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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
Quote:the cavalry were placed on the wings/ridge tops to defend those locations as opposed to being up there in order to sweep down upon the enemy... operating rather differently to the norm I guess.

My Dunstable scenario has the cavalry operating entirely conventionally - stationed at the wings and attacking the flanks of the enemy in downhill charges.

The point about stopping outflanking attempts over the ridges refers more to the deployment stages of the battle: the presence of large bodies of Roman cavalry on the high ground would probably have been enough to deter all but the most determined callers...

The kind of irregular light cavalry and infantry skirmishers available to the Britons would not have stood much chance attacking uphill against the Roman horsemen, and if any made the attempt to gain the high ground to either side of the position then brief Roman counter-attacks could have driven them back before the main battle commenced.

Meanwhile, as finding things in this monstrous thread is getting tricky, here's my old Dunstable map again, with what I would imagine to be the Roman plan of attack...

[attachment=11126]Dunstable3.jpg[/attachment]

Bear in mind that by the time the cavalry launched their attacks the Britons would probably have advanced to only 10-15 meters short of the Roman infantry line, with smaller bodies perhaps spreading up the slopes to either side to oppose the auxiliaries and cavalry; the mass of Britons would therefore have filled most of the available space, meaning the Roman charges would have had less ground to cover before meeting the enemy.


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Nathan Ross
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I also realise that I have overlooked your query about chariots, John.

The rise of the ground safely negotiated is directly proportional to the method of towing used. By this I mean that, if two ponies are harnessed together directly to the chariot their chances of getting up quite a decent slope depends on the strength of the ponies and whether the occupants of the chariout get out and run along side to remove their weight from the vehicle until such time as they need to get back in. This is opposed to a conventional notion that the chariot had a pole up the centre on either side of which the horses were harnessed. Clearly, the ground clearance of the pole would make an impact on the incline of the ground (depending upon it's length).

Conventionally, horses normally push into collars and do not pull their towed vehicle but in this period we are probably dealing with the yoke type of connection (ie horses harnessed to a a like "beam" which is over their withers) or a step down from collars, a strap around the horses' chests against which they lean to get traction.

It would be an interesting experiment to see which method of harnessing provided the most towing strength. I have limited experience of driving horses, but somewhere in the development of the function, someone decided collars were the way forward instead of breast girths and yokes. The latter is more often seen with oxen and one could deduce, therefore, that this significant change was due to speed requirements.
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Just a few questions, which I hope is not taking this very interesting thread off-topic.

Where was the legion Valeria (XX) stationed?

When Paulinus returned from Wales, would Paulinus’ direction of travel take him somewhere close to the fort of the XXth legion?

One translation I have states that Paulinus’ force consisted of the veterans from the XXth legion. Another translation just has the XXth legion. So I am not sure which is correct.
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There have been several suggestions over the years as to where the Twentieth Legion was based at this time. The favourite now (I think) is Usk, which is well away from Paulinus' route, if he travelled to London down Watling Street.

We have discussed in this thread the contingent of the Twentieth that formed part of Paulinus' force during the final battle and the conclusion is that it consisted of the veterans. My suggestion is that Paulinus' campaigning force in Wales consisted of the Second, Fourteenth and Twentieth Legions and that the veterans of each legion remained behind to guard their fortresses, under the command of their respective praefecti castrorum. At the outbreak of the revolt, Paulinus set off eastwards with the Fourteenth, leaving the Second and the Twentieth to complete mopping-up operations in North Wales and expecting that the Fourteenth and the (at that point undefeated) Ninth would be sufficient to suppress the revolt. Later, he send orders to the praefecti castrorum of the Second, Fourteenth and Twentieth Legions to join him with their veterans but only the Fourteenth and Twentieth complied. The veterans of the Fourteenth Legion are not mentioned in Tacitus' account because they would have been subsumed in their parent legion.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Nicely put, if I may say so Smile
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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I have found Barry Horne's theory quite compelling. as I do about others' too. The notion about close to Verulamium seems logical. I have asked Nathan , if ever a spot of fieldwalkig or another Seminar is proposed, please let me know.
Davidus
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Quote:Nicely put, if I may say so Smile
That's kind of you. Thank you.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Michael wrote:
There have been several suggestions over the years as to where the Twentieth Legion was based at this time. The favourite now (I think) is Usk, which is well away from Paulinus' route, if he travelled to London down Watling Street.

Thanks for that Michael.

Michael wrote:
We have discussed in this thread the contingent of the Twentieth that formed part of Paulinus' force during the final battle and the conclusion is that it consisted of the veterans.

I’ve gone back and read the thread from the start…wow….I can’t believe I did that.

Michael wrote:
My suggestion is that Paulinus' campaigning force in Wales consisted of the Second, Fourteenth and Twentieth Legions and that the veterans of each legion remained behind to guard their fortresses, under the command of their respective praefecti castrorum.

I have found it to be standard Roman policy to leave the veterans to garrison the fort, which can be found in the accounts of the many battles particularly the battle of Veii in 480 BC, and Pharsalus just to name two from the top of my head. It is an old tradition. These veterans I believe refer to the age of the troops, therefore, they are the oldest legionaries, which are the pilani or the third line men. Tacitus also mentions in one campaign of the Annals the dispersing of garrison troops while the rest operated in the field.

Michael wrote:
At the outbreak of the revolt, Paulinus set off eastwards with the Fourteenth, leaving the Second and the Twentieth to complete mopping-up operations in North Wales and expecting that the Fourteenth and the (at that point undefeated) Ninth would be sufficient to suppress the revolt. Later, he send orders to the praefecti castrorum of the Second, Fourteenth and Twentieth Legions to join him with their veterans but only the Fourteenth and Twentieth complied. The veterans of the Fourteenth Legion are not mentioned in Tacitus' account because they would have been subsumed in their parent legion.

I am of the opinion that the veterans of the 14th legion are not with Paulinus, but remained behind and garrisoned their fort. I think the 14th legion was Paulinus’ flying column and if the Romans are following their doctrine, the 14th should be accompanied by an ala. With the addition of the veterans of the XXth Paulinus had one complete legion. Dio’s comment of the army organised into three strong divisions I believe only refers to the infantry.

I’ve played with the figures and following what I have learnt of Roman doctrine, I get a figure of 9960 men, which includes 28 squadrons of cavalry. In the end it’s still conjecture. Boudicca’s rebellion is a favourite of mine and I have been toying with the idea of including the battle in my book. However, after reading this thread, and I am not being patronising here, as that would be insulting, but I believe Nathan would produce a far superior account of the campaign and battle, that I have now happily decided to omit it. I’m actually relieved as it is one less thing to do. However, I would like to see Nathan publish his account as it would be a valuable addition to our understanding of this fascinating campaign.
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Quote: I’ve gone back and read the thread from the start…wow….I can’t believe I did that.

I can't either!!! :-o
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Quote: Michael wrote:
My suggestion is that Paulinus' campaigning force in Wales consisted of the Second, Fourteenth and Twentieth Legions and that the veterans of each legion remained behind to guard their fortresses, under the command of their respective praefecti castrorum.

I have found it to be standard Roman policy to leave the veterans to garrison the fort, which can be found in the accounts of the many battles particularly the battle of Veii in 480 BC, and Pharsalus just to name two from the top of my head. It is an old tradition. These veterans I believe refer to the age of the troops, therefore, they are the oldest legionaries, which are the pilani or the third line men. Tacitus also mentions in one campaign of the Annals the dispersing of garrison troops while the rest operated in the field.

An interesting policy and still reflected in doctrine today of "one foot on the ground".

I am not disputing that this is the case but one is then led to wonder about the status of the veterans. There needs to be a balance of experience within the fighting troops, so I wonder what the deciding factors were on who remained behind as the garrison. The oldest and the newest, perhaps?

It is also interesting that this decision has led some to speculate that Paulinus did not rate the seriousness of the revolt. I feel, however, that the true seriousness with which he regarded it was the fact of call-up of these veterans to aid the fighting force. From what Steven has said this is a serious change of doctrine which would have been the exception and not the rule.
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Quote:I have found it to be standard Roman policy to leave the veterans to garrison the fort, which can be found in the accounts of the many battles particularly the battle of Veii in 480 BC, and Pharsalus just to name two from the top of my head. It is an old tradition.
A variation on ancient practice: I like the sense of continuity.


Quote:I am of the opinion that the veterans of the 14th legion are not with Paulinus, but remained behind and garrisoned their fort. I think the 14th legion was Paulinus’ flying column and if the Romans are following their doctrine, the 14th should be accompanied by an ala. With the addition of the veterans of the XXth Paulinus had one complete legion.
I was speaking in purely legionary terms but I have no doubt that he had cavalry as well, at the very least for scouting and screening purposes. I wouldn't confine it to one ala, though, and I wouldn't rule out his having auxiliary infantry too.

I agree with the veterans of the Fourteenth remaining at base; I wasn't suggesting otherwise. However, when the extent of the revolt became apparent and, particularly, after the defeat of the Ninth, Paulinus had to raise as large an army as possible as quickly as possible. Hence my suggestion that he called up the veterans of his three campaigning legions. This explains the presence of the veterans of the Twentieth and the order to Postumus to bring up the element of the Second under his command. The veterans of the Fourteenth would simply have joined their parent legion and, accordingly, do not get a separate mention.


Quote:There needs to be a balance of experience within the fighting troops, so I wonder what the deciding factors were on who remained behind as the garrison. The oldest and the newest, perhaps?
An interesting idea. Perhaps he called up the most experienced (the veterans) and left the tyros at base, so that it was not completely abandoned. I pity their fate, though, if it had all gone wrong, although in that case everyone was doomed anyway.


Quote:I feel, however, that the true seriousness with which he regarded it was the fact of call-up of these veterans to aid the fighting force. From what Steven has said this is a serious change of doctrine which would have been the exception and not the rule.
For what it is worth, I agree.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Renatus states:

.......leaving the Second and the Twentieth to complete mopping-up operations in North Wales and expecting that the Fourteenth and the (at that point undefeated) Ninth would be sufficient to suppress the revolt.

From this observation it appears that Seutonius Paulinus had no idea of the size of the revolt when he left North Wales if he left two Legions to “mop up”.

At what stage did he find out the true situation either of the size of the uprising or that the Ninth had been lost?

It seems strange that given the seriousness of the situation that SP then finds himself him, he then relies on the veterans of the Twentieth (perhaps at Usk) the Second (possibly at Exeter) and the Fourteenth (maybe at Wroxeter) to re-inforce his troops.

My question is: Why not send for the two Legions mopping up in North Wales if he "...had to raise as large an army as possible as quickly as possible"?

Surely they would be fitter, battle hardened and younger and there would have been around 8,000 legionaries plus cavalry which would have been more than Seutonius Paulinus could have expected from the veterans.

Kind Regards
Deryk
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Quote:Renatus states:

.......leaving the Second and the Twentieth to complete mopping-up operations in North Wales and expecting that the Fourteenth and the (at that point undefeated) Ninth would be sufficient to suppress the revolt.

From this observation it appears that Seutonius Paulinus had no idea of the size of the revolt when he left North Wales if he left two Legions to “mop up”.

At what stage did he find out the true situation either of the size of the uprising or that the Ninth had been lost?
It may well be that the full extent of the revolt did not become apparent until some time after Paulinus left North Wales. Nor can we be sure when he learned of the defeat of the Ninth. If I am right in thinking that his original intent was to quash the rebellion at source with the Fourteenth and Ninth Legions, his probable route of march would be along Watling Street as far as Lutterworth and then along the Via Devana to join the Ninth at Godmanchester. If he learned of Cerialis' defeat before reaching Lutterworth, he could have continued on Watling Street to London. On the other hand, if he were already on the Via Devana, he could have continued to Godmanchester and then turned south on Ermine Street. This would have taken him close to the rebel forces and, possibly, through the fringes of the territories of the Iceni and the Trinovantes. This could explain Tacitus' description of him pressing forward through hostile territory, rather than that the tribes around Watling Street were hostile. Although he would have been considering and reconsidering the situation throughout the march, he may not have made his final appreciation before reaching London.


Quote:It seems strange that given the seriousness of the situation that SP then finds himself him, he then relies on the veterans of the Twentieth (perhaps at Usk) the Second (possibly at Exeter) and the Fourteenth (maybe at Wroxeter) to re-inforce his troops.

My question is: Why not send for the two Legions mopping up in North Wales if he "...had to raise as large an army as possible as quickly as possible"?

Surely they would be fitter, battle hardened and younger and there would have been around 8,000 legionaries plus cavalry which would have been more than Seutonius Paulinus could have expected from the veterans.
I do not doubt that Paulinus would have wanted to use the Second and Twentieth Legions, if he could. The fact remains that we know that he did not. We know from Tacitus that he abandoned his conquests in North Wales but cannot tell whether this was to deal with the immediate emergency or afterwards, when he consolidated his forces to extinguish the last glimmerings of the revolt. There seem to be two possibilities: that the two legions in Wales could not disengage without being attacked in the rear as they marched south by still active Welsh tribes or that he did, indeed, summon them but that they did not reach the battle site in time.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Some interesting thoughts here.


Quote:I wouldn't confine it to one ala, though, and I wouldn't rule out his having auxiliary infantry too.

Usual complement (i.e. our assumption!) for a Roman force would be, I think, about 10% cavalry, although Paulinus would probably have tried to gather as many alae as possible. I would guess between 1000 and 2000 cavalry in his force of ten thousand, with at least 2000 auxiliary infantry.



Quote:his probable route of march would be along Watling Street as far as Lutterworth and then along the Via Devana... he could have continued to Godmanchester and then turned south on Ermine Street... pressing forward through hostile territory, rather than that the tribes around Watling Street were hostile.

Quite plausible, although there's so much we don't know about the positioning of the various legions that hypotheses start mounting on top of each other. The theory about the veterans seems very sound though.

I suspect Paulinus was quite a bit further south before he heard about the disaster of the Ninth though. He had already been appraised of the threat to Colchester, and I would guess that he would be intending his forces to converge in that region rather than further north. Cerealis was presumably defeated by the rebels at or near Colchester itself, rather than by a separate band somewhere in East Anglia. But, once again, there are too many known unknowns in all this!

I was thinking a bit more about the idea raised somewhere above of a final battle in the Essex region. Most of our theories have supposed that the path of Boudica's advance Colchester-London debars Paulinus from any activity in that area, but it seems to me quite possible that having (for example) withdrawn first to St Albans and sent his refugees northward from there, he could then have marched eastwards into the hinterland of the rebel advance and positioned himself directly behind them - this would have forced the Britons to turn back from plundering the Thames valley in order to protect their rear. There's possibly some explanation here of the note in Tacitus about ensuring the enemy were only in front of him, not behind... I'm sure there are plenty of viable sites in the Epping Forest area!
Nathan Ross
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Quote:I suspect Paulinus was quite a bit further south before he heard about the disaster of the Ninth though. He had already been appraised of the threat to Colchester, and I would guess that he would be intending his forces to converge in that region rather than further north.
My guess is that Paulinus intended to combine his force with that of Cerialis and (a) to launch a combined attack on the Iceni homeland, thus drawing Boudica away from Colchester or (b) to interpose himself between the rebels and Colchester or © to raise the siege of Colchester. In the event, Cerialis did not wait for him, either because of his natural impetuosity or because the rebels moved faster than anticipated and he felt that he had to go to the aid of Colchester as quickly as possible.


Quote:I was thinking a bit more about the idea raised somewhere above of a final battle in the Essex region . . . it seems to me quite possible that having (for example) withdrawn first to St Albans and sent his refugees northward from there, he could then have marched eastwards into the hinterland of the rebel advance and positioned himself directly behind them - this would have forced the Britons to turn back from plundering the Thames valley in order to protect their rear.
How do you envisage the destruction of Verulamium fitting into this? Boudica's main force attacking it and then following Paulinus eastwards? A breakaway group being responsible, while Boudica moved north-east to challenge Paulinus? Or simply a local uprising?

Essentially, I don't like the idea. I know I keep harping on about reinforcements but going east separates Paulinus from his main sources of support. All there was in the east were the remnants of the Ninth, which was something of a broken reed and which may, even so, have had some role as a blocking force to prevent tribes moving down from the north. Perhaps this role was why Cerialis seems to have taken only half the legion to Colchester.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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