Roman Battle Formations Mid Republic to Late Rep.

[Macedon]

Regarding the word phalanx, we can be pretty sure as to its normal meaning. It meant a continuous line of men either in close or in open order. Also keep in mind that in the era of Polybius, the normal "Greek phalanx" had nothing to do with hoplites anymore, it was a continuous line of pikemen. Surely, if you are a proponent of the theory that has the Romans fight in open order, the term does not exclude it, but large gaps would be exluded. In a couple of centuries, one of the Greek terms for a legion would be a "phalanx" (Arrian for example), which again hints at the Roman legions arraying in phalanx. Even later, when we have clearly detached units they are all called phalanxes, so that, for example, you could have 3 phalanxes on the field. The Greek terms for a formation with smaller units being separated from each other with intervals of some length was "speiridon" for infantry and "ileidon" for cavalry.

[Bryan]

I'm far from an expert on the subject but from what I've read on the subject here on RAT and in other sources like ancient warfare magazine, the word phalanx has a bunch of different meanings, especially among different ancient authors. Was the word never used in the context of just "battle line" or "fighting line?"

Are you stating that a Macedonian army, like at pydna, had no intervals between each pike unit just because it can be called a phalanx?

Polybius makes it a point to describe the great differences in unit and individual tactics as compared to Hellenic methods. These include not just intervals within subunits but also between units.

Maybe it was similar to the leadership vs. Command vs. Manage debate in the other thread. Words mean different things to different people based off their biases.

[Macedon]

One has to know the era in which a text was written to be able to state with any degree of certainty what a specific term means. The word phalanx can mean a number of things but not in all eras at the same time. Especially the word "phalangidon", which is an adverb, has no other meaning even if the term phalanx could, under circumstances be used more broadly. As far as the Macedonian phalanx is concerned, its doctrine was to deploy with no gaps whatsoever between individual syntagmata or other subunits. In battles, in which it was deployed in a different manner (Selasia, Mangesia), the authors are careful to state the peculiarity. The best proof for this is the fact that in the many frontage calculations we have in ancient texts, there is no room for any intervals as is the case in the surviving tactical manuals describing the Macedonian mode of deployment. Unfortunately, Polybius does not describe the peculiarity of the Roman system in a manner that its difference from the phalanx can be understood. If we are to follow his exact words, then the Romans deployed with gaps between the maniples, fought as a phalanx in open order and kept retreating in front of the enemy when they were unable to defeat him front to front. No one can deny the fact that he describes gaps in their initial deployment and no one can deny the fact that he has his Romans fight in a battle-line formed like a phalanx (phalangidon = in the manner of a phalanx). What one can do is question his understanding and claim that he is wrong, but this is what the old man writes. The problem is that without knowledge of Greek one cannot study the usage of any term in Polybius (or any other author you want to discuss), so one will look up dictionaries, whose work it is to give all the "different" meanings in a manner that an English speaker would understand them in various texts regardless of the when, where and how. Just because the word "hard" in "I hit him hard" has a different meaning to "I had a hard time" or to "this material is hard", it does not mean that the meaning is not clear in all three instances. So, you cannot really make any helpful claims as to what else the word might man and your only option, as I see it, should the usage of such terms be crucial to your study, would be to consult someone you really trust to make such a study. Unfortunately there is a huge gap in our bibliography concerning these issues and I know that this has produced a great many misunderstandings in the past even for very well known historians.

[Bryan]

Macedon wrote:

and no one can deny the fact that he has his Romans fight in a battle-line formed like a phalanx

and before that:

Also keep in mind that in the era of Polybius, the normal "Greek phalanx" had nothing to do with hoplites anymore, it was a continuous line of pikemen.

So from these two statements, you'd think that in his Histories, Polybius would have made it a point to describe the similarities between the Romans and the Macedonians in the manner that they fought instead of writing paragraphs specifically addressing their differences. See Book 18, 27-32


I'd like to add this quote from Livy:

'The king's army was a motley force drawn from many nations and presented the greatest dissimilarity both in the men and their equipment. There were 16,000 infantry in the Macedonian fashion. known as the "phalanx." These formed the centre, and their front consisted of ten divisions; between each division stood two elephants.' (Livy Hist. 37:40)

So here we have a description of the Seleucid forces at the battle of Magnesia. Apparently, there were gaps between each "division" that had been filled with elephants. But its still described as a phalanx. Did Livy make a mistake in using the word to describe such a formation since it clearly was not a continuous line? Or did he just mean a fighting line of a specific infantry troop class?

This is just one example of was I was attempting to state before, that words have different meanings, to different people. Phalanx sometimes just meant infantry in a fighting line. I'm sure I could find plenty of other examples but I'd rather not just make this topic about linguistics.

Speaking of, in multiple other recent threads that delve into topics revolving around ancient Greece and/or Rome, I've noticed that the debating strategy shifted to linguistics with the new argument being that unless you are able to decypher the language yourself, you will lack a true understanding of the nuances of the words. While I agree in principle, multiple other translations are available and most differ greatly from one another, meaning no two historians seem to be able to agree. Many others who also are able to read the original text in ancient Greek, here in RAT, do not seem to agree with one another on definitions and translations. So I'd appreciate if the topic can stay on track and stick with historical sources and not the subtle differences in linguistics and word choices.

[Macedon]

He explains the differences, which, according to him, have nothing to do with any intervals during the battle. The Macedonian phalanx had nothing to do with the hoplite phalanx in terms of tactics and armament, but that does not mean that they were not drawn up in phalanx.

As regards the battle of Magnesia, I already pointed out that it was a battle in which the Macedonian subunits had intervals between them as was the case with one of the "wings" of Antigonos at Selasia (see my previous post), but that does not mean that the literary evidence that the normal deployment of the Macedonian phalanx was without intervals is not absolutely overwhelming.

Now, as far as Livy is concerned, I hope you know that he wrote in Latin, so I cannot say what terminology he used and how these terms were used in Latin. This is something that others here, proficient in the said language, may help you with. I can only speak of Greek texts. What is certain, is that English translations cannot be taken at face value in such issues.

What you call "linguistics" is nothing more than proper translation. There is no "subtle" difference on what words like phalanx or phalangidon mean in Polybius and other authors. The problem is that you treat these texts as if they were actually written in English, trying to understand what they say by playing with the meanings of the English words. This is a mistake in my opinion, that only leads to wrong conclusions. I do not ask you to trust me, I said that you should find someone you really trust to help you out IF you are interested in what the ancient texts really say. The problem with the translations is that almost all translators care nothing about military terminology and (like in the text Steven quoted in the thread about centurions) happily render the "grosphomachoi" as "velites", the "machaerae" as "swords", the "tagmata" as "ordines", etc etc etc. If you think that you can use such translations to come to any sound conclusions, be my guest, but I would really advise against it.

[Bryan]

Livy might have written in Latin but I'm sure he understood there was a difference in the methods of fighting between the Greeks, Macedonians, and Romans. Hence why the translation of the text even has the word phalanx in quotes. To Livy, that word meant something, specifically it seems to be not just a definition of a fighting line but also is a name synonymous with a specific fighting style. Phalanx becomes a pronoun, instead of just a noun.

but that does not mean that the literary evidence that the normal deployment of the Macedonian phalanx was without intervals is not absolutely overwhelming.

Certainly not overwhelming, but there are other examples. At the battle of Asculum, Pyrrhus separated his pike units (referred to in the translated texts as phalanxes) with Lucians, Bruttanians and Samnites, all in a single battle line, not "separated from each other over some length." This goes back to my point, that both Frontinus and Dionysius use the word phalanx in the context not as a continuous battle line but as a specific troop type.
Dionysius 20.1, Frontinus 2.3

[antiochus]

Deleted

[Macedon]

I enjoyed the spanking. Lesson learnt and all text corrected. Many sincere thanks.

Hehehehe :grin: :grin: :grin: , always here to help!

[Timus]

The Greek terms for a formation with smaller units being separated from each other with intervals of some length was "speiridon" for infantry and "ileidon" for cavalry.

That sounds interesting. If I understand you correctly (English is not my 1st language either^^), the Greeks had a word to describe a formation with gaps.
So for instance, when Xenophon describe the usual battle formation of the 10 thousands, I guess he's using an expression that doesn't imply gaps, but when he describes his formation in IV,VIII,10 (see here: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=...=GBS.PA140 ), he must be using a word that implies gap ?

For those that believes that gaps were just a no go in ancient warfare, Xenophon at least proved that an army could deploy this way successfully. See from IV.VIII.10 till 14.
His reasoning is very interesting:

1/ the nature of the battlefield won't allow a line to remain unbroken anyway.
2/ If we're too deep, the enemy will overlap us, and the enemy wings will be free to use that advantage.
3/ If we're too thin to prevent 2/, then the line risk being broken by the enemy in certain points which will be no good for the whole battle line.
4/ But if we have gaps then we can overlap the enemy while each sub-unit is free to maneuver around obstacles. If the enemy tries to go for the gaps, then our sub-units be in a position to attack him from two sides. And each sub-unit will be deep enough not to be easily broken. Finally, if a sub-unit finds itself in difficulty, then neighboring units will be free to keep maneuvering and either push through or help the unit in trouble.

In the end, Xenophon describe his battle line as being made up of 80 sub-units of about a 100 men(?) plus 3 divisions of light troops.
It does tell us that gaps could be maintained in combat as long as each unit was close enough to support one another and deep enough to stand on their own. And using them allowed an army to overlap or at least match the flank of a numerically superior foe. But he had to convince his army first ! So c. 400BC, gaps were indeed not something natural. Could the Romans have just reached the same conclusions on their own and use that as their basic battle formation ?

Out of curiosity, I'd really like to see a greek-english version of that part of the text, if anybody could help me with that, I'd be really grateful : )

[Macedon]

Yes, there are a number of examples of Greek infantry (hoplites, pikemen and possibly other types of troops) arraying with sizable intervals between smaller units. This was nothing (too) strange and the authors described it clearly. It is certain that should the authors know that the Romans fight in such a manner, we would have more explicit descriptions, as they surely did not lack the vocabulary and they themselves were no strangers to such tactics being employed by Greeks (in defense of the Roman interval model, I also do have some accounts that seem to propose such arrangements in battle). For some reason, an effort to explain the lack opf relative textual evidence, such a manner of fighting is always described by scholars as a peculiarity of the Romans, which the Greeks were unfamiliar with, but this could be no further from the truth. This is why I maintain that troop arrangement tactics were nothing as monolithic as many take them to be. Different tactics were used for different purposes.

What do you mean by greek-english version? Juxtaposition of texts?

[Timus]

What do you mean by greek-english version? Juxtaposition of texts?

If such a version has indeed been printed, then yes. My ancient greek skills are very limited, but I can somehow decypher the interesting bits when I can get my hands on a "double language version". At least I can check which word was actually used by the author.
I really share the frustration of severals posters here about some of the various translations available to us.

Quick question to anybody that might have the answer close at hand: which sources tell us the distances that separated the hastati from the principes from the triari ? And what would those distances be ?

[Bryan]

And how about I provide you with another little snippet of research to see if we can determine the legality of a unit being six ranks deep, of which I posted on this forum some years ago. All I am going to work with is the military age of the iuniores and the three battle lines found in Caesar’s legion, so no need for Pythagoras or pulling rabbits out of a hat. Taking the military age of the iuniores to be from 18 to 45 years, this produces a span of 27 years. The 27 years is divided by the three battle lines giving each battle line an increment of 9 years.
First battle line 18 to 27 years
Second battle line 28 to 36 years
Third battle line 37 to 45 years
Taking the premise each battle line is six ranks deep, each two ranks in a battle line equates to a period of three years
First battle line
Ranks one and two 18 to 21 years
Ranks three and four 22 to 24 years
Ranks five and six 25 to 27 years
Second battle line
Ranks one and two 28 to 30 years
Ranks three and four 22 to 33 years
Ranks five and six 25 to 36 years
Third battle line
Ranks one and two 37 to 39 years
Ranks three and four 38 to 42 years
Ranks five and six 43 to 45 years
Now as Pompey is reported to have his oldest troops guard the camp, wouldn’t ranks five and six fit the bill?

Technically yes it could work, but I don't see it being likely. One aspect is that at the time it appears that cohesive units were used in this manner. Caesar used 2 cohorts to guard his own camp at Pharsalus (I know, different person but a contemporary to Pompeius). Other times he used maniples and centuries (I believe once his camp was almost overrun but one century held). His commentaries are filled with other examples of similar acts.
EDIT: Pompeius had actual cohorts defending his camp, not individual ranks, Source: DBC 3.95.

If ranks five through six are detached from each century, it also wouldn't be an equal number. Even Pompeius' units wouldn't be completely up to strength after all those months of campaigning. Also, what if he was in 10 ranks, like he did at Pharsalus. There would have been casualties, deserters, sick lame and lazy. So those numbers could fluctuate greatly. Lastly, pulling individual soldiers would leave no small unit leaders. While a tribune or so could be left back to watch them, there would be no members of the century holding any rank. Also no standard bearers, which could come in handy while rallying troops to defend a portion of the camp. Just my thoughts though.

Also, from my understanding, Gaius Sempronius Gracchus, sometime during his tribuneship put into law in the 120s BC that the age limit for enlisting was no younger than 17 (Plutarch Life of Gaius Gracchus, 5). Also, I believe 46 was the top end in age, not 45. I will have to do more research to find this source though. But even the seventeen throws off your formula. Especially when you consider the only reason Gracchus passed that legislation was because citizens under 17 were being enlisted.

Your focus on ranks is interesting though.

But are they organised differently. As I have not seen your research so I cannot comment.

What happened to the Roman citizen cavalry? If the legions were standardized, when was it announced that citizen cavalry would no longer be levied? Under Marius in 107? In 104? Catalus had them in 102. They existed during the Social War I believe. Sulla didn't have any, nor did Caesar. Pompey did.

What happens if Joe Blow the Consul holds a dillectus for a war in Spain in the mid second century (unpopular Fiery Wars) and not enough citizens show up? Or like when Marius held a Supplementum for the Jugurthine War and ended up enlisting far more than he was authorized to by the Senate. Real life has that way of interfering with "standardized formulas." In theory, legions might have standardized according to custom, I don't think enough info has been presented by anyone to really say so, but in reality, they would all differ. What organization or command authority existed that ensured a standardization was followed? The Senate? Yeah, that worked well against Marius when he enlisted the poor. The Consul had enough power to ignore customs if they had due cause. Things always change.

So now you want to start when the cohort was introduced debate. As you claim you have read all of my posting, you know I do not follow Bell’s theory the cohort was introduced by Marius in 102 BC. Oh hold on, the new school of thought is the cohort was introduced in 210 BC. Sorry, I belong to the school that the cohort existed with the introduction of the Servian constitution, so that makes me the odd one out.

Why didn't Polybius mention them? Did he fail to grasp the concept? Did Aemilius Paulus, Gaius Laelius, and Scipio Aemilianus forget to describe that unit? That's the type of thing I was referring to. You can have theories all you want but the available ancient sources are so contradictory to one another there is no way with that evidence you can 100%, or even close, state anything.

Bryan let’s not play word games. The end result is the triarii end up as the front line.

Yep. But the triari doesn't need to be the same size as the other lines because it isn't relieving those units as one battleline. A retreating line of hastati and principes, beaten in the field and forced to fall back behind the kneeling and waiting triari, probably won't be a nice pretty extended line matching the enemy's. They will most likely be a chaotic mess of partially filled maniples (others dead on the field) all running to safety behind their dads and uncles in the triari.

Bryan you jump down Mark and my throat demanding proof but you then present this conjecture as an absolute. Did Caesar and Pompey actually deploy in the 4-3-3 formation?

Caesar most certainly did in the past. With Pompeius, no evidence suggests he did but he might have. Previous to and after Pharsalus, Caesar commonly used a cohort method of forming his lines, where the maniples and centuries weren't front to back but side to side. The 4-3-3 method was specifically one of his formations. When fighting in three lines, which Caesar did on multiple occasions, there are only so many ways to use the cohorts, so I am presuming that he used similar methods at Pharsalus because few wise generals rarely attempt to use completely novel tactics that their subordinates are not familiar with at battles where they are outnumbered 2 to 1. In his battle plans, legions commonly controlled a battle space in the overall formation, like how the 10th Legion was always used on the right.

And where as you claim does “Frontinus makes it a point to state that Caesar's lines were formed in only four ranks?”
I cannot find in Frontinus anything about Caesar’s battle lines being four deep. So where is this reference that alludes me?

Great question. Too be honest, I ask the exact same question in post #297426 in this thread and that's how Macedon answered, using Frontinus and Polyaenus as sources. I looked up both of them at the time and read them and while they specifically provide Pompeius' ranks at Pharsalus (3 lines of ten ranks), they don't do the same for Caesar. In the three years since that thread and reading those passages, I must have forgot that part about Caesar and have gotten confused. While I can't at this time find any source stating definitively that Caesar had only four ranks, I think with some deduction we can figure this out.

At Pharsalus, multiple sources, including Caesar, have it that he had three lines facing Pompeius' infantry, as well as a fourth, of varying size, which was detached to the right of the battleline to deal with Pompeius' cavalry. Caesar had 22,000 troops in 80 cohorts. Pompeius had 45,000 men in 112 cohorts, also in three lines. Frontinus says that Pompeius' cohorts were in 10 ranks. Overall, the way it is written in Caesar's Commentaries about the total numbers seems to imply that they specifically related to Roman infantry, and not auxiliaries, skirmishers or cavalry. So Pompeius had 200% the total number of infantry, but only 140% higher number of cohorts. Ergo, Caesar's cohorts were understrength compared to Pompeius', who also didn't need to pull 6 cohorts to make a fourth line. Additionally, many of his units had been recently levied, as compared to many of Caesar's cohorts, which hadn't been supplemented since Spain the year before. Losses suffered after a full year of campaigning, not to mention the traveling from Spain to Greece, or the losses at Dyrrachium, where he lost 2,000 dead and untold wounded (lots by the description). So while Caesar' cohorts were understrength compared to Pompeius', he at the same time was forced to extend his line to the same width as Pompeius'. If so, then he would have had less than half of the ranks per cohort Pompeius did, or there abouts, depending on cohort to cohort. I am too stupid and lazy to do the math for all this myself, and it would probably be wrong anyway, as Roman units didn't equalize their units like a British battalion did every morning during the Napoleonic era, so I doubt the answer can be definitely stated as four ranks. It probably fluctuated a bit. I don't know where Macedon came up with the four ranks but it does sound about right.

And let’s not forget Orosius numbers Caesar’s army at 30,000 men, which when divided by 80 cohorts gives each cohort a strength of 375 men.

When discussing Caesar, I prefer Caesar as a source for most things (propaganda aside). Still, 375 is not 500 per cohort.

So you don’t believe there were 3000 men in six cohorts. As I said, Frontinus, Plutarch and Caesar claim there was six cohorts and Plutarch and Appian give the number of the six cohorts at 3000 men. So are you claiming Appian and Plutarch have got it wrong?

I looked back on the sources and you are correct, Caesar does specifically mention six cohorts, I missed that. Whoops. (See, I owe up when I make a mistake and am not rigid) So that means six legions were present, at least in theory according to Caesar's description. But like I mentioned before, 22,000 total men divided by 80 cohorts is 275 men per cohort. But this number wouldn't be firm, as the strength of cohorts would fluctuate greatly according to their previous actions, number of wounded, sick, deserters, etc. For six cohorts to have a total of 3,000 men it would mean on average 500 men in a cohort, or some with less while others had +500, which for most accounts is above the "standard" 480 commonly used. And judging by his commentaries, Caesar didn't go into battle at Pharsalus with overstrength anything.

So yes, Plutarch is wrong this. But I've found plenty of discrepancies in his Lives before. I cringe when I read his Life of Marius, so many errors. In the case of the 3000 men in six cohorts, he probably reread Caesar's commentaries and other sources, saw six cohorts mentioned, did a quick count in his head and came up with 3,000 men. I'm less familiar with Appian, still reading his Civil Wars, but if he used 3000 then he too is wrong.


content of this post has been removed as irrelevant.

[Renatus]

I have given it to others on this group including Renatus, who after assessing my work I gave permission to tell this forum if I am a crackpot or not. It is not my fault if Renatus has chosen not to say anything one way or the other.

When you approached me on this matter, I thought that you were after private advice, not public criticism, and I will continue to deal with it in that way; any comment that I may have on the specifics of your theories will be between us. In any event, I have only seen half of your book, so I am not yet in a position to judge. Generally speaking, it is not crackpot to suggest that the Romans had crackpot ideas. It only becomes crackpot if you have got a particular bee in your bonnet that you pursue in the teeth of all evidence to the contrary and you assure us that that is not the case. When we have everything before us, we will be able to assess whether or not this is so. One thing I will say is that, because the concepts that you are dealing with will be unfamiliar to the majority of your readership, you have to be particularly careful to explain the basis of your ideas and how they are relevant to your subject. If you do not do so, there is indeed the danger that you could be dismissed as a crackpot, not because your ideas lack merit but because your readers do not understand them. I have mentioned this to you before and may develop it more fully in private. I am entirely neutral in the matter; I have no axe to grind either way, other than to say that I would like book to be a success, so that it reaches as wide an audience as possible and that your theories receive the fullest consideration. Only then will we know whether you have made a major contribution to our understanding of the Roman army or have taken yourself up a blind alley.

[Timus]

@ Bryan.
About numbers at Pharsalus, you may or may not be aware of Gary Brueggeman very thorough work on the topic.
http://www.romanarmy.info/pharsalus2_arm...rmies.html
Anyway he has Caesar's cohorts at 5-6 deep. I don't agree with all his hypothesis, but some of the bias would be equal for both side, so 5-6 sounds like a good number I guess.
My personal hypothesis is that the 9th and 8th were so understrength at that point that they could no longer form deep enough while maintaining a decent frontage , hence the whole ordering them to support each other, which I interpret (purely personal once again) as those 2 legions halving the frontage of their centuries and sharing their reserves among other things.
Also, Caesar says two things contradictory: that he took one cohort from each legion to form his 4th line and that this line was 6 cohors strong, despite having 8 legions. It's possible (my personal opinion) that the 8th and the 9th were not asked to provide an extra cohort.

[Bryan]

Tim NC,

Where in his commentaries does it say eight legions? I can't find it but my brain has been fried these last couple of weeks so that doesn't say alot. I always thought the 8 legions came from him bringing 80 cohorts. Does it specifically say 8 legions in his commentaries? I've read Gary's entire website a dozen times but I'll need to go through it again to reread what he wrote about Pharsalus. I read so much of this stuff I can't remember the sources half the time. He brings up Delbruck and Keppie, who I havent read, who state Pompeius only had 88 cohorts, stating 110 was too many. How did they get those numbers? Was it based on the number of eagles taken by Caesar's army?

Regardless, at Pharsalus, in order for Caesar to have matched the length of Pompeius' vastly superior battle line, with his limited numbers and cohorts, Caesar's ranks would have been much smaller. Either that, or as Michael J. Taylor theorizes, he extended the gaps between maniples. Since we're talking about half the numbers, I doubt the gaps were doubled to make up for it. The easiest thing to do would be to half the ranks, especially if you have confidence in your men to hold, which Caesar appears to have.