The "Fred thread": the Argead Macedonian Army

[Paullus Scipio]

Oh, dear, this just won't lay down and die will it? It belongs in a thread of its own;"The Murder of Cleitus". There we could discuss the 'Cluedo' like possibilities at length ( "it was a somatophylake with a longche indoors"...."no it wasn't, others say it was a 'guard' with a sarissa outdoors..."). In any event, it tells us nothing about 'Hypaspist' armament.....

You yourself raised this question - sorry - digression. The armamnet of the hypaspists has, in fact, been part of this thread the "pre-Philip army" has not

Eh? You are the one who raised this 'non-evidence' in respect of 'Hypaspist' armament ! :?
Just two small points:
1. Arrian here doesn't write or use the word "Hypaspist" together with 'sarissa'. Why not? Perhaps he knew 'Hypaspists' didn't use such a weapon......
2. Arrian has Alexander shouting out, apparently in fear for his life, calling for the 'Guard"=Hypaspists? ( in another source "in the Macedonian dialect", IIRC) No-one answers or comes - which implies a) the 'Guards/Hypaspists?' were out of earshot.
b) The 'Guard' at the door ( why at the door? Nothing in the sources about this - but of course a guard indoors couldn't realistically be carrying a 16 ft sarissa could he? Hence the supposition he was 'at the door'.) can't have been a 'Hypaspist' because he doesn't reply/come to Alexander, who is yelling 'murder!' or similar at the top of his voice, and calling for his 'Guard/Hypaspists?! ( If it were so, there could be any number of reasons for this - was he deaf for example - but it does damage the credibility of this version of events. If there was any sort of 'guard' at the door, whatever he was armed with, why didn't he respond to his King?)

Nor does the 'ordinary guard' have to be a Hypaspist. By way of analogy, consider that I have personally witnessed the "Royal Fusiliers", the "Royal Marines", the "Royal Air Force Regiment" and a 'foreign' regiment, "The Royal Australian Regiment" mount the guard at Buckingham palace. None of these belong to the "Guards Division". Every year, non-Guard units form the Monarch's guard at times. So why couldn't an 'ordinary guard' in the form of a regular 'sarissaphoroi' from one of the ordinary 'Taxeis' have been guarding Alexander at the time? No 'real stretch' at all.......

Like Arrian, we just don't know, and have no way of telling......

If you want to continue debating the armament of the 'Hypaspists', address the iconography and archaeological evidence, please.....

The armamnet of the hypaspists has, in fact, been part of this thread the "pre-Philip army" has not.

Sorry, I thought the subject of this thread ( apart from Fred! :wink: ) was the "Argead Macedonian Army"? The Argeads trace their ancestry back to Herakles, so we could presumably discuss the Makedones in the Trojan war ! hock: hock: :lol:

However, I realise that in reality you mean 'from the time of Philip and his reforms'. I merely propose to briefly mention What it was that was reformed ( brief because we have very little information), by way of a prologue/background. We can then proceed to discuss Philip's army, Alexander's army etc in an orderly fashion..... D

[Paralus]

We can reasonably assume the words "outos toi egô ho Kleitos, ô Alexandre" were also in Aristobulos' account, but I'm not so sure about the last sentence introduced by "kai". That one can be Arrian's own wording as well, ending this digression and resuming his own narrative. But in this case we no longer have the sarissa mentioned by Aristobulos, and that is either Arrian's own interpretation or it comes from a source which we can't identify (and it can be also Aristobulos, only that we have no hints it is actually so).

I also have noticed Aristobulos calls the guard a sômatophulax. If we check the two versions of the story presented in the beginning of this passage and we consider the wording is supposed to make a difference, it seems then the weapon was a logchê.

Hi Rumo,

"kai" is here used in its everyday function of a conjunction. The "free" English translation begins a new sentence here though there is no reason for doing so. It likely reads as "here I am, Cleitus!" and thereupon he was struck..." All the words from “all the fault” to “struck with a sarissa” were from Aristoboulos unless Arrian entirely messed up his Greek grammar.

In any case, even were it not Aristobulos' testimony there is no compelling need to assume it is some later writer and even less that Arrian would alter dory or longche for sarisa. Arrian dismisses much of the later works on Alexander and tells us that his method is to follow the sources (primarily the two) ostensibly weighing up the evidence before reporting. It is why he wrote the book - to counter the later and, in his view, misinformed works in circulation.

My cut and paste left out a little of the line. It is not Aristobulos refering to a somatophylax rather "some".

The discussion involving the guard here has, indeed, gone on for some. A few last points.

Alexander clearly calls out to his hypaspists and there is, as Hammond observes, no point to this unless they are within earshot. Alexander is being held by his somatophylakes to stop him in his rage and the hypaspists, taking the cue, do not respond. It is at this stage, in Curtius, he has a trumpet sounded to call out the men under arms. At this stage he bemoans that he is reduced to Darius' fate as his guards will not respond and he is betrayed.

The translation of "ordinary" guard is misleading. The words are ton phylakon and indicate a guard not of the somatophylakes or paides basilikoi. Hence modern commentators agree that this guard was of the other corps deputed to guard the king - the hypaspists. This guard is reached via the "vestubule: in Curtius and Alexander waits at the exit door with the sarisa. Hammond (The Various Guards of Philip II and Alexander III) sums it up:

The Guards(ton phylakon) were armed with pikes (sarissai). When Alexander was disarmed by two Bodyguards, he appealed to these soldiers' loyalty (Curt.8.1.47, militum fidem implorans), and he issued an order to the trumpeter [...] I shall call them the King's Personal Guards, which is one meaning of doryphoroi.

As an aside, Arrian has Alexander assault the wall breach at Tyre with the hypaspists (the royal hypaspists) and says so in his description of Alexander being with them on the ship with its gangway. When he takes the breach in the wall it is with his hetairoi. Clearly they are the hypaspists and no one suggests members of the cavalry.

Oh, dear, this just won't lay down and die will it?

Yes, well, as I said this has likely been exhausted and whilst I commenced the thread to discuss the army of Philip and Alexander I shall leave it to yourself as to which direction this thread should take.

[Rumo]

kai" is here used in its everyday function of a conjunction. The "free" English translation begins a new sentence here though there is no reason for doing so. It likely reads as "here I am, Cleitus!" and thereupon he was struck..." All the words from “all the fault” to “struck with a sarissa” were from Aristoboulos unless Arrian entirely messed up his Greek grammar.

Hmm, my fault for writing "sentence", I did not actually mean that. Indeed "kai" is a mere conjunction and the last words form no independent clause, however I still maintain that can be read as a conclusion of the entire digression, which does not necessarily belong to Aristobulos. Please note that in the last series of infinitives (genesthai, phanai, apothanein) introduced by "kai"s the last one uses a different verbal aspect, a fact which can also be interpreted as a shift from a eye-witness account to a summary of a past event.

In any case, even were it not Aristobulos' testimony there is no compelling need to assume it is some later writer and even less that Arrian would alter dory or longche for sarisa. Arrian dismisses much of the later works on Alexander and tells us that his method is to follow the sources (primarily the two) ostensibly weighing up the evidence before reporting. It is why he wrote the book - to counter the later and, in his view, misinformed works in circulation.

My cut and paste left out a little of the line. It is not Aristobulos refering to a somatophylax rather "some".

Arrian knows two versions of the story, so it seems at some point someone altered something

However there are two occurences of the word in our fragment of text. In the beginning (tôn sômatophulakôn) and in the part which we both agree it comes from Aristobulos (tou sômatophulakos). My observation is that this wording might not be accidental, and thus Aristobulos' account may be a detailed story as known by "some", not by the "others".

The words are ton phylakon and indicate a guard not of the somatophylakes or paides basilikoi.

Or a generic name coming from a later source less concerned about 'technical details'.

[Paralus]

... however I still maintain that can be read as a conclusion of the entire digression, which does not necessarily belong to Aristobulos. Please note that in the last series of infinitives (genesthai, phanai, apothanein) introduced by "kai"s the last one uses a different verbal aspect, a fact which can also be interpreted as a shift from a eye-witness account to a summary of a past event.

Your grasp of the ancient Greek will certainly be better than mine. My advice, though (from a scholar of the ancient Greek), is very straight forward in that the last clause (“that thereupon he killed him, striking with a sarissa” ) is a subordinate clause to “Aristoboulos does not say from whence..." Hence all is Aristobulos' testimony.

Arrian knows two versions of the story, so it seems at some point someone altered something

No, simply that there was one story: the murder of Cleitus. There were, though, two traditions regarding the weapon. No one actually "altered" anything simply that the two source traditions Arrian relied on diverged only in the nature of the murder weapon - which is not unusual . That and the fact that Aristobulos exculpated Alexander by glossing over the drunken revel leading to it - as one might expect from a fellow about whom Arrian writes "Aristobulus also asserts that Alexander used to have long drinking parties, not for the purpose of enjoying the wine, as he was not a great wine-drinker, but in order to exhibit his sociality and friendly feeling to his Companions". Cleitus, were he around, might strongly disagree with that. In any case, the fact that the weapon - a sarisa - was in the hands of a phylax is the point.

However there are two occurences of the word in our fragment of text. In the beginning (tôn sômatophulakôn) and in the part which we both agree it comes from Aristobulos (tou sômatophulakos). My observation is that this wording might not be accidental, and thus Aristobulos' account may be a detailed story as known by "some", not by the "others".

Yes, the first is "some say" and the latter is Aristobulos. He is here, though, designating Ptolemy as a somatophylax ("the somatophylax")and it has no import other than that in the report.

The words are ton phylakon and indicate a guard not of the somatophylakes or paides basilikoi.

Or a generic name coming from a later source less concerned about 'technical details'.

That, of course, might always be possible. Arrian, though, is very plain in his methods. These are not to rely on later "histories" of Alexander but the primary sources so as to dispel what he perceived "rubbish" circulated by the extant later material on Alexander. He has a famous digression on the siting of the battle of Gaugamela where these later sources or writes say "Arbela". His method was to collect material of witnesses - hence his preponderant reliance on Aristobulos and Ptolemy. The word (phylakon) was almost certainly used by a Ptolemy or Aritobulos (or even Nearchus or, *gasp*, Cleitarchus) who felt no need to explain its meaning. As I say, Arrian has the hypaspists morph into the hetairoi at Tyre.

[Old Husker]

Following are some rough, preliminary thoughts on issues related to the 'Macedonian vs Greek phalanx' question and the related 'hoplite vs phalangite' question:

Leaving out for the moment the question of just how the hypaspists are armed, we might ask just what was the record when Doric (i.e. hoplite) phalanx met Macedonian phalanx (whether all sarissa or my preferred mix of dory and sarissa). Doing a quick survey, I came up with 15 4th century B.C. engagements in which these different formations met on the field of battle, which resulted in 9 victories for Macedonia and 6 for the Greeks (note that this does not include the Greek victory at Pegusae in 353, which I believe must have come at the expense of hired spearmen serving under Philip II's mercenary commander). At first blush this looks favorable for the Macedonian phalanx; however, such a suposition doesn't hold if we take likely (best estimate) relative heavy-armed manpower into account.

When the Macedonians held a likely significant (defined here after Frederick the Great [no relation] as 50% or more) edge in heavy infantry manpower, they were 6-0 (Pherae I 357/356, Pherae II 354, Olynthus III 348, Olynthus IV 348, Megalopolis 331, and Crannon 322). However, the Greeks could claim equal success under such circumstances, going 3-0 when holding a significant advantage in heavy manpower (Peloponnese 331, Thermopylae II 323, and Rhamnus 322). In the remaining six battles (Pheae II 354, Crescent Hills 354, Crocus Plain 353, Chaeronea 338, Upper Satrapies 323, and Lamia 322) neither side appeasrs to have had a significantly greater strength in heavy-armed troops and the victories were evenly split 3-3. These are, of course, generalized results (without remark upon the many unique circumstances attached to each of these actions) and my rough manpower estimates are certainly speculative; nonetheless, it strongly suggests that there really wasn't much of a 'superiority' factor attached to either formation. I think that where the Greeks tried to do eveything with hoplites, the Macedonians used (in my opinion) a mix of hoplites and phalangites to accomplish exactly the same tactical goals - their differing approaches dictated not so much by whether one method was better than the other, but rather predominantly by the sort of restricted and particular national resources each could bring to bear.

Given the foregoing viewpoint, it then doesn't seem all that strange that some Greek armies didn't take up the Macedonian way of war until more than a century after it's introduciton in 358. Even then, it should be noted that adoption of the Macedonian manner of fighting doesn't necessarily mean universal use of the sarissa. Indeed, at the time the Achaeans acquired this military style they had long abandoned the hoplite, yet they now set about equipping some of their men with a large shield (aspis, suggesting a return to hoplites) and others as phalangites with sarissai, indicating that both warrior types were considered necessary to make the system work. In contrast, the Spartans, who had never abandoned the hoplite, needed only to add sarissai to complete a transition to Macedonian warfare.

I would propose that each warrior type, hoplite and phalangite, had its strengths and weaknesses, with the former offering better offensive potential at greater expense and the latter offering excellent defensive characteristics at lower cost. Ultimately, just like in modern trench warfare, defense ended up ruling the day; once pikes got long enough, it was simply too hard for hoplites to cut their way through their overlap and kill/wound the phalangites holding them. This probably was what prompted a revival of the throwing spear, which could (like the Roman pilum) project offense forward into fronting phalangites and, perhaps, give the hoplite a chance to disrupt and get at some of the pikemen (note, however, that such missiles would have been carried only in additon to the dory, which was retained for its shock combat value). Still, throwing spears would have been no more than a stop-gap method and, in the end (probably sometime in the late 3rd century), the phalangite almost entirely replaced the hoplite toward stalemating battlelines that were both stronger on the defensive, thus leaving battles to be decided by dueling cavalry either at the fore or off the flanks. Yet at this point, oddly enough, the phalangite actually became more of an offensive threat, at least against other phalangites. The rather weak prodding of a sarissa was more of a hinderance than a deadly threat to a well-protected hoplite, but it was very dangerous for a nearly unprotected fellow phalangite. Fighting each other, they could fence for advantage and actually break through an enemy phalanx. So things must have stood as long it was Macedonian against Macedonian, but entry of the Romans onto the scene changed all that. Protected like hoplites, but more flexible and well able to take advantage of disruptons in the Macedonian array over rough terrain or as devloped during the course of a battle, the Roman swordsman put an end to the phalangite era, causing Hellenistic armies to adopt Roman gear and techniques after 168 B.C. - Fred

[PMBardunias]

(Pherae I 357/356, Pherae II 354, Olynthus III 348, Olynthus IV 348, Megalopolis 331, and Crannon 322, etc.)

Usually we cite sources when listing battles like this, because 1) it saves me from searching for them, 2) I know which version of the battle you are basing your opinion on.

Even then, it should be noted that adoption of the Macedonian manner of fighting doesn't necessarily mean universal use of the sarissa. Indeed, at the time the Achaeans acquired this military style they had long abandoned the hoplite, yet they now set about equipping some of their men with a large shield (aspis, suggesting a return to hoplites) and others as phalangites with sarissai, indicating that both warrior types were considered necessary to make the system work. In contrast, the Spartans, who had never abandoned the hoplite, needed only to add sarissai to complete a transition to Macedonian warfare.

Both the Achean transition and the use of shields larger than peltae are hotly debated topics.

I would propose that each warrior type, hoplite and phalangite, had its strengths and weaknesses, with the former offering better offensive potential at greater expense and the latter offering excellent defensive characteristics at lower cost. Ultimately, just like in modern trench warfare, defense ended up ruling the day; once pikes got long enough, it was simply too hard for hoplites to cut their way through their overlap and kill/wound the phalangites holding them.

I don't think there is such a solid trend in sarissa lengthening for you to correlate against. Don't forget the simple dominance of Macedonian-derived militaries. Just as the US derived 5.56mm has replaced other calibers- some of which would have been superior in the Gulf war setting- there was surely cultural pressure to rearm that was not of neccesity tied to peformance.

This probably was what prompted a revival of the throwing spear, which could (like the Roman pilum) project offense forward into fronting phalangites and, perhaps, give the hoplite a chance to disrupt and get at some of the pikemen (note, however, that such missiles would have been carried only in additon to the dory, which was retained for its shock combat value).

Be careful, I know of no battle where thrown spears were significant in breaking formed sarissaphoroi. You'll need to correlate thureophoroi-vs-phalanx battles, being sure to recall that phalangites could be longche armed as well. Where the Romans, who were essentially thureophoroi, succeeded was in having the tactical flexibility to exploit terrain effects and attack a phalanx with smaller modular units.

The rather weak prodding of a sarissa was more of a hinderance than a deadly threat to a well-protected hoplite, but it was very dangerous for a nearly unprotected fellow phalangite. Fighting each other, they could fence for advantage and actually break through an enemy phalanx. So things must have stood as long it was Macedonian against Macedonian, but entry of the Romans onto the scene changed all that.

I'm not sure the prodding was all that weak compared to the protection offered by an aspis, and the 60 cm pelta was still a robust shield in its own right for catching sarissa points.

Protected like hoplites, but more flexible and well able to take advantage of disruptons in the Macedonian array over rough terrain or as devloped during the course of a battle, the Roman swordsman put an end to the phalangite era, causing Hellenistic armies to adopt Roman gear and techniques after 168 B.C. - Fred

Polybious (here I should be giving you the reference) is clear that Romans could not stand up to the frontal assault of a phalanx. Remember that the hastatii that first faced a phalanx was rather poorly armored, and the scutum was often "pinned" by the sarissa.

[Paullus Scipio]

Alright, here we go with a ‘foundation’ hopefully, on which to build a discussion, firstly of the Argead Army Reformation, completed, if perhaps not started, by Philip II and its subsequent evolution under Aexander III the Great/’Megas’.

Of necessity, it will be fairly brief and lacking in detail.
The first point to note is that ‘Macedonia’, in archaic and Classical times, consisted of mountainous valleys in the west (highland Macedonia) occupied by a largely pastoral people. Because of this geography, they tended to be largely independent, under their own ‘Kings’. Eastern Macedonia (lower Macedonia) consisted of broad flood plains, large and rich in natural resources such as timber and minerals; large that is by Greek standards. This made it a target of colonisation to the more urbanised, covetous Greeks of the south.
The Macedonian forces will have been ‘tribal’ like their Thracian, Paeonian and Illyrian neighbours. The bulk of them amateur warriors levied when needed ( and that was often! ), and armed with the traditional pair of‘longche’/hunting spears and a light skin/leather covered wicker ‘pelta’. Few would possess helmets or swords, and those who did tended to be in richer lower Macedonia, with its trade with southern Greece. (a fairly large number of graves in lower Macedonia have been excavated, and Illyrian helmets and other weapons recovered). Added to these were cavalry, formed from the ‘Kings’ and their aristocratic retinue. These likely were able to afford ‘panoplia’, and again their main weapons seem to have been two’longche’. At this time the ‘Kings’ and their retinue are likely to have been a mix of armoured (heavy) and unarmoured(light) cavalry.
We first hear of Macedon in our first Greek Historian, Herodotus, who describes how Amyntas, their lowland King, submitted to Darius after the devastation of neighbouring Paeonia, and his successor Alexander, submitted to Xerxes ( very wise of him!) but actively co-operated with the southern Greeks, being his only hope of getting rid of Persian suzerainty. (The valleys of upper Macedonia tended to be independent at this time). Herodotus does not tell us anything about Macedonia’s military capacities. We first hear of Macedonian troops in Thucydides, when Macedonia was coveted, and colonised by Athens and became a ‘fringe player’ in the wars between Sparta and Athens.They acted as auxiliaries to the armies of Sparta, Athens and Corinth that used lower Macedonia as a battleground. Thucydides reports the infantry, who don’t ever seem to have numbered more than a couple of thousand ‘tribal peltasts’, as being rather poor around the 420’s BC. The several hundred cavalry seem to have been better quality, described By Thucydides (II.100) as “excellent horsemen and armed with breastplates”, when defending against a Thracian invasion by Sitalkes. (429/428 BC).
The highland Macedonians seem to have been tougher, and challenged Brasidas’ Spartan (but not ‘Homioi’) army for instance. We now hear of ‘Hoplite’ heavy infantry in Macedonian armies for the first time, Perdiccas, the lowland King, allied to Brasidas, bringing ‘Hoplites’ raised among Greeks living in Macedonia from the coastal cities, against the upper Macedonian Lynkestians, who also fielded ‘Hoplites’ – probably mercenaries, and fewer, in 423 BC. ( Thuc. IV.124). Chalkidian allies also provided ‘Hoplites’ – 800 against Olynthus. This then is the rather motley Macedonian army prior to the ‘Age of Philip’.
The first reformations seem to have been those of King Archelaos some time before 400 BC, who “built straight roads throughout the country, re-organised the cavalry, the arming of the infantry, and equipment in general, so as to put the country in a stronger position for war than it had ever been.”
Macedon was becoming stronger and wealthier, and was expanding. We are not told exactly what these reforms are, but the issue of state arms for the first time is implied – ‘panoplia’ of helmets and perhaps body armour and greaves too. Since later, Philip is not credited with the Macedonian ‘pelta’ – wooden, bronze-faced and 24-30 (60-70 cm) inches in diameter, and hence suitable for hand-to-hand combat, perhaps this was introduced at this time too. The cavalry reforms probably involved them being made a permanent, regular force for the first time- and perhaps the name ‘Hetairoi’ appeared now. Thucydides does not refer to re-arming the cavalry, but the 12 ft (3.6 m) ‘xyston’/cavalry lance may have been introduced – again not something explicitly credited to Philip, whose reforms seem to have been the introduction of the ‘sarissa’ ( likely a Thracian weapon, and unlikely to be anything to do with Iphicrates, contra Fred’s earlier post), and the organisation, drilling, the introduction of the Macedonian version of ‘synaspismos’/ locked shields, and general discipline of the Makedones after their disastrous defeat, with 4,000 casualties and the death of Philip’s brother Perdikkas II, by the Illyrians under King Bardylis( Diodorus XVI.1.)

This then was the Army inherited by Philip, at a crucial time when Macedonia’s very existence was at stake. We can now consider in detail the Argead Macedonian Army under Philip.

[Paullus Scipio]

I see we are getting a sneak peek at your current project, Fred ! Looking forward to it, even if it is bound to cause as much controversy, if not more, than your previous book. There's a fair bit just in this snippet....

…and my rough manpower estimates are certainly speculative; nonetheless, it strongly suggests that there really wasn't much of a 'superiority' factor attached to either formation.

Indeed, many must be speculative, as with your earlier work, and it is dangerous to build castles of statistics on such shaky data, but one must work with what has come down to us, meagre as it is! I notice you don’t include Gaugemala, Issus etc, where similarly there doesn’t seem to have been much in it between Macedonian and Doric phalanx?

I think that where the Greeks tried to do eveything with hoplites, the Macedonians used (in my opinion) a mix of hoplites and phalangites to accomplish exactly the same tactical goals - their differing approaches dictated not so much by whether one method was better than the other, but rather predominantly by the sort of restricted and particular national resources each could bring to bear.

A good observation! Armies are never the product of technology or tactical considerations, outweighed by factors such as national resources, economic factors, and social conditions..
And certainly a portion of Philip and Alexander’s Phalanx were ‘Dory( or longche)/Argive aspis’armed.

Given the foregoing viewpoint, it then doesn't seem all that strange that some Greek armies didn't take up the Macedonian way of war until more than a century after it's introduciton in 358.

That date isn’t entirely certain, as I expect this thread will discuss…. :lol:

Even then, it should be noted that adoption of the Macedonian manner of fighting doesn't necessarily mean universal use of the sarissa. Indeed, at the time the Achaeans acquired this military style they had long abandoned the hoplite, yet they now set about equipping some of their men with a large shield (aspis, suggesting a return to hoplites) and others as phalangites with sarissai, indicating that both warrior types were considered necessary to make the system work.

Whoah ! That's quite a hypothesis. Don’t be confused here! Philopoemon’s reforms (late 3 C) were undoubtedly to re-arm “in the Macedonian style”. This is not a reference to a ‘mixed’ phalanx, but ‘sarissaphoroi’.
The confusion arises from the use of the word ‘aspis’, which, since the virtual disappearance of the specific ‘Argive Aspis’, had come to mean a generic ‘circular shield’ only. ( previously the ‘Argive aspis’ had been the only kind of ‘Aspis’ in use, hence could be synonymous with it). The ‘Macedonian shield’ – circular, wooden, 60-70 cm in diameter, often metal faced could be equally accurately described as a ‘pelta’ or ‘aspis’.It should be noted that it is a physical impossibility to use the ‘Argive Aspis’ ( 80-90 cm diameter) with the sarissa.

In contrast, the Spartans, who had never abandoned the hoplite, needed only to add sarissai to complete a transition to Macedonian warfare.

Again, the evidence is fairly conclusive that ALL the Spartan Infantry became ‘sarissaphoroi’, not a mix of ‘Hoplites’ and’ Sarissaphoroi’. The evidence strongly suggests that ‘Hoplites’ armed with ‘dory/argive aspis’ no longer existed in 222BC…

This probably was what prompted a revival of the throwing spear, which could (like the Roman pilum) project offense forward into fronting phalangites and, perhaps, give the hoplite a chance to disrupt and get at some of the pikemen (note, however, that such missiles would have been carried only in additon to the dory, which was retained for its shock combat value).

A controversial claim ! The throwing spear/longche had been in use all along, but it was the success of Aetolian ‘peltast’ types thus armed, against the Gauls in 279 BC, in contrast to the lack of success of ‘Hoplites’, that prompted the southern Greeks to switch to ‘Thureophoroi’ – adopting the oblong ‘thureos’ from the Gauls.

Yet at this point, oddly enough, the phalangite actually became more of an offensive threat, at least against other phalangites. The rather weak prodding of a sarissa was more of a hinderance than a deadly threat to a well-protected hoplite, but it was very dangerous for a nearly unprotected fellow phalangite.

Where does this come from? Do you have evidence for this proposition? By the end of Alexander’s reign, the phalanx were definitely all equipped with full ’panoplia’, and the leading ranks at the very least ( if not all) had been so equipped since Philip’s reforms, the only difference being the smaller shield – more than compensated for defensively by the ‘sarissa’ keeping an opponent further away, as you have pointed out.

Fighting each other, they could fence for advantage and actually break through an enemy phalanx. So things must have stood as long it was Macedonian against Macedonian, but entry of the Romans onto the scene changed all that. Protected like hoplites, but more flexible and well able to take advantage of disruptons in the Macedonian array over rough terrain or as devloped during the course of a battle, the Roman swordsman put an end to the phalangite era, causing Hellenistic armies to adopt Roman gear and techniques after 168 B.C.

Hhh…mmm, the Romans had little body armour for the most part, but the large ‘scutum’ provided excellent protection.Again, it was not ‘weapon technology’ that made the difference. Western Mediterranean peoples fought a much more ‘heavy missile’ style of warfare than the phalanx, but the barrages of ‘pila’ did not alone break up the phalanx in any of the major clashes – Cynoscephalae (197 BC), Thermopylae (191 BC), Magnesia (190 BC), Pydna (168) BC. In each case, other factors led to victory/defeat, just as you have pointed occurred between ‘Macedonian’ and ‘Doric’ phalanx.

[Paullus Scipio]

I would find myself largely in agreement with Paul B.'s post here, but would comment as follows....

Fred wrote:I would propose that each warrior type, hoplite and phalangite, had its strengths and weaknesses, with the former offering better offensive potential at greater expense and the latter offering excellent defensive characteristics at lower cost. Ultimately, just like in modern trench warfare, defense ended up ruling the day; once pikes got long enough, it was simply too hard for hoplites to cut their way through their overlap and kill/wound the phalangites holding them.

I don't think there is such a solid trend in sarissa lengthening for you to correlate against. Don't forget the simple dominance of Macedonian-derived militaries. Just as the US derived 5.56mm has replaced other calibers- some of which would have been superior in the Gulf war setting- there was surely cultural pressure to rearm that was not of neccesity tied to peformance.

I agree with this. I have (so far unpublished) evidence that strongly suggests that in fact ‘Sarissa’ length did not vary anything like as much as supposed…but largely stayed around the optimum 16-18 ft .As I have suggested elsewhere, changing your equipment isn’t necessarily about ‘better technology’ but often about the ‘perceived success’ ( e.g. of first ‘pike and pelta’, then of ‘scutum and pila’) or responding to ‘perceived threat’, and sometimes just soldiers thinking brandishing ‘enemy’ weapons is ‘macho’.

Fred wrote:

This probably was what prompted a revival of the throwing spear, which could (like the Roman pilum) project offense forward into fronting phalangites and, perhaps, give the hoplite a chance to disrupt and get at some of the pikemen (note, however, that such missiles would have been carried only in additon to the dory, which was retained for its shock combat value).

Be careful, I know of no battle where thrown spears were significant in breaking formed sarissaphoroi. You'll need to correlate thureophoroi-vs-phalanx battles, being sure to recall that phalangites could be longche armed as well. Where the Romans, who were essentially thureophoroi, succeeded was in having the tactical flexibility to exploit terrain effects and attack a phalanx with smaller modular units.

I don’t think there is any evidence to suggest ‘double arming’. Either ‘sarissa’ OR longche were employed, never, AFIK, both together. I agree with you about some of the factors for Roman success though ( see also previous post)

Fred wrote:

Protected like hoplites, but more flexible and well able to take advantage of disruptons in the Macedonian array over rough terrain or as devloped during the course of a battle, the Roman swordsman put an end to the phalangite era, causing Hellenistic armies to adopt Roman gear and techniques after 168 B.C. -Fred

Polybious (here I should be giving you the reference) is clear that Romans could not stand up to the frontal assault of a phalanx. Remember that the hastatii that first faced a phalanx was rather poorly armored, and the scutum was often "pinned" by the sarissa.

Polybius XVIII.30-32….(Inter alia) “So it is easy to see that, as I said at the beginning, nothing can withstand the charge of the phalanx as long as it preserves its characteristic formation and force…”

[PMBardunias]

I don’t think there is any evidence to suggest ‘double arming’. Either ‘sarissa’ OR longche were employed, never, AFIK, both together.

I meant either/or as well, but your responce makes me wonder, did someone suggest that they held both longche and sarissa at the same time? I'd say impossible.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paul B. wrote:

I meant either/or as well, but your responce makes me wonder, did someone suggest that they held both longche and sarissa at the same time? I'd say impossible.

No, only your...

being sure to recall that phalangites could be longche armed as well.

....seemed to me to read that way. ( ambiguous, I guess) :wink:

[Astiryu1]

There is no pictorial evidence I have seen but I have this question. Could the ranks of the pikemen alternate weaponry? In lines First,Third, Fifth, etc.= Sarissa men and Second,Fourth,Sixth,etc.= Dory/Longche Men. This "could" be effective but I am no expert on these tactics.

[Paralus]

There is no pictorial evidence I have seen but I have this question. Could the ranks of the pikemen alternate weaponry? In lines First,Third, Fifth, etc.= Sarissa men and Second,Fourth,Sixth,etc.= Dory/Longche Men. This "could" be effective but I am no expert on these tactics.

I know of no evidence for such. The only mixed armament phalanx was Alexander's experiment - due to making do with what was available - with integrated Persians armed in their "traditional" fashion.

Much has already been said here that I would have. It needs to be noted that Alexander, clearly, felt the need for his sarisa-armed infantry. A need strong enough to see him train 30,000 Asians over 3-4 years in that Macedonian manner. This is a serious phalanx and he obviously saw it as the arm of his foot. This also suggests that there was more to Alexander's phalanx than could be picked up in a month or so and it would seem these fellows went through something of a Macedonian agoge: the "full learning" of some sort (Nooo! I'm not claiming the Macedonians appropriated the agoge...) The drill outside of Pelium and the fact that his phalanx overcame the threats of Issos, Gaugamela and Hydaspes also speaks to this. Polybius will have been (was, in fact, regarding Issos) aghast that such was achieved with what, in his day, seemed a ponderous beast.

[PMBardunias]

It needs to be noted that Alexander, clearly, felt the need for his sarisa-armed infantry. A need strong enough to see him train 30,000 Asians over 3-4 years in that Macedonian manner.

Perhaps Asians simply make lousy hoplites. :wink:

[Paullus Scipio]

Nor does the fact that they were 'unused', but in existence 3-4 years mean it took that long to train a competent 'sarissaphoroi'!

That training was comprehensive is attested by Alexander's bloodless drill display victory - a standard of drill by thousands that surpasses the mere hundreds in the Brigade of Guards Queen's Birthday Trooping of the Colour!
Arrian:
"Alexander drew up the phalanx in a column 120 deep, with 200 cavalry before and behind/on the flanks, and gave orders for strict silence, and to obey orders smartly.Then he gave the order for the phalanx first to erect their spears/sarissae, and after, at the word of command to lower the massed points as for attack lowering them now to the left, then to the right, again upon command.He then moved the phalanx smartly forward, and wheeling it this way and that, caused it to execute various intricate movements. Having thus put his troops through through a number of of different formation changes with great rapidity, he then ordered his left to form column/wedge and advanced to the attack.
The enemy, already shaken by the smartness and discipline of these manouevres, abandoned their positions on the lower slopes without waiting for the Macedonians to come to drips with them.Thereupon Alexander ordered his men to raise the war-cry and clash their spears/sarissae against their shields. This was altogether to much for the Taulantians(Thracian tribe), who hastily withdrew...." (Arrian Book I.6)