reads as follows:

templum, in quo se miles conglobaverat, biduo obsessum expugnatumque. et victor Britannus Petilio Ceriali, legato legionis nonae, in subsidium adventati obvius, fudit legionem, et quod peditum interfecit: Cerialis cum equitibus evasit in castra et munimentis defensus est.

This translates literally as:

‘The temple, in which the soldier had gathered himself, [was] besieged for two days and taken by storm. And the victorious Briton, with Petilius Cerialis, legate of the Ninth Legion, pressing forward in relief, meeting [him] routed the legion and slew those who were infantry: Cerialis with the cavalry escaped into a camp and was protected by the ramparts.’



Quote:The interesting point is the reference to “Cerialis escaped with some cavalry into the camp, and was saved by its fortifications.”

Which camp was this? Was it near Colchester? In my interpretation it would have been Wixoe or perhaps Great Chesterford.
This is a mystery. I am sure that I have read one interpretation that suggested that he was pursued right back to his base fortress, which seems nonsense to me. Castra is plural, which implies a camp, rather than a fort. I am not sure of the nature of the sites that you mention. I have thought that Cerialis made it back to his last marching camp and that the rampart and ditch had not been slighted, so would provide some protection. It is possible that the Britons did not actually pursue him that far and that the idea that the rampart protected him is simply rhetoric. Alternatively, it is likely that any pursuing force would have been cavalry only and, if it did follow him as far as the camp, it may be that he actually outnumbered it at that point, so it did not press home an attack on the camp.



Quote:I think that you have taken a concept out of context. You are correct in that I said the quickest route home for the Iceni from London was via Braughing and it is. In this case however I am saying that Boudica’s other army went to St Albans instead of going to London via the Icknield way. This would also have had the effect of cutting off SP if he had gone up Watling Street. (Boudica of course in this scenario is advancing on London with the Trinovantes)

The other point is that if SP left to the West and the Brythons followed him towards Staines who burned St Albans?
I was assuming that Boudica’s “other army”, when released from the necessity of defending the homeland, would proceed to London to join the main horde. What is your precise suggestion? That it travelled along the Icknield Way to Dunstable and then down Watling Street to St. Albans or, perhaps, that it branched off the Icknield Way direct to St. Albans, thereby cutting out Watling Street altogether? What was its objective? Specifically to attack Verulamium or was that merely incidental to some other purpose?

Who burned St. Albans? It could have been a local rising. It could have been the local tribe eliminating Roman influence within its territory before joining the revolt. It could have been a breakaway group from the main horde. There are several possibilities.



Quote:This does not seem to fit with your previous arguments. For your previous timescales to work and for SP to arrive in London before the Brythons you have consistently said that the “Horde” travelled at around 5 miles every two days.

If SP left with his refugees they would have travelled at least 10 miles per day. We understand from Tacitus that the Brythons destroyed London and this would have delayed them for at least 2 days. SP would have been far away by the time the Brythons left London and would increase the distance between them as time went on.

I believe that what both historians imply is that instead of stopping at London as SP expected they continued to follow him. This is in fact what you have maintained that London had the riches and food to satisfy the Brythons.
I have never suggested that the horde travelled at a rate of five miles per two days; that was Nathan. I said that oxen travel at a rate of 2 m.p.h. and work for a maximum of five hours a day. That said, it is strange that Paulinus was not able to outstrip the rebels. It is possible that he only just got out of London in time and that the Britons did not waste as much time as he hoped in plundering the town. Even so, he should still have been able to maintain a distance between them. I wonder if there is something that we are not being told.


Quote:Tacitus

“The fourteenth legion, with the veterans of the twentieth, and the auxiliaries from the
adjacent stations, having joined Suetonius, his army amounted to little less than ten
thousand men. Thus reinforced, he resolved, without loss of time, to bring on a decisive action.”

Tacitus particularly relies on the point that the Fourteenth was reinforced by veterans of the Twentieth and the auxiliaries and because he had a bigger army he had the men to fight the Brythons.
Goodness knows where you got this translation. The Latin reads:

Iam Suetonio quarta decima legio cum vexillariis vicesimanis et [e] proximis auxiliares, decem ferme milia armatorum, erant, cum omittere cunctationem et congredi acie parat.

A literal translation would be:

‘At this time with Suetonius were the Fourteenth Legion with the veterans of the Twentieth and auxiliaries from the nearest [forts], almost ten thousand troops, when he decided to abandon delay and engage in battle.’

Apart from the auxiliaries, who appear to be recent additions to the force and whose numbers we do not know, there is nothing to suggest that Paulinus had been significantly reinforced.




Quote:But all our scenarios, I think, rely to some degree on a level of long-distance strategic coordination. With the rebellion erupting in East Anglia, would it be so difficult for Paulinus to order Cerialis to move towards Colchester and the Second (or whatever was available of their strength) to march on London and wait there until he arrived?
Perhaps I was over-interpreting the concept of a three-pronged attack. It is certainly possible to order that forces rendezvous at a particular point. It was the thought of three forces homing in on the rebel band from three different directions and all arriving at the right spot at the right time that caused me concern.




Quote:With so much hinging on a single word, I think Michael's strategy of going back to original latin is the best option here. Tacitus says 'the victorious Briton' - so the same people as conquered Colchester defeated Cerialis. Unless the singular refers to 'the victorious British people', perhaps? :-|
Thank you. General translations are fine for getting the basic story but, if you need to consider detail, you have to go back to the Latin (I wonder if you can still get old-fashioned cribs like Brodie’s Classical Translations, which should, in theory, be closer to the original). One of Deryk’s translations above is a case in point. The simple victor becomes ‘flushed with success’. (Strictly speaking, victor and Britannus are nouns in apposition, ‘the victor Briton’, but my dictionary considers that, in such circumstances, ‘victorious’ is acceptable.)



Quote: We're assumed that Cerialis was too rash to build marching camps in his advance against an enemy in the field! If he did (and it was usual practice, after all), then the camp in question could have been his own fortification.
Great minds think alike!



Quote: Incidentally - question for Michael, returning slightly to the original purpose of this thread: you've mentioned that you favour a site to the west of London, but east of Silchester. So did I, at one point, but lengthy scanning of OS and terrain maps all along the route of the Portway failed to turn up any locations that match the topography as described in Tacitus. There's Virginia Water, but the ground is wet and covered in streams, and a place east of Crowthorne, but it's very tenuous. Can you find an alternative? ;-)
Can you recommend a decent physical map in which the contour lines are not obscured by development?



Quote:Barossa? RMAS training ground...
Do you have a map or is it top secret?
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Quote:Can you recommend a decent physical map in which the contour lines are not obscured by development?

Development's pretty thin in this area. Unless Moi has a secret map (!), the Bing OS map I linked above is your best bet. Barossa lies south-west of the position I've indicated, I think, from the 'Danger Area' south to Sandhurst itself. It's hilly country, but as far as I can see all the valleys decline to the south-west, so face away from the potential approaching British force.

The gap between New England Hill and Surrey Hill, where the road rises onto the high ground, looks like the only suitable position (Rapley Lake is 19th century, by the way) - but I'd be interested in alternatives. You're looking for a defile at least 500m wide with rising ground to either side, either on or close to the Roman road and opening onto a flattish area in the direction of London, I'd say.

Good luck! :grin:
Nathan Ross
Reply
Quote:If SP left with his refugees they would have travelled at least 10 miles per day. We understand from Tacitus that the Brythons destroyed London and this would have delayed them for at least 2 days. SP would have been far away by the time the Brythons left London and would increase the distance between them as time went on.

Ah, but only if Paulinus was retreating at a constant speed, and the Britons were pursuing constantly too. The rebels may have 'pressed upon him' (Dio) in a static position, or a succession of them, while he waited for reinforcements. If I'm right about Paulinus using a 'Fabian' delay strategy, he would have needed to stay close to the rebel army, counting on his superior speed to pull back ahead of them if he needed to. This doesn't mean he was fleeing away from them the whole time though.

Here's my current hypothesis:

Stage 1: Paulinus leaves London with refugees and withdraws 19 miles to St Albans. He remains here for several days, waiting for reinforcement along Akeman street from the west. The Iceni are plundering London and the surrounding area.

Stage 2: The Iceni get their collective act together and move north against St Albans. Paulinus, realising that reinforcements aren't coming from the west and unable to hold St Albans, withdraws again 9 miles to Dunstable. He takes up a new position there and waits. He could still be reinforced along the Iknield Way, possibly by the remains of Cerialis' force.

Stage 3: After a few days, the Iceni finish plundering St Albans and once again move north. Paulinus recognises that if he doesn't hold the Chiltern ridge he'll be pushed back into the Midlands. With the rebels approaching from the south, he resolves to stop delaying, marches a mile south himself and takes up a position in the saddle north-east of Kensworth. The battle takes place there.
Nathan Ross
Reply
Quote:


Vindex post=323653 Wrote:Barossa? RMAS training ground...
Do you have a map or is it top secret?

It is still (painfully) etched on my subconscious (and parts of my body!!!) so I don't need a map Tongue

But I'll go and see if I can find the 1:25000 that I used to have.
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
Reply
Nathan wrote:

With so much hinging on a single word, I think Michael's strategy of going back to original latin is the best option here. Tacitus says 'the victorious Briton' - so the same people as conquered Colchester defeated Cerialis. Unless the singular refers to 'the victorious British people', perhaps?

I do agree with you about having a translation down to the Latin. Sadly my linguistic skills are limited (in the extreme – amo, amas, amat) so I may have to butt out at some stage.


Nathan wrote:

We're assumed that Cerialis was too rash to build marching camps in his advance against an enemy in the field! If he did (and it was usual practice, after all), then the camp in question could have been his own fortification. Warned of an approaching enemy, he deployed his force in front of the camp, but the infantry was overwhelmed and only the cavalry managed to make it back inside the fortifications. If this is the case, the camp could have been anywhere along the road - close to Colchester is most likely.

I think that both Nathan and Renatus are spot on here. Of course it makes the most sense. Well done both of you.


Nathan wrote:

To be fair, that was only my suggestion I think. And the 5 miles per two days was just a low figure, I didn't mean that was their usual marching pace. They weren't an army, is the point - so didn't have a 'usual' marching pace!

Typically hordes of this size moved at around 5 - 10 miles per day rather than the 5 miles that you have indicated every two days. If it was just to point out that they would have been slower than the Roman Army (15 – 20 miles per day (25 miles if pushed) I can support that.

I think it would be a mistake to assume that the Brythons could not travel faster. War bands would have been able to travel much faster and we shouldn’t dismiss their mounted and chariot warriors. In earlier battles the Brythons were credited with thousands of chariots and there is no reason to think that this was not the case at this time either.

So parts of the Horde could have moved very quickly.

Renatus wrote:

Better still that we work from the Latin and make as literal a translation as possible. This minimizes the danger of our interpretations being influenced by any glosses or bias on the part of the translator.

In this case, the Latin reads as follows:

templum, in quo se miles conglobaverat, biduo obsessum expugnatumque. et victor Britannus Petilio Ceriali, legato legionis nonae, in subsidium adventati obvius, fudit legionem, et quod peditum interfecit: Cerialis cum equitibus evasit in castra et munimentis defensus est.

This translates literally as:

‘The temple, in which the soldier had gathered himself, [was] besieged for two days and taken by storm. And the victorious Briton, with Petilius Cerialis, legate of the Ninth Legion, pressing forward in relief, meeting [him] routed the legion and slew those who were infantry: Cerialis with the cavalry escaped into a camp and was protected by the ramparts.’

Regarding the Translation – totally agree but as I said earlier my understanding of Latin is limited and I only have the translations that are generally available.

I think that as Nathan says “the victorius Briton” could refer to the whole of the Brythons but the point is debateable.

Renatus wrote:

This is a mystery. I am sure that I have read one interpretation that suggested that he was pursued right back to his base fortress, which seems nonsense to me. Castra is plural, which implies a camp, rather than a fort. I am not sure of the nature of the sites that you mention. I have thought that Cerialis made it back to his last marching camp and that the rampart and ditch had not been slighted, so would provide some protection. It is possible that the Britons did not actually pursue him that far and that the idea that the rampart protected him is simply rhetoric. Alternatively, it is likely that any pursuing force would have been cavalry only and, if it did follow him as far as the camp, it may be that he actually outnumbered it at that point, so it did not press home an attack on the camp.

Good point – wish I had considered it!!! Well done to both you and Nathan!

Renatus wrote:

I was assuming that Boudica’s “other army”, when released from the necessity of defending the homeland, would proceed to London to join the main horde. What is your precise suggestion? That it travelled along the Icknield Way to Dunstable and then down Watling Street to St. Albans or, perhaps, that it branched off the Icknield Way direct to St. Albans, thereby cutting out Watling Street altogether? What was its objective? Specifically to attack Verulamium or was that merely incidental to some other purpose?

Who burned St. Albans? It could have been a local rising. It could have been the local tribe eliminating Roman influence within its territory before joining the revolt. It could have been a breakaway group from the main horde. There are several possibilities.

A number of people have suggested that St Albans was equally as an important target to the Iceni as Colchester or London. It was after all a municipium since around AD50 in effect Roman through and through as would have been the inhabitants. It would also have had wealth and food a great attraction and something Roman to be driven out.

There were a number of towns that were overtly Roman with Roman citizens in residence Colchester, London, St Albans and Silchester and all appear to have been burnt around this time.

I cannot see a reason why it is not feasible that the second army would not have marched down the Icknield Way to Dunstable and then to St Albans.

Where they went after that is debateable.

Renatus wrote:

I have never suggested that the horde travelled at a rate of five miles per two days; that was Nathan. I said that oxen travel at a rate of 2 m.p.h. and work for a maximum of five hours a day. That said, it is strange that Paulinus was not able to outstrip the rebels.

It is possible that he only just got out of London in time and that the Britons did not waste as much time as he hoped in plundering the town. Even so, he should still have been able to maintain a distance between them. I wonder if there is something that we are not being told.


I am not sure that we are interpreting this correctly (back to the original translation I expect). My interpretation is that the Brythons were continuing to pursue SP relentlessly. In other words they may not have been fast BUT they weren’t stopping and were obviously after more than loot. I don’t think that they were that close necessarily.

If the Brythons were travelling at 5 – 10 miles a day at this time, SP (as Nathan states) would have been able to control the “chase” from the front.

This is totally off the wall but could of SP feigned a complete withdrawal from the Province by taking the refugees? It would look like Rome was giving up all together in the face of the uprising? Or is that a bit too subtle?


Renatus wrote:

Goodness knows where you got this translation. The Latin reads:

Iam Suetonio quarta decima legio cum vexillariis vicesimanis et [e] proximis auxiliares, decem ferme milia armatorum, erant, cum omittere cunctationem et congredi acie parat.

A literal translation would be:

‘At this time with Suetonius were the Fourteenth Legion with the veterans of the Twentieth and auxiliaries from the nearest [forts], almost ten thousand troops, when he decided to abandon delay and engage in battle.’

Apart from the auxiliaries, who appear to be recent additions to the force and whose numbers we do not know, there is nothing to suggest that Paulinus had been significantly reinforced.


Again I am of the opinion that the Twentieth were not with SP in Anglesey – so I will pass on this.

Nathan wrote:

Ah, but only if Paulinus was retreating at a constant speed, and the Britons were pursuing constantly too. The rebels may have 'pressed upon him' (Dio) in a static position, or a succession of them, while he waitied for reinforcements. If I'm right about Paulinus using a 'Fabian' delay strategy, he would have needed to stay close to the rebel army, counting on his superior speed to pull back ahead of them if he needed to. This doesn't mean he was fleeing away from them the whole time though.

Here's my current hypothesis:

Stage 1: Paulinus leaves London with refugees and withdraws 19 miles to St Albans. He remains here for several days, waiting for reinforcement along Akeman street from the west. The Iceni are plundering London and the surrounding area.

Stage 2: The Iceni get their collective act together and move north against St Albans. Paulinus, realising that reinforcements aren't coming from the west and unable to hold St Albans, withdraws again 9 miles to Dunstable. He takes up a new position there and waits. He could still be reinforced along the Iknield Way, possibly by the remains of Cerialis' force.

Stage 3: After a few days, the Iceni finish plundering St Albans and once again move north. Paulinus recognises that if he doesn't hold the Chiltern ridge he'll be pushed back into the Midlands. With the rebels approaching from the south, he resolves to stop delaying, marches a mile south himself and takes up a position in the saddle north-east of Kensworth. The battle takes place there.


Your point that Paulinus controls the chase is well made and one that I can support.

I quite like Dunstable as a site (although not as defensible as Cunetio)

I always feel that the Watling Street scenario is made because it is a way to explain the destruction of St Albans however any destruction of St Albans does need some explaining.

(If we were looking at a scorched earth policy by SP this would also fit)

The use of Akeman Street to obtain re-inforcements from the Twentieth (based at Cirencester / Bath) works as well for me and possibly local auxiliaries from the forts on Watling Street.

I think that there was more chance of a second Iceni force coming down the Icknield Way and arriving in SPs rear rather than Cerealis and his force who was bottled up like a number of other forts in the area.

I have always wondered why a force was not sent to get Cerealis so either it wasn’t known where he was or he was guarded. The latter seems the obvious choice as I cannot see him staying put otherwise.

Of course if SP went West Cerealis would be on his own.

I have to say that one of the major points against going up Watling Street is the refugees. They simply would have wanted to run away from the war not by pass it.

So for me it still has to be a Westward journey with a “just out of reach” small army with its tail between its legs, loaded with civilians leaving the country – followed by an exulting host who were soon to be badly disillusioned.

A clever ploy to lead the Brythons to their deaths.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
Reply


Possibly Related Threads…
Thread Author Replies Views Last Post
  Armchair Wall walking mcbishop 3 3,483 01-11-2012, 03:22 AM
Last Post: Vindex

Forum Jump: