The "Fred thread": the Argead Macedonian Army

[Paralus]

Rather than declare Paraetacene a victory for Antigonus (which it technically was by the standards of the era, he having possessed the field and its dead at day's end, something that both sides accepted as shown by their maneuvering to sieze the battlefield in the action's wake), I chose to cast Paraetacene as 'inconclusive' by stating that Eumenes was denied the victory rather than saying that he had lost outright. [...] It's thus interesting that Diodorus, who had been so generous as to give the Athenians a draw at Tanagra, didn't do the same for Eumenes, instead boldly declaring that it was Antigonus who had "gained the victory" (XIX.30.7)

Possession of the dead and, so too, the field was the ancient claim to a victory. That said, Diodorus’ text clearly shows that Antigonus only "won" this due to the intransigence of the Silver Shields as we agree. As well he had to retreat – in as discrete a way as possible – to Media and thus forgo the objective he’d fought the battle for (Gabiene). Polyaenus (4.6.10) has it right when he describes Antigonus as concealing the nature of his loss.

19.26.1-2; 31.2 – 32.3 Eumenes, on considering the matter, concluded rightly that the enemy intended to withdraw into Gabenê, as this place, distant about three days' march, was unplundered and filled with grain, fodder, and in general with that which could amply supply the provisions for a great army.

Eumenes undertook to march back to the dead, desiring to control the disposal of the bodies and to put his claim to victory beyond dispute. When, however, the soldiers would not listen to him, insisting with shouts that they return to their own baggage train, which was some distance away, he was forced to yield to the majority […] When after leaving the battle Antigonus saw that his men were disheartened, he decided to move as far as possible from the enemy with the utmost speed. Wishing to have the army unencumbered for the retirement, he sent the wounded men and the heaviest part of the baggage ahead to one of the neighbouring cities. He began to bury the dead at dawn and detained the herald who had come from the enemy to treat for the recovery of the bodies; and he ordered his men to eat dinner at once. When the day had passed he sent the herald back, assigning the removal of the bodies to the next morning, but he himself at the beginning of the first watch broke camp with the whole army, and by making forced marches withdrew a long distance from the enemy

Note that Diodorus implies a Eumenid victory: disposal of the dead would simply put it beyond doubt or confirm it. The Macedonians that mattered saw matters otherwise though.

My claim that the Silver Shields had cost Eumenes ultimate success was too harsh, since Diodorus actually stated that it was the Silver Shields and the remaining body of that general's infantry that broke their line in a pursuit that carried toward the nearby hills. For heavy infantry to chase enemy troops off the field of battle was a cardinal sin in the ancient Greek world. This was work for cavalry and light foot,

Which, unfortunately for Eumemes, stayed rooted to the hills. His infantry and right wing were in the ascendency. I doubt that the Eumenid infantry discarded their weaponry; rather that Diodorus’ formulaic language here has them “pursue” the enemy in the same manner as his topos of "many had fallen on either side" (clearly many only fell on Antigonus' side). The Eumenid infantry drove the Antigonid phalanx from the field as it collapsed in evident disarray in a preview of the rout at Gabiene and Diodorus also describes Antigonus' left wing as defeated. The numbers for Antigonus' army at Gabiene internally confirm the nature of the defeat of his phalanx at Paraetekene. I would say the Eumenid infantry, particularly the argyraspids, were still in formation as their battlefield discipline - described at Gabiene - would indicate. The "fleeing" soldiers that Eumenes then collars and rallies are the light troops and cavalry of his defeated left wing - not his own heavy infantry line which has driven the opposition onto the hills behind them in concert with Eumenes' right wing. Antigonus needs to collar and rally not only left wing but also his heavily defeated phalanx ("Although Antigonus saw that his own left wing had been put to flight and that the entire phalanx had been defeated..." 19.30.7)

This indicates that the most logical interpretation is that once Antigonus and his reformed troops began advancing once more, Eumenes soldiers made their second abandonment of the battlefield, this time doing so in full retreat rather than in an ill-advised pursuit.

Antigonus “rallied” his soldiers and formed them into a line along the foothills to which they’d been driven. This is far from a menacing attacking move and is, rather, redolent of a defensive strategy. Antigonus' cavalry charge had, in reality, caused little damage to Eumenes’ army only damaging the cavalry and “lights” of the left that remained in their positions. Diodorus’ text does not indicate any “full retreat” rather a prolonged shadowing stand-off in the dark where neither side was inclined to go at it all over again. Both armies retired for the night but, unfortunately for Eumenes, his Macedonians – those who were clearly the most important (more later) – refused to return to the dead wanting rather to return to camp and their baggage. There was a lesson in this that Eumenes failed to heed for Gabiene and it would cost him his life. I do not see any “full retreat” by either side though the text describes an earlier collapse of the Antigonid infantry – also to be repeated in some weeks’ time.

All in all, I think that a close reading of Diodorus' account shows why he chose to award the victory to Antigonus, despite his primary source for the action (direct or second hand) being a close friend and supporter of Eumenes who must have cast that general's and his army's performances at Paraetacene in the most favorable light possible. Regards, Fred

It is most unlikely that Hieronymus, under Antigonid patronage, chose to portray Eumenes so favourably whilst consistently casting the dynasty’s founder as a rebel to royal authority constantly conniving at supreme power. Those who see the favourable treatment of Eumenes (and the exaggeration of Antigonus’ losses etc) as a clear Hieronymian partisanship seem gladly to pass over the traducing of Antigonus and the persistently favourable portrayal of his deadly adversary, Ptolemy. The latter is generally and conveniently passed off as a stray Ptolemaic source but the other themes – consistent throughout books eighteen and nineteen – are not so easily put aside.

Indeed, I don't believe that the idea of the Silver Shields being a composite elite unit originating in India is a widely held notion, though it remains a possibility and has been mentioned as such in the past. […] The strongest ties (though none all that direct) seem to be between the Silver Shields and hypaspists, but this doesn't 'prove' that Silver Shields and hypaspists were (respectively) former members and current members of the same unit from Alexander's days in India nor that they were even the same type of troops in two elite units of differing origins. This is something I will continue to wrestle with in the months ahead.

A possibility that I’d hold as rather remote. That the argyraspids were the hypaspists is as near to a certainty as one might come to in discussions such as these. That they were a group selected from the phalanx - either in India or after Triparadeisos - is not borne out by the sources that remain to us. I’ve already adduced the descriptions of Gaugamela where the two units are clearly (if anachronistically) treated as one and the same including commander. There are more though:

Arr. Succ. 35 To Antigenes, commander of the Macedonian argyraspidae, who had first attacked Perdiccas,

Here we have Antigenes, the argyraspid commander, identified as their commander in Egypt where Diodorus refers to them as hypaspists.
The reputation and consistently emphasised fighting skills of the argyraspids argues for a cohesive unit rather than selected groups from the entire phalanx. They consistently stress their service to Alexander – indeed to both the kings (Philip and Alexander most famously at Gabiene) and the length of that service. Again this is far more applicable to a long term corporate unit rather than a group selected, late in the anabasis, from the entire phalanx.

Most telling, though, is how they were seen by others and how they saw themselves. The regent, Polyperchon, and Olympias are both attested as having written to the argyraspids instructing them, in the name of the kings, to pace themselves at the service of the royal general, Eumenes (Diod.18.58 ff). This they do without any promise of monetary or other reward: it is service to the Argead crown. Most unlikely that a motley and rebellious group detatched from the royal army at Triparadeisos would be so inclined I'd suspect.

During the disputes over who should command the satrapal army in Susiane it is Antigenes and the argyraspids who will decide. Even though there clearly were other Macedonian veterans of the anabasis in this army, they have no say: the premier unit and its commander trump them (Diod.19.1-2):

Peucestas thought that because of the number of soldiers who followed him on the campaign and because of his high rank under Alexander he ought to have the supreme command; but Antigenes, who was general of the Silver Shields, said that the right to make the selection ought to be granted to his Macedonians, since they had conquered Asia with Alexander and had been unconquered because of their valour.

The other Macedonians in Eumenes' army who’d accompanied Alexander (19.22.2; 18.62.4 for example) do not rate a look in. This is behaviour indicative of an elite unit whose history, reputation (as above) and primacy commands such priviledges. Such a unit is most unlikely to have been either a group selected from amongst the average phalanx drafts in India or detached as troublemakers at Triparadeisos. It fits very well, though, the hypaspists and pezhetairoi of Alexander and Philip for mine.