06-17-2010, 10:09 PM
Following are some rough, preliminary thoughts on issues related to the 'Macedonian vs Greek phalanx' question and the related 'hoplite vs phalangite' question:
Leaving out for the moment the question of just how the hypaspists are armed, we might ask just what was the record when Doric (i.e. hoplite) phalanx met Macedonian phalanx (whether all sarissa or my preferred mix of dory and sarissa). Doing a quick survey, I came up with 15 4th century B.C. engagements in which these different formations met on the field of battle, which resulted in 9 victories for Macedonia and 6 for the Greeks (note that this does not include the Greek victory at Pegusae in 353, which I believe must have come at the expense of hired spearmen serving under Philip II's mercenary commander). At first blush this looks favorable for the Macedonian phalanx; however, such a suposition doesn't hold if we take likely (best estimate) relative heavy-armed manpower into account.
When the Macedonians held a likely significant (defined here after Frederick the Great [no relation] as 50% or more) edge in heavy infantry manpower, they were 6-0 (Pherae I 357/356, Pherae II 354, Olynthus III 348, Olynthus IV 348, Megalopolis 331, and Crannon 322). However, the Greeks could claim equal success under such circumstances, going 3-0 when holding a significant advantage in heavy manpower (Peloponnese 331, Thermopylae II 323, and Rhamnus 322). In the remaining six battles (Pheae II 354, Crescent Hills 354, Crocus Plain 353, Chaeronea 338, Upper Satrapies 323, and Lamia 322) neither side appeasrs to have had a significantly greater strength in heavy-armed troops and the victories were evenly split 3-3. These are, of course, generalized results (without remark upon the many unique circumstances attached to each of these actions) and my rough manpower estimates are certainly speculative; nonetheless, it strongly suggests that there really wasn't much of a 'superiority' factor attached to either formation. I think that where the Greeks tried to do eveything with hoplites, the Macedonians used (in my opinion) a mix of hoplites and phalangites to accomplish exactly the same tactical goals - their differing approaches dictated not so much by whether one method was better than the other, but rather predominantly by the sort of restricted and particular national resources each could bring to bear.
Given the foregoing viewpoint, it then doesn't seem all that strange that some Greek armies didn't take up the Macedonian way of war until more than a century after it's introduciton in 358. Even then, it should be noted that adoption of the Macedonian manner of fighting doesn't necessarily mean universal use of the sarissa. Indeed, at the time the Achaeans acquired this military style they had long abandoned the hoplite, yet they now set about equipping some of their men with a large shield (aspis, suggesting a return to hoplites) and others as phalangites with sarissai, indicating that both warrior types were considered necessary to make the system work. In contrast, the Spartans, who had never abandoned the hoplite, needed only to add sarissai to complete a transition to Macedonian warfare.
I would propose that each warrior type, hoplite and phalangite, had its strengths and weaknesses, with the former offering better offensive potential at greater expense and the latter offering excellent defensive characteristics at lower cost. Ultimately, just like in modern trench warfare, defense ended up ruling the day; once pikes got long enough, it was simply too hard for hoplites to cut their way through their overlap and kill/wound the phalangites holding them. This probably was what prompted a revival of the throwing spear, which could (like the Roman pilum) project offense forward into fronting phalangites and, perhaps, give the hoplite a chance to disrupt and get at some of the pikemen (note, however, that such missiles would have been carried only in additon to the dory, which was retained for its shock combat value). Still, throwing spears would have been no more than a stop-gap method and, in the end (probably sometime in the late 3rd century), the phalangite almost entirely replaced the hoplite toward stalemating battlelines that were both stronger on the defensive, thus leaving battles to be decided by dueling cavalry either at the fore or off the flanks. Yet at this point, oddly enough, the phalangite actually became more of an offensive threat, at least against other phalangites. The rather weak prodding of a sarissa was more of a hinderance than a deadly threat to a well-protected hoplite, but it was very dangerous for a nearly unprotected fellow phalangite. Fighting each other, they could fence for advantage and actually break through an enemy phalanx. So things must have stood as long it was Macedonian against Macedonian, but entry of the Romans onto the scene changed all that. Protected like hoplites, but more flexible and well able to take advantage of disruptons in the Macedonian array over rough terrain or as devloped during the course of a battle, the Roman swordsman put an end to the phalangite era, causing Hellenistic armies to adopt Roman gear and techniques after 168 B.C. - Fred
Leaving out for the moment the question of just how the hypaspists are armed, we might ask just what was the record when Doric (i.e. hoplite) phalanx met Macedonian phalanx (whether all sarissa or my preferred mix of dory and sarissa). Doing a quick survey, I came up with 15 4th century B.C. engagements in which these different formations met on the field of battle, which resulted in 9 victories for Macedonia and 6 for the Greeks (note that this does not include the Greek victory at Pegusae in 353, which I believe must have come at the expense of hired spearmen serving under Philip II's mercenary commander). At first blush this looks favorable for the Macedonian phalanx; however, such a suposition doesn't hold if we take likely (best estimate) relative heavy-armed manpower into account.
When the Macedonians held a likely significant (defined here after Frederick the Great [no relation] as 50% or more) edge in heavy infantry manpower, they were 6-0 (Pherae I 357/356, Pherae II 354, Olynthus III 348, Olynthus IV 348, Megalopolis 331, and Crannon 322). However, the Greeks could claim equal success under such circumstances, going 3-0 when holding a significant advantage in heavy manpower (Peloponnese 331, Thermopylae II 323, and Rhamnus 322). In the remaining six battles (Pheae II 354, Crescent Hills 354, Crocus Plain 353, Chaeronea 338, Upper Satrapies 323, and Lamia 322) neither side appeasrs to have had a significantly greater strength in heavy-armed troops and the victories were evenly split 3-3. These are, of course, generalized results (without remark upon the many unique circumstances attached to each of these actions) and my rough manpower estimates are certainly speculative; nonetheless, it strongly suggests that there really wasn't much of a 'superiority' factor attached to either formation. I think that where the Greeks tried to do eveything with hoplites, the Macedonians used (in my opinion) a mix of hoplites and phalangites to accomplish exactly the same tactical goals - their differing approaches dictated not so much by whether one method was better than the other, but rather predominantly by the sort of restricted and particular national resources each could bring to bear.
Given the foregoing viewpoint, it then doesn't seem all that strange that some Greek armies didn't take up the Macedonian way of war until more than a century after it's introduciton in 358. Even then, it should be noted that adoption of the Macedonian manner of fighting doesn't necessarily mean universal use of the sarissa. Indeed, at the time the Achaeans acquired this military style they had long abandoned the hoplite, yet they now set about equipping some of their men with a large shield (aspis, suggesting a return to hoplites) and others as phalangites with sarissai, indicating that both warrior types were considered necessary to make the system work. In contrast, the Spartans, who had never abandoned the hoplite, needed only to add sarissai to complete a transition to Macedonian warfare.
I would propose that each warrior type, hoplite and phalangite, had its strengths and weaknesses, with the former offering better offensive potential at greater expense and the latter offering excellent defensive characteristics at lower cost. Ultimately, just like in modern trench warfare, defense ended up ruling the day; once pikes got long enough, it was simply too hard for hoplites to cut their way through their overlap and kill/wound the phalangites holding them. This probably was what prompted a revival of the throwing spear, which could (like the Roman pilum) project offense forward into fronting phalangites and, perhaps, give the hoplite a chance to disrupt and get at some of the pikemen (note, however, that such missiles would have been carried only in additon to the dory, which was retained for its shock combat value). Still, throwing spears would have been no more than a stop-gap method and, in the end (probably sometime in the late 3rd century), the phalangite almost entirely replaced the hoplite toward stalemating battlelines that were both stronger on the defensive, thus leaving battles to be decided by dueling cavalry either at the fore or off the flanks. Yet at this point, oddly enough, the phalangite actually became more of an offensive threat, at least against other phalangites. The rather weak prodding of a sarissa was more of a hinderance than a deadly threat to a well-protected hoplite, but it was very dangerous for a nearly unprotected fellow phalangite. Fighting each other, they could fence for advantage and actually break through an enemy phalanx. So things must have stood as long it was Macedonian against Macedonian, but entry of the Romans onto the scene changed all that. Protected like hoplites, but more flexible and well able to take advantage of disruptons in the Macedonian array over rough terrain or as devloped during the course of a battle, the Roman swordsman put an end to the phalangite era, causing Hellenistic armies to adopt Roman gear and techniques after 168 B.C. - Fred
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
