05-26-2010, 09:44 PM
I think that the concept of the Persians at Thermopylae being "poorly ordered" is one of the myths that have sprung up around the Persian Wars; in fact, this was the problem that I alluded to in Reinstating the Hoplite with regard to Schwartz's shallow investigation into opposing armies (the Persian army in this case). To really know what hoplites could do, it is necessary to have a good handle on what all of their foes could do as well. Actually, the standard Persian formation called for quite a well-ordered array, with a shield wall forward (large spara or gherrhon shields held by two or more ranks of spear-armed men - the source of the term sparabara or 'shield holders' for the standard Persian line infantry), with following ranks (normally to a depth of 10 men - a dathabam, the smallest unit of organization) lacking shields, but armed with spears and bows (the spears being buried in the ground for use of the bow) in the middle and bows only at the far rear (save for the Immortals, who all seem to have carried spear as well as bow).
The design was for the forward 'shield wall' to stop (or at least slow) the enemy, a spearman from behind stepping up to take the shield of any man fallen at the front, while the bowmen farther back continued to bombard and cavalry maneuvered to envelop off the flanks (something not possible at Thermopylae to the Persians' considerable cost). What the Spartans did facing this kind of oppositon in the opening round (first of three engagements on the battle's first day) was to fake retreat, getting the Persians to open up the shield wall for pursuit only to then be cut down as the Spartans spun on command and resumed their attack. This is attested by Herodotus only for the intial action against the Medes and, though it worked more than once (cutting through several separate Persian shield walls, each in front of a fresh unit - hazaraba, the standard field units of the Persian army, each having 600 men in this action - which were set up one after another within the narrow pass). Naturally, the Persians eventually caught on and the faux retreat tactic is not attested at any later point in the Thermopylae story (though the Pesians apparently fell for the same trick at least one more time a year later at Plataia). Deprived of this device, the Spartans then (and the other, less-drilled Greeks from the beginning) had to rely on the slower, costlier, but sure method of spearing/pushing through each new shield wall before putting the shieldless troops behind to rout. (Interestingly, on the second day of battle, the Persians appear to have modified their attack - per Diodorus - by making an assault with a force put together from only shield bearers from several regiments, thus trying in vain to match the Greek phalanx with a fully shield-equipped force of spearmen.)
As to exactly how the faux retreat was carried out, I can only speculate. However, based on what Herodotus and Plato said about it, I believe that it was an evolution that started on command at the back of the phalanx (probably only six deep in the case of the spartiate array at Thermopylae), with each line from the rear taking a practiced step or two back and then turning to begin a quick-step (not running) retreat with their back to the enemy. Thus, when the front rank pulled back in the midst of a bout of spear-fencing (not othismos), it took the enemy by surprise for a few seconds (never having seen anything remotely like this before), allowing the hoplites to rapidly move off while showing their backs (undoubtedly the most difficult part of the action, calling for a good deal of moxy among the Spartan front-rankers). Suddenly realizing that they had apparently won, the foe would foolishly break ranks to pursue, only to encounter a deadly counter-move as the Spartans turned back in unison with their spears and shields, once more doing so from the back first (the back now being the old front rank, which now advanced to re-contact the enemy). I envision Philip's well-trained and seasoned professional spearmen/hypaspists doing pretty much the same thing to the poor amateur and inexperienced Athenian militiamen at Chaeronea. Regards, Fred
The design was for the forward 'shield wall' to stop (or at least slow) the enemy, a spearman from behind stepping up to take the shield of any man fallen at the front, while the bowmen farther back continued to bombard and cavalry maneuvered to envelop off the flanks (something not possible at Thermopylae to the Persians' considerable cost). What the Spartans did facing this kind of oppositon in the opening round (first of three engagements on the battle's first day) was to fake retreat, getting the Persians to open up the shield wall for pursuit only to then be cut down as the Spartans spun on command and resumed their attack. This is attested by Herodotus only for the intial action against the Medes and, though it worked more than once (cutting through several separate Persian shield walls, each in front of a fresh unit - hazaraba, the standard field units of the Persian army, each having 600 men in this action - which were set up one after another within the narrow pass). Naturally, the Persians eventually caught on and the faux retreat tactic is not attested at any later point in the Thermopylae story (though the Pesians apparently fell for the same trick at least one more time a year later at Plataia). Deprived of this device, the Spartans then (and the other, less-drilled Greeks from the beginning) had to rely on the slower, costlier, but sure method of spearing/pushing through each new shield wall before putting the shieldless troops behind to rout. (Interestingly, on the second day of battle, the Persians appear to have modified their attack - per Diodorus - by making an assault with a force put together from only shield bearers from several regiments, thus trying in vain to match the Greek phalanx with a fully shield-equipped force of spearmen.)
As to exactly how the faux retreat was carried out, I can only speculate. However, based on what Herodotus and Plato said about it, I believe that it was an evolution that started on command at the back of the phalanx (probably only six deep in the case of the spartiate array at Thermopylae), with each line from the rear taking a practiced step or two back and then turning to begin a quick-step (not running) retreat with their back to the enemy. Thus, when the front rank pulled back in the midst of a bout of spear-fencing (not othismos), it took the enemy by surprise for a few seconds (never having seen anything remotely like this before), allowing the hoplites to rapidly move off while showing their backs (undoubtedly the most difficult part of the action, calling for a good deal of moxy among the Spartan front-rankers). Suddenly realizing that they had apparently won, the foe would foolishly break ranks to pursue, only to encounter a deadly counter-move as the Spartans turned back in unison with their spears and shields, once more doing so from the back first (the back now being the old front rank, which now advanced to re-contact the enemy). I envision Philip's well-trained and seasoned professional spearmen/hypaspists doing pretty much the same thing to the poor amateur and inexperienced Athenian militiamen at Chaeronea. Regards, Fred
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
