05-05-2010, 06:17 PM
It certainly seems logical that strength (and quick reflexes) honed by wrestling training would help a lot in a shoving match. I recall coming accross an ancient comment somewhere (don't remember exactly where) to the tune that skill in wrestling was recongized as a Theban advantage in combat. In general, superior athleticism among the Thebans was apparently regarded by all the other Greeks as giving their phalanx a significant edge on the battlefield.
As for Delium, Thucydides' account indicates that though the much deeper Theban right shoved the Athenians "further and further back," (4.96.4) it not only did not break them but made progress no more than "gradually at first" (4.96.4). It seems clear in the historian's ordering of events that the Athenian right took advantage of this heroric initial resistance to defeat the Theban left wing (4.96.2), rolling it up and at least partially surrounding the Thespian contingent, which was close to the center on that side (triggering a slaughter so fierce that some Athenians even cut down their own men in the chaos). Upon seeing that that the distress on his left wing was about to cost him the battle (his right clearly still not in command of its side of the field), Pagondas sent two squadrons of his horsemen (who had been forced into a reserve role by terrain restrictions on both sides of the battle ground) "round the hill" (4.96.5) to strike the victorious Athenian right wing from behind. (Note that this seems to be the most straight-forward reading of the text and follows the detailed field work of W.K. Pritchert at the battle site [1969: Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Part II (Battlefields)]. However, V.D. Hanson has suggested that the horsemen came up over the hill rather than around it as Thucydides states and hit the Athenians there who had turned their backs in encircling the men from Thespiae [2005: A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponesian War].) This surprise attack finally ("at length" [4.96.6]) managed to panic the Athenians "in both parts of the field" (4.96.6), and only then was the Athenian left "broken by the advancing Thebans" (4.96.6) and the whole Athenian phalanx put to flight, so disrupted that its three components (right, center, left) all took off in different directions (4.96.7). (Note: all quotes are from the Richard Crawley translation.)
That the almost fatally tardy defeat of the Athenians' left came against what was presumeably the weaker wing of their phalanx is, if anything, a further indication that Pagondas' ploy of stacking three times deeper than his foe was pretty much a failed tactic (though, to be fair, he likely faced good quality troops since the actual custom seems to have been to put an army's 'second best' men on the left wing, saving the weakest troops for the formation center, preferably sandwiched between better men both front and back). In fact, we don't hear of anyone else using this 'deep wing' sort of approach again for over half a century, and then solely in much modified form (at Leuctra, with even deeper files on the left this time and 'refusing' the right wing to avoid a repeat of the near disaster at Delium). And even these changes weren't entirely adequate, as at Mantinea nine years later, it appears that a failure of discipline among Thebes' allies on the right brought them prematurely into action and caused their defeat on that part of the field, resulting in a draw for the battle overall. - Regards, Fred
As for Delium, Thucydides' account indicates that though the much deeper Theban right shoved the Athenians "further and further back," (4.96.4) it not only did not break them but made progress no more than "gradually at first" (4.96.4). It seems clear in the historian's ordering of events that the Athenian right took advantage of this heroric initial resistance to defeat the Theban left wing (4.96.2), rolling it up and at least partially surrounding the Thespian contingent, which was close to the center on that side (triggering a slaughter so fierce that some Athenians even cut down their own men in the chaos). Upon seeing that that the distress on his left wing was about to cost him the battle (his right clearly still not in command of its side of the field), Pagondas sent two squadrons of his horsemen (who had been forced into a reserve role by terrain restrictions on both sides of the battle ground) "round the hill" (4.96.5) to strike the victorious Athenian right wing from behind. (Note that this seems to be the most straight-forward reading of the text and follows the detailed field work of W.K. Pritchert at the battle site [1969: Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Part II (Battlefields)]. However, V.D. Hanson has suggested that the horsemen came up over the hill rather than around it as Thucydides states and hit the Athenians there who had turned their backs in encircling the men from Thespiae [2005: A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponesian War].) This surprise attack finally ("at length" [4.96.6]) managed to panic the Athenians "in both parts of the field" (4.96.6), and only then was the Athenian left "broken by the advancing Thebans" (4.96.6) and the whole Athenian phalanx put to flight, so disrupted that its three components (right, center, left) all took off in different directions (4.96.7). (Note: all quotes are from the Richard Crawley translation.)
That the almost fatally tardy defeat of the Athenians' left came against what was presumeably the weaker wing of their phalanx is, if anything, a further indication that Pagondas' ploy of stacking three times deeper than his foe was pretty much a failed tactic (though, to be fair, he likely faced good quality troops since the actual custom seems to have been to put an army's 'second best' men on the left wing, saving the weakest troops for the formation center, preferably sandwiched between better men both front and back). In fact, we don't hear of anyone else using this 'deep wing' sort of approach again for over half a century, and then solely in much modified form (at Leuctra, with even deeper files on the left this time and 'refusing' the right wing to avoid a repeat of the near disaster at Delium). And even these changes weren't entirely adequate, as at Mantinea nine years later, it appears that a failure of discipline among Thebes' allies on the right brought them prematurely into action and caused their defeat on that part of the field, resulting in a draw for the battle overall. - Regards, Fred
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
