06-11-2010, 09:18 PM
Indeed, I don't believe that the idea of the Silver Shields being a composite elite unit originating in India is a widely held notion, though it remains a possibility and has been mentioned as such in the past. My point here is that real 'proof' is an extremely elusive thing and there are a great many scenarios from which to choose depending upon just how we personally choose to view ancient realities. The strongest ties (though none all that direct) seem to be between the Silver Shields and hypaspists, but this doesn't 'prove' that Silver Shields and hypaspists were (respectively) former members and current members of the same unit from Alexander's days in India nor that they were even the same type of troops in two elite units of differing origins. This is something I will continue to wrestle with in the months ahead.
Rather than declare Paraetacene a victory for Antigonus (which it technically was by the standards of the era, he having possessed the field and its dead at day's end, something that both sides accepted as shown by their maneuvering to sieze the battlefield in the action's wake), I chose to cast Paraetacene as 'inconclusive' by stating that Eumenes was denied the victory rather than saying that he had lost outright. Similar scenarios played out in many an ancient Greek battle, with the closest parallel maybe being Tangara (457), in which Sparta held the field despite having taken casualties at least equal to that of their Athenian-led foes. Diodorus called this engagement a draw, but the historian and former general Thucydides awarded the victory to Sparta because it had held onto the contested ground. Here too, the operational advantage lay with the 'loser', in that the Athenians succeeded in sending the Spartans home in the battle's wake, thus separating them their Boeeotian allies (whom Athens would attack and defeat decisively in a mere matter of weeks). It's thus interesting that Diodorus, who had been so generous as to give the Athenians a draw at Tanagra, didn't do the same for Eumenes, instead boldly declaring that it was Antigonus who had "gained the victory" (XIX.30.7).
My claim that the Silver Shields had cost Eumenes ultimate success was too harsh, since Diodorus actually stated that it was the Silver Shields and the remaining body of that general's infantry that broke their line in a pursuit that carried toward the nearby hills. For heavy infantry to chase enemy troops off the field of battle was a cardinal sin in the ancient Greek world. This was work for cavalry and light foot, who were vastly better suited to the task. The truth is that unless the Silver Shields and their heavy foot comrades abandoned much of their own cumbersome gear, which I strongly doubt they did, then they could never have caught the fleeing foe, thus becoming no more than 'cheerleaders' trailing far behind the action. Of course, seeing so grave an error on his opponents' part, an old warhorse like Antigonus took advantage to attack the now exposed inner end of Eumenes' left wing, routing the enemy horsemen there before turning back to rally his foot soldiers into a new battle line at the foot of the hills. At this point, Eumenes called back his men, hoping to get them once again into some semblance of proper order for another attack under a bright moon. Unfortunately, these troops now refused to stand their ground, chosing to fall back against orders all the way to their camp. Note that their camp with its valuable baggage was not at that time (nor had ever been) under attack. Indeed, Eumenes and his entire army stood between the enemy and the baggage train. This indicates that the most logical interpretation is that once Antigonus and his reformed troops began advancing once more, Eumenes soldiers made their second abandonment of the battlefield, this time doing so in full retreat rather than in an ill-advised pursuit.
All in all, I think that a close reading of Diodorus' account shows why he chose to award the victory to Antigonus, despite his primary source for the action (direct or second hand) being a close friend and supporter of Eumenes who must have cast that general's and his army's performances at Paraetacene in the most favorable light possible. Regards, Fred
Rather than declare Paraetacene a victory for Antigonus (which it technically was by the standards of the era, he having possessed the field and its dead at day's end, something that both sides accepted as shown by their maneuvering to sieze the battlefield in the action's wake), I chose to cast Paraetacene as 'inconclusive' by stating that Eumenes was denied the victory rather than saying that he had lost outright. Similar scenarios played out in many an ancient Greek battle, with the closest parallel maybe being Tangara (457), in which Sparta held the field despite having taken casualties at least equal to that of their Athenian-led foes. Diodorus called this engagement a draw, but the historian and former general Thucydides awarded the victory to Sparta because it had held onto the contested ground. Here too, the operational advantage lay with the 'loser', in that the Athenians succeeded in sending the Spartans home in the battle's wake, thus separating them their Boeeotian allies (whom Athens would attack and defeat decisively in a mere matter of weeks). It's thus interesting that Diodorus, who had been so generous as to give the Athenians a draw at Tanagra, didn't do the same for Eumenes, instead boldly declaring that it was Antigonus who had "gained the victory" (XIX.30.7).
My claim that the Silver Shields had cost Eumenes ultimate success was too harsh, since Diodorus actually stated that it was the Silver Shields and the remaining body of that general's infantry that broke their line in a pursuit that carried toward the nearby hills. For heavy infantry to chase enemy troops off the field of battle was a cardinal sin in the ancient Greek world. This was work for cavalry and light foot, who were vastly better suited to the task. The truth is that unless the Silver Shields and their heavy foot comrades abandoned much of their own cumbersome gear, which I strongly doubt they did, then they could never have caught the fleeing foe, thus becoming no more than 'cheerleaders' trailing far behind the action. Of course, seeing so grave an error on his opponents' part, an old warhorse like Antigonus took advantage to attack the now exposed inner end of Eumenes' left wing, routing the enemy horsemen there before turning back to rally his foot soldiers into a new battle line at the foot of the hills. At this point, Eumenes called back his men, hoping to get them once again into some semblance of proper order for another attack under a bright moon. Unfortunately, these troops now refused to stand their ground, chosing to fall back against orders all the way to their camp. Note that their camp with its valuable baggage was not at that time (nor had ever been) under attack. Indeed, Eumenes and his entire army stood between the enemy and the baggage train. This indicates that the most logical interpretation is that once Antigonus and his reformed troops began advancing once more, Eumenes soldiers made their second abandonment of the battlefield, this time doing so in full retreat rather than in an ill-advised pursuit.
All in all, I think that a close reading of Diodorus' account shows why he chose to award the victory to Antigonus, despite his primary source for the action (direct or second hand) being a close friend and supporter of Eumenes who must have cast that general's and his army's performances at Paraetacene in the most favorable light possible. Regards, Fred
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
