05-26-2010, 06:12 PM
Paralus/Michael,
Your observation that Alexander's small armament crossing the Danube clearly included phalangites/sarissaphoroi is a very important point. My view on this is that the common ratio of hypaspists/hoplites to pikemen in the Macedonian army at this time was 1-to-3, with hypaspists organized in 1,000-man units and phalangites in 3,000-man units, the number of units of each maintaining this same 1-to-3 ratio (3 phalangite units for every one of hypaspists). Thus, the advance force at the Danube was a fully integrated 'mini-phalanx' in proper proportion, its 4,000 heavy infantry including one unit of hypaspists (1,000 elite doryphoroi, undoubtedly the agema of Royal hypaspists under Nicanor, quite likely the king's best 'hoplite leader' and thus future hypaspist commander) and one of sarissa-bearing phalangites (3,000 strong, again likely Alexander's best) plus cavalry for forward/flank work (these latter probably had screening light infantry as well, perhaps organically attached in this era and thus not mentioned separately). With such a diverse force, Alexander was ready to meet any sort of threat by deploying in Philip's standard fashion (hoplites and heavy cavalry on the right for offense, phalangites at center and left to hold the line, light horsemen to seucure the left flank, and light footmen for screening the cavalry on both ends of the line and post-battle pursuit). When deployed for action, Alexander would have taken charge of the left/center of the phalanx (as he had at Chaeronea and would continue to do until such time as he reorganized his methods for the Asian campaign) and Nicanor the right (with his own hypaspists and any Companion horse on hand). This would explain the use of sarissai that is mentioned, as troops armed with this weapon would have made up fully 3/4 of the force's heavy contingent.
As I say, I haven't formally reconstructed the battle of Chaeronea yet; however, I have done reconstructions of the 12 Macedonian engagements in Philip's reign up through the battles on Crocus Plain and at Pagasae in 353 B.C. In wrestling long and hard with these, I have found that a Macedonian system of mixed arms (hoplites, phalangites, shock cavalry, and light horse/foot) seems to offer the most rational explanation for all the raw data and a very plausable description of Philip's fighting style. His son seems to have largely continued this methodology, albeit with some necessary later modifications in adapting it to the much more open terrain he had to contend with in Asia. (One of his changes might have been to eliminate phalangites from his advance parties like that at the Danube, keeping the other elements - including an upgrade to elite Agrianian peltasts among the light foot - and relying entirely on his more flexible hypaspists/hoplites for heavy, line infantry. This, however, it s a pretty tentative thought at this point, being well out ahead of my deep research.) Still, all the foregoing personal opinion having been vented, I nevertheless sincerely remain open to other ideas - any ideas! I've got no private agenda on these issues, only a fervent wish to treat the data as evenly and logically as possible toward letting "the chips fall where they may." Regards, Fred
Your observation that Alexander's small armament crossing the Danube clearly included phalangites/sarissaphoroi is a very important point. My view on this is that the common ratio of hypaspists/hoplites to pikemen in the Macedonian army at this time was 1-to-3, with hypaspists organized in 1,000-man units and phalangites in 3,000-man units, the number of units of each maintaining this same 1-to-3 ratio (3 phalangite units for every one of hypaspists). Thus, the advance force at the Danube was a fully integrated 'mini-phalanx' in proper proportion, its 4,000 heavy infantry including one unit of hypaspists (1,000 elite doryphoroi, undoubtedly the agema of Royal hypaspists under Nicanor, quite likely the king's best 'hoplite leader' and thus future hypaspist commander) and one of sarissa-bearing phalangites (3,000 strong, again likely Alexander's best) plus cavalry for forward/flank work (these latter probably had screening light infantry as well, perhaps organically attached in this era and thus not mentioned separately). With such a diverse force, Alexander was ready to meet any sort of threat by deploying in Philip's standard fashion (hoplites and heavy cavalry on the right for offense, phalangites at center and left to hold the line, light horsemen to seucure the left flank, and light footmen for screening the cavalry on both ends of the line and post-battle pursuit). When deployed for action, Alexander would have taken charge of the left/center of the phalanx (as he had at Chaeronea and would continue to do until such time as he reorganized his methods for the Asian campaign) and Nicanor the right (with his own hypaspists and any Companion horse on hand). This would explain the use of sarissai that is mentioned, as troops armed with this weapon would have made up fully 3/4 of the force's heavy contingent.
As I say, I haven't formally reconstructed the battle of Chaeronea yet; however, I have done reconstructions of the 12 Macedonian engagements in Philip's reign up through the battles on Crocus Plain and at Pagasae in 353 B.C. In wrestling long and hard with these, I have found that a Macedonian system of mixed arms (hoplites, phalangites, shock cavalry, and light horse/foot) seems to offer the most rational explanation for all the raw data and a very plausable description of Philip's fighting style. His son seems to have largely continued this methodology, albeit with some necessary later modifications in adapting it to the much more open terrain he had to contend with in Asia. (One of his changes might have been to eliminate phalangites from his advance parties like that at the Danube, keeping the other elements - including an upgrade to elite Agrianian peltasts among the light foot - and relying entirely on his more flexible hypaspists/hoplites for heavy, line infantry. This, however, it s a pretty tentative thought at this point, being well out ahead of my deep research.) Still, all the foregoing personal opinion having been vented, I nevertheless sincerely remain open to other ideas - any ideas! I've got no private agenda on these issues, only a fervent wish to treat the data as evenly and logically as possible toward letting "the chips fall where they may." Regards, Fred
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
