Roman Battle Formations Mid Republic to Late Rep.

[Bryan]

Sorry if my previous post sounded negative or immature but I have a ton of things that need to get done and constantly having to post here with tons of sources is cutting into my life. But I will defend myself.

Macedon wrote:

Have you actually read what I wrote or did you think it too cumbersome so you had to assume that my position was that the Romans always fought in a long continuous line?

i read them. Trust me I did. As evidence:

Macedon wrote:

Did I say that there were no intervals?

before that he wrote:

Again I do agree that intervals would have been employed as suggested before combat or by the rear lines but I disagree with their use during the actual melee.

He later wrote:

Indeed, there are mentions of such intervals in their primary sources, unfortunately very few determine their width and none actually explaining or describing their use in combat. No mention of any such interval being exploited by the enemy (in the specified era) exists, nor any mention of any measure as to how to guard it. Of course lack of such evidence is not proof, this is why the debate rages even today, thus while not denying the probability I will show quotes that suggests that such intervals were not employed.

These are just a few of the many ways that I have become frustrated and confused. And this is why I don't like debating on the internet. Again, back to the whole Special Olympics joke.

So I think I demonstrated enough evidence already that gaps did in fact exist in combat. I even demonstrated a method that they could be used properly.

This whole argument still stems from the gaps/interval debate. I brought up Polybius and Livy and then Caesar himself. I quoted lines from Caesar to substantiate that gaps existed as well even though he only mentions them between legions.

Macedon reply:

Another (I would admit totally unsupported by modern historiography) theory could have the 8th be posted behind the 9th. This is something that comes to mind since there is absence in the translation of any certain hint as to the relative position of the two here or in any part of the description of the battle. Then, Caesar's orders would be interpreted in another sense, the 8th would indeed as a whole support the 9th, effectively forming a second line very close to the front. Maybe the whole of the 9th would be deployed in single line? Now, such an idea is not supported by bibliography and may easily be dismissed by the Latin text itself if there is something there not clearly translated... As a tactical decision it would certainly though not be a first (told you we RomanArmy forumites are prone to wild theories!).

Okay, a little out of left field, but okay. Still think that this goes against the concept of unity of command which is a principle of warfare but okay, a possibility until you read the example of how Caesar had organized legions into the fabled triplex acies while fighting in Spain.

"Caesar had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and three others were behind these." 1:83

Meaning each legion controlled its own battle space with the cohorts within broken up to form different lines.

Macedon swiftly counters with:

And where exactly does your disagreement lie? At Pharsalus it seems the formation was 4/3/2/1... Do you really suggest that there were no tactical variations? Afranius posted his legions against Caesar in two lines... Studying a traditional, often used formation is very understandable, not taking into account the different variations is a mistake. (It awfully looks to me like soccer tactics... Whether you play 4-4-2 or 4-3-3, even 5-3-2 etc it is up to the coach. Yet, generally, coaches use variations of the 4-4-2 system.)

Ahhh, okay...my argument is that gaps existed. That separating units makes sense. That if fighting against a solid line, whether straight or snake shaped would be easily broken by using independent and flexible combat units that each have a mind of their own (centurion) that could fight and maneuver in different ways when necessary (again I gave examples of this).

Further confusing me and sending me into an endless spiral of "This is Going Nowhere Slowly" is when Macedon himself quotes Caesar:

He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P. Sulla, and of the center to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post opposite Pompey.

and then says later:

Now you are debating that the legions did not (ever? traditionally?) fight trying to keep their relative positions but when we read that someone drew his battleline posting legion A&B on the right wing, C&D in the center and E&F on the left wing, we should understand that this someone was preparing to give 6 different battles that would not be coordinated, that legion E would not care where legions D and F were... Now, THIS is a theory you will need much effort to support. Does it also work in your manipular model?


Did you read the Caesar's Commentaries? At almost every single battle he describes chaos and independent action from each legion. Did I say this? Or did Caesar kind of imply this?

I will finish by answering a question from Macedon.

So, now your model has every Roman battle being a sum of many individual, virtually tactically independent battles whose sum would determine the outcome?

Judging by my own experiences in the military, in war and in combat and from reading such writings as Caesar's commentaries and many other historical accounts of battles including Romans or others, I believe this to the bottom of my heart. Everything else is an author simplifying the battle or campaign by giving credit to the whole rather than the individual soldiers or units.

Lastly, this thread is still going nowhere since both parties wont agree with each other. We can continue but both parties will still ignore everything the other says except to use it as evidence to push their own ideas. So I am bailing out for now. Someone else can jump in, Crispus, you sound like you have some ideas, lets hear them!

But lets not argue for the sake of winning an argument.

[Macedon]

(double post)

[Macedon]

Macedon wrote:

Did I say that there were no intervals?

before that he wrote:

Again I do agree that intervals would have been employed as suggested before combat or by the rear lines but I disagree with their use during the actual melee.

He later wrote:

Indeed, there are mentions of such intervals in their primary sources, unfortunately very few determine their width and none actually explaining or describing their use in combat. No mention of any such interval being exploited by the enemy (in the specified era) exists, nor any mention of any measure as to how to guard it. Of course lack of such evidence is not proof, this is why the debate rages even today, thus while not denying the probability I will show quotes that suggests that such intervals were not employed.

These are just a few of the many ways that I have become frustrated and confused. And this is why I don't like debating on the internet. Again, back to the whole Special Olympics joke.

...Macedon probably again failed to make his position understood.

I wrote as my initial opinion (your first quote on my opinion) :

"As I hope is till now clear, I do support that in antiquity and Byzantine period, intervals between infantry units, even those of the first line, could be employed. It is the width of these, their function and nature that I contest. In my opinion, the Romans of the periods in question did not deploy in maniple or later cohort sized units with intervals between each other equal to their width. Again I do agree that intervals would have been employed as suggested before combat or by the rear lines but I disagree with their use during the actual melee. Until now I have not specifically occupied myself in these posts with how the Roman system actually worked, I have only contested the existence of these intervals."

This came JUST before my

"Indeed, there are mentions of such intervals in their primary sources, unfortunately very few determine their width and none actually explaining or describing their use in combat. No mention of any such interval being exploited by the enemy (in the specified era) exists, nor any mention of any measure as to how to guard it. Of course lack of such evidence is not proof, this is why the debate rages even today, thus while not denying the probability I will show quotes that suggests that such intervals were not employed"

Now.... is it clear if one reads both paragraphs that I meant intervals of a width equal to cohorts or maniples, the very intervals that were crucial to your model? I thought it was but... maybe I am wrong. And if you thought this was unclear (I just think of it as proof that you should read posts more carefully), why didn't you just ask me to clarify? Had you the patience to do that we could really have a debate. But acting as though you are frustrated by my inability to form a coherent argument, thus making it a waste of your time to seriously bother with addressing my points is not a good way to get your own opinion across.

By the way, what is the Special Olympics joke? I'd love to hear it...

So I think I demonstrated enough evidence already that gaps did in fact exist in combat. I even demonstrated a method that they could be used properly.

This whole argument still stems from the gaps/interval debate. I brought up Polybius and Livy and then Caesar himself. I quoted lines from Caesar to substantiate that gaps existed as well even though he only mentions them between legions.

In your opinion you might have. In mine you have not. Imagining that mentions of gaps in a formation automatically means that this formation fought with them is plainly wrong. I asked you to produce some mentions of anything that has to do with gaps in the Roman lines during melee and of course you came up with none. I also offered you the Greek texts of Polybius describing actual melee and you understandably voiced your doubts. I hoped you would try asking around, there are more of us here who know ancient Greek, but you did not or if you did I guess they did not refute me or else I would be seeing your objections. I offered you Frontinus, Vegetius, Polybius and Livy, I could and can provide many more sources regarding actual melee and you never responded to one with an answer that refuted them.

Again, your model demands gaps the size of the units arrayed in front. How many of your sources said that, even if not directly referring to melee combat?

Macedon reply:

Another (I would admit totally unsupported by modern historiography) theory could have the 8th be posted behind the 9th. This is something that comes to mind since there is absence in the translation of any certain hint as to the relative position of the two here or in any part of the description of the battle. Then, Caesar's orders would be interpreted in another sense, the 8th would indeed as a whole support the 9th, effectively forming a second line very close to the front. Maybe the whole of the 9th would be deployed in single line? Now, such an idea is not supported by bibliography and may easily be dismissed by the Latin text itself if there is something there not clearly translated... As a tactical decision it would certainly though not be a first (told you we RomanArmy forumites are prone to wild theories!).

Okay, a little out of left field, but okay. Still think that this goes against the concept of unity of command which is a principle of warfare but okay, a possibility until you read the example of how Caesar had organized legions into the fabled triplex acies while fighting in Spain.

So, I actually lighten up things by showing you that often wild theories can be offered and there is nothing wrong with them, yours being one of them, and you choose to answer by saying that the proof that the 8th was not posted behind the 9th was that Caesar in Spain posted his legions in a certain way? What does this have to do with anything? I forgot... you actually support that Caesar never made any variations in his formations... If this is your opinion, as I already stated, we can discuss that and see whether Caesar is as predictable as you think. But, seriously now... something could not be the case in Pharsalus because in Spain it was not?

And why does keeping a legion behind another legion "go against the concept of unity of command which is a principle of warfare"? What unity of command is breached? I cannot understand you...

"Caesar had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and three others were behind these." 1:83

Meaning each legion controlled its own battle space with the cohorts within broken up to form different lines.

What does "controlling their own battle space" have to do with legions fighting individual battles? A cavalry squadron occupies its own battle space, so does a taxis of phalangites.

Macedon swiftly counters with:

And where exactly does your disagreement lie? At Pharsalus it seems the formation was 4/3/2/1... Do you really suggest that there were no tactical variations? Afranius posted his legions against Caesar in two lines... Studying a traditional, often used formation is very understandable, not taking into account the different variations is a mistake. (It awfully looks to me like soccer tactics... Whether you play 4-4-2 or 4-3-3, even 5-3-2 etc it is up to the coach. Yet, generally, coaches use variations of the 4-4-2 system.)

Ahhh, okay...my argument is that gaps existed. That separating units makes sense. That if fighting against a solid line, whether straight or snake shaped would be easily broken by using independent and flexible combat units that each have a mind of their own (centurion) that could fight and maneuver in different ways when necessary (again I gave examples of this).

Your argument was never that gaps existed. It was that gaps existed the size of maniples in the manipular system and cohorts in the cohortal system. This is a very different thing. And no! There is no evidence whatsoever that

"...if fighting against a solid line, whether straight or snake shaped would be easily broken by using independent and flexible combat units that each have a mind of their own (centurion) that could fight and maneuver in different ways when necessary (again I gave examples of this)"

Nor have you offered any. Did you make any statistics as to the performance of the Roman line as you model it against such lines? Do you think that Pydna, Cynoscephalae or Magnesia support this view (even if one does admit that your model is correct)? You might be surprised... Where are the examples, especially those that would show that armies admittedly fighting in that manner did "easily" break enemy lines? Your argument sounds like me making up a strange model for Alexander's army and then supporting that my model works because it worked for Alexander... You do have to find examples of such formations really doing what you suggest they did and then show that the effects of your model are similar.

Further confusing me and sending me into an endless spiral of "This is Going Nowhere Slowly" is when Macedon himself quotes Caesar:

He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P. Sulla, and of the center to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post opposite Pompey.

and then says later:

Now you are debating that the legions did not (ever? traditionally?) fight trying to keep their relative positions but when we read that someone drew his battleline posting legion A&B on the right wing, C&D in the center and E&F on the left wing, we should understand that this someone was preparing to give 6 different battles that would not be coordinated, that legion E would not care where legions D and F were... Now, THIS is a theory you will need much effort to support. Does it also work in your manipular model?


Did you read the Caesar's Commentaries? At almost every single battle he describes chaos and independent action from each legion. Did I say this? Or did Caesar kind of imply this?

I have read Caesar's commentaries many times and from a lot of different translations. If you think that Caesar's descriptions of battles are chaos and independent actions then we could discuss that. Strangely enough, even that was not a part of your initial model. Again I disagree. Caesar is describing maneuvers of units in battle. His descriptions make tactical sense and (to me) clearly show the interdependence of the legions in his battle plans. Interpreting the existence of commanders for each wing as proof that the wings would act as a single entity, let alone the legions in them, is strange and this is the first time I have heard anyone suggesting that... Do you know of any army that did not assign commanders to its wings and centers? To units and subunits? From this answer I get that your answer to my :

Now you are debating that the legions did not (ever? traditionally?) fight trying to keep their relative positions but when we read that someone drew his battleline posting legion A&B on the right wing, C&D in the center and E&F on the left wing, we should understand that this someone was preparing to give 6 different battles that would not be coordinated, that legion E would not care where legions D and F were... Now, THIS is a theory you will need much effort to support. Does it also work in your manipular model?


is a big and clear "YES". I respect your opinion, but again, I disagree and had you the patience, I would readily debate you on that with only Caesar's work as reference.

What I do not get is why you found that confusing? Did you really think that such a model of Caesar's battles is the norm?

I will finish by answering a question from Macedon.

So, now your model has every Roman battle being a sum of many individual, virtually tactically independent battles whose sum would determine the outcome?

Judging by my own experiences in the military, in war and in combat and from reading such writings as Caesar's commentaries and many other historical accounts of battles including Romans or others, I believe this to the bottom of my heart. Everything else is an author simplifying the battle or campaign by giving credit to the whole rather than the individual soldiers or units.

OK... this is your own opinion based on personal experience and personal research. I beg to differ. And I think that I would not be too bold in suggesting that your opinion is certainly not mainstream and as such you should not find it strange if people disagree. Having an opinion so different to what is generally accepted calls for you being able to explain and support it and for this you need patience, clarity and a willingness to debate in length.

By the way, why are you so vexed if I do not readily agree with opinions you have never even voiced?

Bryan, I know that I have posed many questions and comments and now they have piled up and are almost impossible to answer even if you wanted to -happens when people lack the time to post answers for many posts. I hope this discussion goes on. If sometime you have the time and willingness to form a complete answer, tell me to sum up the points I would like to see answered or commented on.

[Bryan]

Bryan wrote:

The internet is a poor method of communication to perform debates.

Bryan wrote:

Pulling a few lines out of someones massive diatribe, cutting and then pasting them while highlighting them bold or in italics does not make the argument clearer. Instead it makes it more confusing to the reader. As an example look at the mess that is above me and try to figure it out. And then wonder why messages and points get confusing.

Bryan wrote:

The amount of documentation and sourcing required to prove this point to either one of our satisfaction would be the size of a book. Actually, it would have to be a book. Furthermore, many have already written books on the subject. I recommend that you Macedon write a book about this and publish it electronically so everyone can read your uninterrupted thoughts without someone ripping them to pieces after every three paragraphs. In the meantime I not participating in the argument between gaps and intervals or anything else similar. Not worth the amount of time it takes to read these posts and then write my own after pouring through documents.

The Internet says:

Arguing on the internet is like the Special Olympics because even if you win you're still retarded...

[Crispvs]

Well, reading through the evidence, theories and suppositions expressed so far, I have the impression that if you were sitting together over a pint of beer you would probably have concluded that there were certainly gaps of some unstated width between units on some occasions at least but no specific mention of them on others. I have no problem with any of this but would add to the mix that whether gaps existed, how many there were and how wide each would have been would have been down to how the general decided to deploy his army. I am not about to try to second guess how Scipio Africanus, Fabius Maximus or Scipio Aemilienus might have viewed the tactical options in front of them. For that matter, despite having read Caesar I am wary of trying to assume how he would have seen the options*. I spoken with enough generals, brigadiers and colonels myself to know that what appears in a press release may be very different to what happens on the ground and what one senior officer will feel is best may not be the same as what another senior officer would choose to do.
What I would say though, is that any deployment decided on by a general who knew what he was doing would be decided on the basic of tactical considerations. I do not believe that the Roman army was always deployed in the same way but I do believe that the soldiers would have been trained to be able to carry out the tactical demands of their officers.
I think that less imaginative commanders would have deployed in what they felt was a tried and trusted manner but many, more gifted commanders would have varied their tactics according to the prevailing tactical considerations.

We do see a variety of tactics used in the examples cited above. We see gaps left for cavalry to ride through; we see narrow gaps between what appear to be cohesive units; we see gaps filled with skirmishing soldiers used as ruses; we see multiple battle lines and we see apparently independent cohorts. I don't think there is much chance of either of you managing to set all of these things within a single tactical layout. Rather, they are all examples of tactics Roman commanders could employ in response to the tactical demands, using the skill-sets of the soldiers at their disposal.

I am a bit concerned that there are a few too many assumptions in this thread. A couple of examples should demonstrate what I mean.

" "Caesar had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and three others were behind these." 1:83

Meaning each legion controlled its own battle space with the cohorts within broken up to form different lines. "

Fine - no problem with this, but to extrapolate from this that there must be a gap between each legion, as you have done previously, is to uggest things not present in the original text. What he did in Spain may not be the same as what he decided to do at Pharsalus. Therefore each example serves only to tell us what was done on a particular occasion but not what was done on other occasions where different conditions might have suggested different tactics to a commander.

"Ahhh, okay...my argument is that gaps existed. That separating units makes sense. That if fighting against a solid line, whether straight or snake shaped would be easily broken by using independent and flexible combat units that each have a mind of their own (centurion) that could fight and maneuver in different ways when necessary (again I gave examples of this)."

Separating units with gaps may indeed make sense in some situations but a solid line might make sense in some other situations. Independent units might well work brilliantly against some enemies in particular formations but might be disasterously defeated against the same or a different enemy in a different formation. To say that what works on one occasion must therefore work on every occasion or that what might break and be defeated on one occasion will break and be defeated on every occasion are a couple of assumptions too far for my liking. There are numerous factors involved in why a unit might or might not break under combat conditions: new tactics on the part of their opponents quite possibly, but also the weather and ground conditions; weakness from losses or wounds carried over from earlier battles in a campaign; good or bad leadership; whether or not they had had breakfast (on at least one occasion); what other units are seen to do; and a whole host of other factors. It is worth remembering that Roman armies did not always win, meaning that Roman units using Roman tactics could also be broken.

As to maniples having minds of their own in the form of their centurions, I am uncomfortable with this. There is a difference between leadership and command. The centurion's job surely would be to lead and inspire his men, rather than to make tactical decisions. These are the preserve of the commander and the working out of these tactics once the battle is joined is down to his sub-commanders, who have already discussed them with him at the council of war. Therefore the decision to make a tactical manoeuvre would not rest with a centurion. That is what tribunes were for surely. The centurion makes sure his unit carries out the orders he has received from the tribune, who has his orders and knowledge of the battle plan from the general. This, however is getting close to the mechanics of how to do things, which I intend to address further down.

"So, we do not need units (and here I understand that you do not mean legions but cohorts and maniples again) being detached from each other to "feel" or "act" like units. We could have such models, but we do not have to, as you strongly suggest."

I am not a believer in everything being either this or that, but it has to be acknowledged that almost every ancient army was composed of separate units, each of which had its place in the battle line, so the unit identity of maniples was not unique to the Romans. It would have been a feature of every unit in every army. Just because you have different units in an army, it does not mean that they cannot fight next to each other. In fact, judicious placement of units might allow differently equipped units to protect or support each other, surely a feature of Hellenistic warfare and all that descended from it, as well as the earlier Persian and probably Assyrian armies, many of which were very successful. There is little to suggest that any of these employed gaps between units, yet each unit would have been able to fight in its own way. The same must surely be able to apply to the Romans, if a commander decided it should be so.

Moving now to the mechanics to how to put tactical decisions into action, which actually interests me more.

First and foremost, I am convinced that the importance of training cannot be underestimated. I think that one very important reason for Marius' success was that he was able to take his new army to the north of Italy and give them several months of training, meaning that when they took the field, much of what they lacked in battlefield experience they could make up for in discipline and training. Although the armies of the second century BC would not have been able to spend as much time as Marius did on training, the mixture of experienced men with first time soldiers, combined with training on the Campus Martius and when opportunity allowed during campaigns, would have ensured that every unit would have a fairly good practiced repetoire of drill moves which would allow it to move where it needed to, both on the march and on the field of battle. Each unit (and as the smallest tactical unit used we should assume this to be each maniple) would have to be able to turn left or right as a body, march whilst maintaining their ranks and files in good order, march and stand in both open and closed order, march both forwards and backwards in good order, charge in good order, and open and close gaps, as well as knowing the technique for relieving a unit in the front line and being proficient in the use of their weapons and equipment. Added to that, they may also have received training in the use of scaling ladders and other siege techniques. I would think that the use of artillery would have been concentrated in the hands of experienced men under the leadership of experienced and professional engineers, and separated off from the general levy making up the legions.

How would the men in the maniples have known what to do though when required? Effective communication is key to controlling action, but those of us who are used to portraying Roman soldiers will all be familiar with the limitations of the human voice. Even in a unit of twenty men it can be hard to hear spoken or shouted commands, especially if it is a windy day.
However, we know that the Romans had standards and trumpets/horns. I can think of no reason to suggest that these would not have had practical battlefield applications. The obvious use of standards is to provide rallying points for disordered units, but what it lass well recognised is that standards could also be used as a means of recognition and communication. By the use of different elements and colours every units standard could be distinctive and would allow a commander, either the overall commander or the relevant subordinate, to identify which units were where. Add to this the possibility for standards to be moved in ways which would enable rudimentary communication (up and down movements, side to side movements and revolving movements) and you have the beginnings of a system which will allow a commander to transmit commands to individual units.

Next we need to look at the use of trumpets. These would allow an order to be instantly communicated to an entire unit, and it is entirely possible that a series of commands which might otherwise have been issued verbally would have been translated into a set of distinctive 'bugle' calls which would need to be learnt by the soldiers. The battlefield could be a noisy place though and there might be many trumpets being blown by both sides at any one time. Therefore I would suggest that each unit would have had its own distinctive prefix call, which all the men would be attuned to.


As a model of how communication could be used on a noisy battlefield to give orders to specific units I would propose the following purely theoretical example.

1/ Commander A has deployed his units in the way which in his view best suits the tactical conditions but then sees a weakness in the enemy line. He decides to move his left wing into a curve to draw vulnerable enemy units forward and then outflank them. To do this he needs to move the maniples at the far end of the first legion, which is holding the left wing. This was always a part of his planning and he has positioned units on that flank who he knows have the training to accomplish this if the opportunity presents itself.
He needs to send the message to them to make their move. However, as he has many individual units in his army he cannot possibly have sufficient signals in his repetoire to give them each an individual signal. In addition to this, some will be a long way away and will not be able to see his standards or hear his trumpets clearly. Additionally if he had a multitude of standard movements for different units this could become confusing and different units might become confused about who an order was meant for. Therefore, the general needs to keep his list of 'contacts' small. They will therefore be his subordinate commanders.

2/ Commander A therefore has a group of trumpeters blast out the signal for the first legion, causing Sub-commander B, who is commanding the legion, to look towards him. Sub-commander B has his standard move in a prescribed way to indicate that he is paying attention. By means of movements of his standards or trumpet calls from his trumpet battery (or possibly a combination of both), Commander A communicates the orders to Sub-commander B, who, having attended the council of war the day before, knows what he needs to do. Due to the already noisy nature of the battle, trumpet communication over longish distances needs to be kept to a minimum.

3/ Sub-commander B has his own trumpets blast out the signal for Tribune C, who was not at the council of war but has been briefed on the various possibilities for how his maniples will be used. Tribune C (who is in charge of maniples 1,2 and 3) hears his 'call signal' and looks towards Sub-commander B. Sub-commander B indicates by a particular combination of movements of his standard (which can, of course, be seen over the heads of other men if Tribune C is on foot) which of the potential options is to be put into action and which units are to be moved. Using the standard to communicate this avoids the possibility of extraneous noise confusing a complex trumpet call. It is also unlikely that the enemy commander will have the detailed knowledge of the code used by the standard bearers to be able to interpret the orders himself, so the orders can be communicated without the enemy knowing anything more than that something is being communicated at the left hand end of the Romans' battle line.

4/ Tribune C has his trumpeter give the 'call sign' blast for maniple 1. The optio in the rear rank hears this and shouts along the file for the standard to be moved in response. Tribune C then has his standard moved in such a way as to tell cohort 1 to wheel around to the left to outflank the enemy unit on receipt of a further signal. This information is passed forward to the centurion and his trumpeter so that the appropriate bugle call can be sent as soon as the signal is received. Maniple 1's standard is moved in the prescribed way to indicate that the message has been received.

Tribune C contacts maniple 2 in the same way and tells them to drop back six paces on receipt of the signal, in order to encourage the enemy unit to surge forward. The message is transmitted in the same way.

Tribune C then contacts maniple 3 in the same way and tells them to wheel backward slightly to the right on the signal, so that its left edge stays level with maniple 2.

As the movement of maniple 3 will compact maniple 4, maniple four is sent a bugle call to tell it to expect a planned movement into its left by maniple 3, thus avoiding the possibility of maniple 4 thinking maniple 3 is in retreat and panicking.

5/ Once the maniples all have their orders (which may have taken a couple of minutes to communicate), Tribune C sends a bugle call to give the signal to maniples 1,2 and 3 to move according to their orders. The three centurions have their trumpeters give the appropriate bugle calls and the soldiers, who all know the drill manoeuvre to match each bugle call, automatically respond with their prescribed unit movements. Maniple 1 wheel to the right whilst maniple 2 drops back and maniple 3 wheels back so its left end remains level with maniple 2's frontage. The enemy unit moves forward in response to what it takes to be a retreating foe and then finds itself being outflanked on its right by maniple 1 and compressed on its left by maniple 3. Caught in this trap the enemy unit starts to suffer heavy casualties and breaks, causing panic in the units adjacent to it.
If any of the Roman maniples get into difficulty particular movements of their standards can be used to signal this to Sub-commander B, who can see from the standards which units are in trouble and can send maniples held in reserve to the right place to support the embattled units.


I think that with a well drilled army and an established system for battlefield communication such as I have suggested, which allows for the general to use his sub-commanders to manage their areas according to his wishes but by their execution, almost any of the manoeuvres we know they employed could be arranged and carried out, led at the point of contact by centurions but ordered and arranged by senior officers commanding them.

I would welcome your thoughts.


Lastly, Macedon,

"Actually, 80 cohorts would regularly form 8 legions, 10 cohorts nominal strength each. "

Sorry about that. Yes I know there should be ten cohorts per legion. I was writing late at night when I should have been asleep. Thanks for pointing out the mistake.


*Caesar's commentaries show some evidence of having been 'tidied up' somewhat for the audience in Rome and De Bello Gallico may in fact be the republished collection of his annual governor's reports, which might explain some of the minor inconsistencies between the books. Bellum Civili must be seen as the work of someone who was not only fighting a war but also running an effective propaganda machine. Reading through Cicero's letters to Atticus and others, it is obvious that Caesar has generalised some details or shifted the dates things happened in order to retrospectively produce a better story. We don't have Caesar's letters unfortunately but we do have numerous mentions in Cicero's letters to other people of things Caesar has told him in letters and which he thus has knowledge of, written on dates which often seem to conflict with the dates or orders of events mentioned in the commentaries. This means that what we read in Caesar has been subject to his retrospective editing and this may also apply to how he claims to have seen things at the time. It is also worthy of mention that if you read many modern translations of Bellum Civilica, you will see the Spanish War, The Alexandrian War and the African War listed as if they are also works by Caesar, but in fact they are by Hirtius and others. The African War (or was it the Spanish War - I haven't read either recently and all of my university notes are a very long way away) is neither a work of great technical nor literary merit and its author (who is an almost blindingly fervent supporter of Caesar) has been suggested as being one of Caesar's centurions (the quality of his Latin in about equal to the quality one might expect of the written English of a modern sixteen year old who has been excluded from school for several years and spent the whole time playing video games).



Crispvs

[Bryan]

As a side note, can any Latin readers translate the following paragraph into english to the best of their abilities.

De Bello Civili 1,76

[Q Rutilius]

Crispus: "We do see a variety of tactics used in the examples cited above. We see gaps left for cavalry to ride through; we see narrow gaps between what appear to be cohesive units; we see gaps filled with skirmishing soldiers used as ruses; we see multiple battle lines and we see apparently independent cohorts. I don't think there is much chance of either of you managing to set all of these things within a single tactical layout. Rather, they are all examples of tactics Roman commanders could employ in response to the tactical demands, using the skill-sets of the soldiers at their disposal." (Sorry, I could not make the quote thing work.)

This, I think, is the nub of it. It is reasonable to suppose a number of tactical layouts. How else, does one explain the various accounts of Caesar et al?

Gaps could have been left, although I doubt it. But, if the terrain is rough enough, if the enemy has certain characteristics, i.e. they fought in small independent groups too, then gaps in the line might make sense. Which brings us back to Crispus' point; no one formation fits all possibilites.
(I think I am reading you correctly here.)

I might add that I have often thought how similar or dissimilar Roman formations and tactics were compared to the formations and tactics of the other Italians. A book describing warfare as waged by the Samnites, Ligurians etc would be darned interesting, but I know of no such book. If, I say if, there is good evidence that say the Samnites fought with gaps, I'd be much more inclined to think that at least some of the time the Romans did too.

[Bryan]

Been thinking about it a lot lately and I think that Macedon is right, my ideas of the whole gap/fighting method probably were never very realistic. I think I originally formulated a mental image without gathering all the facts, looking back on it most of what I wrote about seems like my own creation and then I tried to pull historical quotes to support it. Bad research on my part.
So it turns out you win this round Macedon but you haven't heard the last of me...

I still think gaps would have existed though.

[Macedon]

Gaps have existed during battle. It does not make a difference if they are unquestionably attested in sources regarding other armies or periods. It is their actual use that is interesting that shows that under circumstances and by taking certain precautionary measures, they were indeed used. So, if Byzantines could fight with gaps (of a certain width, in specific parts of the front line, with men assigned to fill them up and maneuver/defend in a very specific way), it surely was possible for others to do so too.

Yes, sizable gaps would have been rare in pre-gunpowder battle formations, but still possible as a tactical choice.

As I perceived your model, and that of course is my personal opinion, the core of its mechanisms would be the continuous attacks and retreats by the "first" and "second" lines. This idea is very interesting but, I think, would need some further backing up with sources or parallel examples, even not about the Roman army itself. In order for such a mechanism of attack to be possible, gaps as wide as the units themselves are indeed necessary. Outside this model, these gaps need not be that wide, even exist. So, again in my opinion, you should try to find more arguments that could suggest that such a model of attack was indeed used sometime in antiquity.

If you really believe in your theory, do keep on researching it. Try to find information and quotes on infantry wedges, how they were formed and used. Certain comments aside, it was an interesting discussion and I truly hope I haven't heard the last of you Bryan! As I said, I love such "challenges", discussions on the application of tactics instead of just translations of sources.

As my ancient forefathers would say : "Hygienai!" (Be healthy!)

[Brent Nielsen]

Looks like you are missing a cohort here!

[Brent Nielsen]

Bryan wrote: Centuries are not a independent fighting force so they would never do anything alone.

Although they fight as a cohort, the Centuries are marched by their individual Centurions.

BTW on a different post you asked for a translation (in English) from BG I-75? or 76? They don't go that high. I have a latin left side, english right side translation of BG. I can scan whatever you need, but book one ends at 54. Dyslexia can be a terrible disease. Did you mean 26? Let me know I lost your email address somewhere in a backlog of email Ihave yet to clean up.

[Tarbicus]

Get yourselves copies of Rome: Total War and hack the unit formation text files to test out your theories - the AI is very good, and the game very straightforward to customise, including the spacing of the men. Just tell your enemy where to go in the game and see what the Romans do in response. When I tried it using the different theoretical formations based on Polybius, etc (Lendon?), there was never a problem with quickly moving units back through the maniples. The legionaries just step aside and step back into place, for example. If celts rushed into the gaps in the checkerboards, the Romans at the edges just turned and attacked them from three sides, i.e. did to the celts what the celts were trying to do to them, but the Romans had the advantage of remaining organised and not being on the move. This was years ago and I've since lost the files, but there are plenty of RTW forum threads and tips to be found on the web describing how to make your own units and formations.

[Brent Nielsen]

Bryan: Consular/cohort system: The formation you show for the Legios I and II are the exact formations i was attempting to describe. What makes you think Caesar and other Consular Imperators fought in the lower formations of Legion III and IV? Or am I misreading your diagrams and their explainations? Both armies should be arrayed as Lregions I and II. Gaps are nearly non exatant and flexibility remains. Anyway it is late and I had a long day...Mery Christmas!

[Cesco]

these discussion is pretty old, anyway... in my opinion the gaps between two maniples were closed, before the clash, by the centuriae posteriores, moving on the left of the centuriae priores; then when the mainiple of hastati had to retreat, the centuria posterior moved back the prior one recreating the gap. the maniple of principi moved through the gap and did the same manoeuvre, while hastati moved back. these hypothesis could conciliate Bryan's and Macedon's thought and is supported by Polybios, when he say(6.24)that the centurio prior leads the right part of maniple, while the posterior the left one. what do you think?
PS: sorry for my english, I hope I have been clear

[Bryan]

I've reread some of my previous theories on gaps and find some of them pretty bizarre. Cohort sized gaps? Units in such depth? But then again I've read so much more in the 2.75 years since I wrote those posts. To clarify my current position, I still believe the following is generally true:

- Gaps existed in the fighting line during battle and were not just a factor of the approach march to contact or only used during the relief of lines. Separating units by small distances would be necessary not only during a march, to maintain cohesion and to provide mobility, but also during a fight, as units in contact do not remain stationary (attack, retreat, face about, get turned like a hoplite phalanx). In order to move across anything less than flat manicured parade ground terrain, intervals would be necessary or cohesion can be lost. Good luck doing that while being attacked by a more mobile force.

- Livy states the gaps were maniple in size. I don't think they were always that size, only at specific times and places (not every battle during all periods), as dictated by the commander. The theory of having large gaps, coupled with multiple lines, units protecting the gap (quincunx) still sounds like a sound theory. But that theory is up to interpretation, as the width of a maniple is not a constant. Intervals between individuals in a rank within the Roman line, as well as the number of ranks, would change the frontage of the formation. The width of a narrow front maniple (10x6) in close interval would be smaller than a maniple with a wide front, less ranks (20x3), in an more Polybian open interval between legionnaires. As Michael J. Taylor described in his excellent article, I don't think the depth of ranks was a constant.

- Since no one knows exactly how the Greek hoplite phalanx fought (close interval/shield overlapping and shoving vs. a more open ranked "fencing" formation), I don't think the inclusion of the word phalanx has to mean the Romans fought shield to shield either. As I had demonstrated in my posting about Ukranian Riot Police, I don't think fighting shield to shield was a viable offensive tactic for the Romans, as compared to infantry armed with Aspis shield and a spear. The description of Roman fighting by Polybius, Vegetius, Caesar, and others, as well as the use of a medium to short bladed sword (19"-26"), and the use of a large curved body shield with a reinforced umbo (shield boss), is more conducive to an open/independent offensive fighting method.

If you want to talk gaps and intervals, discuss!