We\'re going to beat the legions...

[Ghostmojo]

Hannibal in Cannae proved that this could work - he forgot to raze Rome and he paid for this in the end!

Hannibal wasn't a master of seige warfare. He wanted to crush the Romans on the battlefield - which he did. He never got to grips with encircling Rome and digging in. And sadly, whether he knew it or not, they could always wait him out ...

[Paralus]

I might be a bit harsh on Pyrrus in Beneventum with allies such but his army was in battle lines with cavalry and elefants mainly used to plug the gaps.

Again, I'd suggest he is making the best of the sarrisa-armed phalanx numbers he has. That description sounds like Dionysius' (of Hailcarnassus) description of Asculum. Plutarch provides little detail and Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives a wonderful list (20.1.1-2) of the king's forces:

Pyrrhus gave the Macedonian phalanx the first place on the right wing and placed next to it the Italiot mercenaries from Tarentum; then the troops from Ambracia and after them the phalanx of Tarentines equipped with white shields, forced by the allied force of Bruttians and Lucanians; in the middle of the battle-line he stationed the Thesprotians and Chaonians; next to them the mercenaries of the Aetolians, Acarnanians and Athamanians, and finally the Samnites, who constituted the left wing.

He later says that of these foot (70,000!)"the Greeks who had crossed the Ionian gulf amounted to 16,000". That would account for the "Macedonian phalanx" as well as the Ambracians, Aetolians, Arcananians, Athamanians, Thesprotians and Chaonians. How many of these are sarissa-armed we do not know. The words used to describe the Tarentines are "leukaspin phalagga" and the two Epirote tribes "phalaggos Thesprotous te kai Chaonas". Does this indicate sarissa-armed? The term phalanx is not applied to others in the battle line but there seems a distinction being made with the Macedonian phalanx (unless Gonatas lent Pyrrhus some Macedonians so as to be rid of him?!).

Polybios seems clear in his description of Pyrrhus alternating semaian of Italians and speiran of "his own phalanx" and so I'd think the numbers of sarissaphoroi are nothing huge.

Pyyrhus, with the elephants and horse, seems to realise that his forces are weak in certain areas and so uses these as "reserves". Bit like Alexander at Thebes.

Antiochos might have a poor excuse because of the Aetolians in Thermopylae but Magnesia proves that he was a joke of a general!

How do you see that latter?

The Greeks in the Hellenistic failed to show a general who completely understood what was to be done to the point that antiochus made Hannibal an admiral!

That more likely had much more to do with Antiochus not trusting Hannibal. Hannibal wanted only the one thing and Antiochus did not necessarily share that desire. Antiochus spent much energy in diplomatic manoeuvres with Rome before the inevitable attempting to neutralise Rome as far as his ambitions were concerned. As it was, his diplomacy was seen and raised by Flammininus whose purloining of the Hellenistic dynasts' political coin of choice - "freedom of the Greeks" - was a central plank. By the time Antiochus realised the diplomats had suffered checkmate he needed to quickly enrol a "royal" army. Too late to use Hannibal in any meaningful sense he gave him the navy.

[john roberts]

It doesn't matter much. Whatever the Greeks won militarily they would almost immediately lose politically. The Greeks and Macedonians were sporadic military geniuses and consistent political imbeciles. The Romans were more than militarily competent and political geniuses. Political smarts are what count in the long run.

[Paralus]

The Greeks and Macedonians were sporadic military geniuses and consistent political imbeciles. The Romans were more than militarily competent and political geniuses.

The two socio-political environments are totally dissimilar: one might compare an apple to a bunch of grapes as easily.

The Romans were benefitted by a "unitary state". Without doubt there were ambition driven political rivalries amongst Romans - the Triumvir Wars being the standout example - but these took place within the context of a single Roman state which was viewed as such. In contrast, there was not ever a unitary Greek state and, after Alexander, no unified Macedonian state.

The Greeks, pre Macedonian Empire, were actuated by the singular interests of the poleis. Even when "leagued" the interests were strictly limited (generally to those of the leader or hegemon) and generally aimed at another "group". The Macedonian conquest did little other than crash Greek heads together under a Macedonian boot. After Alexander, the Macedonian Empire fell into separate competing spheres and, eventually, kingdoms.

The Greek/Macedonian (post Argead) "model" could never produce the "political smarts" that the singular Roman state did.

[Lanista]

Thanks all again. I love the whole... what if/what would I do scenario, as I said at the front end - its like Rome Total War - only more erudite *lol*.

What I got from this, whether I'm a hoplite or a phalangite army, is that I'm going to have to take a few to get to grips with the Romans. But my infantry isn't what's going to win. So the "innovation" the Greeks/Macedonians would have to invent would be investment in specialist light troops to disrupt the Romans whilst the hoplites/phalangites lumber along.

And cavalry. Ultimately, the Phillipian/Alexandrian hammer-anvil would be the key to victory.

Even it it may end up being Phyrric.

[Ghostmojo]

The Romans understood the business of 'inclusivity'. When expanding and conquering, to keep the new acquisitions on-side, you make it worth their while. They become stake-holders in the greater adventure and exercise. This was the key to Roman success as an expanding state. Conquered or acquired peoples could quicky weigh up the benefits of throwing in their lot with the new order. 'Does this new set-up benefit me?' many of them must have thought, and realised quite quickly that it could do. Of course, not all the Roman neighbouring states thought that, and there were always degrees to the complicity of some and lack of, of others - but in general, I think the inexorable march to greater territorial expansion, and control of this land and peoples could be seen to be a two-way street of sorts. It was obvious who the masters were - but it also became increasingly possible to join the management as time went by. The ultimate expression of this I suppose was (some way down the line) non-Italians becoming generals and even emperors.

Apart from perhaps Alexander III (in his own mixed up way) I don't think any of the Greeks really viewed their enterprises in the same way. They were by nature 'exclusive'. Trade and conquest were really for the benefit of the city-state embarking upon the venture. It was all quite short-term thinking. It is true that some Greek thinkers believed in pan-Hellenism, and maybe some politicians and commanders too, but not nearly enough, and it wouldn't have extended to non-Greeks anyway. Even Alexander used the 'Greek' thing to suit himself as and when necessary, as had Philip before him. He was no different from any other Greek in that respect. He was a Makedonian first and Greek second, just as Agesilaos II was a Spartan first and Greek second. Their respective enterprises were initiated to benefit the primary, rather than the secondary viewpoint. If the secondary benefitted as well - then so much the better - there was political capital to be made from that.

The absence of any serious binding together into a complete nation meant one or other of the Greek states was always going to dominate (in turn) be it Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Makedon, or the later leagues, and unlike the Roman scenario - the other neighbouring states were rarely, if ever going to see any benefit in it themselves from merely participating. A good example of that is the Spartan response to both Philip's and Alexander's requests that the Lakedaimonians join in their 'pan-Hellenic' adventure against Persia, which was from Agis III; "Sparta leads and does not follow"...

[taira1180]

But tha "Inclusivity" would take years to take place. That may explain the longivity of the empire, but until the social wars, the roman allies didn't received much for their help. IMO, the biggest diference was that roman didn't explore so much his allies as the athenians (or Thebans/whateaver else), making the alliance with rome much more acceptable than in a greek league.

[markdienekes]

It's true, Hannibal wasn't a master at siege warfare, neither though, was he inept. Capturing cities at that time was mainly achieved by starving it out, or through betrayal. Assaults were generally avoided. Scipio's capture of New Carthage was brilliant, but circumstances permitted the capture which did not show themselves for Scipio again. He tried to take Utica for years and failed. The problem with Hannibal's policy in Italy didn't give him much room to engage in sieges, he could not treat the towns and cities how he wanted - not only were sieges usually costly in men, which was something Hannibal wanted to avoid, but destroying the population of towns would not have had a positive effect on his chances. He was here to restore balance to the Italian peninsular by reducing Rome's power, and distributing it out to the many tribes once again.

Paradoxically, Hannibal's strategy of destroying Roman armies to show the weakness of Rome pretty much ended by the sheer scale of his victory at Cannae though he would still go on to destroy a few more armies - he was still not presented with the chance to do more damage after Cannae.

hoplite14gr wrote:
Hannibal in Cannae proved that this could work - he forgot to raze Rome and he paid for this in the end!

He didn't simply 'forget' - it just wasn't a viable option at that time.
Hannibal's decision not to besiege Rome was the correct one.

Immediately after Cannae Hannibal sent a delegation led by Carthalo to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate on moderate terms. It would have made little difference if he had been outside Rome, he was a few weeks march away regardless, yet despite the multiple catastrophes Rome had suffered, the Roman Senate refused to parley. With poor supply lines, he relied on movement across the Italian peninsular to acquire food (one of the main reasons he brought so many Numidian cavalry with him - to forage - most of Hannibal's shock cavalry were Iberian and Celts) he could also not sever Roman supply lines.

In Hans Delbruck's Warfare in Antiquity he says: At Cannae then, he had beaten and wiped out only the smaller half of the Roman Legions (8 of 18), and the Romans soon replaced their losses through new levies; they did not even have the legions stationed overseas - in Sicily, Sardinia, Spain - return home. To have moved against Rome immediately after the battle with a view toward the terrorizing effect would therefore have served no purpose for Hannibal and, passing as a negative demonstration, would have nullified the other morale effects of the victory at Cannae. If the well-known statement by the cavalry leader, Marharbal, that Hannibal understood how to win but not exploit his victories, was actually said, it only proves that the brave general who said it was a simple fighter rather than a true strategist. During the lengthy butchery of the encircled legionaries the Carthaginian army had itself sacrificed 5,700 killed, and consequently in addition at least 20,000 wounded, who were not capable of marching again until days and weeks had passed. Had he started out immediately after battle, Hannibal would have arrived before Rome with hardly 25,000 men, and the Romans would not have given in to such a small force, even at the height of their terror. (p.337)

And onto besieging Rome:

Rome was a very large, well-fortified city: the Servian wall had a circumference of more than five miles. Large open areas within the walls could accommodate refugees from the countryside. Rome was also a large trading capital, richly provided by supplies of all kinds. Hannibal would have had to control the sea and taken Ostia first so he himself could be supplied by sea to make besieging Rome not impossible with 50-60,000 men. But we know the Roman's had superiority at sea, which is why Hannibal had gathered his forces in a land army. According to Delbruck again:

The siege army would, therefore, have had to be supplied by land. Gigantic supply lines would have had to be organised and made to function through a completely hostile countryside and passing by innumerable cities and strongholds that blocked the routes. A very large portion of the Carthaginian force would have had to be assigned to this duty, and every isolated unit would have been exposed at every turn to the legions and cohorts, both Roman and allied, which were still stationed in the country or were newly organised. The remainder of the army which would have been available for siege, divided by the Tiber River, would have withstood only with great difficulty sorties of the numerically far superior garrison. The principal arm of the Carthaginians, their cavalry, could not have been of any assistance. (p.338)

With what forces Hannibal had at his disposal after Cannae, he clearly couldn't achieve the above. He used his victory well by gaining allies - a position which would support his campaign for years.