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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
I think now is my opportunity to present another theory which, taking everything into account from Ogbourne St. George to Mancetter, narrows down the search sites. More to follow.
Davidus
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Thanks for the summary of Hoffmann, Michael. It sounds refreshingly open-minded and sceptical, which I like - anything which loosens the screws a bit and allows for some contrary interpretations is always welcome.


Quote:She expresses some doubt that the rebel army operated as a single unit, describing this as "at best a good guess".

True. There must have been other rebel groups around, or Paulinus's 'mopping up' operations wouldn't have stretched on into the winter season. We could perhaps imagine quite a lengthy rebel occupation of the London and Colchester areas, with smaller bands spreading in all directions to plunder and forage...


Quote:She points out that there is little evidence of destruction at Verulamium

I have a (quite self-serving) theory that Tacitus only mentioned Verulamium because his source mentioned it (neither T nor his readers will have been that aware of British geography). And his source mentioned it because... it was either important in Paulinus's strategic planning or very close to the site of the final battle, or both... :whistle:


Quote:She comments, " . . . an open mind may well be a valuable asset for future researchers."

Sure enough!


Quote:I think now is my opportunity to present another theory...

The suspense... Confusedmile:
Nathan Ross
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Quote:She suggests that the sacking of Colchester may have taken some time and that, as fragments of Claudius' equestrian statue have been found in two places in East Anglia, some at least of the rebels may have had time to return home.

This is an interesting point to pick up on - I like the idea of the rebels dismembering the emperor's statue and carrying off bits of it as trophies! The fragments mentioned here are (presumably) the bronze head found in a river at Saxmundham, Essex, and the bit of a bronze hoof found at Ashill, Norfolk. We could also perhaps add the pieces of segmentata hinge found in a hoard at Santon in Thetford forest, not far from Ashill - combined they might represent the spread of battle loot from the fall of Colchester and perhaps also the defeat of Cerealis.

However, identification of these bits and pieces is not certain. This article - Claudius, oh aye?! - questions the identification of the bronze head and its links to the hoof. Incidentally, the Professor Haverfield mentioned in the article as the first to declare the head as Claudius is the same person who originally came up with the 'cavalry dash' theory later adopted by Webster...

The segmenta hinge comes from a hoard that includes British metal-working tools, so perhaps was just a bit of broken old armour acquired by the natives as scrap.

But if this was battle plunder, the spread might explain why the rebels took so long to reach London after sacking Colchester.
Nathan Ross
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But if this was battle plunder, the spread might explain why the rebels took so long to reach London after sacking Colchester.
or that most of them went home and few popped down to do London Wink

Thanks for the Oh Aye link, seems applicable to a lot of accepted wisdom on this topic
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Here's a diversionary tactic for Legio II
See Hamm Hill, Somerset. On this site.
Davidus
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Renatus wrote:

I agree with virtually everything that Nathan has said. Dividing one's force against an eventuality that may never come and having each division separated from the others by high ground (especially with Hastoe Hill between Divisions I and 2) is a recipe for disaster. A single force with its left and right flanks anchored on Coombe Hill and Hastoe Hill respectively fits the topography and Tacitus' description exactly

In my opinion the problem with coming out of one valley into a host of this size is that the smaller force will be absorbed unless there is a thin line of opposition and patently that cannot be the case unless there is another force affecting the warriors that causes a disruption to the Brythons attack.

Nathan wrote:

Your camps still appear to be on very uneven ground! Don't see much of a water supply either (and for a camp that might be occupied for some days, that's a problem...)

If you go on to Google Earth and look at the area some of the ground is sloping but the vast majority appears to be useable for camps although I have not visited the area myself so any local knowledge would be useful.

Regarding water supply, this whole area is based on a major aquifer and there are springs to this day all around (Dancers End, Tring Park, the Crong) and there appear to be ancient reservoirs on the high grounds.

The River Bulbourne rises opposite the plateau and SP may well have collected water from here and contaminated that supply so the Brythons had to travel farther for their supplies.

In either case I don’t see this as an issue.

Regarding the Divisions, I am afraid that we are destined to differ here.

I admit that I am not a military man and certainly take your points on board and I am only having a stab at what I think might have happened and am prepared to modify my early thoughts on the advice of others.

Of course, on the day, SP would have had to react to what the Brythons did in answer to his moves so in reality anything that I say about the battle is pure deduction from the texts.

I am grateful that you acknowledge that the site is feasible however flawed my interpretation of the battle maybe.

From the texts it is obvious that the Brython’s baggage train partially blocks the exit from the battle site itself.

I think that this in itself needs some explanation apart from the statement from Tacitus about people wanting to see the battle.

I think that the Brythons camped along the routes that they travelled to the site much as we would today (Akeman Street and the Icknield Way) and around the water sources at Bulbourne and Wendover.

It would have formed in a natural way and therefore unique to the sites so far gives an idea of where the camp might have logically occurred.

This camp would have been huge if we accept only Tacitus description that 80,000 Brythons were killed which as many escaped according to Tacitus, would seem to imply that Dio may well not have been as inaccurate as it seems at the outset.

This huge camp would in effect have cut off many fleeing warriors as described but it also becomes a liability to the Brythons as you have intimated previously.

Their camp becomes a weak point because it has to be defended if the tide of battle goes against the Brythons and would cause chaos in the fighting forces.

Seutonius Paulinus probably would have seen this weakness and planned his attack accordingly.

If we keep the sequence of events simple rather than trying to second guess counter attacks etc. perhaps the following works better:

By bringing Division 1 into play down Valley 1 would have attracted the Brythons to attack and stop them. This Division could have been made up of some 4,500 men in close order across the 900 yard valley 5 rows deep with the legionaries in the centre and the auxiliaries on the wings.

By SP then releasing Division 2 down Valley 2 from the plateau at Hastoe, in the same configuration, the Brythons would be forced to confront them across a 700 yard valley (to prevent their camp from being attacked) again with the Roman Division being 5 rows deep.

Both the Divisions combined would be made up of 8,000 infantry leaving the cavalry and 2 cohorts of mounted Batavians that made up the mounted Division 3 based on the heights at Wiggington possibly with 2,000 horse held out of site of the Brythons.

I think that SP was used to dealing with fighting in mountainous terrain and would have been able to co-ordinate troops over a distance - after all he was reckoned to be one of, if not the, greatest general of his time.

The main thrust of the Brythons at this time of the attack would be focussed on Disions 1 and 2.

I think that it is possible that a relevant time (when the Brythons were totally engaged) the order fto charge was given to Division 3 whose 2,000 horse charged down the hill at Wiggington surprising the loosely packed Brythons on the edge of Valley 2 and on the sides of Wiggington Hill.

This unstoppable force crosses Akeman Street and is in heart of the baggage train within minutes causing the Brythons attacking Divisions 1 and 2 to panic and turn to defend their camps and wagons.

This is the time that SP gives the command for Divisions 1 and 2 to charge, chasing down the Brythons racing to saving their baggage train and the Brythons are routed but many cannot escape and are slaughtered as are many in the baggage train.

Some do escape as there are only so many that can be killed in the time scale......

This is just another scenario but I don't think that it takes away the validity of the site.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Nathan wrote:

But while we have access to this technology, Paulinus had nothing of the sort. He didn't even have an accurate road-map as we would understand it. All he had to plan his campaign and find his battle site was the evidence of his own eyes, the reports of scouts and a sort of itinerary of distances by road. So we can (I think) narrow down the range of options quite considerably, based on a wider interpretation of the shape of the campaign and the sort of locations Paulinus might have considered.

I think that Nathan has perhaps hit the nail on the head with this statement.

Seutonis Paulinus had to react to an ever changing set of situations:

1. Rebellion behind his back
2. Betrayal by the Procurator
3. Destruction of the Capital City in the Province
4. Slaughter of one of his Legions (or part of)
5. Complete logistical re-think to get his troops down to the seat of the rebellion
6. Various parts of the country being up in arms
7. A review of the status of the rebellion
8. Disobedience of part of one of his Legions
9. A rescue mission for the citizens of London
10. Receiving re-inforcements to enable him to fight at the right time and place
etc.

(These are the words from a man who interviewed the man who was there at a privileged position in the very army that fought Boudica and not an interpretation)

It seems strange to me that the recent book (although I have not read it) implies that SP was in London without his army when somehow he takes the refugees away with him.....

Also there really aren't any obvious places for battle with the topography described near Staines, Virginia Water also has its flaws as does Silchester but it does not mean that Staines and Silchester were not attacked as part of the rebellion.

As for the other comments from Renatus about the book, I agree with Nathan's views....

John 1 wrote:

I'd still like to see Steve's techniques used to test the nominated sites, i.e. if the site was Dunstable what would the criteria have to be for the GIS model to come up with that as the top result, and how would those criteria differ to CS coming up as the optimum candidate.


I'd like to include Tring in that list! but I am possibly biased Smile

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Quote:Here's a diversionary tactic for Legio II
See Hamm Hill, Somerset. On this site.
There is evidently something missing here.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Quote:This article - Claudius, oh aye?! - questions the identification of the bronze head and its links to the hoof.
A salutary questioning of received wisdom.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Nathan Ross wrote:

This article - Claudius, oh aye?! - questions the identification of the bronze head and its links to the hoof.

Good point, well made.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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I think the Iceni and Trinobantes (and Others?) could only have been a 'loose coalition', on this occasion, formed together with a strategy to avenge the assault upon Boudica and the removal of Trinobantes land for the Romans to found Colchester. There may have been much dis-agreement about tactics. Unlike Roman military discipline, there was probably only a loose chain of command cascading from Boudica, or others,( which eventually showed up in the later battle). Especially when, for example, Colchester was sacked. The Trinobantes would, I think have considered the booty (or the better share of it) to be their property. Whether or not there was some agreement to the contrary, everyone would have wanted to get home with their share to prevent it falling back into Roman, or one of their partners' hands!. And the same for London and Verulamium presumably.

Regarding the crossing of the Thames at London or Staines. I think similar rationale would apply to both B and SP. That the other force might destroy it.
If SP crossed first he would then be marooned on the South side, with little control of events in the rest of the country, especially as B was following him. If B crossed, following SP (with a sizeable proportion of the ' coalition ' population in her wake), she would be unable to retreat, or return quickly to defend East Anglia, should other Legions decide to attack it. The Thames next becomes fordable at Wallingford

Similarly,unless trying to gather other forces, how far North would B be prepared to go before her 'wagon train' began to disintegrate? Presumably she always had to consider how to get her followers home. Taking possible sites into account.
Kings Norton/ Mancetter etc., too far North. Seem to have been discredited.
Church Stowe. Possibly return via the navigable Nene Valley, but what about the 'extremity of the plain'?Please see next paragraph.
Paulersbury. Unlikely
Dunstable/ Tring. Possibly, especially as at the crossing of the Icknield Way
Staines/ Virginia Water and West. Inaccessible or wrong terrain.

Regarding the battle site. Tacitus says 'and so sure of victory they placed their wagons at the extremity of the plain where they might survey the scene of action'. How far out would this be to accommodate, maybe 100,000 people? 2 Miles?
Two thoughts come to mind
1. This feels to me very much like a set- piece of Theatre, as though acted in an Amphitheatre
2. If you give weight to the rest of T's commentary, what does 'extremity of the plain' mean, and what does it say about the terrain of the site? Also, what different terrain might have been beyond the extremity?

Conclusion. Regrettably, I have ruled out the burning of Southwark, Staines or Silchester, (even St Albans?) which may have occurred on another occasion, or as a sideshow. I believe the site may be somewhere North of the Thames, in an arc roughly formed between the un- named road between Silchester and Towceser and Watling Street, North as far as Bannaventa. This, of course, includes much of The Ridgeway/ Icknield Way and Akeman Street.

If pressed, I would plump for sites close to StAlbans,
Dunstable looks promising, although I have nor seen the evidence, and is on The Icknield Way (home)
Tring is also on the Icknield way, but seems to have the weakness that Tacitus says 'He (S) knew the enemy had no approach but in front'.
Church Stowe, for me, has the 'extremity of the plain' problem and is more remote.
Davidus
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Quote:Tring is also on the Icknield way, but seems to have the weakness that Tacitus says 'He (S) knew the enemy had no approach but in front'.
Generally, a nice overview. However, this point seems to be based on a mistranslation, implying that the enemy had no alternative but to approach from the front. What Tacitus actually says is "satis cognito nihil hostium nisi in fronte", which I translate literally as "with sufficient knowledge that (there were) none of the enemy except in the front". This I interpret as describing the actual situation, with the enemy in front, whatever alternative positions might have been available, and that the enemy might have approached from a different direction, had it chosen to do so.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Quote:Unlike Roman military discipline, there was probably only a loose chain of command cascading from Boudica, or others

Yes, the question of who was in control of the British rebellion is fascinating. We assume that Boudica was supreme commander, based on Tacitus and Dio - but she could have been a figurehead, and appealed to the Roman writers' taste for the bizarre and 'barbaric'... In any case, we probably can't assume that she had any great military ability (where would she have learned it?), nor indeed that any of the British leaders were experienced in the sort of long-distance warfare of strategy and manoeuvre that Paulinus seems to have engaged in. Holding a huge and diverse rebel army together and directing it from place to place must have been an extremely difficult business.

So I tend to agree with you that our battles site needs to be close to London (unless we follow John's ideas and have the rebels dispersing to their homes and then reforming for the final confrontation). As I've said before, anywhere further than a few days cart ride and the risks of Boudica's army fracturing and dispersing would be too great - some groups falling out about war aims, others wanting to return home with their loot, others going off plundering on their own account, etc. For this reason, I also tend to think that the British would need to stick fairly close to their own homelands, and not, for example, head off into the west with the sole object of locating and fighting the Romans (I've never been much taken with this 'duel' theory!)

Perhaps we could best imagine the movement of the Britons as less like a disciplined army (John's notorious 'parade') and more like a swarm of bees? They mass around one particular location - Colchester, or London - drawn by the promise of plunder, then afterwards disperse into a multitude of smaller bands, spreading across the countryside in all directions before once more coalescing around a new location. Paulinus could only decisively strike at them if he could force them all together in one place - and so we get the plain and the defile...

I don't see either Staines or Virginia Water as being too far away, though - both lie within foraging-distance of London and a Roman force at either place would be picked up by the 'radar' (so to speak) of the rebels.


Quote:This I interpret as describing the actual situation, with the enemy in front... and that the enemy might have approached from a different direction, had it chosen to do so.

Or that there was potentially another enemy force somewhere to the rear of Paulinus's position? I would interpret this, for my Dunstable theory, as a reference to the 'hostile population' in the Midlands: Paulinus ensured that there were no rebel groups closing in to threaten him from the north before taking up his position against the main army advancing from the south... (the weakness of the position to a simultaneous attack from both directions has been noted!)
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:

........nor indeed that any of the British leaders were experienced in the sort of long-distance warfare of strategy and manoeuvre that Paulinus seems to have engaged in.

Yet a century earlier Caratacus and his brother waged a war in Kent that utilised tribes from the Cirencester area and from around the country.....

Nathan wrote:

Holding a huge and diverse rebel army together and directing it from place to place must have been an extremely difficult business.

Absoloutely!

Nathan wrote:

....some groups falling out about war aims, others wanting to return home with their loot, others going off plundering on their own account, etc. For this reason, I also tend to think that the British would need to stick fairly close to their own homelands, and not, for example, head off into the west with the sole object of locating and fighting the Romans (I've never been much taken with this 'duel' theory!)

This is embarrassing! I have to agree again – yet this also supports John’s thoughts that some of the army went home after defeating the Ninth.

Nathan wrote:

Perhaps we could best imagine the movement of the Britons as less like a disciplined army (John's notorious 'parade') and more like a swarm of bees? They mass around one particular location - Colchester, or London - drawn by the promise of plunder, then afterwards disperse into a multitude of smaller bands, spreading across the countryside in all directions before once more coalescing around a new location.

One of the best ideas yet!

This really opens up some alternatives that is worth giving considerable thought to.

Nathan wrote:

Paulinus could only decisively strike at them if he could force them all together in one place - and so we get the plain and the defile...

Not totally convinced of this. (Thank goodness! Smile ) Tacitus states that he didn’t have enough troops when he was in London and only when he was reinforced did he decide to give battle.....but Dio of course states that “as he grew short of food and the barbarians pressed relentlessly upon him, he was compelled, contrary to his judgment, to engage them”

This seems like two opposing arguments

It seems to me that SP could not force the Brythons to give battle – they could have just dispersed or gone around a prepared position – it wasn’t like Thermopylae where the blockade had to be faced.

In my opinion why the Brythons had to attack was because they had no option, they couldn’t leave an army in their rear as they returned home - a subtle but important difference.

This of course implies that they weren't chasing the Roman Army but were dispersing - it also implies that there was a large "core" of the army that was returning home.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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I do not know if the ancients had a different mindset to us. Taking their 'homesickness' and need for future survival into account the followingseems to apply.
Even on Watling Street the Iceni are around 100 miles from home and unfamiliar with the terrain. Theirs is predominantly fens and flat and they are in ?inhospitable Catuvellaunian territory. The Romans' knowledge of the local terrain must havebeen far greater. They probably have poor footwear and armour unfit for purpose. How did they get this far?
At most, they only have four routes home. The quickest and arguable most perilous, on Roman Roads.
To Caistor, Via Longthorpe. Who would want to go there?? Alternatively via Godmanchester.
Nene and Great Ouse.
Icknield Way.
St. Albans or London to Colchester.

All of this leads me to the same conclusion I have already drawn (with appreciated amendments)
Davidus
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