Thread Rating:
  • 4 Vote(s) - 5 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
(09-07-2016, 03:01 PM)John1 Wrote: Otherwise I can't fault the logic...

Heh heh... [Image: smile.png]

However, if Paulinus withdrew anywhere very far north-west of the Iknield Way, he'd be surrendering his strategic advantage. By remaining in the vicinity of the Iknield he could manoeuvre to intercept or threaten the rebels' route back to their own lands.  Move any further and he'd be leaving them a clear road home.

We'd also have to ask why, if Paulinus withdrew into the Midlands, he was not reinforced by elements of his army in North Wales. If he marched all the way back to Church Stowe he would surely have been joined there by units heading south, and so would have had a lot more than ten thousand men at the last battle? (Or perhaps the druids were keeping them busy up there? [Image: wink.png] )
Nathan Ross
Reply
 "if Paulinus withdrew into the Midlands, he was not reinforced by elements of his army in North Wales."
He may have been reinforced by elements, if he'd gone up Icknield he'd just have made such reinforcement harder to achieve, which would make him a bit thick.

"If he marched all the way back to Church Stowe"
You make it sound like CS is a huge distance it's only 30 miles different to the Tring option, maybe 8 hours hard march. The whole section regarding time and distance doesn't provide a differentiation between Tring, Dunstable and CS. They are all too close for anyone to rule the others out on this basis.

"he would surely have been joined there by units heading south,"
Alternatively he would have been barking to put himself in a position where he didn't have the best opportunity to be joined by forces heading South or protect the route to the North, you are making this way too easy for me.

"so would have had a lot more than ten thousand men at the last battle?"
I'm not sure how that follows, the other units were otherwise engaged, he was waiting on the IInd. The 10k is still under suspicion as an understatement... but who knows.

"(Or perhaps the druids were keeping them busy up there? [Image: wink.png] )"
Partying with Mrs Getafix might indeed account for the enclave of Hap E-V13 in Abergele...... see figure 6 here http://www.jogg.info/32/bird.pdf
Reply
(09-07-2016, 07:07 PM)John1 Wrote: if he'd gone up Icknield he'd just have made such reinforcement harder to achieve

Ah yes, sorry - I didn't mean that he would actually follow the Iknield, just remain around the junctions of it and one of his routes of reinforcement (Watling or Akeman). If he remained close to the Britons - within a single day's march of them - he could watch their movements, harry their foragers, threaten their flanks and use the manoeuvrability of his small mobile force to gain an advantageous position once they advanced in his direction.

He could not do this if he went further north - he would be out of contact with them and heading in the wrong direction. If he knew there was a large body of reinforcements only a day or two away then he might have done this, but only to regroup before leading his augmented force south again. If you're proposing that he stayed in the Midlands, we're back to thinking of reasons why the Britons would go and find him there.

I still don't go with the idea of Paulinus sort of challenging the Britons to a showdown at a distant site of his choosing. This seems to leave too much to chance, and we know that he was 'skillful' in his strategic thinking.



(09-07-2016, 07:07 PM)John1 Wrote: you are making this way too easy for me.

I'm glad you think so! [Image: tongue.png]


(09-07-2016, 07:07 PM)John1 Wrote: The 10k is still under suspicion as an understatement...

Is it? I would say it was one of the more reliable army-estimates in Roman literature! One legion plus a vexillation, plus a 50/50 auxiliary support, would make around 10K. It's the numbers of the Britons that I'd find hard to believe...



(09-07-2016, 07:07 PM)John1 Wrote: Partying with Mrs Getafix

fnarr! [Image: wink.png]
Nathan Ross
Reply
Nathan wrote:
If Paulinus was already moving south with his army by the time the rebels attacked Colchester, much of the confusion in the chronology disappears, I think.

This is an interesting take on the situation but relies heavily on the first message from Catus being accepted by SP that the situation was very serious indeed.

This would appear to be far from the case as Catus only sent 200 poorly equipped soldiers to defend Colchester and no physical defences were raised or any of the civilian population evacuated.

When Catus realised how serious the situation was he fled to Gaul and disappears from the page of history which would indicate that he did not think that the reports and requests for support from Colchester were that serious the first time.

There is always that point that during the advance on Colchester when the forts were overrun that messages managed to get out to Cerialis or SP allowing SP to intiate a march south east earlier.

Nathan wrote:
Not really - the citizens had prior warning of the attack and sent a request to Catus, who sent 200 men as reinforcements (and almost certainly informed Paulinus). The defeat was perhaps due to bad defensive planning, expectation of relief, confusion, or just sheer Roman hubris!

It is strange that the Roman intelligence was so poor but perhaps as is indicated that there was some kind of reassurance that was acceptable and a non acceptance that there was any fight left in the local tribes...

Nathan wrote:
Very likely, if the numbers are anything like those that the sources suggest. Such a massive force would strip the land bare in all directions, and spend much of their time foraging for food, animal feed and fuel - 150,000 men use up 65-70 tons of firewood a day, apparently. Even a disciplined army of that size with an established supply train and logistics corps would struggle to make 10 miles a day. Estimating 8 miles a day or less for the Britons is reasonable, I'd say, even allowing for plundering on the way.

This statement shows how difficult it would have been for a surprise attack on Colchester but again supposes that the horde was together to begin with and did not meet up just outside Colchester prior to the "battle".

This is the area where I disagree with virtually everyone else in the composition of the Brythonic army which I do not believe was a migration but a warrior attack planned and executed ruthlessly to take back control of the Trinovantes and Iceni Homelands that had been taken by Rome, firstly by overunning the Roman forts and then by destroying Colchester and its hated inhabitants.

Renatus wrote:
We have it in the speech that Dio gives to Paulinus that the rebels burned a couple of cities, one of which was 'betrayed' and the other abandoned to them. These would be, respectively, Colchester and London. We have speculated before that this suggests that there was a 'fifth column' in Colchester that persuaded the colonists that there was no need to erect defences or to evacuate the city.

This is again reference to the raising of a large body of people that Rome was not concerned about. Can this be explained by there being some type of "entertainment" planned and that rather than Catus underestimating the threat by sending so few soldiers, he effectively sent a force purely to police an event to be held that had been agreed with local dignatories and perhaps even himself? 

Nathan wrote:
Colchester is 50 miles from London, not 70, but if we dispense with the 'cavalry dash' (which I believe we must) then Paulinus did indeed reach London first.

This necessarily supposes that the rebels were either moving very slowly, or had paused somewhere in their advance.
I would agree about dispensing with the "cavalry dash" theory and my apologies for the typo on the mileage.

Again I am not convinced that the "horde's" (Brythonic army) objective was London after the destruction of Colchester. This was a Roman port and 18 years before hand was of limited use to the Brythons who had used their own ports.

Their wealth and way of life was measured in their own land that the Roman Veterans had taken from the Trinovantes and the land taken from the Iceni by Catus and the Roman State.

It was this that had to be re-occupied and defended and I agree with John that the tribes returned to their homelands and set up ambushes and against the Romans who true to form were advancing from Bangor (14th) and Peterborough (9th) to destroy the uprising at its source.
What changed everything was that SP did not advance on them partly because the 2nd didn't turn up and partly because the 9th didn't either because the latter had been destroyed and Cerealis trapped.

When he retreated from London westwards and then up Watling Street to St Albans he was followed by the Brythons and London was destroyed (although the warehouses were probably destroyed by SP to prevent use of supplies contained by the Brythons) and St Albans overrun in the chase after the retreating Roman Army.

Nathan wrote:
Why west? If he wanted to 'regroup' he would head north - his main army was in that direction!

West out of London itself and then North West up Watling Street to St Albans....

Renatus wrote:
I agree. The scenario as I see it is that Paulinus withdrew a short way up Akeman Street to a strategic position from which he could observe through scouts the movements of the enemy and react accordingly. The intention was to wait there for reinforcements to join him but the actions of the rebels were such that he felt obliged to give battle before his reinforcements could arrive.

AND

Nathan wrote:
I agree with this, except that I think he withdrew initially to St Albans (which is why that otherwise-unsignificant place finds its way into Tacitus's account!). He perhaps intended reinforcements from the west or north-west to meet him there; when they did not he withdrew once more to the vicinity of either Tring/Newground or Dunstable/Manshead.

I agree with this as well and obviously favour Tring but think that Church Stowe should not be discarded as John explains:

(John wrote: “If he marched all the way back to Church Stowe"
You make it sound like CS is a huge distance it's only 30 miles different to the Tring option, it's not at all, maybe 8 hours hard march. The whole section regarding time and distance doesn't provide a differentiation between Tring, Dunstable and CS. They are all too close for anyone to rule the others out on this basis.)

John wrote:
"(Or perhaps the druids were keeping them busy up there? file:///C:/Users/DERYK~1.CUN/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image002.gif )"

Although said in jest John has a valid point - the Romans were over stretched in garrison duties holding down the Silures, the Ordovices, the Brigantes as well as the newly conquered territory and Cornwall as well as having a Battle Group in the field and having lost the operational part of the 9th.

The veterans of the 20th were possibly being re-located similarly to Colchester in Gloucester to create what had been a successful policy until this time and were able to join SP at the battle site  

Nathan wrote:
As we discussed before, I think it unlikely that the rebels would have brought their wives but left their children at home! 'Wives', in the Tacitus account, is a metonym for 'families'.

I am afraid that we are destined to disagree on this point.....and the text reflects a typical baggage train where cattle and beasts of burden were also part of the supplies. Cattle can be driven at 15 miles per day over long distances and the base design for chariots can be easily adapted for horse drawn carts allowing for a mobile army.
Deryk
Reply
(09-08-2016, 02:27 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Catus only sent 200 poorly equipped soldiers to defend Colchester

sine iustis armis - 'without proper weapons', I think (Tacitus). These 200 men, I think, would be all that Catus had available - beneficiarii on his staff, stationarii guarding the port and the docks, plus perhaps some of the men he'd been using on his tax surveys. They didn't have 'proper weapons', presumably, because they weren't intended as combat troops.

In the circumstances, there wasn't much else that Catus could have done - besides sending messages to Paulinus and perhaps Cerialis. I don't think this suggests he wasn't taking it seriously.


(09-08-2016, 02:27 PM)Theoderic Wrote: When Catus realised how serious the situation was he fled to Gaul

Exactly. If there was no immediate threat to London Catus would not have fled, and Paulinus would not have evacuated the city shortly afterwards. We must assume, therefore, that the rebels were advancing on the city in great strength.



(09-08-2016, 02:27 PM)Theoderic Wrote: I agree with John that the tribes returned to their homelands and set up ambushes and against the Romans

As above - if they'd gone home again after Colchester there would be no reason for Catus to flee, and no reason for Paulinus to even go to London, let alone evacuate it. If the rebels were heading back north again, by going to London Paulinus would be placing a hostile enemy between himself and his route of retreat and reinforcement. He would have remained somewhere in the Midlands instead and waited for back-up. He didn't, so the rebels must have continued south-west after leaving Colchester.


(09-08-2016, 02:27 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Cattle can be driven at 15 miles per day over long distances and the base design for chariots can be easily adapted for horse drawn carts allowing for a mobile army.

One wagon could perhaps go at 15 miles a day, or even a few wagons. Hundreds of wagons could not. The larger the army, the slower it moves, and a force of the size that Boudica is supposed to have been leading would have moved very slowly indeed.

You could imagine smaller groups splitting off and moving faster, but they would have been easier to defeat individually. Far better if they stick together and use their strength of numbers, which is their only advantage over the Romans.
Nathan Ross
Reply
Nathan wrote:

sine iustis armis - 'without proper weapons', I think (Tacitus). These 200 men, I think, would be all that Catus had available - beneficiarii on his staff,stationarii guarding the port and the docks, plus perhaps some of the men he'd been using on his tax surveys. They didn't have 'proper weapons', presumably, because they weren't intended as combat troops.


Tacitus seems to imply that Catus didn't do much at all apart from look after his own interests but that could have been because he was not impressed by the State Administration Office in general but was highly supportive of the Military Arm. 

Again it seems incredulous that the people of Colchester, if they and Catus had thought they were about to be attacked would not have evacuated the women and children nor built defences that we are aware of.  In fact Tacitus implies they were attacked in a state of peace, so I maintain that they did not feel that they were in danger. 

As you said earlier 150,000 people on the move would have been impossible to hide IF they were moving as one body but a number of smaller groups coming together to muster around Colchester would have been much easier and quicker to move as well as being easier to slip under the radar or to be presented as a "local show".

I still maintain that this was not a mass migration and it is rare for people to take their children or old aged to war. This was a well planned campaign to take back their lands, their wealth and their way of life in their homelands.

This army in my opinion was made up of tribal warbands, a very mobile force, like the insurgents of today, able to strike quickly using cavalry, chariots and horse drawn wagons for transport and logistics. There is no reason to suppose that young women were not capable of driving wagons and providing support for the fighters.       

Nathan wrote:

........if they'd gone home again after Colchester there would be no reason for Catus to flee, 


Catus must have been shocked that his intelligence was so incorrect and that Colchester had been completely destroyed. He had lost control of the facts and what was happening at the tribal level and would have automatically thought in the Roman fashion (as we tend to do today) that as he was the cause of the revolt and that they were coming for him and for the treasures of London. So he fled.

The Brythonic society was not based on the Roman ideal and they had their own lifestyle. The Romans had brought no benefits to the local people at this time and the way the Romans lived,as stated by Tacitus, was only for the benefit of the Roman Empire and at the beginning the local aristocracy but even this was becoming too high a price to bear.

London was a Roman invention manly for the benefit of traders and tax gatherers of the Roman Empire and had no value for the Brythons. Archeology leads us to believe that at this time London contained a very few roundhouses which presumably was the continuation of the cereal trade etc.from the tribes. Most of the trade would have been for the military and the incoming Roman citizens.   

Nathan wrote

........and no reason for Paulinus to even go to London, let alone evacuate it. If the rebels were heading back north again, by going to London Paulinus would be placing a hostile enemy between himself and his route of retreat and reinforcement. He would have remained somewhere in the Midlands instead and waited for back-up. He didn't, so the rebels must have continued south-west after leaving Colchester.  

If there was a paucity of information (which clearly there was) regarding the very fluid situation that SP was faced with there are a number of reasons why he would have led the 14th to London depending on his plans.

Perhaps he was hoping to meet Catus in London to get detailed intelligence.


It seems inconceivable that a cautious man such as SP would not have sent out scouts to gain information of what was happening so would have been aware of an approaching force of 150,000 reaching London at the same time as himself before he committed to the advance.

It may well of been that SP was surprised that London had not been attacked and strategically needed to capture the supplies for his own use or to destroy them to prevent them getting into the enemy's hands.   

As we have discussed perhaps he was expecting to meet up with the 9th and the 2nd Legions and then advance on Colchester with a combined force of perhaps 15,000 + men. 

As we know neither of these forces were available to him for various reasons and Tacitus makes it clear that by the time he got to London the he knew the 9th had been defeated badly, to such an extent SP thought it prudent to withdraw as London could not be defended with the limited forces (small army) at his command.

So he may well have withdrawn because he realised that this was a full blown rebellion that he needed more forces to deal with (plan 1) or a place where he could gain strategic advantage because of the topography (plan 2) or both (plan 3). 

Nathan wrote:

One wagon could perhaps go at 15 miles a day, or even a few wagons. Hundreds of wagons could not. The larger the army, the slower it moves, and a force of the size that Boudica is supposed to have been leading would have moved very slowly indeed.


You are of course correct which is why the idea of a huge host travelling together seems wrong.

Nathan wrote:

You could imagine smaller groups splitting off and moving faster, but they would have been easier to defeat individually. Far better if they stick together and use their strength of numbers, which is their only advantage over the Romans 

   
I believe that this is exactly the modus operandi of the Brythons who harried a marching column as they did with Caesar in BC54 (which SP was concerned about - which is why he turned to face them) and also mustered for battle only, not travelling together.

The Brythons never won any pitched battles over the Romans as far as I understand it so an organised battle was not really what they wanted unless the odds were vastly in their favour but their best bet was to defeat a diisorganised army on the march.

The brilliance of SP was to turn the tables on them by forcing them to attack him in a place that could be defended by a few men and work against a large host - in a seige situation which they were used to - wherever that was.
  




    
Deryk
Reply
(09-09-2016, 12:29 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Catus didn't do much at all apart from look after his own interests

So Tacitus makes out - but we should consider that part of his intention in this section of Annals may have been to extol the virtues of Paulinus, and exonerate him for any perceived failings (not realising the revolt was imminent, taking too few men with him, not relieving Colchester in time, etc).

Making Catus - an equestrian, of whom nothing further is heard - the fall guy for everything serves his purposes well. In fact, as Paulinus was governor he would surely have known what Catus and co were doing to the Iceni, and may have directed it. He was at least as much to blame for the uprising as the procurator.

Catus had only a small military force at his disposal, and could not command legionary troops, so his options were limited. Once Colchester had fallen, and Cerialis had been defeated, fleeing to the continent (probably taking many of his staff, his personal and imperial wealth, and the provincial records with him) would have been a sensible thing to do!


(09-09-2016, 12:29 PM)Theoderic Wrote: it seems incredulous that the people of Colchester... would not have evacuated the women and children nor built defences that we are aware of. 

Annals 14.32 claims the citizens of Colchester were 'hindered by secret accomplices in the revolt, who embarrassed their plans' and persuaded them not to construct a ditch or rampart. So - fifth columnists, as Michael points out.

Also - where would they have evactuated to? Colchester was a military settlement, home to a large number of veteran legionaries. Short of heading for London, 50 miles away, it was probably the safest place in the vicinity. Or so the 'secret accomplices' may have argued...


(09-09-2016, 12:29 PM)Theoderic Wrote: I still maintain that this was not a mass migration and it is rare for people to take their children or old aged to war.

Not a migration, no. But remember Paulinus's words in his pre-battle speech: the rebel army contained 'more women than warriors'. So there would have been a substantial number of civilians with them. Whether these civilians were there all along, or joined the army after the fall of Colchester, is unknown. But they would certainly have slowed things down.


(09-09-2016, 12:29 PM)Theoderic Wrote: This army in my opinion was made up of tribal warbands, a very mobile force, like the insurgents of today, able to strike quickly using cavalry, chariots and horse drawn wagons for transport and logistics.    

Traditional hit and run insurgency tactics would have worked well against a scattered foe, but for attacking cities and disciplined armies in the field the rebels needed vast numbers, so keeping everyone more or less together would have been critical.


(09-09-2016, 12:29 PM)Theoderic Wrote: London... had no value for the Brythons.

It had warehouses full of Roman grain, which the rebels needed. It was the centre of provincial administration, and the home of the hated procurator. So it had both logistical, military and symbolic value, I would say.


(09-09-2016, 12:29 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Tacitus makes it clear that by the time he got to London the he knew the 9th had been defeated

I still think the scheme that Michael proposed some time ago makes the best sense: Paulinus marched initially towards Colchester, intending to meet Cerialis en route, perhaps at Godmanchester. By the time he arrived there, the rebels had taken Colchester and Cerialis had marched off ahead to confront them, and been defeated.

Paulinus, hearing of this and realising that the next rebel target would be London, which had supplies of grain and a large number of vulnerable civilians, redirected his march south from Godmanchester, through the margins of rebel territory, to arrive at London after two or three days, ahead of the main rebel advance.

(It's also possible that he was joined at London by auxiliary units from the south coast forts.)



(09-09-2016, 12:29 PM)Theoderic Wrote: The Brythons never won any pitched battles over the Romans as far as I understand it so an organised battle was not really what they wanted unless the odds were vastly in their favour but their best bet was to defeat a diisorganised army on the march.

Their defeat of Cerialis was probably a pitched battle. No source implies that it was an ambush, or that Cerialis was attacked on the march; he knew he was in hostile territory, advancing against a sizeable enemy, and would have been keeping good march discipline.

We know he had a camp (to which he retreated), and it seems the infantry were deployed separately to the cavalry (which would have been on the wings in a standard battle array, and thus managed to escape the rout intact).

So it seems likely that Cerialis met the rebels somewhere near Colchester, deployed for battle, but was overwhelmed by their vastly superior numbers.
Nathan Ross
Reply
Nathan wrote:


Also - where would they have evactuated to? Colchester was a military settlement, home to a large number of veteran legionaries. Short of heading for London, 50 miles away, it was probably the safest place in the vicinity. Or so the 'secret accomplices' may have argued...


Certainly a good point…..but then why no defences at all?  

50 miles against losing your life and your family’s lives – I know which I would have chosen….

Nathan wrote:

Traditional hit and run insurgency tactics would have worked well against a scattered foe, but for attacking cities and disciplined armies in the field the rebels needed vast numbers, so keeping everyone more or less together would have been critical.


Typically hit and run tactics and ambushes is how the Brythons were successful in fighting the Romans over the previous 18 years and indeed a century before against Julius Caesar by harrying his foragers and the edges of the column of some 15,000 men.

There were very few cities in Britannia apart from Colchester, London and St Albans. None of these were defended or indeed defensible. That it is not really the point.

To be effective against either cities or a large army they would not have to travel together but to agree to muster at a particular place and particular time. This would appear to be how they fought prior to this so I find it difficult to see why their tactics would change.

Their standard successful tactics were surprise, ambush and hit and run which is why they were so hard to defeat because they had no cities to defend and therefore could retreat swiftly into the countryside which they did unless they were caught by the cavalry or trapped as in Boudica’s final battle although many tens of thousands escaped to fight on.

I think that you can equate it to Colonial Powers invading Afghanistan where although they have all the fire power and the disciplined professional armies the tribal warlords as such have never been defeated since the RAJ including the Russians and the Americans
 
Nathan wrote:

Their defeat of Cerialis was probably a pitched battle. No source implies that it was an ambush, or that Cerialis was attacked on the march; he knew he was in hostile territory, advancing against a sizeable enemy, and would have been keeping good march discipline. 

We know he had a camp (to which he retreated), and it seems the infantry were deployed separately to the cavalry (which would have been on the wings in a standard battle array, and thus managed to escape the rout intact).

So it seems likely that Cerialis met the rebels somewhere near Colchester, deployed for battle, but was overwhelmed by their vastly superior numbers.


The defeat of the Ninth Legion is undocumented (although a number of scenarios have been postulated) and there is no other evidence of the Roman Army being defeated by the Brythons in an organised battle since the invasion although they did manage to have a two day battle at the Medway before they were defeated and scattered to fight again at the Thames

Having said that all scenarios are possible including the weight of numbers as you propose but if that is the case it would seem again that this was a well organised and disciplined army who admittedly defeated a depleted Legionary force of around 2,000 infantry and a cavalry force of whom we have no numbers.

With this small force it would be surprising if even Cerealis lined up against the full Brythonic Army in full battle array......

Again this small Roman force seems to have had no understanding of the numbers of the army they were up against so the intelligence is sadly lacking not only at Colchester but also London and with Cerealis and therefore no doubt with SP.
   
Nathan wrote:

I still think the scheme that Michael proposed some time ago makes the best sense: Paulinus marched initially towards Colchester, intending to meet Cerialis en route, perhaps at Godmanchester. By the time he arrived there, the rebels had taken Colchester and Cerialis had marched off ahead to confront them, and been defeated. 

Paulinus, hearing of this and realising that the next rebel target would be London, which had supplies of grain and a large number of vulnerable civilians, redirected his march south from Godmanchester, through the margins of rebel territory, to arrive at London after two or three days, ahead of the main rebel advance.


I value Michael’s view on this and certainly it fits the texts but if this was the case surely Cerelias would have informed SP that the situation was worse than he thought and that he was continuing on towards Colchester.

I would have thought that one of SP's major objectives would have been to secure Verulamium as this was a Roman Colony (London was not) and there were Roman citizens there who had to be protected. From there it is only 25 odd miles to London which would possibly have been easier to get to rather than go farther east.  

That doesn’t mean that SP didn’t go to Godmanchester and found that the Ninth had left and then decided to go to London for the reasons you list, but not because the Brythons were advancing there but because it had not been attacked as yet and he needed more intelligence which he hoped to gain from Catus.

Nathan wrote

It (London) had warehouses full of Roman grain, which the rebels needed. It was the centre of provincial administration, and the home of the hated procurator. So it had both logistical, military and symbolic value, I would say. 


I think that this answers your need for SP to go to London but not necessarily the Brythons.
 
Deryk
Reply
(09-10-2016, 03:46 PM)Theoderic Wrote: why no defences at all? 

According the Tacitus, the 'secret accomplices' of the rebels had persuaded the citizens it was not necessary. Although, like most tales of 'fifth columnists', this could have been an excuse for the citizens' lack of organisation and failure to act in time!


(09-10-2016, 03:46 PM)Theoderic Wrote: hit and run tactics and ambushes is how the Brythons were successful in fighting the Romans over the previous 18 years

Not that successful - the Romans had managed to completely conquer most of Britain by this point.

Caesar's invasion force was largely successful in open battle, and brought the Britons to surrender - it was his own poor planning that led to his retreat (although we only have Caesar's own account, of course...). The Romans beat the Britons at the Medway and the Thames, and defeated Caratacus in pitched battle in c.51. The previous Iceni revolt, in 47, had been defeated with the storming of one fort.

The Caledonians and others in the north seem to have given the Romans more trouble, but still mustered for open battle at Mons Graupius, and were duly defeated.

Insurgency and ambushes could have been successful against a scattered occupying power, but not against an army in the field - which could be why Boudica attempted to defeat Paulinus by weight of numbers.


(09-10-2016, 03:46 PM)Theoderic Wrote: they would not have to travel together but to agree to muster at a particular place and particular time.

Perhaps - they could have slowly gathered around Colchester until they had the numbers to attack. But we know very little about how the rebels operated or fought at this time. By the time they moved against London, they must have been in some kind of coherent body - otherwise Decianus Catus would not have fled and Paulinus would not have thought of fighting his battle there. By the final confrontation they were certainly in one body.

A strategy of scattering and then regrouping at particular targets would have been hard to organise, especially with a diverse force under uncertain leadership (Boudica was not even a reigning monarch, and had no power over the Trinovantes and others).

Trying to get various different groups to make a coordinated muster after splitting up would be hazardous - if only a few failed to turn up, the rebellion would fall apart. Far better, if possible, to keep them all together for as long as possible.


(09-10-2016, 03:46 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Colonial Powers invading Afghanistan

A tempting analogy - but we have to remember that, following a few clashes during the initial invasion, and Boudica's revolt nearly twenty years later, most of southern Britain seem to have remained entirely peaceful under Roman rule for over 400 years. This does not suggest an intractable and indomitable warrior people, and was very different to the Afghan experience.


(09-10-2016, 03:46 PM)Theoderic Wrote: this was a well organised and disciplined army... it would be surprising if even Cerealis lined up against the full Brythonic Army in full battle array......

What leads you to think that Boudica's rebels were organised or disciplined? We have no evidence either way. As you say, the fact that Cerialis led such a small force against the rebels* around Colchester suggests that he didn't rate their capabilities that highly, or underestimated their numbers - he was rash, but not suicidal.

While the Britons may have had a nucleus of trained warriors (although they had apparently been disarmed after the 47 revolt), I would think that most of their vast army would probably have been untrained farmers and other tribesmen armed with improvised weapons.

*Edit - 2000 men was only the number of legionaries needed to replace the losses in the 9th legion. Tacitus says that the rebels 'destroyed his infantry' (peditum interfecit); a routed force will commonly lose around 37% of its number. But even if the 9th detachment lost 4 out of every 5 men, the original force could have numbered 5000 infantry (50/50 auxiliary/legionary), and probably at least 500 cavalry. The loss or dispersal of such a force would have been a major blow to Paulinus's plans.


(09-10-2016, 03:46 PM)Theoderic Wrote: surely Cerelias would have informed SP that the situation was worse than he thought and that he was continuing on towards Colchester.

He surely would have done. But little time would have elapsed between Paulinus learning of what Cerialis had done and news of his defeat, so it would not affect his planning from that point on.


(09-10-2016, 03:46 PM)Theoderic Wrote: one of SP's major objectives would have been to secure Verulamium as this was a Roman Colony (London was not) and there were Roman citizens there who had to be protected.

Verulamium was a municipium, not a colonia - the inhabitants were allied Britons, and only the most senior men had citizenship. London, on the other hand, "though not distinguished by the title of colony, was none the less a busy centre, chiefly through its crowd of merchants and stores" (Annals 14.33) - most of these merchants would have been Roman citizens, so it was the more important place to defend.



(09-10-2016, 03:46 PM)Theoderic Wrote: this answers your need for SP to go to London but not necessarily the Brythons.

The Britons needed grain, and London had a lot of it. If they took London they could cut Paulinus's main communication route with the south coast, and revenge themselves on Decianus Catus. It was a clear objective for them, I would say.

Again, unless London was threatened by a very large hostile rebel force, Catus would not have fled from the place, Paulinus would not have thought of fighting his battle there, and he would not then have evacuated it.
Nathan Ross
Reply
The timeline of the whole affair is fascinating. However - this is just an idea of my own - The Trinovantes were the ones who had had enough of the veterans, they weren't bothering the Iceni. Only when the loans from Claudius and Seneca were called in, (one could suspect that Claudius practically bought a number of tribes instead of defeating them) and probably around the time that Prasutagus died, did the Roman rule really start to bite. I find it interesting that Catus Decianus came with a small force to collect the money. Now it would have been very stupid on the part of Suetonius to go off on campaign if he had known that Decianus was off to get the money - tax gathering was an ideal way to take money for yourself without anyone being the wiser. Every Roman would know that. So is it the case that Decianus waited until PS had gone off and then hurried off to augment his income?

Another idea - please drive it into the ground is it is too ridiculous - but why could there not have been some planning for the rebellion? The Trinovantes, the Coritani , Iceni and perhaps even the tribe that appears to have boxed in the IInd? For all we know Boudica came from Devon/Dorset and might have contacts there. Plenty of time after a confab with the three tribes above to send a messenger and start the rebellion.
Now surely there wasn't much point in the Iceni helping the Trinovantes, rather ( think of Varus) the Iceni would have had word from the Coritani if and when the IXth got ready, ideal ambush and it obviously worked. Presumably the Coritani then made sure that what was left of the IXth stayed in either Longthorpe (which is more or less Peterborough?) or Lincoln?

Surely the rebels wanted to engage with Suetonius as soon as possible. It would work to his advantage not to do so. I've read in several accounts that St. Albans wasn't necessarily put to the sword by the rebels at least not to the extent that Colchester and London were. The long delay before they take London is a puzzle. Either they sat there waiting in St. Albans to intercept them on Watling Street, or they waited elsewhere.
In any case, they didn't take London until Suetonius had left there and the cavalry dash is really not an option. Logistics are, the warehouses in Southwark were burnt, but not necessarily by the rebels in my opinion. They had perhaps not expected Suetonius to go as far south as London in the first place. In which case, his withdrawing south or south-west, towards Cogidubnus' territory would surely have been a useful move? Towards more food, possibly there was a loyalist Regni army the other thing is: (Annals) 'Suetonius collected the fourteenth brigade and detachments of the twentieth, together with the nearest available auxiliaries - amounting to nearly ten thousand armed men - and decided to attack without delay. '
(Hunt says: this last part was not true at all. He was sensibly seeking the advantage of a good defensive position, where he could wait for his enemies to come to him on ground of his own choosing').
In addition to that there must have been an opportunity for the Classis Britannica to sail from Anglesey to at least the area of Poole harbour? Even though it is rarely mentioned I recall one mention of it somewhere! in relation to the Anglesey expedition.
I still think - thanks to Steve Kaye - that withdrawing south/west was easily the best thing PS could do, he would engage on a site of his own choice, one that would be unfamiliar to the rebels
Reply
(09-12-2016, 10:14 AM)Alecto Wrote: possibly there was a loyalist Regni army

Nic Fuentes suggested that some of Paulinus's troops at the final battle could have been sent by Cogidubnus. It's possible, but not necessary, I think - as I said above, one legion plus a vexillation and attendant auxiliaries would make up the ten thousand.

We know that Cogidubnus remained loyal during the revolt, but I still think it would been risky to withdraw into his territory: not only are the nearest possible battle sites beyond Virginia Water some distance away, but Paulinus would be trusting to the King and his people to support them, while a huge rebel army poured across their borders...


(09-12-2016, 10:14 AM)Alecto Wrote: withdrawing south/west was easily the best thing PS could do, he would engage on a site of his own choice, one that would be unfamiliar to the rebels

Possibly unfamiliar to Paulinus too! He'd spent most of his two years as governor campaigning in north Wales, and may have had little reason to visit the pacified southern districts. The only ground that we know he knew was the south coast district, London, and the line of Watling Street up to Wroxeter.
Nathan Ross
Reply
Nathan Wrote:

Not that successful - the Romans had managed to completely conquer most of Britain by this point. 

Caesar's invasion force was largely successful in open battle, and brought the Britons to surrender - it was his own poor planning that led to his retreat (although we only have Caesar's own account, of course...). The Romans beat the Britons at the Medway and the Thames, and defeated Caratacus in pitched battle in c.51. The previous Iceni revolt, in 47, had been defeated with the storming of one fort.

The Caledonians and others in the north seem to have given the Romans more trouble, but still mustered for open battle at Mons Graupius, and were duly defeated.

Insurgency and ambushes could have been successful against a scattered occupying power, but not against an army in the field - which could be why Boudica attempted to defeat Paulinus by weight of numbers.


I think we are talking at cross purposes here. There is no question that in a formal battle the Roman Army was far better than the Brythons. That is the point; the Brython's success only happened in broken order when they were harrying a column or from an ambush or a surprising a foraging party; hit and run tactics - which is why I do not think that Cerealis had a formal battle outside Colchester

Caesar had very few open battles at all, either in 55 or 54 BC and was forced into a burnt earth policy as an attack and probably needed a truce as much as the Brythons. 

By this point in AD61 a lot of the Brythonic Tribes had been conquered and assimulated into the Roman Empire but there were a number of "Client Kings" who ruled their own subjects (the Iceni, the Brigantes, the Atrebates and possibly Verulamium and its environs) yet even so,  according to the experts there were many forts garrisoning the country (40,000 men in the army) - hardly a peaceful occupation - more of a repressed state. Even Tacitus states that Rome had not tried to give any benefits to the Brythons but only taken the spoils.
 
There is no denying that the Brythons could assemble vast forces quickly and effectively (Medway and previous battles) and equally quickly melt away.

Nathan wrote:

By the final confrontation they were certainly in one body.


Something we can agree on - but they could have mustered anywhere - including the battle site.

Nathan wrote:

A tempting analogy - but we have to remember that, following a few clashes during the initial invasion, and Boudica's revolt nearly twenty years later, most of southern Britain seem to have remained entirely peaceful under Roman rule for over 400 years. This does not suggest an intractable and indomitable warrior people, and was very different to the Afghan experience. 


The first 8 years from AD43 to the uprising was fractious with constant advances and fighting and the territory won which would then be intensely garrisoned. This was a warrior people contained and  much time and force was spent keeping down the Silures and the Ordovices even after Caractacus was captured and only ended as part of the SP campaign which finished on Anglesey. 

Even after Boudica was defeated the Brythons still fought on in the fens and it wasn't until SP had left that a period of total peace reigned throughout the Country although "Wales" may have been lost...requiring Frontinus to re-conquer it in the 70's as well as take on the Brigantes.

I would agree that after Agricola it was more peaceful but a number of generals continued to battle the inhabitants of the North for many years and many "cut their teeth" on the "front line".  


Nathan wrote:

What leads you to think that Boudica's rebels were organised or disciplined? We have no evidence either way. As you say, the fact that Cerialis led such a small force against the rebels* around Colchester suggests that he didn't rate their capabilities that highly, or underestimated their numbers - he was rash, but not suicidal. 

While the Britons may have had a nucleus of trained warriors (although they had apparently been disarmed after the 47 revolt), I would think that most of their vast army would probably have been untrained farmers and other tribesmen armed with improvised weapons.

*Edit - 2000 men was only the number of legionaries needed to replace the losses in the 9th legion. Tacitus says that the rebels 'destroyed his infantry' (peditum interfecit); a routed force will commonly lose around 37% of its number. But even if the 9th detachment lost 4 out of every 5 men, the original force could have numbered 5000 infantry (50/50 auxiliary/legionary), and probably at least 500 cavalry. The loss or dispersal of such a force would have been a major blow to Paulinus's plans.


I would agree that much of the army would not be elite warriors and possibly farm labourers etc. and indeed women - numbers required to overrun an undefended town but there could have been a substantial core of warriors ready to take on an advancing Cerealis although I still favour an ambush.  

14 years to re-arm secretly is easily possible

It does no justice to the various Roman generals to dismiss the Brythons as a rabble and certainly Julius Caesar seems to rate their expertise and for them to have held the Roman Army at the Medway for two days speaks volumes. Also this first force of Boudica's had also captured forts - no mean feat.

Regarding the 9th as a force of some 5,500 military is possible but if that was a loss or dispersal it as you say would have really stretched Roman resources later on.

Nathan wrote:



Verulamium was a municipium, not a colonia - the inhabitants were allied Britons, and only the most senior men had citizenship. London, on the other hand, "though not distinguished by the title of colony, was none the less a busy centre, chiefly through its crowd of merchants and stores" (Annals 14.33) - most of these merchants would have been Roman citizens, so it was the more important place to defend.

SP had been a Governor of Britain for two years and would have known the defensive possibilities of London before he arrived there this time as all good generals would. 

Most Roman citizens of worth would have already escaped with Catus if the situation was dire or the perception was of imminent danger but the supplies would have needed to be taken or destroyed perhaps by both sides.

Verulamium was important because if Rome could not defend its own allies it would prove that it was weak and could not protect its own.

Nathan wrote:

The Britons needed grain, and London had a lot of it. If they took London they could cut Paulinus's main communication route with the south coast, and revenge themselves on Decianus Catus. It was a clear objective for them, I would say.

Again, unless London was threatened by a very large hostile rebel force, Catus would not have fled from the place, Paulinus would not have thought of fighting his battle there, and he would not then have evacuated it.
   



Still do not buy this argument.

They may have needed the grain but I am not convinced unless they wanted to starve the Romans so it may have been a strategic target.    

SP still had around 35,000 men (allowing for the partial loss of the 9th) so plenty of men to regroup and he could easily communicate from Chichester, Poole or any of the Southern Ports to the continent if necessary for further reinforcements to land along the south coast.

Once Colchester was burnt to the ground Catus would have realised that there were no local troops to defend London and left either from selfish reasons or indeed as you have reasoned for the benefit of the State.  

He would have reasoned that a Roman army would have reached London in 3 days maximum and possibly 2 days and would have had no intelligence of the movement of the Brythonic horde and left ASAP just to be on the safe side.  

We don't know if SP had chosen London as a battle site originally only that he decided that it was a poor position to defend and at this time he may have only been thinking of withdrawing  to fight in another season (or a stronger place) when he had more troops. 

The implication is that he learnt the lesson from the destruction of the 9th not to go on the offensive with his "little army" against a larger force.
  
Deryk
Reply
Alecto wrote:


The timeline of the whole affair is fascinating. However - this is just an idea of my own - The Trinovantes were the ones who had had enough of the veterans, they weren't bothering the Iceni. Only when the loans from Claudius and Seneca were called in, (one could suspect that Claudius practically bought a number of tribes instead of defeating them) and probably around the time that Prasutagus died, did the Roman rule really start to bite.

The Iceni were a “Clent Kingdom” under Prasutagus but became part of the Roman Province on his death and the whole of their lands became Roman property. This was exactly the same situation that the Trinovantes found themselves in so there was a joint case for both tribes to take back their lands and rid their area of the Romans by destroying Colchester.  
 
Alecto wrote:


I find it interesting that Catus Decianus came with a small force to collect the money. Now it would have been very stupid on the part of Suetonius to go off on campaign if he had known that Decianus was off to get the money - tax gathering was an ideal way to take money for yourself without anyone being the wiser. Every Roman would know that. So is it the case that Decianus waited until PS had gone off and then hurried off to augment his income? 


As far as Rome was concerned the act of taking possession of a Client Kingdom totally was an accepted act of State and therefore SP would have supported this, so Catus probably was within his rights to do this although his method was both draconian and cruel. To flog a leader of a tribe and to have her daughters raped shows the level of contempt that the Roman state had for the Brythons; add to this insult the fact that the possessions of the aristocracy were also forfit to the Emperor and you can understand why the uprising occurred.
 
Alecto wrote:

Another idea - please drive it into the ground is it is too ridiculous - but why could there not have been some planning for the rebellion? The Trinovantes, the Coritani , Iceni and perhaps even the tribe that appears to have boxed in the IInd? For all we know Boudica came from Devon/Dorset and might have contacts there. Plenty of time after a confab with the three tribes above to send a messenger and start the rebellion. 



Even the uprising to take Colchester would have taken some planning between tribes and it is surely no coincidence that it took place when SP was campaigning in Anglesey (although at this time there was a campaign every year so it could be almost guaranteed that most of the available army not on garrison duty would be occupied).

Tacitus does not limit the Brythons that attacked Colchester to only the Iceni and the Trinovantes and it is possible that other tribes including the Coritani were involved but to what degree is unknown. There is an argument that the Druids were also involved in the organisation of the war and acted as go betweens.

Was it a “country wide” uprising that caused the 2nd not to join with SP or just unfortunate judgement or a sense of duty by the officer to his immediate superiors rather than SP to protect his Legion for them?

Difficult to say but the implication is that it would have been possible for the 2nd to have joined with SP otherwise there would have been no need for Poenius Postumius  to have taken his own life in regret.   
 
Alecto wrote:

Surely the rebels wanted to engage with Suetonius as soon as possible. It would work to his advantage not to do so. I've read in several accounts that St. Albans wasn't necessarily put to the sword by the rebels at least not to the extent that Colchester and London were. The long delay before they take London is a puzzle. Either they sat there waiting in St. Albans to intercept them on Watling Street, or they waited elsewhere. 


The access points towards the homelands of the Trinovantes and Iceni are diverse so for the tribes to wait for SP at St Albans would leave them exposed to an approach from (for example) Godmanchester and it is more likely that they would have waited in an area that they knew well closer to home.
 
Alecto wrote:

In any case, they didn't take London until Suetonius had left there and the cavalry dash is really not an option. Logistics are, the warehouses in Southwark were burnt, but not necessarily by the rebels in my opinion.

Probably burnt by SP

Alecto wrote:

In addition to that there must have been an opportunity for the Classis Britannica to sail from Anglesey to at least the area of Poole harbour? Even though it is rarely mentioned I recall one mention of it somewhere! in relation to the Anglesey expedition. 

It is mentioned but does not seem to fit with the other parts of the narrative at all.

Alecto wrote:

I still think - thanks to Steve Kaye - that withdrawing south/west was easily the best thing PS could do, he would engage on a site of his own choice, one that would be unfamiliar to the rebels


On the face of it this is a good option and my original favourite but it can equally be applied to the Akeman Street route with the same destination and a number of highly defensible positions for SP and a more compelling argument regarding distance and "comfort zone" for the Brythons.   
Deryk
Reply
(09-14-2016, 06:44 PM)Theoderic Wrote: a lot of the Brythonic Tribes had been conquered and assimulated into the Roman Empire

Yes. It's interesting that all the fighting in Britain we know about (Boudica excepted), following the immediate invasion campaign, seems to have happened in the far west, Wales and the north.

It could be that the peoples of the south-east and Midlands, perhaps due to a closer affinity or cultural connection with the Gauls of the continent, perhaps a more developed social system or economy, found it easier to assimilate to Roman control and live under Roman laws and taxation.

(09-14-2016, 06:44 PM)Theoderic Wrote: It does no justice to the various Roman generals to dismiss the Brythons as a rabble

True - although it does seem that the Romans themselves underestimated their enemy quite badly - the citizens of Colchester by not defending their town, Cerialis by trying to relieve it with too small a force, Paulinus by advancing with only part of his army from Wales. And who knows what Postumus thought he was doing!

But I don't think we can draw from this that the Britons were collectively a 'disciplined, organised' military force. What they had was an overwhelming numerical superiority, and a mass grievance against Rome to motivate them. Imperialist occupation forces have habitually understimated such things...

The more I think about it, the less inclined I am to see Cerialis's defeat as the result of an ambush. While it would have been possible to ambush a small Roman column by surprise, or cut off a foraging party, Cerialis was advancing into a hostile country and would have been on his guard. Unless he was incompetent (which seems not to have been the case) he would have had scouts all around him keeping him informed of enemy movements. We know from Arrian that the Romans could deploy from line of march to line of battle very quickly - unless the Britons managed to rush upon Cerialis in vast numbers and at great speed, he would have had time to prepare himself for a pitched battle.

(09-14-2016, 06:44 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Still do not buy this argument.

Well, it seem we cannot agree then! But I still don't see that we can read this any other way, unless we assume that Tacitus was covering up for Roman trepidation. London was comprehensively sacked and almost completely destroyed, and Paulinus would not have evacuated the place were he not faced with an enemy that he could hope to defeat in open battle.
Nathan Ross
Reply
Getting back to Decianus and his small escort, did the Romans really think that they had disarmed the Iceni (as well as some other tribes) ?  Only 14 years earlier  if I recall correctly, the Coritani and Iceni  fought Scapula  when he decided  to disarm them, near Stonea. 14 years is certainly living memory.
As fas I've read, these tribes were still without arms.  Obviously not the case - in any case, any items left by the detachment of the IXth would have been  very useful.
Alice
Reply


Possibly Related Threads…
Thread Author Replies Views Last Post
  Armchair Wall walking mcbishop 3 3,481 01-11-2012, 03:22 AM
Last Post: Vindex

Forum Jump: