Re: Ancient army numbers

[Macedon]

And it is important that Arrian did think that these casualties were substantial, not average, for a melee action that involved 2,500 Hetairoi among others.

How do you see 2,500 hetairoi (Companion Cavalry) at Gaugamela?

The battle of Gaza saw many cavalrymen killed - as many as 500philoi of Demetrius if the cavalry-centric description of Hieronymus is correct. This from some 2,900 on this wing. Now, it won't do to argue that this is Macedonian against Macedonian because that is not correct ("no less than fifteen hundred horsemen of all kinds"). The losses accorded to to "the Great's" cavalry are court pap. Clearly, at Gaugamela, the Macedonian cavalry lost more than those recorded; Arrian's narrative says as much.

Arrian 3.15.2:
...and Hephaestion himself, as well as Coenus and Menidas, was wounded.

Diod.17.61.3:
Hephaestion was wounded with a spear thrust in the arm; he had commanded the bodyguards. Perdiccas and Coenus, of the general's group, were also wounded, so also Menidas and others of the higher commanders.

Now, we may argue about Hepaestion, but Heckel is surely correct that he led the somatophylakes (= agema of the hypastists). Even if not we have two certainly attested infantry leaders in Coenus (the asthetairoi) and Perdiccas who are wounded in this "skirmish" of cavalry.

I remain to be convinced George.

??? Well... let's see....

First, about Gaza... the casualties reported are "more than 500 men, most of whom were cavalry"... This probably means some 300-350 men. These are the casualties that the defeated side sustained, the side that broke and fled.... Fortunately, the cavalry soon regrouped and covered the retreat, else the casualties would be much more. The cavalry that took part in the fight (along with the rest of the wing, elephants, light infantry etc) is adequately described and mainly are lancers. Also, the "pantodapoi" are not cavalry of all sorts, but cavalry of other "places", more like allied cavalry, but this is a small detail. Yet, this can only be concluded if one compares the use of this word in Diodorus which can have the meaning of "all sorts" but when used for troops, it most always clearly means "of other places/nations etc". Now, Demetrius has at least 1,500 lancers in his numbers and his enemies array against him the strongest 3,000 of their own cavalry. Diodorus clearly says how the first attack was with the xyston lance and then with drawn swords. The battle is described as particularly vigorous and still... the side that breaks into flight only loses the most part of the 500+ casualties... Where exactly do you see this battle clashing with what Arrian suggests? Now... would Demetrios actually have been the victor you might claim that the casualties were somewhat disproportionate, although it is a fact that BOTH sides had xystophorous whereas at Gaugamela the Persians had none. Yet, he wasn't, so I guess you could maintain instead that the casualties were very few...

Now, about Hephaesteon... the text actually reads :

"Ἡφαιστίων μὲν εἰς τὸν βραχίονα ξυστῷ βληθεὶς ἐτρώθη", which is translated as :

"Hephaestion was wounded by a xyston spear that was hurled on his arm." The text is very clear. It was no hand to hand thrust, it was a xyston that was thrown at him...

Moreover, the somatophylacae are not counted among the hypaspistae. They are a small group of men that are supposed to be closest to Alexander and protect him always. In battle, they were not always beside him. They could even lead other units.

Now, I cannot understand your point here. Why cannot infantry be wounded during a cavalry skirmish against them? I fail to see the logic here... Unless you thought that cavalry only skirmished against cavalry which of course never was nor is the case.

Does this answer to these points? As for the companions, yes, at that point in time, Alexander would still have 8 squadrons of hetairoi which would make more than 1800 and less than 2500.

[Macedon]

I once wrote I would not go here. I'm a bad boy, bad boy, very bad boy...

We love you as you are

Arrian writes that the "Macedonians" assaulted by ile. I woyuld, though, agree he refers to those on the Macedonian side rather than Macedonians. More of Alexander's men fell clearly means the Persians were doing and killing well. Arrian gives a thousand Macedonian horses as dead. Whilst he says this is due to wounds and the chase (half belonging to the Hetairoi), that should stand as a warning to accepting that only sixty Hetairoi died.

As well, Coenus, Perdiccas and Hephaestion are wounded. I fully concur with Heckel that Hephaestion is wounded leading the agema of the hypaspists (referred to as somatophylakes by Arrian on several occasions and directly attested here by Diodorus) and the other two are unarguably leading infantry who must, therefore, have attacked. In fact Arrian states this baldly at 3.14.2-3 which is worth quoting in full for a number of reasons:

All cavalry of Alexander would move/attack by ile. So did the Persians too. It is not clear where Hephaestion was when he was wounded, I tend to think he was among the Companions of Alexander rather than the hypaspists, but the thing is that all three men are attested to have been wounded but no details are given as to how. Only Hephaestion's wound is elaborated on and that was caused by a missile. Of course there were men among the phalanx who were wounded, some even killed. This does not require for the phalanx to be engaged in hand to hand combat.

For a time Alexander himself led his men in column, but when the cavalry, charging the Persians who were trying to surround the Macedonian's right wing, first breached the barbarian phalanx, Alexander wheeled about opposite the gap, arrayed the Companion cavalry and the nearby portion of the phalanx in a wedge formation and led them at full speed and with a war cry at Darius himself. For a breif period the fighting was hand to hand, but when Alexander and his horsemen pressed the enemy hard, shoving the Persians and striking at their faces with spears (xustois), and the Macedonian phalanx, tightly arrayed and bristling with sarisae, was already upon them, Darius, who had long been in a state of dread, now saw terrors all around him; he wheeled about - the first to do so - and fled.

Correct. This is the only time that the phalanx is attested to enter hand to hand battle by Arrian. Against Darius and his Royal Friend cavalry who were forced to retreat being hard pressed both by Alexander and his companions, probably from their left flank and from the rightmost taxis frontally. Their advance practically would force the Persian cavalry around Darius to give ground and Darius would have to retreat giving the appearance of flight even if he didn't plan to flee but only retreat. Masterstroke... The sight of Darius withdrawing on his royal chariot to get away from the infantry, his cavalry would have been able to stand against the companions alone, even if eventually they might anyways break, must have filled those who saw him with terror... and bad news travel fast... It would be a matter of time for the troops to think that their king had left them.

Tactically, no cavalry would stand in front of an advancing phalanx. The Royal Squadron of the Persians could not withdraw in a tactical manner because they had already been engaged by Alexander and so their withdrawal had to be performed in full disorder...

There are a number of points to take from this. We can reject the portrait of a terrified, fleeing Darius as this is contradicted by all other sources (Curtius 4.15.29-31; Diod.17.60.2-3; Plut. Alex.33.4-6)) and represents a tradition in Arrian's sources of portraying Alexander's opposite as a craven coward reliant on massive numbers to achieve anything (see also the Astronomical diaries which clearly describe Darius' army deserting him rather than the reverse).

I personally have always kind of admired Darius and despite the two defeats at Issus and Gaugamela, I find him a very competent strategist and tactician. Both battles were played well by the Persians and the differences observed between the choices he made clearly show that he was a very versatile man who learned from experience and was not afraid to innovate. I cannot say with any certainty whether he did or did not flee from the battle as Arrian describes. Diodorus also has him flee in front of Alexander rather soon.

As for the diaries... I cannot say I find them reliable, maybe they are, maybe they are not. Who knows who reported what to the priests, what tradition ordained regarding how to address events that had to do with the king and of course the text is all too brief. If only we had more Eastern sources to work with...

Yet, as I already stated, I respect Darius and personally believe that after mainly following Arrian's narrative and using Diodorus to juxtapose information, add detail and patch gaps, Darius was forced to withdraw and the units nearby mistook withdrawal for flight. Soon after, flight was the only option left, the lines routed. I think that had the infantry stayed in their positions, Darius would have ordered them to attack the somewhat disordered and partly fatigued Macedonian phalanx and pray for the Gods to save the day as he may have done in 3.14.1. if Arrian uses the term phalanx for the Persian infantry that up till then was uncommitted. If we take him for a coward, then he just snapped and fled. I personally do not think that he was.

Arrian clearly claims that Alexander led his army in column. It was, then, not in battle formation. This column began a rightward advance, commencing with Alexander opposite Darius in the centre. When Alexander turns to attack he is opposite the Persian left advance guard where the hetairoi are assailed by the chariots of that left wing advance guard. His right flank guard is occupied with the Persian left flank cavalry. Though Arrian does not describe it, the army must have deployed from column at the moment of, or just prior to, attack unless "his men" only refers to the cavalry 9which makes little sense to me).

Also, Arrian twice refers to the Persian array as a "phalanx". This is an odd term to use of cavalry.

Not exactly, more like many "columns" and turned squadrons. Alexander first arrayed the line for battle, and not in a customary simple phalanx in 3.12 and then Alexander begins the march towards the right in 3.13. The text is not clear as to who followed this movement but from the appearance of the battle later on I would suggest that all troops followed the movement. How would this be done? By having all infantry units to face right and advance, the first-rankers effectively shielding the left. The right march would also show the Persians the shielded side of the "column". Yet, this was not an ordinary column. It was a face left, advance movement of the whole battle-line that kept its formation and shape. Alexander would be able to keep the march until a part of his army, and especially the phalanx, would be engaged and thus rendered immobile. The first attempt of Darius was to check the rightward movement by driving the Greek cavalry of the Macedonian right away but the attempt proved futile, since the Greeks withstood the cavalry attacks and were not put to flight. Then he committed his chariots, maybe with close cavalry support as Diodorus suggests. Understandably, when necessary, they would face left and form normally. The very fact that the infantry was moving right shows that they (at least till the chariot attack) were not engaged in any hand to hand combat. Then Arrian has Darius advance the whole of his phalanx. The term phalanx could as well be used for cavalry, yet his attack that routed Darius was also made at about that moment and if he indeed left so quickly, then there would anyway be no real time for an infantry battle, and if any did take place, it certainly was not reported unless one would like to support that the enemy that Parmenio is reported to have pursued was infantry since the pezetairoi would be unable to do harm against fleeing cavalry. Yet there is one more thing that I will address next.

At the moment of attack Alexander assaults with the cavalry and "the nearby portion of the phalanx" which attacks bristling with sarisae. This is clearly a concerted attack by the infantry (along with the cavalry) and we can be sure, given the wounded Perdiccas and Coenus, that their taxeis were involved. I cannot see this as a "skirmish" and, given the break in the line, more of the phalanx was likely involved. Peter has misinterpreted the action to the left. The break was not made by the Persians, rather it was made by Alexander's attack. Here the phalanx advances and Simmias, pinned by the Persian counter charge on the Macedonian left, is unable to follow.

That point may be the most interesting part of the battle...

"καὶ ὥσπερ ἔμβολον ποιήσας τῆς τε ἵππου τῆς ἑταιρικῆς καὶ τῆς φάλαγγος τῆς ταύτῃ τεταγμένης ἦγε δρόμῳ τε καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ ὡς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον. καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ὀλίγον ἐν χερσὶν ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο·" 3.14.2.4.

"he made the companion cavalry into a wedge and with the (part of the) phalanx arrayed next to it, he advanced quickly (actually dromo usually means "at a run") and with shouting onto Darius. And after a short time, the battle became hand to hand."

In order to advance any part of the phalanx with him, the phalanx still should have been fully unengaged and prepared. It sounds a great risk to have a phalanx part (however great) run against their opponents, so Arrian either means that they just advanced at a quick pace (for that we have to "stretch" the meaning a bit) or that there was no reason to keep perfect cohesion because the enemy would be cavalry (this for me is certain since Darius would have been protected by the Royal Squaron). Yet, this would also be very risky, for a disordered part of the phalanx would then become very vulnerable to any attack. We know that there was uncommitted Persian horse nearby (at least those that attacked the Greek camp according to Arrian, if we turn to Diodorus now it will become messy...), so unless there was immediate routing of the Persians, there would be trouble. In my opinion, a slightly alternative reading solves these problems. If the "at a run" part is only attributed to the companion charge, since the subject is "he", that is Alexander and "he" is among the companions, and the phalanx followed at its own safe pace. So, the Royal Squadron is attacked first by the companions as goes the narrative, and soon after, maybe 3-5 minutes, the part of the phalanx that was able to follow joins in. In order for this to happen, the companion attack cannot have been performed frontally, else there would be no space for the pikemen unless the companions withdrew, which is not the case. So, Alexander has to have attacked at an angle that would force the Persian cavalry to turn to them and expose their flanks to the attack of the sarrissae. I do not think that anyone would really disagree with that part, it more or less is how most people picture this action.

Yet, now, Arrian, and AFTER he has Darius be put to flight, we have Indian and Persian cavalry ride through some gap that has somehow formed in the line... First, if that gap was created in front of Persian infantry, it would be footmen that would have exploited it. So, again we have a direct hint at cavalry action or even inaction, in front of the phalanx. Second, was it formed through battle? No clue, maybe. If not? A phalanx part would have to have been detached by the phalanx for a gap to have been created... But just lines above we had exactly that. Simmias' taxis had to detach from the phalanx to attack Darius' position. This would of course have formed exactly the type of gap we want, wide enough for cavalry to unmolested gallop through. Can it be that there was another gap? I guess so, but what are the chances of two gaps being created at the same time and why was there no other mention of another exploitation? In my opinion, THIS is the gap through which the cavalry rode. Again, one could make a different reading and support that what Arrian means is that the gap was IN the left wing but this is not the case. The formation that was disjointed can as easily be the whole phalanx and if we accept that there is indeed a fullstop before the "and" this is even more probable.

What is also interesting is that Arrian uses the exact same verb (παραρρήγνυμι) to announce the gap in the Greek phalanx withe the one he used to announce the gap in the Persian lines, the gap that Alexander in his turn exploited to attack Darius. This means that the word CERTAINLY is not used for forceful breach alone.

Ohh.. and just so that I am not misunderstood.. Of course all this has to do with Arrian's account, if we take other accounts into the picture this whole thing cannot stand.

Lastly the tradition in Arrian that Alexander drove for Darius and then chased him is likely wrong. Plutarch, for once, preserves a pertinent piece of battle description when (at Alex 33.3) he describes "Alexander driving the conquered foe towards the centre of their array, where Dareius was". If the Macedonians advanced at hear a 45 degree angle, this is precisely what Alexander will have done: from just right of the Persian left (point of impact) to the centre.

Sorry, I do not understand what you mean here. You do not agree with the tradition that Alexander went straight for Darius? That he chased him after he was put to flight? Or that he chased him through the lines like targeting him?

I well understand fighting in loxe taxis (Paraetecene and Gaza for example). In fact that is exactly how Diodorus describes Alexander's line here (17.57.6) I also well understand what a skirmish is. But, your assertion that this battle is a skirmish is contradicted by Arrian and Diodorus (17.59.1-4) based on your own definition. Arrian clearly describes the battle - after the phalanx engages - as hand to hand.

I would never call the battle of Gagaumela the skirmish of Gaugamela. First of all, skirmish as an English word is used in actions that are fought between relatively small armies. Even in skirmishes we can have melee. This is how we all, as far as I know, use that word when in need to describe certain combat actions. What I only said is that this battle is "practically" a huge skirmishing action with some exceptions. From day 1, for example, I said that the Companions did not skirmish, they attacked with their long xyston. The fact that in some hours of battle, other such instances would also occur is logical and expected. A few accounts of short hand to hand combat? Some that may be implied and could be open to debate? The desperate melee action that was fought in the end of the battle so that the trapped Persian cavalry could escape? Of course there have to have been spells of hand to hand combat. YET, this battle was not fought like most other battles. It was NOT a normal battle with long melee action and phalanxes clashing and staff... It revolves over an effort of Darius to wisely stay out of melee, where he was weakest and hurl as many missiles on the Macedonians (skirmish) as possible. Believe you me we do not disagree here, just read how I now and initially made this comment. It is like saying that the battle of Carrhae was essentially a huge skirmish. Yes, there was some melee action there too. Yes, we and I will always call it the BATTLE of Carrhae. Yet, wtf... it essentially was a great Scythian skirmish... Of course all this is also based on my perspective regarding cavalry action of the era. Those who believe that the cavalry at Gaugamela would fall upon each other with swords and lances and engage in dire hand to hand combat, will understandably NEVER call the cavalry action a skirmish.

I do not think that Badian's understanding of the ancient Greek was "limited". I believe that to be unfounded criticism. The point he is making is that Arrian is not the military historian that modern writers would have you believe. Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrou should not be read as a technical treatise for it does not use terms in a technical fashion. If it did we would have to assume that the Macedonian infantry were "hoplites". What Badian is saying is that if Arian were the expert military historian many would make out then he would utilise technical nomencalture consistently. Instead we have the agema of the hypaspists called somatophylakes, hetairoi, hypaspistae basilikoi to name a few.

Badian is not claiming that the archers are any super weapon. He is saying that Arrian does not realise what he has written, that is that Alexander seriously though to defeat the entire Indian army with cavalry and archers (5.14.1-2):

[Alexander] took only his horse-soldiers, who were 5,000 in number, and led them forward with speed. He also instructed Tauron, the comnunder of the archers, to lead them on also with speed to back up the cavalry. He had come to the conclusion that if Porus should engage him with all his forces, he would easily be able to overcome him by attacking with his cavalry

Also that he can't have the horse archers in two places at once (6.5.5;6.6.1)

Alexander then transported the elephants, the brigade of Polysperchon, the horse-archers, and Philip with his army, across the river Hydaspes, and instructed Craterus to lead them. He sent Nearchus with the fleet with orders to set sail three days before the army started [...] HE then took the shield-bearing guards, the bowmen, the Agrianians, Peithon’s brigade of men, from those who were called foot Companions, all the horse bowmen and half the cavalry Companions...

No writer is free of error (and, yes, I have Bosworth's paper) and Badian's point is that Arrian is not the military historian that modern commentators hold him to be. Arrian likely did not set out to write a technical treatise on Alexander's campaign and so it should not be read as such (unlike his Tactica).

Of course there is no writer free of errors, well.. people in this forum excluded of course... Yet, I dislike Badian's assertive/aggressive style in general and I have often personally found flaws in his understanding of ancient Greek. I do not trust his conclusions and I always double and triple check before accepting them. I also disagree with his remarks about the errors in Arrian in the said article, although, I do agree that Arrian has made mistakes. Yet, his attacks are almost childish.. He says :

The man who -to cite only a few obvious examples- can use the word "somatophylaces" in three different senses, who can contradict himself within a few lines on who led the mounted archers to the junction of Acesines and Hydraotes and who seriously thought that Alexander meant to defeat Porus' forces with cavalry and archers-this man was far from the great military historian of conventional modern encomia.

Now these lines reek of malice and injustice... This is why I hate his style. He could be less aggressive and make his points. Now, he makes you really wanna crush him. See the last one...

"the man who seriously thought that..." Arrian only says that "Alexander thought that..."

What the hell has this to do with Arrian? Since when do biographers not have the right to write : "and then X thought that it was night" during the day? And of course the whole remark is so shallow... there are a number of reasons why Arrian's report of what Alexander was thinking was certainly not baseless, but Badian only conveniently laughs at the very thought...

"The man who can use the word "somatophylaces" in three different senses..." ????? And what about the man who can use the word "balls" in even more? He seriously scolds Arrian for the fact that the word "bodyguard" does not have just one meaning??? Nope... this is not constructive criticism, it is just crappy, self-centered, childish bitching.

Of course there are also more scholarly arguments as to why the comments are flawed but I do not wish to elaborate on this now... enough posting for a day... even for two.

[Paralus]

I cannot say with any certainty whether he did or did not flee from the battle as Arrian describes. Diodorus also has him flee in front of Alexander rather soon.

I disagree. You must remember that Diodorus summarises his source and thus contracts the action. Contracted into four sentences (17.60.1-4) he describes the "crisis" of the battle and, it is clear, his source described a fierce encounter in which Darius did not flee, rather his troops did.

This was a second success for the Persians, and Alexander saw that it was time for him to offset the discomfiture of his forces by his own intervention with the royal squadron and the rest of the elite horse guards, and rode hard against Dareius. The Persian king received their attack and fighting from a chariot hurled javelins against his opponents, and many supported him. As the kings approached each other, Alexander flung a javelin at Dareius and missed him, but struck the driver standing beside him and knocked him to the ground. A shout went up at this from the Persians around Dareius, and those at a greater distance thought that the king had fallen. They were the first to take to flight, and they were followed by those next to them, and steadily, little by little, the solid ranks of Dareius's guard disintegrated. As both flanks became closed, the king himself was alarmed and retreated.

As Bosworth notes (Commentary, VI. 307):

Arrian is isolated here (except for Itinerarium 62). According to Plut. Alex. 33.8, Darius continued fighting until his Persian nationals fell back in disarray on his own chariot. The Vulgate sources go further, describibg an epic hand-to-hand combat in the course of which Darius' driver was killed [...] But if, as Arrian claims, Darius fled at the outset of the Macedonian charge, it is hard to explain why such a small minority of the Persian centre followed their king out of battle (3.16.1). On purely a priori grounds Plutarch's version seems preferable.

As for the diaries... I cannot say I find them reliable, maybe they are, maybe they are not. Who knows who reported what to the priests, what tradition ordained regarding how to address events that had to do with the king and of course the text is all too brief. If only we had more Eastern sources to work with...

One should never dismiss source material which does not fit the hypothesis. It fits quite well with the other literary material; Arrian stands alone in having Darius flee immediately and deserting his army in terror. Much would be unknown were we to consider the Astronomical Diaries, the "Chronicle of the Successors and other tablets unreliable.

Not exactly, more like many "columns" and turned squadrons. Alexander first arrayed the line for battle, and not in a customary simple phalanx in 3.12 and then Alexander begins the march towards the right in 3.13. The text is not clear as to who followed this movement but from the appearance of the battle later on I would suggest that all troops followed the movement. How would this be done? By having all infantry units to face right and advance, the first-rankers effectively shielding the left. The right march would also show the Persians the shielded side of the "column". Yet, this was not an ordinary column.

Pretty much as I see it. Phalanx in normal "marching order", leading off the right (facing to sarissa) and at whatever depth takes your fancy (16). Thus it faces to left for engagement.

Lastly the tradition in Arrian that Alexander drove for Darius and then chased him is likely wrong. Plutarch, for once, preserves a pertinent piece of battle description when (at Alex 33.3) he describes "Alexander driving the conquered foe towards the centre of their array, where Dareius was". If the Macedonians advanced at hear a 45 degree angle, this is precisely what Alexander will have done: from just right of the Persian left (point of impact) to the centre.

Sorry, I do not understand what you mean here. You do not agree with the tradition that Alexander went straight for Darius? That he chased him after he was put to flight? Or that he chased him through the lines like targeting him?

Firstly, we should deal with the Vulgate note that Darius commanded his own left. This plays into the heroic king v king personal combat that the descriptions of both Issus and Gaugamela suffer from. Diodorus (or his source) seems to be reconciling this tradition with Alexander being on his right and Darius in his centre: how can they clash? One transfers Darius to his left.

The important matters here are that Alexander begins his march to the right opposite Darius and the melophoroi (3.13.1). Thus Alexander begins opposite the Persian centre. Alexander (and the ile basilikoi) are the apex of the right (with a refused flank guard). Alexander then continues right until he is just about to leave the prepared area for the chariots . He is now opposite the chariots of the Persian left wing advance guard (3.11.6). After Alexander deals with the chariots of the Persian left (3.13.5-6), he continues to the right. He can be no other place than the Persian left wing (which continues to extend to envelop him). Then he charges. He can hardly charge straight at Darius who he has left well behind in his own centre.

What has been lost in transmission is that which Plutarch preserves: Alexander charged the gap that opened as the Persian left wing extended. My contention is that his line (or "column") had advanced at near a forty-five degree angle (forcing a long charge by Mazaeus on the Persian right). When Alexander "wheels", he faces left and charges the very short distance between himself and the Persian left of centre. With the Companions as the apex, the phalanx (hypaspists included) will have formed the left edge that drove back towards the Persian centre on that angle. As Plutarch (Alex. 33.3-4) says:

...the cavalry charged at full speed upon the enemy and the phalanx rolled on after them like a flood. But before the foremost ranks were engaged the Barbarians gave way, and were hotly pursued, Alexander driving the conquered foe towards the centre of their array, where Dareius was.

[Macedon]

So you disagree with Arrian's account of Darius flight, supporting that he couldn't have fled as soon? Ok, but I fail to see the real difference among the various sources regarding the "timeframe" of Darius' flight. Although in my opinion, as I stated, Darius most possibly tried to withdraw rather than flee, a move that was mistaken for flight causing the rest of the army to disintegrate (no actual sources support my idea -the only hint being Diodorus' account of the false news that led to the center's disintegration-, it is just a hunch I have, based on my personal respect for Darius' abilities), all sources (Diaries excluded, but they actually say nothing helpful, since they offer no description of the circumstances, no details at all) agree that Darius soon took to flight. NONE says immediately upon "seeing" Alexander.

Arrian does not say that Darius fled while Alexander WAS attacking. He says that 1.he was the first to flee - very understandable, considering that the rest of the men around him would fanatically fight for his safety, this was no ordinary cavalry unit and he doesn't speak about the whole Persian army and 2.that he fled AFTER the phalanx arrived. This allows for a short cavalry fight.

Diodorus describes the Royal Friends squadron trying to stop Alexander. Yet, according to him, the uproar produced by the death of Darius' driver caused false news of his well-being, so that the units on his right started to flee, not the Royal Squadron (by the way, the word guard is not in the text. Diodorus says "τῷ Δαρείῳ σύνταγμα κατ’ ὀλίγον παρερρήγνυτο.", which means that the units [syntagma here does not only mean one unit but the sum of forces arrayed "close to" Darius] close to Darius started to present gaps). Seeing that his right flank now was vulnerable as had been the right from the beginning, he was forced to flee. How soon this happened it is not said but Diodorus has the line disintegrating immediately after the javelin-throw, so that doesn't allow for much time. So, embellished with some more details, Diodorus actually does not refute Arrian as to how soon Darius fled.

Polybius adds more details as to the cavalry fight. The Friends of Darius try to fight but are immediately beaten back, they fall upon those left right in front of the King and in full confusion start to flee in panic. This action is also described as very quick with no substantial resistance on the Persian Friends' part as Diodorus asserts. It is the least possible scenario for me, since had the Friends' not covered the flight of Darius with stern self-sacrifice, Darius would have been taken then and there. I do not see them fly BEFORE the King.

The Diaries (IIRC) only say that the King was abandoned... This is not really helpful because it could be interpreted in a number of ways, maybe that later few troops joined in with him, maybe simply that other units fled first -actually complies with all sources-. Who knows?

Bosworth makes another strange remark. He, for some reason, finds it strange that "only" so few of the Persian "center" followed him after the battle... There are so many reasons as to why a unit would not follow him that it is strange to actually find such a thing strange... What is truly peculiar is the fact that infantry is attested to have followed. In order for footmen to follow Darius in his flight, he should not have left in such a great hurry after all, which can only be attributed to Alexander's decision to relieve Parmenio. Why others didn't? According to Diodorus he proved his intelligence by taking another route of flight. He wouldn't have achieved that if he had allowed others to follow him. So, IF we take trust Diodorus, he probably left without brandishing his standard, only informing these elite units of his true intentions. Else, anyone who saw the standard would follow and that would leave a too conspicuous trail for Alexander to follow, rendering the stratagem, as described by Diodorus, simply a failure.

[Macedon]

One should never dismiss source material which does not fit the hypothesis. It fits quite well with the other literary material; Arrian stands alone in having Darius flee immediately and deserting his army in terror. Much would be unknown were we to consider the Astronomical Diaries, the "Chronicle of the Successors and other tablets unreliable.

I probably wasn't clear enough in that post. I am a man who mainly work from primary sources. I love primary sources. The problem is that the said tablets, IIRC, correct me if I am wrong do not offer any details as to what they mean when they say that Darius was abandoned. I commented on that in my previous post too. I wish they were more extant texts. It would be easier to make some kind of conclusion then. I also have not read many accounts of such tablets (maybe a dozen or so), so I do not know what the attitude of the priests towards the established authority was supposed to be. One who has studied the, substantially can enlighten us on whether they did sometimes write things that would "shame" the authority of the Persians or not. I simply do not know personally.

Firstly, we should deal with the Vulgate note that Darius commanded his own left. This plays into the heroic king v king personal combat that the descriptions of both Issus and Gaugamela suffer from. Diodorus (or his source) seems to be reconciling this tradition with Alexander being on his right and Darius in his centre: how can they clash? One transfers Darius to his left.

The important matters here are that Alexander begins his march to the right opposite Darius and the melophoroi (3.13.1). Thus Alexander begins opposite the Persian centre. Alexander (and the ile basilikoi) are the apex of the right (with a refused flank guard). Alexander then continues right until he is just about to leave the prepared area for the chariots . He is now opposite the chariots of the Persian left wing advance guard (3.11.6). After Alexander deals with the chariots of the Persian left (3.13.5-6), he continues to the right. He can be no other place than the Persian left wing (which continues to extend to envelop him). Then he charges. He can hardly charge straight at Darius who he has left well behind in his own centre.

What has been lost in transmission is that which Plutarch preserves: Alexander charged the gap that opened as the Persian left wing extended. My contention is that his line (or "column") had advanced at near a forty-five degree angle (forcing a long charge by Mazaeus on the Persian right). When Alexander "wheels", he faces left and charges the very short distance between himself and the Persian left of centre. With the Companions as the apex, the phalanx (hypaspists included) will have formed the left edge that drove back towards the Persian centre on that angle. As Plutarch (Alex. 33.3-4) says:

...the cavalry charged at full speed upon the enemy and the phalanx rolled on after them like a flood. But before the foremost ranks were engaged the Barbarians gave way, and were hotly pursued, Alexander driving the conquered foe towards the centre of their array, where Dareius was.

Plutarch unfortunately offers the shortest description of the battle. He virtually gives no information as to the evolutions, there is no chariot attack, no description of the arrangements of the two armies and he is unique in having the camp attack take place not just before the battle itself but even before the speeches to the army! See how his haranguing the Thessalians on the left happens after the attack on the camp... He also speaks nothing of any slant or side movement. What is interesting in his description though is that he too had no Persian infantry being involved in battle. The description he makes of the Persian withdrawal only suits to cavalry tactics and the only unit actually mentioned is cavalry. Yet, he does say that Alexander charged "towards the middle" which seems in accordance with what D and A suggest.

As for Darius' post, all sources have him practically in the center don't they? I doubt that Darius intentionally wanted to post himself against Alexander. This would only make sense if he planned to attack him. He already knew that the Macedonian king would be arranged with his maneuverable wedges of companions and that he would probably accompany them in their attack. He posted himself at a point where he thought he would be safe and planned to overwhelm him with his cavalry. By his rightward movement (if we accept that it happened), Alexander actually tried to lessen the numbers of enemy cavalry he would have to fight off before attacking Darius. There were only two options. Darius would either keep the units on his left at their posts and so less troops would attack Alexander or he would detach units and leave himself less protected. He chose the second option making it possible for Alexander to attack him frontally and on the flank (according to Arrian).

Now, regarding the attack of Alexander, I agree that it probably happened at an angle towards the center. This is what is admittedly suggested by the sources. Yet, I do not see the advance happening at an angle. This would disturb the formation, especially a complex one as seems to be the case at Gaugamela. When the cavalry fight began, the squadrons would certainly have moved to whichever direction and at whatever angle necessary, but not the infantry of the line. I generally consider movement at an angle to the frontage of a unit impossible for sizable units let alone formations and I have never seen it suggested in any military manual, even though some re-enactors think it is possible.

[Macedon]

Just looked it up..

"The king, his troops deserted him and to their cities..."

This is the quote in question a line after "Opposite each other they fought and a heavy defeat of the troops [of the king he inflicted..."

As I see it, this particular quote is indeed most possibly covering events after the battle (the "heavy defeat" mentioned above it). Especially since it is further followed by the "to their cities..." part.

Still.. too few to draw conclusions with any certainty, as far as I am concerned.

BTW, maybe a mod could make a new thread of the last posts regarding Gaugamela? We are totally off the OP....

[hoplite14gr]

Sorry Gentlemen but from the army number we went to an analysis of Gaugamela.
I feel a bit lost.

Kind regards

[Paralus]

This is what is admittedly suggested by the sources. Yet, I do not see the advance happening at an angle. This would disturb the formation, especially a complex one as seems to be the case at Gaugamela. When the cavalry fight began, the squadrons would certainly have moved to whichever direction and at whatever angle necessary, but not the infantry of the line. I generally consider movement at an angle to the frontage of a unit impossible for sizable units let alone formations and I have never seen it suggested in any military manual, even though some re-enactors think it is possible.

I'll try again. Imagine the Macedonian line being something like a half to 60% of the Persian battle line. The Persian line is like this text: horizontal. The Macedonian line forms up at a forty-five degree angle (for simplicity). The Macedonian right (apex given its refused right flank guard) is the ile basilikoi. This line then advances at that forty-five degree angle (Arrian and Curtius are clear on this advance to right) until the ile basilikoi is about to leave the area prepared for the chariots. Alexander is now opposite the Persian left and his own left is now far outflanked by the Persian right. The advance, as Arrian notes, happened with Alexander "leading his men in column". When the Persian left has extended itself so far as to provide a gap - which will have been just to the right of the left wing but nowhere near the centre - Alexander "wheels" and charges with the phalanx.

That wheel, if we stick with the forty-five degrees, now sees him drive into the Persian line at ninety degrees to his previous line of advance. In other words, forward and towards the Persian centre which is some distance away. The object is to break and roll up the line towards the centre. The phalanx, advancing in column, faces to shield (left) and advances frontally (obviously at the same angle of attack as Alexander), the result being all moving towards the Persian centre. This is the vignette that Plutarch preserves in his - as usual - poor battle description (such things did not spark his interest).

Personally, I believe the "break" ( at Simmias' battalion) was incidental if it occurred. It may well have been rooted to the spot given the furious attack mounted by Mazaeus on the Persian right. Tactically and practically, Mazaeus' outflanking charge around the outflanked Macedonian left is far, far more logical.

[Macedon]

This would be a way to reconciliate a rightward movement that would simultaneously bring the Macedonians closer but then it would be a bit problematic for the rightmost taxis to first wheel and then attack or first attack forward and at an angle, then wheel to present frontage against Darius and then go on with the attack. I guess that the whole rightward movement for Alexander could have the tactical goal to get the phalangites against Darius whether at an angle or not and I see no reason to deny the possibility of what you propose other than the the fact that it is not mentioned, like so many other theories we produce.

As for the outflank, both accounts seem possible to me, the outflanking maneuver surely sounds more possible if it was pre-planned, Arrian's version would be more possible if the attack was unplanned. I guess this is a conflict that dates to the older primary sources, maybe a Callisthenes vs Ptolemy & Aristobulus thing...

[Lyceum]

Lines can advance at an angle btw with enough training; we know the Indians routinely did this with their horses, as did the Mongolians. IIRC a very sensible textual emendation makes this likely for Alexander too at the Granikos...but I can't really remember the details two years later. So it is possible. Considering how hard they trained too I wouldn't discount it.

As for Persian army numbers well...trying to constitute them from Greek historiographic texts rather than all the wonderful little NE tablets, texts and material evidence we have seems very odd. See the upcoming monograph by Morgan on the Edinburgh press for such things (though not military, more general Greek views)

[Robert Vermaat]

Upon request these posts were split off from the very large 'Army numbers' thread. If more posts need to go here (I won't read them all to determnine that), please inform me.

[Macedon]

Lines can advance at an angle btw with enough training; we know the Indians routinely did this with their horses, as did the Mongolians. IIRC a very sensible textual emendation makes this likely for Alexander too at the Granikos...but I can't really remember the details two years later. So it is possible. Considering how hard they trained too I wouldn't discount it.

As for Persian army numbers well...trying to constitute them from Greek historiographic texts rather than all the wonderful little NE tablets, texts and material evidence we have seems very odd. See the upcoming monograph by Morgan on the Edinburgh press for such things (though not military, more general Greek views)

Hmm... I would like to have some quotes on that. There is no ancient or medieval source that is describing such an evolution in Europe for infantry or cavalry nor one outside Europe that I know of. I personally view it as a definite impossibility for lines of infantry (not single small units) and less so for very trained cavalry that could possibly be trained to somehow change their formation from square to rhombus and back without redeployment within the formation itself. Sources praised the rhombus and the wedge for their maneuverability but this was because of the easier formation turning, not turning of men within the formation. Which Indians did routinely do so? What age? Where did you see something like that described for the Mongols? These would be texts I would REALLY love to get my hands on...

[Sean Manning]

As for Persian army numbers well...trying to constitute them from Greek historiographic texts rather than all the wonderful little NE tablets, texts and material evidence we have seems very odd. See the upcoming monograph by Morgan on the Edinburgh press for such things (though not military, more general Greek views)

The trouble is that we have almost no Achaemenid evidence for army strengths, save for the records of the garrison at Elephantine, the propaganda figures in the Akkadian version of the Behistun inscription, and a few scattered records from Mesopotamia most of which are unpublished and most of which published ones are untranslated. John MacGinnis is working on a book about military service at Uruk which may shed light on things (a fourth book on the Achaemenid army would be a good thing!), but even then that is just one tiny part of the empire. So we are mostly left with Greek narratives and comparative evidence for Achaemenid army strengths.