Late Roman Army during the 5th century

[Nathan Ross]

The Fabricae were not mentioned at all until the late 4th century

Lactantius claimed that Diocletian set up the first armorum fabrica in Nicomedia; John Malalas also notes that Diocletian established fabricae in Edessa, Antioch and Damascus. Papyrii from Egypt suggest one or more arms factories there in c.298. The tetrarchic senator Attius Tertullus is described in an inscription (CIL VI, 1696) as praefectus fabricae, which might also refer to arms factories in Italy.

So it would appear that most of the fabricae in the east were established by Diocletian; those in the west most probably date from Constantine.

[starman2012]

The Army had to increase it's size by approximately 1/3rd when the Sassanid Empire came about in (238?).

The Sassanids came to power in 226 CE and had already fought a war against Rome prior to 238. I don't think there was any increase in the army's size until the time of Diocletian, and it reflected heightened threats in Europe as well, not specifically the Sassanians, who after their midcentury rampage pretty much quited down for years.

That's what caused the collapse of the 3rd century.

It was caused by a number of factors. I don't think the problem around midcentury was a shortage of troops; it was more the ineptitude of emperors like Decius and Valerian.

The loss of africa meant the loss of revenue - Africa produced about 2-3 million Solidi prior to the loss. (3 million solidi would have supported an army of 90000 based on a rate of 30 solidi per annum).

Yep--funny they didn't seem to have anywhere near that many in 410, or when Aetius had to turn to outsiders, the Huns, in the 430s. Not enough citizens seemed to care anymore.

The Empire was faring just fine until they lost africa - prior to the loss of Africa there was still a chance to recover the Empire.

The western Empire was already fatally afflicted by about 408. It just no longer seemed capable of summoning the strength, especially indigenous strength, to maintain its position for long. The loss of Africa marked the point at which the inevitable erosion of the WRE reached a fatal point. It can be likened to an infection reaching a vital organ of some patient too weak to resist.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The Fabricae were not mentioned at all until the late 4th century

Lactantius claimed that Diocletian set up the first armorum fabrica in Nicomedia; John Malalas also notes that Diocletian established fabricae in Edessa, Antioch and Damascus. Papyrii from Egypt suggest one or more arms factories there in c.298. The tetrarchic senator Attius Tertullus is described in an inscription (CIL VI, 1696) as praefectus fabricae, which might also refer to arms factories in Italy.

So it would appear that most of the fabricae in the east were established by Diocletian; those in the west most probably date from Constantine.

Good to know.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The Army had to increase it's size by approximately 1/3rd when the Sassanid Empire came about in (238?).

The Sassanids came to power in 226 CE and had already fought a war against Rome prior to 238. I don't think there was any increase in the army's size until the time of Diocletian, and it reflected heightened threats in Europe as well, not specifically the Sassanians, who after their midcentury rampage pretty much quited down for years.

That's what caused the collapse of the 3rd century.

It was caused by a number of factors. I don't think the problem around midcentury was a shortage of troops; it was more the ineptitude of emperors like Decius and Valerian.

The loss of africa meant the loss of revenue - Africa produced about 2-3 million Solidi prior to the loss. (3 million solidi would have supported an army of 90000 based on a rate of 30 solidi per annum).

Yep--funny they didn't seem to have anywhere near that many in 410, or when Aetius had to turn to outsiders, the Huns, in the 430s. Not enough citizens seemed to care anymore.

The Empire was faring just fine until they lost africa - prior to the loss of Africa there was still a chance to recover the Empire.

The western Empire was already fatally afflicted by about 408. It just no longer seemed capable of summoning the strength, especially indigenous strength, to maintain its position for long. The loss of Africa marked the point at which the inevitable erosion of the WRE reached a fatal point. It can be likened to an infection reaching a vital organ of some patient too weak to resist.

Aetius did not have to rely on hunnic mercenaries - he merely had an edge with them. The Roman Army in the 430s (this is speculative and theoretical though) mainly consisted of The Old Gallic Field Army and many of them were paid as a private retainer cause the government couldn't afford it.

The Barbarians were not a problem - only chieftans had armor and the raids accross the borders were still mostly petty until the Goths came down the black sea. The army's increase was in the East, read Peter Heather's Fall of the ROman Empire and his EMpires and Barbarians, he's the one who proposed the increase in the size of the army to counter the sassanids who were a power ont he same scale as Rome. The Parthians were never a strong nation and Rome rarely had to deal with them on such a large scale. The army was the focus of Rome's economy and the required increse to counter the centralized army of the Sassanids meant inflation, and other factors which led to Economic Collapse. The Rapid transition of emperors somewhat played into it, yes, but many of them were strong Military leaders.

[starman2012]

Aetius did not have to rely on hunnic mercenaries - he merely had an edge with them.

But the Huns were the decisive element in the campaigns of the 430s, against Burgundians and others. If Aetius had no "edge" without them, and evidently, could accomplish little or nothing without them, he definitely relied on them.

The Roman Army in the 430s (this is speculative and theoretical though) mainly consisted of The Old Gallic Field Army...

Speculative and theoretical indeed. What was the matter with those guys--unable to control, let alone eject, barbarians on Roman territory.

The Barbarians were not a problem - only chieftans had armor and the raids accross the borders were still mostly petty until the Goths came down the black sea.

Seaborne gothic raids occurred in the mid third century and were devastating; the biggest battle of the century was fought and won against them in 268. Even after that the gothic menace, and others never went away.

The army's increase was in the East, read Peter Heather's Fall of the ROman Empire and his EMpires and Barbarians, he's the one who proposed the increase in the size of the army to counter the sassanids who were a power ont he same scale as Rome.

It seemed that way around midcentury but not when Diocletian built his defenses. After Edessa, Persia lapsed into weakness. Carus's march to Ctesiphon seemed as easy as Trajan's. Narses was tougher but was no sapor and was beaten. The Strata Diocletiana represented a new approach to eastern security--more preclusive as Ferrill would've put it--but I don't know if it involved significantly greater numbers of men. As the events of c 257-268 showed, the Rhine/Danubian fronts were second to none as potential threats, so I don't think the new, theoretically bigger army was built to counter Persia specifically.

The Parthians were never a strong nation and Rome rarely had to deal with them on such a large scale.

Even long after Carrhae, the Parthians could be very dangerous. The Romans obviously took their threat seriously. Look what happened to Severianus c 161. And while the Sassanids were very formidable from c 252-60, their power also seemed to fluctuate e.g. wane at times. Already in the 260s Odenathus was able to advance deep into their turf with little if any resistance we know about. By 283-284 the Romans (including Diocletian) could've reasonably concluded the worst of the sassanid problem was behind them; it had died with sapor.

The army was the focus of Rome's economy and the required increse to counter the centralized army of the Sassanids meant inflation, and other factors which led to Economic Collapse.

The worst inflation was prior to Diocletian. As Heather notes, there is evidence for robust economic activity even in the late Empire. Provided a region was still under Roman control, it could provide a lot in tax revenue well into the fifth century.

The Rapid transition of emperors somewhat played into it, yes, but many of them were strong Military leaders.

True, I don't believe power struggles were the key issue.

[Robert Vermaat]

You could try and level a charge of the late army finding it hard to recruit, but it is hard to make stick even considering the greater size of the army compared to the early Imperial period.

Goldsworthy raised doubts about the supposedly larger size of the late army.

I’m sure he does, but then I don’t recall that he has sufficient evidence to prove his case for that doubt.

Rather I suspect the charge that it is hard to recruit soldiers is a constant refrain through history, up to and including today.

Compare the Rome of the punic wars with the one under siege in 410 CE. A city of perhaps half a million people couldn't raise enough troops to deal with maybe 30,000.

It can be doubted that Rome was that large by Ad 410, but even so – what use would it be to put spears in the hands of completely untrained citizens, even if the numbers were available? The post-Adrianople period has learned us it took years to rebuild the Roman army, and even that may never have been achieved.

Can this explain a near-total reliance on people from beyond the frontiers? Many people couldn't serve in republican times, prior to Marius (couldn't meet the property qualification) , but republican armies did rather well. :wink:

An unfair comparison – Republican armies also depended for a lot of manpower on non-citizens. Also, the enemies had profited from centuries of contact with the Romans and the formation of political conglomerates – the supertribes. No longer was it enough to send in a legion and a similar number of auxiliaries.

Btw, where did you find that the Empire faced a ‘near-total reliance on people from beyond the frontiers’? During which period? The later 5th century in the West?

There's a difference between foreigners or barbarians making up part of the army and comprising virtually all of it.

Of course, and the latter only happened during the last decades in the West. It was not a symptom.

Rather than a steady decline I see an army developing by the end of the 4th century into perhaps the first “modern” army in the way we understand such terms.

Didn't seem to fare too well for all that. mile:

You can mock it and look upon it with disdain, but then you are obviously forgetting that that same army managed to defend the East for another 1000 years, supported by an age-old military tradition that formed the basis of military treatises for another 5 centuries.

[Robert Vermaat]

The WRE became effete for some other reason(s).

I see no rerason to use such a word. If you mean that the normal citizen could no longer be relied upon to man the walls in a siege, I think that such a situation could be extrapolated back centuries before the 5th c. AD. If you forbid your citizens to carry arms and then create an internal peace for a century ago, the military tradition will suffer and disappear.

[Robert Vermaat]

Goldsworthy raised doubts about the supposedly larger size of the late army.

I'd be interested to know more about those doubts. Granted, army numbers in any ancient source need to be taken with considerable salt, but most sources I've come across seem to accept that the later army (at least in the 4th century) was larger.

It depends a bit on guesswork about unit strengths (assuming we can even find a standard unit size to begin with). If we assume that, on average, the scholae numbered 500 per unit, field army legions 1.000, border legions 3.000, auxilia palatina 800, border infantry units 300 and cavalry units 350, the total of units mentioned in the Notitia Dignitatum yields an army of about 450.000 men.
However, scholars such as Nicasie think this might be seen as a minimum rather than a maximum, to be taken as a more realistic number, as opposed to a 'paper strength'. The establishment strength could even be 650.000 if each cohort indeed was to be 500, and this number is what Agathius gives us for the 4th-c. army: 645.000 (Agath. V.13). Of course, it could well be argued that since each unit may have been understrength at many times during their existance, the lower number would probably be a good guess too.

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Adrian,

To avoid these inconveniences, the young men enlist in the auxiliaries, where the service is less laborious and they have reason to expect more speedy recompenses.'

Another reason to distrust Vegetius - the 'auxxiliaries' were no longer in existance by the time he wrote (whether that was the later 4th or the later 5th c.). These differences between both services no longer applied in the Late Roman army.

I'm not sure I agree with you on this Robert. Auxilliaries are mentioned a number of times in Ammianus, both in the context of auxilia units and also as foreign mercenaries hired for the occasion i.e. the 'Sythian Auxilliaries' with Julian on his Sasanid campaign, the 'Taifali auxilliaries' who Constantius II approached for assistance against the 'Free Sarmatians' and the 'Limogantes', these are just a couple of examples. I am sure I have read in my collection that those who enrolled in the auxilia units were not expected to perform the non-combat roles that the Legiones were expected to perform i.e. building camps and roads. I believe Heather noted that an infantryman in an auxilia unit received higher pay than those in the Legiones, and there was no obligation for your son to serve in the auxilia when you retired.
I agree that the difference between the roles of the legiones and auxila units on the battlefield may have been almost the same by the Late Roman period, not withstanding Vegetius stating that they were best posted on the wings of the Legiones. Auxilia units also appear to have formed the reserve forces at Argentoratum and Adrianopolis.

You’re making two errors.
The first one is Ammianus, who is using a lot of archaizing words that tend to confuse (but see also what Renatus had to say about it). Julian is apparently not fighting the Persians but still the (vanished) Parthians. His troops use no spatha but seem to be equipped with the gladius. Of course neither is the case, but Ammianus’ use of ‘old’ words was apparently chosen to create a ‘learned’ image of an author who had read his ancient sources.
The second one is about the the auxilia in the post-Diocletianic army. Of course the Republican auxilia had lost a lot of their manpower when Caracalla made all free Romans into citizens. But after Diocletian (or probably Constantine at the latest), the old auxilia units no longer exist in that form. Cohorts that were once formed as auxilia were regular units in the Limitanei border troops, but every auxilia unit that we know from for instance the Notitia Dignitatum belongs to a force of newly raised regiments, all with elite status, belonging to the field army. The ‘auxilia’ is also not referring to the old cohorts and alae, but to the ‘auxilia palatina’, elite troops belonging to the personal forces of the Emperor. That’s why some did enjoy a higher status and pay than the regular infantry (including those of the field armies), a status opposite to the auxilia of the Principate, which was ranked lower than the legions.

[Robert Vermaat]

I would argue that the Notitia Dignitatum was an Ideal organization of the Army listing paper strength units; the army itself probably only numbered around 90,000 in the West, and about 12000 in the East (Paper Strength).

You are mistaken.
The Notitia Dignitatum never mentions numbers. Only is we try to add numbers to the units mentioned in the Notitia we can arrive at a total. As I argues earlier, that might be a number of 450.000.

The west fell because of money - the west never had the money to sustain an adequate defense force without help from the Eastern Empire's rich provinces of Egypt and Anatolia.

I think I can agree there, as least that it was one of the main reasons. On the other hand, much money was spent paying short-term federates (as well know, temps cost more) while the ensuing civil wars probably made it impossible to train enough soldiers for the regular army.

[Robert Vermaat]

Aetius did not have to rely on hunnic mercenaries - he merely had an edge with them.

But the Huns were the decisive element in the campaigns of the 430s, against Burgundians and others. If Aetius had no "edge" without them, and evidently, could accomplish little or nothing without them, he definitely relied on them.

I agree with Tim. Having Hun mercenaries at his call meant very much for the political power of Aetius (and explains his reluctance to destry them later). It’s what makes Aetius a warlord, essentially, but it’s comparable to the political power of Galla Placidia, backed by her Visigothic troops.

The Roman Army in the 430s (this is speculative and theoretical though) mainly consisted of The Old Gallic Field Army...

Speculative and theoretical indeed. What was the matter with those guys--unable to control, let alone eject, barbarians on Roman territory.

Elton claimed they were successful wherever they went, but other saw this differently: they controlled only the territory within a two days’ march in any direction. The truth may have been somewhere in between: superior but overextended.

[Nathan Ross]

Ammianus’ use of ‘old’ words was apparently chosen to create a ‘learned’ image of an author who had read his ancient sources.

Yes, he was writing consciously in the 'grand style', as he tells us in his last paragraph. I believe this means he was writing in style of Tacitus, as a deliberate continuator, and so uses the terminology that Tacitus and writers of his day used.

However, while the words might be archaic, I don't think this means that the things referred to didn't exist. All of Ammianus's references to 'auxiliaries' (their higher pay, barbarian origin, exemption from manual labour and hereditary service, etc) are clearly referring to the late Roman auxilia palatina, not the cohorts of the principiate. I think this was the point Adrian was making, actually...

Cohorts that were once formed as auxilia were regular units in the Limitanei border troops, but every auxilia unit that we know from for instance the Notitia Dignitatum belongs to a force of newly raised regiments, all with elite status, belonging to the field army.

Actually, this raises an interesting question - there are a number of cohorts and alae mentioned in the ND as part of the Egyptian garrison that appear to have a barbarian origin - Vandals, Iuthungi, Franks etc. Do we assume that these cohorts were raised on the same principle as the auxilia palatina, perhaps from laeti (and if so, why do they appear to be border troops rather than elite units?), or were they regular cohorts on the old model?

[Robert Vermaat]

However, while the words might be archaic, I don't think this means that the things referred to didn't exist. All of Ammianus's references to 'auxiliaries' (their higher pay, barbarian origin, exemption from manual labour and hereditary service, etc) are clearly referring to the late Roman auxilia palatina, not the cohorts of the principiate. I think this was the point Adrian was making, actually...

Don’t get me wrong, I did not think so either. Adrian and me were discussing Vegetius and his referral to auxiliaries. That’s different from Ammianus discussing them, but I see your point – he may indeed have been discussing late auxilia palatina. I may have been to stern with Vegetius…

Actually, this raises an interesting question - there are a number of cohorts and alae mentioned in the ND as part of the Egyptian garrison that appear to have a barbarian origin - Vandals, Iuthungi, Franks etc. Do we assume that these cohorts were raised on the same principle as the auxilia palatina, perhaps from laeti (and if so, why do they appear to be border troops rather than elite units?), or were they regular cohorts on the old model?

Ah, but although the palatine regiments are said to have been raised from mainly barbarian recruits, that does not mean that every barbarian recruit (or group) automatically ended up in an elite regiment? Limitanei continued to be used, and apparently also new units could be raised as ‘old style’ regiments, at least in some areas.

It’s long been held that the Notitia for Britain was defunct because so many cohorts and alae appeared, yet the same is the case along the Danube and in Egypt. I never noticed these ‘Germanic’ limitanei before, and although we can’t be sure that they were not formed before the 4th century, it might be considered that the ‘old style’ continued a lot longer than we think.

[ValentinianVictrix]

The charge that Ammianus was 'classicising' when using terms such as 'Auxilliaries', 'Cohorts', 'Maniples', 'Gladius' etc can be countered by the fact that he also uses contemporary terms along side them such as 'Spiculum' for spears and 'Veruta' for javelins. And of course it may just well be the case that the older terms were still in regular use, at least by the 'older generation' such as Ammianus would have been when he wrote his history.

As to my point about auxilliaries, there appears to have been two types, the auxilia units raised since Diocletian as 'Auxilia Palatina', which also served alongside other auxilia units called 'comitatensis' and 'pseudocomitatensis', which were probably the older auxilia units serving on the frontiers. The second type were troops hired for the occasion such as the 'Skythians' I mentioned plus Sarmatians and other tribes hired or approached during the 4th Century. These appear only to have served for a specific campaign and generally returned home afterwards. That's not to say that more permanent auxilia units could not be raised from them as the Notitia shows that there were units of both Cavalry and Auxilia raised from the Taifali, there was a auxila unit raised from the Heruli that was brigaded with the Batavi auxilia unit to the extent they both shared the same standards.

[Nathan Ross]

I never noticed these ‘Germanic’ limitanei before, and although we can’t be sure that they were not formed before the 4th century, it might be considered that the ‘old style’ continued a lot longer than we think.

I notice Speidel (in Gallienus and the Marcomanni) suggests that these Germanic units in Egypt were originally raised by Aurelian or Probus from prisoners of war, and were therefore of a lower class than the auxilia raised some time later.