Ancient army numbers

[Paralus]

He proposed a plan that had Clearchus followed, Artaxerxes might have had lost the battle. Had he not, the Greeks would have been surrounded and slain, which was the fear of Clearchus.

As for an oblique attack, yes, it would have been mighty possible and if anyone could have done so, it would have been the Greeks. But to do so, they would not obliquely attack in the space between the two armies. They would redeploy on the left. An oblique advance so far from the inital deployment position would be impossible without marching in column first and this would never have happened in front of the enemy line.

The Greeks are the right side of Cyrus' army. The Asian levies hold the lft side and Cyrus and his picked troops the centre. Cyrus actually instructs Clearchus, having made his battle dispositions, to agein to strateuma kata meson , "to lead his army down on the centre".

It is highly improbable that he means by this for his entire right to countermarch out of the line and march the the rebel left so as to attack the King in his centre. If we are to belive Xenophon the Great King "was so superior in numbers that, although occupying the centre of his own line, he was beyond Cyrus' left wing" though, with telescopic vision, Clearchus was able to see the compact body at the enemy's centre. Further, although Cyrus is so alarmingly outflanked, he leads his own centre in an attack on the Great King himself!

Two possibilities intrude:

Cyrus asked his entire right to leave the line and march to the left there to reform and attack the King and when that did not happen Cyrus launched an attack on the King's centre from his own centre position thus riding across the face of his entire left wing to do so.

Xenophon's numbers are exaggerated and the Great King was, in reality, in a position for both for Clearchus to "lead his army down upon" from where he was stationed and for Cyrus to reach from his centre.

The latter, meaning the Great King's army was nothing like 900,000 and did not outflank Cyrus in any alarming fashing, is much more plausible. And, yes, Clearchus' fear was being flanked and so he would not march obliquely from the river else the left and the right be flanked.

[Macedon]

There is no "leading his army down on the center" in the text, which would indeed point to your conclusion. The text reads "lead the troops against the center of the enemy" (ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ μέσον τὸ τῶν πολεμίων) with no other instruction which is much more neutral. The Greeks advancing oblique against the position of Artaxerxes would be highly improbable no matter how far this position was. Just 20,000 infantry to the left (now this would be a very moderate estimate, wouldn't it?) would be about 2 kms, assuming a median dept of 10 men. There is no way that the Greeks would parade such a distance in front of the enemy lines, chariots, archers... obstructing their own and practically moving in column as the enemy would be free to engage wherever he chose and stop their movement or just shower them with missiles for the time necessary to complete the march (some 30 mins for that short distance). The only way that such a maneuver could be made, if I accept your assumption that Artaxerxes was not that far to the left and even have him much nearer than your estimates, would again be for the Greeks to march behind the lines and take new positions where it would be more appropriate for them to attack Artaxerxes. Of course this would not be a first. Such maneuvers are indeed attested in the sources quite a few times. Under that prism, no matter where you place Artaxerxes, in order for the Greeks to attack his position, they would have to redeploy to a new position anyways making little difference whether it would be in the center of the far left. You might like Diodorus numbers more, he states 400,000 for the king (Plutarch also IIRC) and 83,000 for Cyrus. Of course, even in this scenario and in anyone other in which Artaxerxes has double or more the men Cyrus has, Artaxerxes will still be outside Cyrus' far left. What you "dispute" is not the actual numbers (unless we are talking about really small armies of maybe 20-30,000 mean each) but the proposed analogy. Also, Cyrus does not lead his center against the king, Xenophon has him outside the battle serving as some kind of cavalry reserve.

Xenophon justifies the decision of Clearchus not to accept Cyrus' proposal and break off the right wing because he was afraid of being surrounded from both flanks. (ἀλλ’ ὅμως ὁ Κλέαρχος οὐκ ἤθελεν ἀποσπάσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, φοβούμενος μὴ κυκλωθείη ἑκατέρωθεν). The text seems to be about his troops only which would require operating without allies on his flanks, that would mean outside the battle-line, although I guess that it could be argued that his fear is about the whole of Cyrus' army. Xenophon is a second time true to his placement of the king when he has Artaxerxes wheeling to surround the enemy(ὅμως ἔξω ἐγένετο τοῦ Κύρου εὐωνύμου κέρατος. ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ἐμάχετο ἐκ τοῦ ἀντίου οὐδὲ τοῖς αὐτοῦ τεταγμένοις ἔμπροσθεν, ἐπέκαμπτεν ὡς εἰς κύκλωσιν.).

As I have always viewed Cunaxa, it is a by the book battle of how to attack an army vastly superior in numbers with an extended front. Cyrus battle-line concentrates on an attack against the left of the enemy aiming at a quick victory there, placing its elite troops on the rightmost flank which also rests secure on an impassable obstacle to thwart any possible outflank from that position. Trusting in speed, he tries to gain the victory before the enemy can wheel his lengthy front, buying time and protecting his infantry with cavalry action on the left. With a refused left, he stays out of contact with the rest of the army, while the enemy also stays back as the King slowly completes his encircling maneuver.

In conclusion, I cannot say whether Xenophon's or Diodorus' and Plutarch's numbers are correct, inflated or anything. I can only say that there is no reason to doubt the general, undetailed placement of forces we are offered or the course of action. Unfortunately, very few is said outside the scope of the Greeks.

Btw, what do you mean by "he would not march obliquely from the river else the left and the right be flanked. "? Oblique has unfortunately a lot of meanings. Do you mean that he would have his line wheel and then march forward? keep front to the enemy and then have each man march at an angle? march en echelon? I cannot see how he could avoid exposing at least one flank and his rear should he march in front of the phalanx in line and not in column, which would of course be even worse...

[Darth_Roach]

This bit of revisionism would warrant a thread of its own. Note that revisionism can be good if it is correct.

Maybe, but I don't think it would attract too much interest.

But remember, unless we simply cast Xenophon aside

But why should we? Xenophon was certainly not in the best position to observe what the Persians were doing, so he likely just reported what he thought he saw.

As for a simple retreat by the Persians. They did loose at least one arrow, for a Greek on the left wing was shot

That may be before or after the primary "engagement", but I am referring to this part:

And before an arrow reached them, the barbarians broke and fled. Thereupon the Greeks pursued with all their might, but shouted meanwhile to one another not to run at a headlong pace, but to keep their ranks in the pursuit.

Their chariotry did not retire well if that was the plan! It would be odd for Tissaphernes to charge through the peltasts if the plan of the persians was to give way. Far more likely is that he charged through the peltasts opposite him as part of the general advance, and then did what so many cavalry forces did- thus he went for the baggage.

Not really, considering he was in command of the infantry as well. What general advance are you speaking of? The imperial forces didn't advance at all, the rebels started off the battle.


Bear in mind I am not dissing Xenophon, I am just saying he was really in no position to accurately know what the Persians were doing. Plus a skirmishing maneuver makes a lot of sense for troops armed like this one:





@Macedon I would really look critically at any ancient numbers. There is no way Cyrus would engage a force that can outmatch his 2:1 in width, and there is no reason to assume Artaxerxes would have deployed on the left. TBH most set piece battles throughout history only occurred when the armies were of similar size. And there is no way 400 thousand troops could be amassed by Artaxerxes, even the sixth coalition at Leipzig, approaching from three separate directions and supply lines, supported by half of Europe, could only put that 390 thousand men in the field. And not nearly all of those engaged either.

[Paralus]

There is no "leading his army down on the center" in the text, which would indeed point to your conclusion. The text reads "lead the troops against the center of the enemy" (ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ μέσον τὸ τῶν πολεμίων) with no other instruction which is much more neutral.

Yes, which is a "freer" construction of κατὰ μέσον = "down upon the middle". I have provided a more literal rendering in that the instruction is to lead the army (Clearchus' forces) down upon the middle which is where the Great King is situated. Xenophon even claims that Clearchus could see the "the compact body at the enemy's centre" which is a plain nonsense if the Great King, in his centre, is out beyond the rebel's left wing.

What you "dispute" is not the actual numbers (unless we are talking about really small armies of maybe 20-30,000 mean each) but the proposed analogy.

No, I dispute the numbers based on the fact that Clearchus could clearly discern the enemy's centre out beyond his force's own left and that he was instructed to march toward it. It is clear that the King's line did not hugely outflank that of Cyrus no matter Xenophon's claim. This is the source who, had the king's bastard brother arrived in time, would have us believe that Cyrus meant to take on 1,200,000 with his force.

An army of 30,000 or so was actually normal for the time. Why, in the Successor period and the following Hellenistic kingdoms do we never hear of such huge numbers? Why did Darius III feel it necessary to defend his empire at Issus with 600,000 but Antiochus III field only some 70,000? The answer is that the latter figure bears a close resembalnce to reality and the former is fiction.

Also, Cyrus does not lead his center against the king, Xenophon has him outside the battle serving as some kind of cavalry reserve.

That is not supported by the source material. Diodorus (14.23.5)states that

In the centre of the lines, it so happened, were stationed both the men who were contending for the kingship. Consequently, becoming aware of this fact, they made at each other, being eagerly desirous of deciding the issue of the battle by their own hands...

But perhaps you rely upon the eye witness Xenophon? He too confirms the fact:

And upon hearing this Cyrus said, “Well, I accept it, and so let it be.” After he had said these words he rode back to his own position...

And where was this position to which he returned?

...on the left was Ariaeus, Cyrus' lieutenant, with the rest of the barbarian army, and in the centre Cyrus and his horsemen, about six hundred in number.

So, having conversed with Xenophon, Cyrus returned to his position. Which position was in the centre of his line as Xenophon confirms again stating that barbarian generals always command from the centre.

Nothing in the source material supports the notion that Cyrus was outside the battle as a reserve cavalry force.

Xenophon justifies the decision of Clearchus not to accept Cyrus' proposal and break off the right wing because he was afraid of being surrounded from both flanks. (ἀλλ’ ὅμως ὁ Κλέαρχος οὐκ ἤθελεν ἀποσπάσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, φοβούμενος μὴ κυκλωθείη ἑκατέρωθεν). The text seems to be about his troops only which would require operating without allies on his flanks, that would mean outside the battle-line, although I guess that it could be argued that his fear is about the whole of Cyrus' army.

Clearchus had the protection of the Paphlagonian cavalry and light armed on his right. He clearly could see that the left would be outflanked (by the enemy centre which he somehow espied) and felt that if he marched away from the river his right end of the line too would be flanked.

As to the question of whether I think this oblique advance meant wheeling left (a la Mantinea 418), I raised this with David Thomas last September using that very example. He disagreed on the very understandable basis that, despite Diodorus, the Lacedaemonian component was far too small and to suggest their tactics (Mantinea) was more than a hoplite too far. He felt that the angled march towards the centre was meant.

[Macedon]

There is no "leading his army down on the center" in the text, which would indeed point to your conclusion. The text reads "lead the troops against the center of the enemy" (ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ μέσον τὸ τῶν πολεμίων) with no other instruction which is much more neutral.

Yes, which is a "freer" construction of κατὰ μέσον = "down upon the middle". I have provided a more literal rendering in that the instruction is to lead the army (Clearchus' forces) down upon the middle which is where the Great King is situated. Xenophon even claims that Clearchus could see the "the compact body at the enemy's centre" which is a plain nonsense if the Great King, in his centre, is out beyond the rebel's left wing.

What you "dispute" is not the actual numbers (unless we are talking about really small armies of maybe 20-30,000 mean each) but the proposed analogy.

No, I dispute the numbers based on the fact that Clearchus could clearly discern the enemy's centre out beyond his force's own left and that he was instructed to march toward it. It is clear that the King's line did not hugely outflank that of Cyrus no matter Xenophon's claim. This is the source who, had the king's bastard brother arrived in time, would have us believe that Cyrus meant to take on 1,200,000 with his force.

An army of 30,000 or so was actually normal for the time. Why, in the Successor period and the following Hellenistic kingdoms do we never hear of such huge numbers? Why did Darius III feel it necessary to defend his empire at Issus with 600,000 but Antiochus III field only some 70,000? The answer is that the latter figure bears a close resembalnce to reality and the former is fiction.

Also, Cyrus does not lead his center against the king, Xenophon has him outside the battle serving as some kind of cavalry reserve.

That is not supported by the source material. Diodorus (14.23.5)states that

In the centre of the lines, it so happened, were stationed both the men who were contending for the kingship. Consequently, becoming aware of this fact, they made at each other, being eagerly desirous of deciding the issue of the battle by their own hands...

But perhaps you rely upon the eye witness Xenophon? He too confirms the fact:

And upon hearing this Cyrus said, “Well, I accept it, and so let it be.” After he had said these words he rode back to his own position...

And where was this position to which he returned?

...on the left was Ariaeus, Cyrus' lieutenant, with the rest of the barbarian army, and in the centre Cyrus and his horsemen, about six hundred in number.

So, having conversed with Xenophon, Cyrus returned to his position. Which position was in the centre of his line as Xenophon confirms again stating that barbarian generals always command from the centre.

Nothing in the source material supports the notion that Cyrus was outside the battle as a reserve cavalry force.

Xenophon justifies the decision of Clearchus not to accept Cyrus' proposal and break off the right wing because he was afraid of being surrounded from both flanks. (ἀλλ’ ὅμως ὁ Κλέαρχος οὐκ ἤθελεν ἀποσπάσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, φοβούμενος μὴ κυκλωθείη ἑκατέρωθεν). The text seems to be about his troops only which would require operating without allies on his flanks, that would mean outside the battle-line, although I guess that it could be argued that his fear is about the whole of Cyrus' army.

Clearchus had the protection of the Paphlagonian cavalry and light armed on his right. He clearly could see that the left would be outflanked (by the enemy centre which he somehow espied) and felt that if he marched away from the river his right end of the line too would be flanked.

As to the question of whether I think this oblique advance meant wheeling left (a la Mantinea 418), I raised this with David Thomas last September using that very example. He disagreed on the very understandable basis that, despite Diodorus, the Lacedaemonian component was far too small and to suggest their tactics (Mantinea) was more than a hoplite too far. He felt that the angled march towards the centre was meant.

[Sean Manning]

There is no "leading his army down on the center" in the text, which would indeed point to your conclusion. The text reads "lead the troops against the center of the enemy" (ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ μέσον τὸ τῶν πολεμίων) with no other instruction which is much more neutral. The Greeks advancing oblique against the position of Artaxerxes would be highly improbable no matter how far this position was. Just 20,000 infantry to the left (now this would be a very moderate estimate, wouldn't it?) would be about 2 kms, assuming a median dept of 10 men. There is no way that the Greeks would parade such a distance in front of the enemy lines, chariots, archers... obstructing their own and practically moving in column as the enemy would be free to engage wherever he chose and stop their movement or just shower them with missiles for the time necessary to complete the march (some 30 mins for that short distance). The only way that such a maneuver could be made, if I accept your assumption that Artaxerxes was not that far to the left and even have him much nearer than your estimates, would again be for the Greeks to march behind the lines and take new positions where it would be more appropriate for them to attack Artaxerxes. Of course this would not be a first. Such maneuvers are indeed attested in the sources quite a few times. Under that prism, no matter where you place Artaxerxes, in order for the Greeks to attack his position, they would have to redeploy to a new position anyways making little difference whether it would be in the center of the far left. You might like Diodorus numbers more, he states 400,000 for the king (Plutarch also IIRC) and 83,000 for Cyrus. Of course, even in this scenario and in anyone other in which Artaxerxes has double or more the men Cyrus has, Artaxerxes will still be outside Cyrus' far left. What you "dispute" is not the actual numbers (unless we are talking about really small armies of maybe 20-30,000 mean each) but the proposed analogy. Also, Cyrus does not lead his center against the king, Xenophon has him outside the battle serving as some kind of cavalry reserve.

Why do you think twenty or thirty thousand men is small? That is the size of a Roman consular army; ancient armies above that size were remarkable things. Cyrus seems to have had three thousand cavalry (Diod, Xen. is consistent) and a barbarian infantry force about the same size as the Greeks (Xen.) Xenophon had no idea how many barbarians Cyrus had so said they were "countless" (ten myriads); he then got Artaxerxes' strength by multiplying every figure he gave for Cyrus' army by ten. Cyrus had 100,000 barbarians, Artaxerxes 900,000 or 1.2 million. Cyrus had twenty scythed chariots and 600 picked cavalry, Artaxerxes had 200 and 6000. Diodorus may have used a five-fold multiplication on his 83,000 Cyreans (including 3,000 cavalry). Cyrus had one myriad of picked cavalry, Artaxerxes five (Diod. 14.22.6-7); Cyrus had 83,000 troops, Artaxerxes 400,000 (Diod 14.19, 14.22).

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

I thought the small size of Consular armies was another thing that set them apart from many ancient forces, which relied a great deal on force of numbers?

[Sean Manning]

I thought the small size of Consular armies was another thing that set them apart from many ancient forces, which relied a great deal on force of numbers?

The problem is that all the evidence we have for massive Gaulish and Persian armies is Greek and Roman sources on the other side. When we look at how they moved, or how long their battle lines were, or compare later armies raised in the same area, we tend to get figures in the tens not hundreds of thousands of soldiers. We see the same thing in medieval chroniclers; the winning side usually insists that they were terribly outnumbered. All ancient armies tried to get a large force into the field, but it seems to me that numbers weren't more important than half a dozen other factors.

All that Xenophon knew about Artaxerxes' army was camp rumour and the sight of it advancing through the dust (and he keeps using indirect speech “they say that ...” in his description of Cunaxa rather than reporting things in his own voice as author). He gave numbers, because counting Persian armies was traditional, but he doesn't give us any reason to believe them. (In contrast, he gives us a list of contingents for Cyrus' Greeks, and gives a source for his numbers; Cyrus held two arithmoi kai exetaseis, “musters and counts,” of the Greeks).

[Eleatic Guest]

...how could we prove it? :-)

Alexander the Great and the Logistic of the Macedonian Army is the best analysis on ancient logistics and the limitations it puts on the army size. Cured me totally from inflated numbers so popular in 'my empire is bigger than yours' online debates.

[Darth_Roach]

I thought the small size of Consular armies was another thing that set them apart from many ancient forces, which relied a great deal on force of numbers?

The problem is that all the evidence we have for massive Gaulish and Persian armies is Greek and Roman sources on the other side. When we look at how they moved, or how long their battle lines were, or compare later armies raised in the same area, we tend to get figures in the tens not hundreds of thousands of soldiers. We see the same thing in medieval chroniclers; the winning side usually insists that they were terribly outnumbered. All ancient armies tried to get a large force into the field, but it seems to me that numbers weren't more important than half a dozen other factors.

All that Xenophon knew about Artaxerxes' army was camp rumour and the sight of it advancing through the dust (and he keeps using indirect speech “they say that ...” in his description of Cunaxa rather than reporting things in his own voice as author). He gave numbers, because counting Persian armies was traditional, but he doesn't give us any reason to believe them. (In contrast, he gives us a list of contingents for Cyrus' Greeks, and gives a source for his numbers; Cyrus held two arithmoi kai exetaseis, “musters and counts,” of the Greeks).

Exactly. You can't move 4 million men through the hot gates in three days. See Delbruck's paragraphs on the lengths of marching columns.

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

Alexander the Great and the Logistic of the Macedonian Army is the best analysis on ancient logistics and the limitations it puts on the army size. Cured me totally from inflated numbers so popular in 'my empire is bigger than yours' online debates.

I will have to find this. And add it to my list of 'to reads'.

I still believe we can not totally discount the massive size of the invasion force.
What would be stopping the supply lines being cut, if there was not a garrison of the areas the forces moved through?

[Darth_Roach]

I still believe we can not totally discount the massive size of the invasion force.
What would be stopping the supply lines being cut, if there was not a garrison of the areas the forces moved through?

So you suggest it was both needed and possible to use more than 10 times the size of a large force by the day's standards?

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

The days standards? What were the standards of the day?
And 10 times any figure? very precise maths.
What I am trying to say is the Empire of Persia was more than 10 times the siz of Greece,
so they were well able to demand a massive levy to meet their needs.
Precisely what figure, I cannot say, but I still think it would have been huge,
given the description of it's build up and it's movement through anatolia and across the Hellespont,
and across the northern Balkans and Thrace.
All these areas, whether they submitted or not, would require garrisoning.

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http...CCEQ9QEwBQ

http://www.zonu.com/detail-en/2009-12-30...90-BC.html

A couple of differening layouts of the Empire as it was supposedly around the time of the clash.
Odd how in 500BC they already held greece down to the Gates! :roll:

[Darth_Roach]

The days standards? What were the standards of the day?

30 thousand was already a large force. 300 thousand is ridiculous.

And 10 times any figure? very precise maths.

300 thousand = 30 thousand X 10

What I am trying to say is the Empire of Persia was more than 10 times the siz of Greece,
so they were well able to demand a massive levy to meet their needs.

Which is irrelevant as far as field army sizes go. Logistics are relevant not a hypothetical full levy. Plus I doubt they had much more than 300 thousand soldiers available anyway, since the core of the army was the Persian landed citizenry. Persians were among the least numerous peoples in the empire.

Precisely what figure, I cannot say, but I still think it would have been huge,
given the description of it's build up and it's movement through anatolia and across the Hellespont,

Even 80 thousand is already huge for 480BC. I doubt there is need to look in the hundreds of thousands.

All these areas, whether they submitted or not, would require garrisoning.

Yes, indeed. But that doesn't mean they could supply hundreds of thousands of troops in the first place.