Ancient Logistics and ancient warfare

[Jugibar]

Greetings to all,

In view of the last few threads on the Greco-Persian conflict, it has dawned on me the methodology presented when discussing army sizes, speed, etc. is inaccurate. When it comes to e.g. ancient rations and marching, to make conjectures based on the numbers presented would not be going the full mile, since military logistics presents us with such formulas to deduct an accurate and acceptable answer compared to alternative history where mere opinion is based on viewpoint and drawn sources (military logistics is a mathematical science). It was brought up by Sean Manning that when planning for the invasion of Greece, "Xerxes' armament gathered in Cappadocia and wintered inland at Sardis." Although I am pretty sure that Cappadocia isn't capable of bearing the whole brunt of storing the supplies, it would suffice to solve the carrying capacity of the two bases by taking the amount of wagons times their carrying load, and multiplied again by trips made possible in a day (speed, road occupation, etc.). Victory at Thermopylae demands the Persians for another forward base, geography of transportation needs to be considered and so on.

What is intriguing about the Persian army in comparison to all other ancient military structures is their use of the navy in securing safe supplies, which was kind of an ancestor of the Phoenician naval forces in its use of cargo ships and battle ships. It was the main retailer in supporting the Persian invasions. For starters, when needed, what ports would the ships land at to meet the invading body. Also, Donald Engels notes in his Logistics of the Macedonian Armythat when Alexander the Great had been retreating from his Indian campaign, a monsoon had struck that prevented his army from gathering the supplies it needed to get by the desert. Were such environmental processes at play off the Greek coast?

Lastly, it is necessary to understand what hindsight the ancient historians were reporting from to get a clear vision of why they represented the facts as they did and/or why they were correct some times and woefully off on others. For Herodotus, he wrote episodic history where facts had to be exaggerated to gain the attention of the audience he was presenting to, best demonstrated by his figures for the invading army size (mis-translations were also possible). Equally crucial was that they saw numbers differently than what we see them as today. Why Xerxes marched through a thin pass at Thermopylae with such a large army, may be because he stored a majority of it on the Thessalian plains. Why his approach of invasion was from the Bache pass, is a matter of its width and that no other road could sustain such a large army. Why a large portion of her manpower pool was withdrawn, is due of the concept of strategic reserves of the day.

I could keep on going, but I think you all get my argument. Indeed, we should all present the facts with more cautiousness. Look forward to replies,

Matt

P.S. This is to discuss all ancient military history events, not just the expeditions in Greece.

[Macedon]

In my opinion, "modern scholars" tend to vastly underestimate the ancient capacity of logistical support, probably because of a wrongful effort to draw their conclusions from what lessons they acquired from studying the logistical issues arising in western medieval/early rennaisance armies/campaigns. I also choose to not discredit any ancient historian and support that most did their best, whatever this might mean, to record what they discovered to be the truth. Herodot was a man who was awfully near the Persian Wars chronically and, to me, he certainly tried to check and double check his reports. He surely did not "have to" inflate numbers, he did not "have to" suck up any state and he was no entertainer to "have to" get his readers' attention. I personally think that some of his reports are indeed inflated mainly because there could have been no actual Greek report of the size of the land-based Persian army, so he would have to rely on dubious assumptions and Persian records. Yet, one should take into account that however inflated (and despite his prosonyme "father of lies"), his numbers were not criticized by later historians as fictional nor are accounts given that even remotely concur with some 20th century assumptions, to me a proof that there was no reliable report to actually discredit Herodot's sources. Embarking on a discussion on whether specific numbers in any ancient or medieval campaign were real or fictional is, to me, almost always relatively fruitless. On the other hand, a discussion on the potential to field certain armies is much more interesting and some months ago we did actually have one that proved quite intriguing and I hope informative.

In your post you touch a lot of issues regarding this specific campaign but I do not see any clear points you would like to discuss plus your PS comment and name of the thread also baffled me a bit. Is it a general approach to ancient logistics you want to discuss or this specific campaign? I think you should make your OP clearer.

As to your question, that is whether there were such (like a monsoon) environmental processes at play off the Greek coast, the answer would be that the Aegean Sea is during the campaign seasons normally quite calm and easy to sail, yet there are often short, violent storms that can prove very destructive (as they were at Athos and at Artemisium) to a fleet that has no safe haven at hand. However, such weather effects are more dangerous to a massed war-fleet than to those carrying supplies, because the latter tend to be scattered over a long area and small, so any damage done to them is not crucial to the campaign. There is nothing as global and persistent as the Indian monsoons.

[Jugibar]

In my opinion, "modern scholars" tend to vastly underestimate the ancient capacity of logistical support, probably because of a wrongful effort to draw their conclusions from what lessons they acquired from studying the logistical issues arising in western medieval/early rennaisance armies/campaigns.

In my own opinion, most of these conclusions are drawn from misusing our modern sources, and then not cross-referencing them with what their counterparts say. Hans Delbruck is the most prime example of this. His view on the invasion, is that an army of 4,200,000 (from Herodotus) would encompass a head to tail column that would be from the invading point, to Susa! However, the problem is that he uses Prussian marching methods to arrive at his conclusion, as well as ignoring the route Xerxes had taken to Greece and that he used ships to transport men as well. I would be interested if anybody here could speak German, so we could understand the sources he used. I Do have the book at home, so I will quote him when I get there in a few days. This may be of interest for you http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Military/P...n_army.htm as well as http://garyb.0catch.com/march9_attack/march_attack.html Gobineau authored many books before Delbruck and comes up with conclusions that they numbered about 180,000. what issues do you believe they were studying in re: “ western medieval/early rennaisance armies/campaigns.”

I also choose to not discredit any ancient historian and support that most did their best, whatever this might mean, to record what they discovered to be the truth. Herodot was a man who was awfully near the Persian Wars chronically and, to me, he certainly tried to check and double check his reports. He surely did not "have to" inflate numbers, he did not "have to" suck up any state and he was no entertainer to "have to" get his readers' attention.

Yes, in fact he was the closest to the war and any representation he depicts of the events in the conflict must be warranted. But he isn't the only word we have on the invasion, we also hold the likes of Xenophon or Diodorus. I would like to hear your word on them and why you would think them to be more or less reliable than H was. On that last point, there may actually have been a reason for him to represent the figures differently, and it lies in the doctrine of ancient Greek nationalism. We see in most/all ancient accounts of culture that the Greeks considered anyone outside their sphere of influence to be barbaric and uncivilized. The last resort of insult for any Greek would be to question your Greekness. For him to lower the numbers would not image the Greeks as being anything superior.

I personally think that some of his reports are indeed inflated mainly because there could have been no actual Greek report of the size of the land-based Persian army, so he would have to rely on dubious assumptions and Persian records. Yet, one should take into account that however inflated (and despite his prosonyme "father of lies"), his numbers were not criticized by later historians as fictional nor are accounts given that even remotely concur with some 20th century assumptions, to me a proof that there was no reliable report to actually discredit Herodot's sources. Embarking on a discussion on whether specific numbers in any ancient or medieval campaign were real or fictional is, to me, almost always relatively fruitless. On the other hand, a discussion on the potential to field certain armies is much more interesting and some months ago we did actually have one that proved quite intriguing and I hope informative.

For there to be no record on the size of the Persian army, at least from a government source is certainly possible, but I doubt it as much. Governments keep record of a lot of things, even if of little significance because it helps in decision making and provides insight for a centralized authority. On the numbers, the most conventional and common estimate I've seen is roughly 100,000, roughly over or under in some cases. Michael Grant may be of interest to you, he narrates the inflation argument that is common even to this day. On the modern take, who is your favorite author?

Arguing on the specific numbers and what was potential to field go hand in hand. Re visioning certain engagements is actually quite intriguing, revisionism is actually taught in the education system as beneficial and even encouraged because it allows us to reflect on certain hypothesis and whether they're right or wrong. History is a science, almost like forensics, our view of certain opinions change base on archeology, technology etc.

your post you touch a lot of issues regarding this specific campaign but I do not see any clear points you would like to discuss plus your PS comment and name of the thread also baffled me a bit. Is it a general approach to ancient logistics you want to discuss or this specific campaign? I think you should make your OP clearer.

Well, I would like to cover all of the ancient campaigns based on the logistics evidence. To make my position more clear, I would like to take this chronologically and start with the Persian campaigns as we are doing now, then move on to the next event when a clear conclusion can be made on the previous event etc. You mentioned above that you feel that picking on specific numbers wasn't interesting and that to estimate what was possible is more fruitful. Let's just start with what we feel was logistically possible, then go from there.

As to your question, that is whether there were such (like a monsoon) environmental processes at play off the Greek coast, the answer would be that the Aegean Sea is during the campaign seasons normally quite calm and easy to sail, yet there are often short, violent storms that can prove very destructive (as they were at Athos and at Artemisium) to a fleet that has no safe haven at hand. However, such weather effects are more dangerous to a massed war-fleet than to those carrying supplies, because the latter tend to be scattered over a long area and small, so any damage done to them is not crucial to the campaign. There is nothing as global and persistent as the Indian monsoons.

So they're violent in terms of short bursts, do they have any tendency to arise during a certain week/period, like early August or mid-July? Yes traditionally supply fleets are scattered, but for the Persians how large were they and did they have to land at ports to supply the army? On that last point you make I am interested on how you think they affected Alexander's army in the given season he was in, and if his casualties were exaggerated.

Well it's midnight where I live, so will reply tomorrow.

Matt

[Vindex]

In my opinion, "modern scholars" tend to vastly underestimate the ancient capacity of logistical support, probably because of a wrongful effort to draw their conclusions from what lessons they acquired from studying the logistical issues arising in western medieval/early rennaisance armies/campaigns.

I have to say I tend to agree with your opinion too.

[Tomenable]

His view on the invasion, is that an army of 4,200,000 (from Herodotus) would encompass a head to tail column that would be from the invading point, to Susa! However, the problem is that he uses Prussian marching methods to arrive at his conclusion,

But what is wrong with Prussian marching methods? :mrgreen:

Anyway - you do realize that an army of 4,200,000 would require a territory with some 20,000,000 inhabitants to be mobilized from, and only in case if you mobilize EVERY MAN who is capable of participating in a military campaign (ca. 20% - 25% of population - but some part of this percentage are men who are just "barely" capable of service).

Now I don't think that even the entire Persian Empire had 20,000,000 inhabitants. And even if it had 20 million inhabitants, then surely mobilizing everyone capable of service - even those from every farthest corner and from every tiny shabby village of the empire, as well as all slaves (who surely were large % of the total population) - would be physically impossible considering the available means of transport, organization & communication. Even if it was physically possible - doing so would mean an economic (who would work?) and demographic, disastrous catastrophe. Surely a huge horde of men of various age and health condition - from less than 20 to more than 50, from perfectly healthy to very ill or not ill at that particular time but of relatively weak health - was an ideal environment for epidemic diseases, which would strike soon and would completely decimate that horde in a matter of months.

Now check the estimates of population of the Roman Empire at its demographic peak (which was of course during the times of economic prosperity and political coolnes of the Principate - with the final imperial borders already established after years of conquest - later population began to decrease):

http://www.unrv.com/empire/roman-population.php

Persian Achaemenid Empire although similar in size did not contain as many densely populated territories as the Roman Empire, plus it was a relatively young Empire - which means it did not have much time to consolidate after the phase of conquests - it did not have such economic prosperity and political stability as the Roman Empire at its peak (which means that more people lived in poverty and that poverty was on average bigger). And - which is also important - it existed several centuries before the Roman Empire, when overall population of the world was smaller (even though there was no such rapid population growth as in our times or since the 19th century).

So when we talk about armies numbering millions we no longer talk about the limits of "Ancient Logistics" - we already start talking about the limits of "Ancient Demography" - which surely was not able to mobilize armies numbering millions.

[Macedon]

In my own opinion, most of these conclusions are drawn from misusing our modern sources, and then not cross-referencing them with what their counterparts say. Hans Delbruck is the most prime example of this. His view on the invasion, is that an army of 4,200,000 (from Herodotus) would encompass a head to tail column that would be from the invading point, to Susa! However, the problem is that he uses Prussian marching methods to arrive at his conclusion, as well as ignoring the route Xerxes had taken to Greece and that he used ships to transport men as well.

What do you mean by cross-referencing? What counterparts?

As far as Delbrueck is concerned, he was a pioneer insofar as he understood the need to further investigate before blindly accepting sources. His line of thinking is, to me, problematic and he often falls victim of very important mistakes, but then even Polybius did... His calculation of the length of the Persian train, SHOULD IT BE EXTENDED ALL AT THE SAME TIME is not problematic, Herodot actually fully confirms it when he records that the Persians needed 7 days and nights to cross the two bridges over the Hellespont. which, at a moderate speed of 3 km/h and assuming that on the road, the train would have a frontage as wide as both bridges together, gives a total of 3x7x24=504km. Of course the train would never extend that long. Each contingent would be ready at a given time throughout the day, so that, for example, the Persians would have to be ready to start marching at 7.00 and the Lydians at 10.00 (of course times are random in this example). So, when the first contingents would start making camp at a pre-ordained place, probably pre-measured, pre-scouted, prepared etc, other contingents would still be preparing for their march in the initial camp. The most probable course of action would be that each camp would be reused by the following column (the ground being already leveled, the water sources checked, etc). This means that at least 6 such main camps would be used upon the marching path, maybe 10-20 kms apart - most probably, there would be even more campsites prepared along the way to accommodate stragglers, provide water and fodder etc. So, to me, the rear would in reality be some 60-120 km away from the van. And of course all this assuming that the march was made in one column, which is, again to me, highly unlikely. I think that moving in two columns, one, the most swift and versatile more inland to secure that the seaward column would not fall into mishaps, would be more understandable. This column would be necessity be lighter, mostly cavalry and light infantry, with few baggage since it would be supplied from the first column. This would make the marching column even shorter, maybe 50-100 km. but at any given time, less than 50%, maybe some 30% of the army would be on the move. And of course, all this if we assume that the Persians did indeed march into Greece with such huge numbers. Of course I assume that there was adequate organization. If there was not, then distances would be greater (maybe 50-100% greater) but still not anything like Delbrueck suggests.

The 4,200,000 number also is problematic... Herodot speaks of 1,700,000 infantry and 80,000 foot. Double that and you have 3,600,000. I guess that the rest would be the Greek and Balcanian allies who of course would not be part of the same train until they actually joined in...

He also has major problems calculating distances... The distance from the bridges in the Hellespont (let alone Susa!!!!! or even Sardis, since he obviously mixed up the cities...) to Thermopylae would be some 700 kms on the map, which would mean double that in reality (due to natural winding of roads and elevation). Even today, the distance from Alexandroupolis to Thermopoylae is some 700-750 kms on straight highways... Add to that the distance from the Hellespont as well as the natural roads of the time and you come to my calculations...

I would be interested if anybody here could speak German, so we could understand the sources he used. I Do have the book at home, so I will quote him when I get there in a few days. This may be of interest for you http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Military/P...n_army.htm as well as http://garyb.0catch.com/march9_attack/march_attack.html Gobineau authored many books before Delbruck and comes up with conclusions that they numbered about 180,000. what issues do you believe they were studying in re: “ western medieval/early rennaisance armies/campaigns.”

Anyone can support whatever one wants... The very thing that so many historians, "military experts" etc cannot agree on such points only shows that there is no specific rule that we can apply. Maybe they were "only" 180,000 men, although, in that case, I would expect them to actually sail to Greece instead of marching there.

The problem with many historians is that they follow the lead of men who wrote in the late 1800s, early 1900s, when there was a feeling that the world had a linear evolution regarding technology, populations etc. They regarded medieval and early renaissance more advanced than classical, Hellenistic or Roman times, which is a grave mistake. Food production is considered to have been lower, urbanization too, the logistical ability of armies inferior, population lower etc. Yet, this, in my opinion, is a mistake regarding the Mediterranean basin. The urbanization observed in Greece, Central and Southern Italy, Sicily, Egypt, Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia cannot be compared to anything before renaissance. The population of the area was not as low as often quoted and as far as I know, recently, scholars do indeed make much higher assumptions than 20-50 years ago, even for places more "barbaric" like Britain. The same applies for food production, especially in Mesopotamia, where the desert has actually today reclaimed lands that were irrigated and well exploited agriculturally. And the higher the indigenous population, the larger an army can be sustained through forage, markets, tribute etc.

Yes, in fact he was the closest to the war and any representation he depicts of the events in the conflict must be warranted. But he isn't the only word we have on the invasion, we also hold the likes of Xenophon or Diodorus. I would like to hear your word on them and why you would think them to be more or less reliable than H was. On that last point, there may actually have been a reason for him to represent the figures differently, and it lies in the doctrine of ancient Greek nationalism. We see in most/all ancient accounts of culture that the Greeks considered anyone outside their sphere of influence to be barbaric and uncivilized. The last resort of insult for any Greek would be to question your Greekness. For him to lower the numbers would not image the Greeks as being anything superior.

The fact that Herodot was chronically near the events in question of course does not guarantee that his accounts are correct. It only says that these were the reports he saw or heard. The Greeks could not have officially measured Xerxes' land force. His navy would easily have been numbered and this is why his accounts of it are much more precise. About the land forces, he says he used certain Persian accounts, like a stele Xerxes raised, which leaves it upon the shoulders of those making it to have told the truth. He also mentions an older Greek "source", an epitaph for the 300 which mentioned that Leonidas had faced 3,000,000 Persians. But this was not written by someone who numbered the enemy and most probably also rested on the same Persian accounts. The rest of the Greek historians who actually offer similar accounts actually enhance the reliability of Herodot. They did not discredit him because a. they did not find other accounts and b. they did not believe the numbers to have been exaggerated, which is much more important. Even if Xerxes actually campaigned with 50,000 men, it is interesting to note that the contemporary and later Greeks did not hold them as impossible. Huge yes, but not incredible. Actually Diodorus dedicates a whole argument as to why such high numbers were not impossible.

Greek elitism was not actually fed by exaggerating about its opponents. This is a very superficial approach. Without claiming that no-one ever exaggerated on purpose, this was not their modus-operandi. The epitome of Greek courage, glory, triumph against the barbarians, the Iliad, was very direct as to the fact that the Greeks (Achaeans, Danaans, Argives) were much more numerous than the Trojans and all their allies together. Illyian numbers are usually low, Thracian are sometimes really big, most times pretty normal-low. The Romans were never depicted in exaggeration, numbers between Greek states were also not that inflated, even though there would be an equally, if not greater need, to glorify their own states rather than Greece. In all Greek historiography and among numerous enemies, it is only the Imperial Persians, not the Persians per se, that are attested in such numbers. Smaller, even though also huge, numbers are accounted for the Carthaginians in Sicily (300,000 men). This only serves to question the argument that the Greeks USED TO inflate the numbers of their enemy to glorify their own actions. They didn't use to although sometimes, some might have.

Also, the Greeks actually often praised the Persians for their courage. They supported that they were superior in arms and tactics, which they obviously were as far as the terrain of Greece was concerned, but they did not have to inflate the numbers of the Persians to glorify themselves. Accounts of battles in Anatolia after Plataea for example do not often involve large numbers, although the Greek exploits there were deemed as important and glorious.

For there to be no record on the size of the Persian army, at least from a government source is certainly possible, but I doubt it as much. Governments keep record of a lot of things, even if of little significance because it helps in decision making and provides insight for a centralized authority. On the numbers, the most conventional and common estimate I've seen is roughly 100,000, roughly over or under in some cases. Michael Grant may be of interest to you, he narrates the inflation argument that is common even to this day. On the modern take, who is your favorite author?

No record on the Greek part of course... As for the Persian records, I cannot say how reliable they were. If they were, then I guess that Xerxes did indeed come to Greece with 5 million men. Herodot does not mention any official Persian records. A stele is a record but still it might be made in such a way as to inspire awe, since it was not hidden in some undiscovered vault, and so numbers there might have been, even grossly, exaggerated. Other cultures did not keep extant written records. I guess that we will never discover anything particular about Thracian, Illyrian, Gallic, Germanic, Iberian etc armies... I have no favorite modern author, most are too generally for my taste when addressing military issues. Our own Duncan Campbell most suits my approach of things, with his many quotes and respect for what has been written. I guess I particularly like military manuals in general, especially those more pertinent to issues common with or relative to the antiquity.

Arguing on the specific numbers and what was potential to field go hand in hand....

...Well, I would like to cover all of the ancient campaigns based on the logistics evidence. To make my position more clear, I would like to take this chronologically and start with the Persian campaigns as we are doing now, then move on to the next event when a clear conclusion can be made on the previous event etc. You mentioned above that you feel that picking on specific numbers wasn't interesting and that to estimate what was possible is more fruitful. Let's just start with what we feel was logistically possible, then go from there.

As for my views on the logistics of the specific campaign you can look through my post in the Ancient Army Numbers thread. There we had this specific discussion. Look through it and raise any points you want.

Indeed, after many endeavors, I have come to the conclusion that fighting over sheer numbers is not that fruitful... If the Persians had the ability to send 5 mil men, this does not mean they did. If they couldn't, it again does not guarantee that they didn't... History is full of examples where a general should have committed more troops and others where he overextended...

So they're violent in terms of short bursts, do they have any tendency to arise during a certain week/period, like early August or mid-July? Yes traditionally supply fleets are scattered, but for the Persians how large were they and did they have to land at ports to supply the army? On that last point you make I am interested on how you think they affected Alexander's army in the given season he was in, and if his casualties were exaggerated.

Yes and no. During the campaign season, such storms can occur at most any moment. This is the case throughout the Mediterranean, the Aegean being particularly dangerous because of the many isles and little open sea.

We also discussed the supply by sea in the thread I mentioned. Look it up.

[Tomenable]

Actually Diodorus dedicates a whole argument as to why such high numbers were not impossible.

4,200,000 is more than the number of Axis troops which invaded the Soviet Union in "Fall Barbarossa" of 1941, along the entire frontline from Murmansk to the Black Sea... :roll:

So I guess we should revise history books and call the Persian invasion of Greece the largest military campaign ever - instead of the Eastern Front of WW2... :mrgreen:

[Paralus]

4,200,000 is more than the number of Axis troops which invaded the Soviet Union in "Fall Barbarossa" of 1941, along the entire frontline from Murmansk to the Black Sea... :roll:

Touche!

The numbers are clearly ridiculous.

[Macedon]

Actually Diodorus dedicates a whole argument as to why such high numbers were not impossible.

4,200,000 is more than the number of Axis troops which invaded the Soviet Union in "Fall Barbarossa" of 1941, along the entire frontline from Murmansk to the Black Sea... :roll:

So I guess we should revise history books and call the Persian invasion of Greece the largest military campaign ever - instead of the Eastern Front of WW2... :mrgreen:

You can say so to Herodot, Diodorus and all the other propagandizers of the ancient world... as far as I am concerned I refrain from saying that they were liers, that they were misled, that they misread the Persian writings... Such arguments I would not exactly call scientific... This is why I simply do not say that the numbers are correct or wrong. Anyone may make his wild guesses, me, you and Michael included. I guess that a further argument would be that in Star Trek, a few galactic battle-ships of a few thousand men each could hold a battleground as large as our solar system, so, even the 1941 German advance on Russia would sound ludicrous...

It is interesting though that instead of commenting on Diodorus' words you chose to discredit him with such an inappropriate argument.

[Tomenable]

that they misread the Persian writings... Such arguments I would not exactly call scientific...

Why not?

In another thread I posted examples how both Early Modern Era and present day scholars frequently misreaded and still misread Ottoman Turkish writings (regarding the size of Ottoman armies). As far as I know very few historians - including one whose article is titled (in translation to English) - "The forgotten army" (which is about camp followers and non-combatants) - noticed this. And I quoted some primary sources who are cited in that article "The forgotten army", which say:

http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat.html?fu...673#316129

"(...) Sir Zelenski [Polish envoy to the Turkish camp, who acted also as a spy, sent there to check how big the enemy army was] counted their forces using Polish method, which is considerably different than Turkish method - in the Turkish army they count separately each living creature, for example if they have a mounted knight and this knight has another horse, or a mule, or a camel - then they count all of this separately, and that's why they get so huge numbers of their armies (...)"

Sir Zelenski after his visit estimated that Ottoman forces were "no more than 210,000", while Turkish own sources said that their army was "400,000 strong" - above is a quotation from a Polish politician, Jan Ostrorog, who explained the origins of that discrepancy - different methods of counting.

And Jan Ostrorog later concluded:

"(...) That's why when there will be a 10,000 strong Polish force, there will still be more actual soldiers among these 10,000, than in a Turkish force which is said to be 20,000 strong, or maybe even in a Turkish force which is said to be 30,000 strong (...)".

Another Polish envoy - Krzysztof Zbaraski - who visited Turkey few years later, wrote:

"(...) Forces of the Turkish tyrant are bigger on paper than in actual armies, because when they count strength of their forces, they count both men and horses (...)"

What I suggested is that maybe the origin of huge Persian numbers is similar.

I guess that a further argument would be that in Star Trek, a few galactic battle-ships of a few thousand men each could hold a battleground as large as our solar system, so, even the 1941 German advance on Russia would sound ludicrous...

Of course that Ancient armies were much more "densely packed" than later, but this was not even my point. My point was that all Axis states (not just Germany - also Germany's allies) were able to mobilize just over 4,000,000 to invade the Soviet Union in 20th century - and someone claims that an ancient empire was able to mobilize more men - and sent them versus tiny Greece (sic!).

[Paralus]

Actually Diodorus dedicates a whole argument as to why such high numbers were not impossible.

Save me reading George. The reference?

[Macedon]

Actually Diodorus dedicates a whole argument as to why such high numbers were not impossible.

Save me reading George. The reference?

Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, B.2, ch.5, s.5, l.3

“οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατόν γε φανήσεται τοῖς ἀναθεωροῦσι τὸ τῆς Ἀσίας μέγεθος καὶ τὰ πλήθη τῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν ἐθνῶν. εἰ γάρ τις ἀφεὶς τὴν ἐπὶ Σκύθας Δαρείου στρατείαν μετὰ ὀγδοήκοντα μυριάδων καὶ τὴν Ξέρξου διάβασιν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τοῖς ἀναριθμήτοις πλήθεσι, τὰς ἐχθὲς καὶ πρῴην συντελεσθείσας πράξεις ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης σκέψαιτο, τάχιον ἂν πιστὸν ἡγήσαιτο τὸ ῥηθέν. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν Σικελίαν ὁ Διονύσιος ἐκ μιᾶς τῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων πόλεως ἐξήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὰς στρατείας πεζῶν μὲν δώδεκα μυριάδας, ἱππεῖς δὲ μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους, ναῦς δὲ μακρὰς ἐξ ἑνὸς λιμένος τετρακοσίας, ὧν ἦσαν ἔνιαι τετρήρεις καὶ πεντήρεις• Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ μικρὸν πρὸ τῶν Ἀννιβαϊκῶν καιρῶν, προορώμενοι τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ πολέμου, κατέγραψαν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐπιτηδείους εἰς [τὴν] στρατείαν πολίτας τε καὶ συμμάχους, ὧν ὁ σύμπας ἀριθμὸς μικρὸν ἀπέλιπε τῶν ἑκατὸν μυριάδων•”

[Paralus]

I really didn't think you'd rely on Ctesias George. Diodorus' entire premise here is that if Syracuse can raise X then Persia can raise X to the power of 100. He then goes on to prove it via the mythical Semiramis:

2.5.4:
Accordingly, after the army had been assembled from every source, it numbered, as Ctesias has stated in his history, one million seven hundred thousand foot-soldiers, two hundred and ten thousand cavalry, and slightly less than ten thousand six hundred scythe-bearing chariots.

17.1-2:
And the multitude of the army which was assembled, as Ctesias of Cnidus has recorded, was three million foot-soldiers, two hundred thousand cavalry, and one hundred thousand chariots. There were also men mounted on camels, carrying swords four cubits long, as many in number as the chariots.

That Diodorus might have been so credulous does not necessitate you also being my good man.

[Macedon]

Why not?

Because it is just not scientific to assert that a certain historian is wrong because you think that he has misread something you have never read yourself. There are many much better arguments why a train of 4 mil people could be unrealistic. In all the examples you quote, you can actually examine whether the authors misquoted or not. In this case you cannot. Plus, no ancient disagreed with Herodot, which means that these (or something in the area) were the numbers they thought to have been true. If the stele in question mentioned other numbers, supposing there indeed was such a stele, another historian would have said something.

What I suggested is that maybe the origin of huge Persian numbers is similar.

Of course you have. I never said you did not. Maybe you are right, maybe you are wrong. Who knows? Your very effort to reconcile the given numbers with what you deem realistic shows that you accept the possibility that the quoted numbers may have been from a source the ancients respected or just what they believed for the truth. I never asserted anything more than that.

Of course that Ancient armies were much more "densely packed" than later, but this was not even my point. My point was that all Axis states (not just Germany - also Germany's allies) were able to mobilize just over 4,000,000 to invade the Soviet Union in 20th century - and someone claims that an ancient empire was able to mobilize more men - and sent them versus tiny Greece (sic!).

This is not relevant really. The number of males who fought for Wehrmacht during the years 1939-1945 were about 18,000,000. Taking into account that the German population in 1939 was about 80 million, I do not see any problem for a state with half that population mobilizing an army 9 times smaller (the actual fighting force is 1,7 mil infantry and 80,000 cavalry sans navy) and still have numbers enough for garrison and border duties. Taking into account that many were not actually subjects but allies, this percentage gets even smaller. The rest were non-combatants which means women, children, whores, slaves, servants, but also countless merchants and traders from any conceivable ethnicity within and without the empire, even Greeks.

You seem to misunderstand me though as does Michael. I never said that Herodot's numbers ARE correct. I simply, since post nr.1 maintain that they MAY be correct or even more probably gross approximations of the truth. The degree of this possibility when huge numbers are being reported by the ancients varies, but it is there.

[Macedon]

I really didn't think you'd rely on Ctesias George. Diodorus' entire premise here is that if Syracuse can raise X then Persia can raise X to the power of 100. He then goes on to prove it via the mythical Semiramis:

2.5.4:
Accordingly, after the army had been assembled from every source, it numbered, as Ctesias has stated in his history, one million seven hundred thousand foot-soldiers, two hundred and ten thousand cavalry, and slightly less than ten thousand six hundred scythe-bearing chariots.

17.1-2:
And the multitude of the army which was assembled, as Ctesias of Cnidus has recorded, was three million foot-soldiers, two hundred thousand cavalry, and one hundred thousand chariots. There were also men mounted on camels, carrying swords four cubits long, as many in number as the chariots.

That Diodorus might have been so credulous does not necessitate you also being my good man.

Who is relying on Ctesias? Based on some who may think that the numbers of Ctesias given in a specific instant are incredible, Diodorus builds a whole argument NOT BASED on Ctesias as to why such numbers are NOT incredible. To this he offers many examples including instants chronologically close to his readers, even for Greek armies. You may think that Diodorus is wrong but the fact remains, that IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION, such numbers should not sound incredible for Asian armies. There are a number of similar quotes from different authors of antiquity including one about why the number of Greeks who sailed to Troy (some 100,000) should not sound TOO FEW to the ancient Greeks...

Again I will say that you are really misplacing your arguments. If you want to support that Herodot is wrong plain and simple because his numbers are simply ridiculous I will fiercely disagree, not with the first part, for I never said that Herodot was right but with the part about how ridiculous these numbers are and thus plainly obvious to all authors of antiquity that what they were reporting, true or false, was nothing but a deliberate pile of crap...