Thread Rating:
  • 4 Vote(s) - 5 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
(09-21-2016, 09:27 AM)Theoderic Wrote: Renatus wrote:

I have been thinking about this. There was an element of regaining homelands. Tacitus tells us that the Icenian nobles had been dispossessed and that the Trinovantes had been driven from their farms. He also mentions in the Agricola the castella that were overrun in the initial stages of the revolt. I take these to be small fortified posts or fortlets, which may have been an acceptable feature of the arrangements with Prasutagus but which had then become symbols of oppression. That said, however, the revolt involved much more than the simple recovery of homelands; it was a concerted effort to combine the tribes in driving the Romans from Britain once and for all.

I agree with this but suspect that the “castella” were the forts imposed upon the Iceni after Boudica had been scourged and her possessions taken by the Roman State.  

I had not thought of that but it seems entirely possible.

(09-21-2016, 09:27 AM)Theoderic Wrote: Renatus wrote:

There was no guarantee that the rebels would have been able achieve their goal within the necessary timeframe. The alternative, therefore, as I see it, is that the rebel army would have had to remain in the field until the Roman forces were finally overcome and that, whatever the hazards, this would have necessitated taking their families with them. Leaving them behind to face possible starvation over the winter was not an option.


This is of course a highly plausible option but where were they going to get their grain for an ongoing campaign with over 150,000 people?

The corn from Colchester is one possibility but this would have only have been enough for around 30,000 people for a limited period and would have required a huge baggage train, London was stripped of supplies by SP and St Albans similarly (even SP was running short of food having had access to the granaries)

The insurgents would never have been able to rely on grain being available to them in other tribe’s lands. (It is said that the mere threat of a Roman army marching through a land and eating its food was enough to cause the surrender before a battle was even needed –no doubt the same devastating effect would be the case with any army living off the land – so the locals were not going to starve themselves).    

We do not know that Suetonius stripped London and St Albans of supplies. That is purely surmise on our part. Depending upon how close to London the rebels were when he arrived there, there simply may not have been time. I have suggested that he may even have left the warehouses intact, relying upon the rebels wasting time in plundering them and buying himself time to link up with his reinforcements. After all, if he could amass a force strong enough to defeat the rebels, it would not matter how much they had seized. Bear in mind also that, even if he did destroy the supplies, the rebels would not have known this in advance and, as Tacitus tells us, had made their plans on the assumption that they would be able to capture sufficient Roman foodstuffs for their needs. Further, if I am right in thinking that they intended to attack tribes perceived to be pro-Roman, they would have pillaged the crops of those tribes without any consideration for the plight that this would create for their victims.

(09-21-2016, 09:27 AM)Theoderic Wrote: As you say SP’s best option would have been to hold off until the next season and then destroy them with a much larger army.

I do not think that this necessarily was Suetonius' best option. I think that he would have wanted, if possible, to have defeated the rebels that year with the forces available to him. However, if he could not do that, there was the distinct possibility that over the winter other tribes would have seen the advantage of joining the rebellion and he then would have needed reinforcements from the Continent to be sure of crushing a much larger rebellion.

(09-21-2016, 09:27 AM)Theoderic Wrote: Tacitus states:

"he was naturally inclined to delay, and a man who preferred cautious and well-reasoned plans to chance success."

In fact I think that this is exactly what he was going to do once he was able to assess the situation accurately, which wasn't until he was in London.

This is then supported by Dio:

“However, he was not willing to risk a conflict with the barbarians immediately, as he feared their numbers and their desperation, but was inclined to postpone battle to a more convenient season.”

But then his options change as by taking the Roman citizens from London with him he is slowed down by them and then starts to run out of food and is being chased by the Brythons.  

“But as he grew short of food and the barbarians pressed relentlessly upon him, he was compelled, contrary to his judgment, to engage them.”


This then provides us with a dilemma – if the Brythons were catching him how was this a slow moving horde, made up of families?

Certainly, the situation was fluid and changing day-by-day. However, I do not believe that he was slowed down by the civilians. Tacitus specifically makes the point that he only took those who were able to keep up. Nathan has pointed out that he was not trying to outstrip the rebels. Indeed, he would have wanted to remain sufficiently close to them as to be able to monitor their progress and react accordingly. You yourself have earlier suggested that what Dio is saying is that the rebels were not so much catching up with him as simply inexorably advancing.


(09-21-2016, 01:00 PM)Alecto Wrote: Surely the Brython  cavalry would harass the tail end of the Roman troops?  Much in the way they apparently had made life difficult for PS when he was on his way to London.
They could but we are not told that they did. Even so, by the time the final battle took place, the main wagon train had caught up, so Dio is clearly talking about the main rebel army, not isolated groups of cavalry. Similarly, Tacitus does not say that he was attacked on the way to London. He simply says that he resolutely proceeded to London through the midst of the enemy.


(09-21-2016, 05:45 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(09-19-2016, 01:32 PM)Renatus Wrote: He also mentions in the Agricola the castella that were overrun in the initial stages of the revolt. I take these to be small fortified posts or fortlets
(09-21-2016, 09:27 AM)Theoderic Wrote: the “castella” were the forts imposed upon the Iceni

Agricola and Annals seem to be in contradiction here - the latter claims that the rebels avoided the fortified posts. Perhaps the Iceni captured some forts initially, but later avoided them, or something?

Tacitus uses the same terminology in both cases. However, in the Agricola he speaks of these stations in the early stages of the revolt, whereas in the Annals he mentions them only after the sacking of London and Verulamium. I assume, therefore, that the Iceni attacked the posts in their own territory but, after that, avoided similar posts elsewhere and concentrated on plundering. Presumably, the Trinovantes did the same.

(09-21-2016, 05:45 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: the crop planting is a headtwister. March/April is too early, as you say - they'd have to wait until Paulinus had at least set off on his Anglesey expedition, which was probably a month later, until they 'left for the war'

If they sowed their crops in March/April, but then didn't come back in August/September to harvest that crop or to plant the winter wheat, they would have no supplies for the winter or any winter wheat crop the following year. This might be the only explanation, although it would still mean that failing to harvest would have been more critical than failing to plant... (unless, of course, crops were only planted in Aug/Sept, grown over the winter and harvested the following year?)

I take the failure to plant in the spring as being a positive policy decision, realising that they were unlikely to be back in time for the harvest and not wanting to have unharvested crops rotting in the fields. Instead, should they return in time for winter planting, they relied upon having seized sufficient Roman foodstuffs to see them through.

(09-21-2016, 05:45 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(09-21-2016, 09:27 AM)Theoderic Wrote: “the barbarians pressed relentlessly upon him...” – if the Brythons were catching him how was this a slow moving horde, made up of families?

Could somebody provide a literal translation of the Greek Dio uses for the phrase 'pressed relentlessly upon him'?

In English it sounds like the rebels were in hot pursuit, but we've seen before how translations (particularly older ones) can be deceptive! Dio could just mean something like 'advanced continually in his direction' or something, with no implication of speed...

I'll have a go, although I cannot guarantee its accuracy: 'and the hard-pressing barbarians did not then give up'.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
(09-21-2016, 09:26 PM)Renatus Wrote: I take the failure to plant in the spring as being a positive policy decision, realising that they were unlikely to be back in time for the harvest and not wanting to have unharvested crops rotting in the fields.

Interesting, and plausible. We'd have to ask Deryk's question above about why the Romans didn't notice this, but I suppose if they'd managed to miss a re-armament program they could also have missed a lack of agricultural activity! It would mean that the planning for the revolt went back several months, of course, but I think we're all accepting that already.

What would they have done with all the seed grain they didn't sow? Could they have simply eaten it?

Good suggestion for a worthy academic paper: The Sowing Season in Iron Age Britain and its Implications for the Date of Boudica's Revolt... [Image: wink.png]


(09-21-2016, 09:26 PM)Renatus Wrote: 'and the hard-pressing barbarians did not then give up'.

Thanks - that sounds about right!
Nathan Ross
Reply
(09-23-2016, 11:12 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: What would they have done with all the seed grain they didn't sow? Could they have simply eaten it?

That would surely be an act of desperation, although it could be what they ended up doing. Could they have stored it until they were ready to plant it?

(09-23-2016, 11:12 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:
(09-21-2016, 09:26 PM)Renatus Wrote: 'and the hard-pressing barbarians did not then give up'.

Thanks - that sounds about right!

The word for 'hard-pressing' (ἐγκείμενοι) derives from the verb ἔγκειμαι, one of the meanings of which is 'to press hard', esp. of troops pressing upon a defeated or retreating enemy. This seems spot-on for the situation.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Renatus wrote:


Tacitus uses the same terminology in both cases. However, in the Agricola he speaks of these stations in the early stages of the revolt, whereas in theAnnals he mentions them only after the sacking of London and Verulamium. I assume, therefore, that the Iceni attacked the posts in their own territory but, after that, avoided similar posts elsewhere and concentrated on plundering. Presumably, the Trinovantes did the same.

I think that is spot on.   

Renatus wrote:

I take the failure to plant in the spring as being a positive policy decision, realising that they were unlikely to be back in time for the harvest and not wanting to have unharvested crops rotting in the fields. Instead, should they return in time for winter planting, they relied upon having seized sufficient Roman foodstuffs to see them through

Nathan wrote:

What would they have done with all the seed grain they didn't sow? Could they have simply eaten it?

Renatus wrote:

That would surely be an act of desperation, although it could be what they ended up doing. Could they have stored it until they were ready to plant it?

They certainly could have stored it for many months but I think that between you, you have come up with a solution that fits.

As we agree that this was a planned uprising they would have realised that they would have needed provisions for the road. Most of their wheat would have to be left to feed their families so this may have meant that they had to take a certain amount from what they would normally have sown in the spring.

This would mean that there may have been some spring sowing but a limited amount perhaps enough to fool the Romans but have taken the rest with them on their quest.

Now if they arrived at Colchester around mid June they would not have harvested their crops but also neither would have the farms around Colchester and possibly the granaries were not as full as the Brythons expected (perhaps Roman supplies were also depleted as SP was short of food) and therefore there was not enough to replace what extra the  Horde used to feed themselves whilst on the march

This would mean that the summer harvest would have been limited with the winter wheat intact but with little spring wheat but their campaign did not deliver enough to make up the shortfall

It would have been unthinkable for them not to have planted their winter wheat but obviously the stocks would have been depleted over a period of months but it is likely that they had other crops which would have helped but SP running a "burnt earth" campaign destroying growing crops may have been the "final straw" as it were. 

The context of the famine was after Boudica’s final battle (probably in early AD62) so this is the first theory that fits the writings.

Renatus wrote:

The word for 'hard-pressing' (ἐγκείμενοι) derives from the verb ἔγκειμαι, one of the meanings of which is 'to press hard', esp. of troops pressing upon a defeated or retreating enemy. This seems spot-on for the situation.

Interesting!!!
Deryk
Reply
(09-24-2016, 06:22 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Nathan wrote:

What would they have done with all the seed grain they didn't sow? Could they have simply eaten it?

Renatus wrote:

That would surely be an act of desperation, although it could be what they ended up doing. Could they have stored it until they were ready to plant it?

They certainly could have stored it for many months but I think that between you, you have come up with a solution that fits.

As we agree that this was a planned uprising they would have realised that they would have needed provisions for the road. Most of their wheat would have to be left to feed their families so this may have meant that they had to take a certain amount from what they would normally have sown in the spring.

Do not misunderstand me. When I suggest that the rebels ate the seed corn I mean this to be following their return to their homelands empty-handed after the final battle, not during their march.

We have a fundamental difference of opinion as to whether or not the rebel fighters left their families behind when they set off on their campaign. As you know, I contend that they were accompanied by their families, in which case they would have taken the bulk of the available provisions with them, leaving only sufficient to sustain those who were too old or infirm to travel. The seed corn would have been placed in storage to await their return. 

(09-24-2016, 06:22 PM)Theoderic Wrote: The context of the famine was after Boudica’s final battle (probably in early AD62) so this is the first theory that fits the writings.

I cannot believe that the final battle was as late as this. There is nothing in the sources to suggest that it was preceded by a winter campaign. The rebellion broke out while Suetonius was engaged in his Anglesey campaign. He would have expected to complete this within a single campaigning season and he was still engaged in mopping-up operations when he received news of the revolt. I think that we are all agreed that the time between this and the final battle could only have been a few weeks. We are told that, after the battle, he combined his forces and kept them sub pellibus for the remainder of the war. It is not specifically stated that this involved their being in tents over the winter but there does seem to be the implication that this was unusual and that normally they would have returned to their bases, presumably for the winter. We are also told that the auxiliaries sent over from the Continent were housed in new winter quarters, which suggests that they were installed before the onset of winter in 61.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Renatus wrote:


We have a fundamental difference of opinion as to whether or not the rebel fighters left their families behind when they set off on their campaign.

And there I was thinking we had reached an accord  Smile

Renatus wrote:

I cannot believe that the final battle was as late as this. There is nothing in the sources to suggest that it was preceded by a winter campaign. The rebellion broke out while Suetonius was engaged in his Anglesey campaign. He would have expected to complete this within a single campaigning season and he was still engaged in mopping-up operations when he received news of the revolt. I think that we are all agreed that the time between this and the final battle could only have been a few weeks. We are told that, after the battle, he combined his forces and kept them sub pellibus for the remainder of the war. It is not specifically stated that this involved their being in tents over the winter but there does seem to be the implication that this was unusual and that normally they would have returned to their bases, presumably for the winter. We are also told that the auxiliaries sent over from the Continent were housed in new winter quarters, which suggests that they were installed before the onset of winter in 61.

I totally agree Michael - I'm afraid that I have unwittingly misled you as perhaps I was not clear in my explanation.

 When I wrote: The context of the famine was after Boudica’s final battle (probably in early AD62) so this is the first theory that fits the writings in the previous post I meant that the famine occurred in early AD62, NOT Boudica's last battle which as I have written in my book was around the end of summer AD61.

 
Deryk
Reply
(09-24-2016, 10:55 PM)Theoderic Wrote:  When I wrote: The context of the famine was after Boudica’s final battle (probably in early AD62) so this is the first theory that fits the writings in the previous post I meant that the famine occurred in early AD62, NOT Boudica's last battle which as I have written in my book was around the end of summer AD61. 

I see what you mean. Thinking about it, I wonder whether the period of hardship may have begun earlier and lasted longer. When the rebels returned to their homeland without supplies and with no crops to harvest, they would have been obliged to start consuming the seed corn immediately. Of its nature, this would have been far less than the crop it was intended to produce and, therefore, would be unlikely to have been sufficient to sustain the people. On the other hand, if possible they would have wished to plant some of it to yield a meagre harvest in the spring, which again would probably have been insufficient but some of which should still have to be planted to provide a greater harvest in the autumn. Gradually, therefore, they would have been able to build up to full production but this could have taken some time. On this basis, famine conditions could have persisted for at least a year and possibly longer.

They may have been able to supplement their supplies by purchasing grain from other tribes who had a surplus and were willing to sell it, no doubt at exorbitant prices. However, the other tribes may have been reluctant to do this for fear of seeming to the Romans to have been sympathetic to the revolt.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Renatus wrote:

When the rebels returned to their homeland without supplies and with no crops to harvest, they would have been obliged to start consuming the seed corn immediately.

I expect that they probably had already planted the winter wheat in AD60 which could have been harvested in AD61 but as you say it wouldn't have been enough to keep them going through the winter without the Spring sowing.
Deryk
Reply
Atherstone Civic Societies assessment of Mancetter, worth a field trip;
http://atherstonecivicsociety.co.uk/projectrm/

134129
Reply
Many thanks John for the link.....

I think that we are back to the "splash and dash" theory but nothing new.

They seem to be indicating that the Roman Army was not blocking the way (as at Tring; not that Tring even gets a mention but I'm glad to see that Church Stowe and Dunstable are in the running!!!).

Also the problem with Mancetter of the river running across the battle site hasn't been explained away.... if we accept that we have to bring back Cunetio and Dorking.
Deryk
Reply
Dear Melvyn Bragg,
 I have been reading this thread with great interest but am a little puzzled by one thing. The phrase "deligitque locum artis faucibus et a tergo silva clausum" is variously translated as "chose a position approached by a narrow defile, closed in at the rear by a forest", "chose a position in a defile with a wood behind him" or "clinging to the narrow defile as a defence". Now I am under the impression that "faux" means ravine or gorge, not some shallow valley in the home counties. Now I only know of two gorges in southern England and one of them is a tad too damp. I am sorry I haven't a clue how they got there but the conclusion is that the battle happened at Cheddar Gorge.
 Mrs Trellis,
  North Wales.
Reply
(10-18-2016, 02:00 PM)kavan Wrote: I am under the impression that "faux" means ravine or gorge, not some shallow valley in the home counties.

It's an odd word, and we discussed it a couple of times. Faucibus is a plural, I think (perhaps this led to Dio thinking there was more than one 'defile'? Or perhaps there actually was more than one?...) Something like 'jaws' might preserve the plural sense. It means anything from a throat or gullet to the entranceway of a house to a ravine or gorge, as you say.

With all those different meanings, we probably don't have to be too literal about our definition in this case - some kind of narrowish gap or gully or pass between two areas of higher ground would be fine, I think - which is what most of us have been suggesting here. We should remember that Tacitus himself probably never saw the location...


(10-18-2016, 02:00 PM)kavan Wrote: the conclusion is that the battle happened at Cheddar Gorge.

Could be! Although I'd wonder why both the Romans and Britons found themselves so far west... [Image: wink.png]
Nathan Ross
Reply
Thank you for replying Mr Ross,
If some historians reckon that Paulinus retreated as far north as Mancetter before giving battle then using their thinking, the Romans could have got as far west as the Mendip hills if they were hoping to link up with Legio II.

Richard Kavanagh
Reply
(10-24-2016, 11:12 AM)kavan Wrote: some historians reckon that Paulinus retreated as far north as Mancetter before giving battle

The reasoning behind placing the battle in the Midlands, suggested by Haverfield, Webster and others, is that Paulinus could not have marched all the way to London in time to head off Boudica - so he must have left his troops on the road, nipped down to London for a personal recce, then nipped back to join them on the march. This would indeed put the final battle somewhere around Mancetter.

However, this idea isn't supported in the texts, and has no parallel in Roman military history. I far prefer the suggestion that Tacitus's dramatic presentation of events seems to compress the time available, and Paulinus in fact would have had a few more days, time enough to get to London by normal marching pace. So no need to assume he was anywhere in the Midlands when it came to the confrontation.

The chronology we're assuming for the campaign, though, doesn't leave too much free time - once things get moving, the critical battle needs to happen within a month or two at most, to allow time for reinforcements and various messages and travellers to and from Rome. That reduces the time available for long distance manoeuvres prior to the battle.

So it seems likely that the battle took place close to London, rather than far away in the west (or the Midlands) - places that would have taken much marching for the Romans, and more importantly the slower-moving Britons, to reach.

But one thing we have established in all these years of discussion is that there are multiple interpretations of even the simplest aspect of the campaign, and we could all be completely wrong!



(10-24-2016, 11:12 AM)kavan Wrote: if they were hoping to link up with Legio II. 

Most people have assumed that the 2nd legion were somewhere in the west at full strength. I've come to prefer Michael's idea that it was only a veteran detachment left to guard the legion camp under the praefectus Postumus, while the bulk of the legion were away in Wales. If so, there would far more troops available in north Wales than anywhere in the west, and if Paulinus was looking for large-scale support he would have been better to move in a northern direction than a western one... The proposed location(s) near Tring suits both avenues of reinforcement!
Nathan Ross
Reply
I've read there is evidence of burning in London, St.Albans, Colchester and maybe Silchester.

Is there anything further north?
Oh the grand oh Duke Suetonius, he had a Roman legion, he galloped rushed down to (a minor settlement called) Londinium then he galloped rushed back again. Londinium Bridge is falling down, falling down ... HOLD IT ... change of plans, we're leaving the bridge for Boudica and galloping rushing north.
Reply


Possibly Related Threads…
Thread Author Replies Views Last Post
  Armchair Wall walking mcbishop 3 3,481 01-11-2012, 03:22 AM
Last Post: Vindex

Forum Jump: