As I said before the Maniple system of fighting legions worked well against well disciplined phalanx armies and would have worked just as well against nondisciplined armies of Celts/Gauls that the Romans frequently encountered in wars in the 3rd and 2nd century BC.
The biggest argument many have against gaps is that the barbarian armies will simply break ranks and charge into the gaps swallowing up the maniples. Could happen, but I don't think it would have worked for two reasons.
1. The undisciplined Celtic/German rabble wouldn't have been that undisciplined. Think about it, they gathered an army, fed it, organized it, marched it to the battlefield. Probably broke it down into families, clans, war bands, tribes who each served under capitaneus, chieftains or "Head Men". These men probably had some power to enforce their will on others, hence discipline.
2. If they did fight their way into the gaps it wouldn't serve a purpose since the maniples could peel Romans off from the back and defend themselves with pilum or swords if necessary. If it got to the point where so many had broken ranks to flank the maniples then its time to send in the principe maniples. The loose uncohesive front ranks of the enemy would not be able to stand against the principes who are now on the second line so they would retreat. Which would cause others to retreat, so on and so forth.
So the maniple system worked extremely well until the Romans noticed a few things (and its generally accredited to Marius so I should say he noticed it).
The formation is inflexible. Every time the Romans use this formation they do it the same way. Allies on the wings in ala, organized like them according to Livy, hold the flanks while the two consular legions in the center punch through the center of the line. Effective but predictable and inflexible. (Later wars consuls could show up with up to four legions and equal number of allied legions.)
Its a major coincidence that the time that the Cimbri War started is the time generally given to Marius for reorganizing the legions. Why you ask? Because the five times that Roman armies had attempted to fight the 300,000 warrior of the Cimbri (see whistles thread for source) confederation the traditional maniple system just wasn't heavy enough. 120 man maniples could not support themselves in battle, not enough men. They could get swallowed up too easily. The other problem would be that however the Cimbri formed up (probably shield wall very deep) it made deploying in the traditional three lines of maniples stupid. What about actual units to protect flanks, what about defensive positions on hills or ridge lines? Can't do that with three long lines.
So what did Marius do? He reformed the legion's organization by increasing the size of the fighting force. He took a maniple from each of the three lines and reorganized them into a cohort. He also put the veteran soldiers of the Triari on the front line since you know, they were veterans. Since they are not on the third line anymore but at the front right of the cohort they are now named Pilus (hair folicle or file).
Organizing legions and armies into cohorts make sense. The imperator/dux can now organize his lines however he sees fit. One line, two, three, four its up to the commander how he wants to station his now extremely flexible legions. Separate flanking attacks, a fourth independent line to stop cavalry, whatever.
Now comes the argument about how they formed in battle. So answer, probably however the imperator/dux wanted them to be. I could see Marius using the maniples and centuries of the cohort similarly to how the maniples were used before. Except know their were three maniples next to each other instead of just one, much larger forces, 480 vs. 120, able to defend themselves, support each other within the cohort and deal a heavy enough blow to the enemy.
Keeping the gaps would have worked as well. Same principle applies, front line of cohorts attack, withdrawal back or hold if they get stuck, second line advance and get it stuck in as well. Soon both front lines are committed. centuries withing the cohort can relieve themselves during battle while the two lines continue to pummel the enemy lines like a boxer giving a 1-2 combination.
Later on more innovation came when they realized that since Legions fought slightly separated from one another (De Bello Civili, 3:89) that it would help to have a stronger right side, so someone beefed up the 1st cohort.
Maybe after fighting each other a few times in Sulla's civil war and later against Sertorius in Spain more innovations happened. Commanders started to realize they could put the centuries within a cohort on line.
So we have multiple formations to choose from. Cohorts in maniples, cohorts in centuries on line. Intervals between cohorts, no intervals, it was all up to the commander.
The thing I have realized it that victory in battle is not assured just because you place your men in a certain formation. If they are motivated, well led and put on good ground in decent enough formations they will probably win if you also use whatever other resources you have (ie. Cavalry, light infantry, archers, slingers).
A. Where would the centuries be posted during melee? One behind the other or in a checkerboard formation just behind the gaps? Normally when we are talking about the quincunx formation we mean that the principes maniples are posted behind the gaps at a certain distance and not the maniples of the hastati (of course in the Polybian era). Or are you addressing Caesar's deployment of his cohorts?
Centuries would be posted front to back in maniples and then later cohorts. Could also be put on line later on as well, only problem is that it makes relieving centuries on contact harder. Centuries from second line would have to individually relieve centuries on the front line (from different cohorts) making unit cohesion a problem.
B. Do you mean that one century joins battle by marching into the gap while the one fighting slowly retreats? But then, how is the enemy weakened? The enemies that these will be fighting will also be fresh. So, the Romans again take on all the risks of having undefended sides, while offering the enemy all the advantages of having half of their line fresh? Or do you think that it served like some kind of trap? If so, then it would only have been a rare stratagem, since if maintained as a system, it would be known to the enemy and dealt with accordingly (if not to enemies that had never dealt with Romans before surely to Greeks, Carthaginians, Gauls, Iberians, Germans etc).
Centuries are not a independent fighting force so they would never do anything alone. Enemy is weakened by massed throwing of pilum and some hand to hand combat. Using the Quincunx formation, units of the Roman front can back away and rest as a unit while phalanx front line units cannot. Simple as that, in a long drawn out fight the Romans will still be less tired and more orderly since they can repeatedly pull off the front line, redress and reorganize and go back into the fight without threatening the integrity of their entire front.
The system was know to the enemy and many did exploit it (Hannibal) and many times the Romans did lose (Pyrrus). But the Romans were a pretty stubborn people who believed their method worked.
C. As for the fear of crossfire, there is no such thing as I see it. What crossfire could be made from men striving to keep formation and forced to form a square looking at every side, much like a Napoleonic square? Why not just employ skirmishers to fire at the unprotected sides of these little squares while keeping your lines straight. It seems that it is the Roman squares which are vulnerable to crossfire at all times while the enemy chooses whether, how and when he will create such opportunities for the Romans.
I don't get it, are you doubting the use of a square? Because they worked pretty good in the Napoleanic War. If you send skirmishers against the sides of a Roman square and keep your lines straight all of your own skirmishers will be dead pretty quickly because they have no place to go. And if the Romans wanted to they could put skirmishers between the units in the intervals as Polybius suggests (6:9) they did at Zama.
D. An army deployed thus is full of opportunities for the enemy to exploit even in melee. The right side of each century/maniple would be defenseless and an easy target to an enemy attack or to enemy missiles if the enemy did not want to just march in the gap in a predetermined orderly fashion or just surge through if the numbers are in his favor. There are a number of stratagems one could employ against such weaknesses and none are ever reported, nor any countermeasures. Why not posting more men in a certain only part of the battle line and with them overwhelm only one or two centuries/maniples instead of the whole line? Just poking with 15 foot pikes at the sides of unshielded legionaries would be enough for a line to crumble.
How is the right side defenseless? The Romans can simply turn outward and face to the right as they sidestep forward. Once their front line meets the enemy's all forward momentum will probably stop anyway it won't be difficult for those in the right side to defend themselves. Poking 15 pikes at the shielded (they turned remember) Romans would be hard with 16 men chucking pilum at them. And shield strapped across the body or not they are going to be vulnerable to it.
Leaving the sides open gives the Roman maniples more opportunity to throw more pilum which is sure easier to do then closing with a sword and stabbing it into someone.
Quote:I have spend some time detailing a whole list of sources and illustrations to support my theory of the evolution of the Roman legion from maniple organization to cohort.
THE MANIPLE SYSTEM
I will start with the legion as organized during the 2nd Punic War period which probably carried over to a great extent until the reforms of Marius in 107-100 BC.
Start with the basic building block of the Legion. The Maniple (not century)
According to Polybius, after the levied men were separated into lines tribunes would next select ten officers for each of the hastati, principes and triarri. These men are called Prior Centurions, another ten are chosen, these are the Posterior Centurions. The ten formations for each of the three lines are called Maniples.
Polybius says this:
“It is natural that they should appoint two commanders for each maniple; for it being uncertain what may be the conduct of an officer or what may happen to him, and affairs of war not admitting of pretexts and excuses, they wish the maniple never to be without a leader and chief.” (6:24,7)
This line implies that maniples are the basic unit of the legion, not centuries. Battles are fought by maniples, not centuries. Only for administrative purpose at this point do centuries exist, mainly to make organization outside of battle easier, ie. less men for each centurion to command.
Next Polybius says “When both centurions are on the spot, the first elected commands the right half of the maniple and the second the left, but if both are not present the one who is commands the whole.” 6:24,8
I believe this implies where the centurions stood in relation to the formation. As I stated above, maniples were the battle formation, not centuries which few sources give account of them doing anything in battle, it’s always maniples (or cohorts later on).
“…placing the maniples closer together than was formerly the usage and making the depth of each many times exceed its front." Polybius, 3:113, Description of Maniples at Cannae
So when the Romans added additional manpower to the Hastati and Principe maniples they added depth with extra ranks because they knew it gave the maniples more hitting power. They evidently liked the idea of depth. Gave them staying power in the fight, allowed them to soak up casualties and replace them and gave them hitting power in the attack.
(see 1st Illustration. Not to scale)
Quincunx Formation for Battle
Both Polybius (6:9,7-9 & 3:113 among others) and Livy (Book 8:8 among others) agree that the maniples in each line had a gap/interval equal to their width between them. Many refer to it as the Quincunx formation.
Now the argument is on whether the Romans chose to close the gaps before battle and form one continuous battle line (articulated phalanx) or whether they chose to keep the gaps. I think there was no reason for Polybius and Livy to mention the intervals if they weren’t used for battle. The only mention of the lines ever closing are from Livy.
“When the triarii had admitted the hastati and principes through the intervals separating their companies they rose from their kneeling posture and instantly closing their companies up they blocked all passage through them and in one compact mass fell on the enemy as the last hope of the army.” (8,8 )
So if the hastati and principes were routed they bolt back through the gaps of the triarri who’d then closed the gaps and fight, giving time for the Hastati and Principe maniples to reorganize on their standards. They could do this by either moving the entire back three rows (posterior century) to the left or just doubling their files by extending prior century files outwards a few feet and the posterior rows moving along side of them.
So why Fight in Gaps?
To understand the usefulness of the maniple formation one first has to look at the enemy that Rome frequently encountered on a battlefield. Celts, Gauls, Africans, Greeks, Latin/Italians, Macedonians. All of these except many of the Latin/Italians generally fought in a shieldwall or phalanx or some kind. (Samnites are said to have fought in Maniple formation, probably were the Romans got the idea)
The phalanx can range from a simple overlapping of shields hedged with spears (Greek and Celtic) to a sophisticated Macedonian sarissa formation where the men must be extremely well drilled to perform it. But the key to both of these formations is that in order for them to be effective they must keep order. That means no one runs away and no one attacks forward. So the key to beating a phalanx is to break their formation. The Romans accomplish this in two ways with their maniple formation.
The key tactic of the Roman attack would have been the massed pilum volleys. Can’t be underestimated what this would do to an enemy formation. Even if most of the pilum didn’t punch through shields or bodies they would have caused some disorder within the phalanx ranks. Since there are 120 men in a Polybian described maniple, each carrying two pilum, that means that the maniple can throw about 240 pilum before they exhaust their supply. Since the maniples only cover a small front all of the javelins would be directed against those men in front and immediately to the sides of them.
Charging with Sword. Why did the Romans fight with swords? Because they are better in tight spots. Close with the enemy, get under his spear and attack him with sword while protecting yourself with a scutum. Don’t slash because the swords aren’t that well made and they might bend or break. Plus it exposes more of your body. A two inch stab might kill but that is in hind sight, piercing the pericardial sac might lead to an infection but it won’t kill immediately unless you pierce a major organ or artery. Aim for exposed areas, arms, legs, faces, necks. Whatever flesh you see try to get at it.
So now the Hastati maniple has clashed with the phalanx, throw their initial volley of pilum, charged forward while the men in the side ranks continue throwing more pilum. Men in the back and center pass their extras to the men who need them. The men in the front ranks make contact with the shield wall and start hand to hand contact. Either way it won’t last too long. Casualty stats don’t lend to a long protracted fight, not enough people died in battles to believe that a unit stayed in constant contact with each other until so many people died that the finally cracked. More than likely if the initial assault failed to break the phalanx the Hastati would back off and retreat to lick their wounds while the second line of Principes move up and take their turn. When the Hastati is sufficiently ready they attack again. Attack, rest regroup and attack again. Think pistons in a car engine. Or a see saw.
This continues until one side generally breaks. Since fear is contagious the tide of men running would grow until one side generally broke completely. If it is the Romans they can always fall back on the triarri line (the true reserve) to reorganize. If that doesn’t work, survivors can gather in the camp which is not far and fortified.
Ok that domains my intention clearly! <<<<<Bloody predictive text on Iphone :roll:
I think I meant to say demonstrates...anyhow nm!
How the he'll do you guys manage to type so damned fast!
Visne partem mei capere? Comminus agamus! * Me semper rogo, Quid faceret Iulius Caesar? * Confidence is a good thing! Overconfidence is too much of a good thing.
[b]Legio XIIII GMV. (Q. Magivs)RMRS Remember Atuatuca! Vengence will be ours!
Titus Flavius Germanus
Batavian Coh I
Byron Angel
Ok that domains my intention clearly!
How the he'll do you guys manage to type so damned fast!
Hah,Great minds think alike. The first time I saw the gaps of a quincunx formation I immediately say the utility from them. Brilliant!
Been working on this for a week now. Was originally planning to write a massive tactical guide from the maniple system to the cohort system with tons of sources and illustrations but realized that I am not getting paid to post this stuff and it would take too long.
Of course the questions I asked were directed to JC's model, not yours Bryan. I thank you for answering them though, because most probably among them there were some that I would direct at you too. Yet, I would like to see JC's answers too since I still cannot understand what exactly he proposed. Each model has its own peculiarities and yours is no exception. Thanks for a detailed analysis of your position. I will compile an answer and post it as soon as I can.
Macedon MODERATOR Forum rules
George C. K.
῾Ηρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικήτου γένος ἐστέ
The basis of exactly what I mean is in Bryan's post.
He has fleshed out the point I made (I thought quite simply), that the gaps in the checherboard can and will be covered by the men in the formations, both in the units in the rearward line, and also by skirmishers. And the men in the rear lines of each frontline
unit will be quite capable of defending the flanks.
I think they would be relishing the hope the enemy would dare enter the gaps, as they would then have to turn t oface the sides of the Roman units, and open themselves up to the fire from skirmishers and the rear units.
I realise in my head the picture is clear, and can only apologise for not taking time and effort to write more on the topic, as it is one I have had in my head for quite a few years!
I realise maybe what I see as simple to understand may not be put across so eloquantly, but to me simple is best.
As I said, if I get time I will try and put it into a longer dialog and copy and paste it here in the future. I think Bryan has said exactly what I mean, in just a more verbose way.
Visne partem mei capere? Comminus agamus! * Me semper rogo, Quid faceret Iulius Caesar? * Confidence is a good thing! Overconfidence is too much of a good thing.
[b]Legio XIIII GMV. (Q. Magivs)RMRS Remember Atuatuca! Vengence will be ours!
Titus Flavius Germanus
Batavian Coh I
Byron Angel
Well, at least some of it is what I meant.... :roll:
I really need to re-read and make my position clearer.
What I read from both of your positions are intersting, but I will obviously have to up my game to respond in kind.
Hopefully I will not get distracted and forget....
Visne partem mei capere? Comminus agamus! * Me semper rogo, Quid faceret Iulius Caesar? * Confidence is a good thing! Overconfidence is too much of a good thing.
[b]Legio XIIII GMV. (Q. Magivs)RMRS Remember Atuatuca! Vengence will be ours!
Titus Flavius Germanus
Batavian Coh I
Byron Angel
This is a very interesting discussion for me. I've always been very interested in how the Romans actually fought. As a retired US Army officer, I don't find it feasible for the Romans to have fought with gaps between maniples against a foe like the Celts. The Celts would have moved forward into the gaps and overwhelmed the men on the front corners of the maniple. The Roman in the front corner position of the maniple would have to face the enemy to his front, the one oblique to him, and the one who would enter the gap between the maniples and would attack him from the side. The Roman soldier behind him would have to defend against an enemy coming around to the flank of the maniple. The maniple would be in contact to the front and on both flanks. This pressure would result in the compression of the maniple and would result in recurring casualties in the front corner positions.
I would like to ask about another author and his website. Gary Brueggeman's "The Roman Army" site, web address: http://www.garyb.0catch.com/ has a great deal of thought on gaps in the formation and how the Romans may have fought. He addresses ancient authors and uses a lot of common sense in his comments. (I know that the website is full of unwanted advertisements and such, sorry about that.) What are your thoughts on Gary Brueggeman's analysis of Roman fighting techniques regarding gaps in the line and a solid front?
There is plenty of evidence that I already stated that suggested that gaps existed in fighting formations not just during the time period of the Maniple styled legions described by Polybius and Livy to the cohort legions described by Caesar.
As great as his website is (awesome website), I don't agree with Brueggeman's suggestion that the Celtic/Germanic armies would simply rush forward into the gaps/intervals.
First, as demonstrated by a few sources, some Celtic/Germanic tribes did fight in tightly packed phalanxes. Second, even those who didn't would probably not sacrifice all of their cohesion to simply run the gaps of maniples and later cohorts because there was another line threatening them. Who probably were just waiting for an unorganized mass of individuals who they can charge as a unit.
As for the men on the corners, yeah they would probably have it rough but according to Polybius' description they were also the centurions. Also the longer the maniple or cohort was in battle the less cohesive and dressed its lines were.
Besides, almost all armies would have had gaps of some size between units. Different men from different countries with different languages that fought differently were many times gathered into one army (Alexander's as an example). Doubt they fought in one perfect straight line.
As a US Army officer how important is cohesion in a stressful confusing battlefield? Would you allow your men to simple run off and do what they want or would you try to keep some sort of order in the ranks? What would a Brigade Change of Command Ceremony look like if their wasn't cohesion, ranks, leaders and some signals and orders given? What would a battalion run turn into if everyone was allowed to run at his own pace?
Crispus: You're right, I think. I visualize a legionary standing in the center of a six foot by six foot box. Thus if he is in the center of the box there is on each side of him 3 feet minus the width of his own body (with some overlap from the shield). So I suppose that works out to about 2 feet of clear distance on each side of him.
On the old RAT wasn't there a long discussion on "which six feet is it"?
Tom Mallory
NY, USA
Wannabe winner of the corona
graminea and the Indy 500.
I have a number of questions and comments on your excellent presentation of your theory Bryan.
First, let me sum up how I understand it, so that you may correct me if I did not get something right. I will call the units arrayed in front “the front line” to easier describe what I understood. I will make some initial remarks and questions after each point, in my next post I will try to present/refute sources. –Now that I am posting this, I see that some of my points were covered by posts of other members, so excuse me if some questions seem to have been asked again- So, in your opinion :
1. Your model is trying to cover and simulate Roman battle formations from at least the Polybian times to at least the times of Julius Caesar.
2. In your model, the first Roman line that fights against the enemy formation is arrayed with sizable gaps. These gaps are usually the width of a maniple (some 20 yards?) in the case of maniples or wider (?) in the case of later cohorts. An exception regarding width but not placement could be Cannae, as Polybius states, another exception regarding placement but not width would be Zama, again according to Polybius.
-Please check your refs. I tried to find them and I was unfortunately unable to. You may have mixed some up. About the ones I did find, Livy, at that point, describes an older formation with undetermined “small” gaps among the companies. He has his Triarii fill in the gaps and attack, unfortunately, he does not comment on the role of the gaps in the attacks of the other lines or whether they did attack with gaps. One could assume that since he has the Triarii explicitly close up the gaps, he infers that the other lines did not or (the other side) that closing up the gaps was a norm, so that explicitly stating it every time would be redundant. I admit I do not read Latin, so I might be missing something in the original text. Polybius descriptions merit much more analysis, especially as to what exactly the original Greek text says as opposed to the translation, so I will refrain from that for now, I would just recommend rechecking the refs and posting the correct ones (I assume that the ones you gave were Pol 6.9, Pol 7.9 and Pol 3.113 ? (you wrote “6:9,7-9 & 3:113 among others”)).
3. Posterior centuries were arrayed, as their name implies in the back ranks and did not play any particular role in your system other than filling the back ranks of the maniple/cohort.
-You mention the right – left centurions described by Polybius, do you assume that the “left” centurion would be the one in charge of the posterior century? If so, would he be posted, as Polybius suggests on the left of the maniple (the actual words Polybius uses for maniples are simaia,speira and taxis, Greek for subunits of the maniple size common in all Greek armies, he actually also calls them cohorts (11.23.1), the only Roman term he uses for them.). Do you place both centurions in the first rank or the left centurion in the first rank of his century, that is the middle rank of the maniple?
4. The gaps were covered by the units of the second line (that would be the Principes in the case of the Polybian era) which would be arrayed only a few yards away from the rear ranks of the first units (I deduced that from your illustration but you did state that they were off scale so I might be wrong here) and/or sometimes by Velites, as as the case at Zama. This is why the gaps should be as wide as the units behind them.
-So, would the second line be arrayed very close to the first or not? How far do you think should it be posted in order for it to actually do actively and efficiently cover the flanks of the first line units? If a unit of the first line was forced to retreat, would the units of the second line in its rear keep their relative positions to it by also retreating? What if that retreat made it lose its preferred distance with the other unit it was supposed to cover? What would happen if a unit drove the enemy back? Would it press on getting inside the line of the enemy? Again would the support unit on the rear follow? How important would you consider keeping an even front with the same line units on your left and right would be? In the case of Caesarian cohorts, wouldn’t the gaps between them would also be as wide as a cohort, which would be quite wide, especially if you place the men in open order, or do you suggest a different placement/density?
5. During the initial charge, the first line would charge the enemy, throw their pila and then charge into the melee. If things did not go well, the line would orderly retreat while at the same time, the second line would attack as the first did before through the gaps of the first line. From your metaphor with the pistons I assume that you think that this might happen repeatedly until the end of the battle.
- Who would give the command for the second line to attack? Would that attack be coordinated or made by single units “as situation demanded”? What would happen if certain units were hard pressed while others were actually victorious, would all be “relieved” or just the ones suffering?
6. I guess that the attack of the second line would facilitate the first line to disengage and reorganize, since the enemy would be reluctant to follow.
-Wouldn’t that mean that the enemy against whom the units of the line fought would also reorganize and take a breath, since the enemy fighting against the Romans would now also disengage and those who just also covered the gaps were engaged?
7. Should the enemy utilize missiles or attack the unshielded flank of the unit, the unit would turn and present face to the enemy.
-Wouldn’t that beat the whole purpose of a unit relying on maneuverability (practically the ability to easily retire and reengage)? Files forced to change face would make the unit more static and would potentially cause disorder (or don’t you agree that a formation facing to multiple directions cannot be as maneuverable and manageable as one facing a single direction?). How would the centurions or other first-rank soldiers on the corner of the first rank defend against 2 or more enemies attacking them simultaneously with no one to protect their personal flanks, especially if we assume that Polybius description of the Roman line fighting in open order (actually “extra” open order, since Pol’s 9 feet for each man is 50% more than the usual 6 feet of open order and 200% more than normal close order of 3 feet) is correct? Does such an order agree with your system? (it seems that Polybius makes some math mistakes when describing the space men occupy in line in chapter 18, his mathematical ability is sadly not in par with his ability as a historian… his critique of Callisthenes is another testament to that.).
8. The enemies of Rome did use recorded countermeasures.
- What were these? Did you find any mention as to anyone somehow exploiting the manipular system as you or anyone else imagines it looked? Do we have any information/advice/stratagem addressing any of the theoretical and practical problems of such a formation?
9. Do you know ancient Greek or Latin? This is an honest question, I always think of reading at the primary sources in their original as very important and I want to know if you can better help me understand the Latin texts (I do not know Latin so I also have to read from the English translations) while understanding what I will be saying about the Greek texts (I know ancient Greek).
- for example, if I told you that there were mentions of Polybius in those same texts explicitly stating that the Romans fought “phallangidon”, like a phalanx, but that is generally not translated in such a manner in the translations, which are usually made by scholars who have little interest in battle mechanics so they try to make an embellished, easy to read work for everyone and do not even understand what difference it makes when translating various military terms in proper English, would that make you see the same texts with another eye?
Thanks in advance, I will now start compiling examples from explicit sources.
Macedon MODERATOR Forum rules
George C. K.
῾Ηρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικήτου γένος ἐστέ
As I hope is till now clear, I do support that in antiquity and Byzantine period, intervals between infantry units, even those of the first line, could be employed. It is the width of these, their function and nature that I contest. In my opinion, the Romans of the periods in question did not deploy in maniple or later cohort sized units with intervals between each other equal to their width. Again I do agree that intervals would have been employed as suggested before combat or by the rear lines but I disagree with their use during the actual melee. Until now I have not specifically occupied myself in these posts with how the Roman system actually worked, I have only contested the existence of these intervals.
Indeed, there are mentions of such intervals in their primary sources, unfortunately very few determine their width and none actually explaining or describing their use in combat. No mention of any such interval being exploited by the enemy (in the specified era) exists, nor any mention of any measure as to how to guard it. Of course lack of such evidence is not proof, this is why the debate rages even today, thus while not denying the probability I will show quotes that suggests that such intervals were not employed.
Polybius may be our best source. He makes mistakes but all in all, he is a source to trust and respect and deserves very careful study. He was knowledgeable in the art of war, so his words carry weight. It is true that Polybius mentions intervals both at Zama and Cannae. About the first battle (15.9.6.), he also mentions that the maniples of the principes were traditionally posted behind the intervals between the maniples of the hastati. The text is very straightforward, but nowhere does it say that these intervals would be retained during the melee against Hannibal’s lines. One could of course contest that it also nowhere says that they were somehow closed and he would of course be right. The reasons why such a formation would have been used before melee is evident to all. It facilitated the maneuvers of cavalry and light infantry, made actual marching easier by enabling maniples to march around certain obstacles. Greek armies tried to address the same issues by marching in open order (6 feet per man), which they called “natural”.
I only give this text to just give the information that Polybius never uses the term “maniple” in his text, this is the Roman term we use to translate the Greek terms he uses. It is only interesting when coupled with :
“That unit of infantry is called by the Romans a cohort”.
I am digressing but I thought it interesting to include in this post since many are very interested in the history of the usage of military terms. By no means do I contest that the word “maniple” is wrong or something!
In the same battle Polybius says :
“Thus it came about that their charge threw the maniples of the hastati into confusion; whereupon the officers of the principes caused their lines to advance to oppose them.” 15.13.7.
This has nothing to do with the existence of the intervals but it shows that, at least according to Polybius, the principes did not alternately attack the enemy line (like pistons). They indeed ran to the support of the faltering hastati. The translation is not exactly correct but the general meaning is indeed the same. Is the “piston” attack model (If I understood it correctly) required in your model Bryan to make sense of the intervals?
And then Polybius says :
“and the hastati to be recalled from the pursuit by the sound of a bugle, and drew them up where they were in advance of the ground on which the fighting had taken place, opposite the enemy's center. He then ordered the principes and triarii to take close order, and, threading their way through the corpses, to deploy into line with the hastati on either flank. When they had surmounted the obstacles and got into line with the hastati, the two lines charged each other with the greatest fire and fury.” 15.14.3
By reading the English text we may find a certain obscure point : he says that “the Principes and Triarii took close order and deployed into line on each of the hastati flank and in line with them.” We might ask ourselves what this closing of order is. Up until now they would have been deployed in the same order the Hastati were. So how would they close up? The Greek text indeed says so but what is not readily understood in the translation is that it also says : “the two phalanxes engaged…”. The word is given as “line” in the translation. In my opinion, this quote would only make sense if the maniples of the Principes and the Triarii closed up the maniples (not the men), formed a single phalanx with the Hastati (that meaning that the Hastati also fought in a single line) and then engaged… Any alternative explanations anyone?
In his description of Cannae, Polybius indeed says :
“and their foot next them in the same line, placing the maniples, however, closer together than usual, and making the depth of each maniple several times greater than its front.” 3.113.3
Again, the meaning is practically the same with small “errors”.
(Actually the translation reads : “the infantry he posted at an even front (with the cavalry), making the maniples denser than before and the depth of the maniples several times greater than their front.” This makes us wonder if the maniples were arrayed with smaller intervals or if the men in the maniples were arrayed in closer order. I tend to agree that he talks about the intervals here, but one could indeed contest that.).
Yet, the “fighting with intervals” theory is contested by the next quote in the same battle description :
“Still they fought, though no longer in line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who charged them on the flanks.”, Pol.3.115.12
Again it is not that evident until we read the Greek text :
We tend to read “line” and think of a general battle line. But here we have three different modes of fighting clearly expressed by Polybius!
“they fought not like a phalanx, but as single men or as maniples…”
So, fighting in maniples was not the way they fought before disorder came…
Vegetius is a later resource and not the most trustworthy one too, but he is also quite clear when he explains how the space required for the arrangement of a line should be calculated. In his third book, the appropriate chapter says :
“PROPER DISTANCES AND INTERVALS
Having explained the general disposition of the lines, we now come to the distances and dimensions. One thousand paces contain a single rank of one thousand six hundred and fifty-six foot soldiers, each man being allowed three feet. Six ranks drawn up on the same extent of ground will require nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-six men. To form only three ranks of the same number will take up two thousand paces, but it is much better to increase the number of ranks than to make your front too extensive. We have before observed the distance between each rank should be six feet, one foot of which is taken up by the men. Thus if you form a body of ten thousand men into six ranks they will occupy thirty-six feet. in depth and a thousand paces in front. By this calculation it is easy to compute the extent of ground required for twenty or thirty thousand men to form upon. Nor can a general be mistaken when thus he knows the proportion of ground for any fixed number of men.
But if the field of battle is not spacious enough or your troops are very numerous, you may form them into nine ranks or even more, for it is more advantageous to engage in close order that to extend your line too much. An army that takes up too much ground in front and too little in depth, is quickly penetrated by the enemy's first onset. After this there is no remedy. As to the post of the different corps in the right or left wing or in the center, it is the general rule to draw them up according to their respective ranks or to distribute them as circumstances or the dispositions of the enemy may require.”
Another interesting chapter is :
“RESERVES
The method of having bodies of reserves in rear of the army, composed of choice infantry and cavalry, commanded by the supernumerary lieutenant generals, counts and tribunes, is very judicious and of great consequence towards the gaining of a battle. Some should be posted in rear of the wings and some near the center, to be ready to fly immediately to the assistance of any part of the line which is hard pressed, to prevent its being pierced, to supply the vacancies made therein during the action and thereby to keep up the courage of their fellow soldiers and check the impetuosity of the enemy. This was an invention of the Lacedaemonians, in which they were imitated by the Carthaginians. The Romans have since observed it, and indeed no better disposition can be found.
The line is solely designed to repulse, or if possible, break the enemy. If it is necessary to form the wedge or the pincers, it must be done by the supernumerary troops stationed in the rear for that purpose. If the saw is to be formed, it must also be done from the reserves, for if once you begin to draw off men from the line you throw all into confusion. If any flying platoon of the enemy should fall upon your wing or any other part of your army, and you have no supernumerary troops to oppose it or if you pretend to detach either horse or foot from your line for that service by endeavoring to protect one part, you will expose the other to greater danger. In armies not very numerous, it is much better to contract the front, and to have strong reserves. In short, you must have a reserve of good and well-armed infantry near the center to form the wedge and thereby pierce the enemy's line; and also bodies of cavalry armed with lances and cuirasses, with light infantry, near the wings, to surround the flanks of the enemy.”
He definitely does not allow the formation of sizable intervals and the role of the second line is to support and not actively fight unless becoming part of the actual line by forming the pincers or the wedge in front of the first line and, as I understand, joining it. Vegetius is trying to give information and advice that, in his mind, reflects reality in the eras we are interested in, so, these chapters are important to at least understand how lettered men of his time understood Roman fighting of the eras in question.
I have to leave in a few minutes, so I will only add some quotes by Frontinus for the time being. Frontinus is very close to the era in question and he is certainly more reliable than Vegetius. He says in his second book, in the third chapter called “On the Disposition of Troops for Battle”:
“Against this formation Scipio drew up the flower of his legions in three successive front lines, arranged according to hastati, principes, and triarii, not making the cohorts touch, but leaving a space between the detached companies through which the elephants driven by the enemy might easily be allowed to pass without throwing the ranks into confusion. These intervals he filled with light-armed skirmishers, that the line might show no gaps, giving them instructions to withdraw to the rear or the flanks at the first onset of the elephants.”, 2.3.16
If translated correctly, this text is very informative as to how Frontinus made sense of the same things discussed above about the battle of Zama. He thinks that Scipio’s leaving the intervals was a stratagem to counter the anticipated offensive of the elephants and that in his opinion the maniples should touch. The reason why the intervals were filled with velites was that the line should show no gaps. So, at least in Frontinus time and of course knowledge, the cohosrt would touch and the line was deemed important to show no gaps (this is also mentioned in later Byzantine manuals as to how to form such intervals) . At least to Frontinus, it was important that the enemy saw no gaps.
In 2.3.17, Frotinus presents another instance in which Sulla formed intervals to be able to send in ligt infantry and cavalry to counter the war chariots of Archelaus.
In 2.3.18, he says that in this way Julius Caesar countered the scythe bearing chariots of the Gauls.
I will continue when I come home…
Macedon MODERATOR Forum rules
George C. K.
῾Ηρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικήτου γένος ἐστέ
Can you please describe in detail how you believe the Romans fought. Pick a time period where the maniple styled legions existed, or early cohorts were used and describe how they were composed, organized, deployed and battled in melee.
Great post BTW. For the life of me can't figure out how some of those sources were included. Must have been tired. Also, I don't comprehend Latin or Greek but am curious as to how not one book I have read included your translation meaning of the word phalanx. How is it that every historian I've read got it wrong? If it is true then all the speculation is over, the Romans fought in one superlong continuous phalanx, just in three lines. But then why is there still debate? Why do major historians throughout the last couple hundred years (who also read Latin and Greek) argue with each other about Gaps and such?
to answer all of your questions would require me to write a book which I don't intend to do. But I will answer some:
Yet, the “fighting with intervals” theory is contested by the next quote in the same battle description :
“Still they fought, though no longer in line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who charged them on the flanks.”, Pol.3.115.12
Again it is not that evident until we read the Greek text :
“οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὐκέτι φαλαγγηδόν, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ σπείρας στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων”
We tend to read “line” and think of a general battle line. But here we have three different modes of fighting clearly expressed by Polybius!
“they fought not like a phalanx, but as single men or as maniples…”
To me Polybius is describing that the line was facing to the front so if fell to individuals or maniples at the sides to turn to meet the African units flanking them which was insignificant to stop them. Since they were so densely packed, the Maniples from the second line couldn't maneuver effectively to engage them. It also to me implies that there was a gap/interval between the Gaulic line and the formations of Africans on the wings. If not then how were they able to maneuver so freely to perform such a flanking maneuver without being engaged with the Roman lines until the pincer was closed?
Who would give the command for the second line to attack? Would that attack be coordinated or made by single units “as situation demanded”? What would happen if certain units were hard pressed while others were actually victorious, would all be “relieved” or just the ones suffering?
Polybius gives the power to deploy the second line Zama to Scipio. But I think that he got it wrong, the tribunes, legatus and the commander controlled deploying the second lines. My take is that unless told beforehand not to commit the second or third line "without my approval" then it would fall on the initiative of the local tribunes to make that decision. Some units would have help up better than others so the battlefield would have been fluid. It called delegating authority.
Another reason Polybius got it wrong is because it is easier to simplify a multi-hour long battle into a few paragraphs by simplifying the tactics of it. For the sake of telling a story he gives orders from the commander which wouldn't be necessary in real life. Why have former consuls commanding the legions at Cannae? Or why you would even have tribunes in the Army? If you read Polybius then I guess they are their for moral support and to serve as messenger boys since all big decisions come from the commander of the army. Or maybe Polybius simplified it for a better story. Like one man giving a battlefield speech to 80,000 men. Kind of hard to do but sounds better on paper.
