Late Roman Army during the 5th century

[starman2012]

Having Hun mercenaries at his call meant very much for the political power of Aetius

Goldsworthy wrote that, after a string of victories, the Huns were severely defeated at Arelate in 439. I wonder: considering their importance to Aetius, could this setback have emboldened the Suevi in Spain, and Geiseric, to seize Roman territory, notably Carthage?

[starman2012]

there are a number of cohorts and alae mentioned in the ND as part of the Egyptian garrison that appear to have a barbarian origin - Vandals, Iuthungi, Franks etc.

I guess Egypt was a good place to send them--too far from home to expect to return if they mutinied and started plundering.

[starman2012]

Elton claimed they were successful wherever they went, but other saw this differently: they controlled only the territory within a two days’ march in any direction. The truth may have been somewhere in between: superior but overextended.

Where was the old/regular force successful in the 430s? According to Heather, Aetius needed the Huns to defeat the Burgundians, and later the Visigoths. The Bagaudae (NW Gaul) were subdued by a Roman force with Alan allies. Seems the regulars couldn't do anything by themselves. The Bagaudae were just civilians AFAIK, so it may say something about the size or effectivenes of the regular forces that they needed Alans to deal with them. Note that Aetius overcame the enemies one at a time. Why couldn't he just concentrate the "overextended" regular units, instead of relying on Huns?

[starman2012]

I’m sure he does, but then I don’t recall that he has sufficient evidence to prove his case for that doubt.

He made an interesting point: barbarians were able to take over areas, apparently with minimal if any resistance, which in theory were guarded by Roman units (which suggests the units didn't actually exist). North Africa was supposed to be protected by "31 regiments" totalling about 15,000 men, plus 10,000 or more limitanei. These should've been able to deal with a Vandal/Alan force of 20,000 or fewer. But Geiseric doesn't seem to have encountered resistance until he got almost as far as Hippo. Apparently unsure of his strength, Bonafatius must have hoped a long trudge would wear out the Vandals, so he made his stand far to the east. But it still didn't work; they had to send an SOS to the east which sent Aspar. The evidence suggests much of Bonafatius's strength was just on paper.

It can be doubted that Rome was that large by Ad 410, but even so – what use would it be to put spears in the hands of completely untrained citizens, even if the numbers were available?

During various emergencies of the republic, the Romans recruited all kinds of untrained people--even slaves after Cannae. And the slaves won a victory too. mile:

The post-Adrianople period has learned us it took years to rebuild the Roman army, and even that may never have been achieved.

Because by then most people seem no longer willing to serve. Rome had big armies again only a few years after Trasemine and Cannae and revived militarily after the catastrophes of 252-260; Gallienus slaughtered the barbarians at Naissus in 268.

An unfair comparison – Republican armies also depended for a lot of manpower on non-citizens.

Sure, Caesar hired Germans, there were balearic slingers etc. But the difference is that non-citizens then supplemented a strong central core of legions. Whereas in the late empire barbarians became a substitute for regulars.

Also, the enemies had profited from centuries of contact with the Romans and the formation of political conglomerates – the supertribes. No longer was it enough to send in a legion and a similar number of auxiliaries.

I think the republic had it just as tough, with Hannibal, the Teutones, Cimbri, Parthians.

Btw, where did you find that the Empire faced a ‘near-total reliance on people from beyond the frontiers’? During which period? The later 5th century in the West?

By about 400, but exaggerated somewhat. mile:

You can mock it and look upon it with disdain, but then you are obviously forgetting that that same army managed to defend the East for another 1000 years, supported by an age-old military tradition that formed the basis of military treatises for another 5 centuries.

Attila is said to have considered the Roman army of 451 "beneath contempt." As for the east, starting in the late fifth century, it was no longer the same, since reforms are said to have reduced its dependence on mercenaries and barbarians.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The WRE became effete for some other reason(s).

I see no rerason to use such a word. If you mean that the normal citizen could no longer be relied upon to man the walls in a siege, I think that such a situation could be extrapolated back centuries before the 5th c. AD. If you forbid your citizens to carry arms and then create an internal peace for a century ago, the military tradition will suffer and disappear.

Novella Val. states that right was-reinstated in 442 with the increased threat from the Vandals.

I agree with Tim. Having Hun mercenaries at his call meant very much for the political power of Aetius (and explains his reluctance to destry them later). It’s what makes Aetius a warlord, essentially, but it’s comparable to the political power of Galla Placidia, backed by her Visigothic troops.

Aetius ran out of mercenaries after Litorius lost the battle of Toulose in 439 due to his incompetance with hunnic strategies.

Aetius still managed to get enough troops to attack africa in 440, and continued to campaign in gaul in the 440s without hunnic support. The huns were an edge to his power, but clearly the field armies were still somewhat intact.

My best guess would be that the Huns were a cover while he restored the field armies to a point where he would not necessarily need the huns to maintain his power. Also, in 436 and 437 the Burgundians were attacked - the first time Aetius had Attila send a force of huns, the second time he led a Roman Army to defeat and relocate them.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Having Hun mercenaries at his call meant very much for the political power of Aetius

Goldsworthy wrote that, after a string of victories, the Huns were severely defeated at Arelate in 439. I wonder: considering their importance to Aetius, could this setback have emboldened the Suevi in Spain, and Geiseric, to seize Roman territory, notably Carthage?

The suevic expansion was decisively stopped by "a signifigant force of Roman troops" in the 440s by (Vitellus I think the name was) and Merobaudes (who became Magister Militum of Spain.) The Bacaudae there were also surpressed.

[starman2012]

Aetius still managed to get enough troops to attack africa in 440,

There were just preparations; the attack was cancelled when the eastern contingent had to go home to deal with the Huns. Apparently the western force was far from adequate.

My best guess would be that the Huns were a cover while he restored the field armies to a point where he would not necessarily need the huns to maintain his power.

What was taking so long? He needed to Huns to return to power in 432 and still needed them in 439. And one can't use the loss of Africa and money as an excuse for that.

Also, in 436 and 437 the Burgundians were attacked - the first time Aetius had Attila send a force of huns, the second time he led a Roman Army to defeat and relocate them.

The Huns must've done the bulk of the work the first time.

[starman2012]

The suevic expansion was decisively stopped by "a signifigant force of Roman troops" in the 440s by (Vitellus I think the name was) and Merobaudes (who became Magister Militum of Spain.) The Bacaudae there were also surpressed.

According to Heather two Roman commanders, Asturius and Merobaudes, defeated the Bagaudae to regain Tarraconensis, but Vitus in 446, who led a "combined Romano-Visigothic force" to Baetica and Cathaginiensis, was "routed" by the Suevi. "This defeat confirmed the Suevi in their possession of most of the peninsula and once again the bulk of hispanic revenues were lost."

[Robert Vermaat]

I've split off the part about serving in the army from the othr pages, as we're moving on from that topic.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The suevic expansion was decisively stopped by "a signifigant force of Roman troops" in the 440s by (Vitellus I think the name was) and Merobaudes (who became Magister Militum of Spain.) The Bacaudae there were also surpressed.

According to Heather two Roman commanders, Asturius and Merobaudes, defeated the Bagaudae to regain Tarraconensis, but Vitus in 446, who led a "combined Romano-Visigothic force" to Baetica and Cathaginiensis, was "routed" by the Suevi. "This defeat confirmed the Suevi in their possession of most of the peninsula and once again the bulk of hispanic revenues were lost."

I stand Corrected

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The East was only sending ships, not troops. Aetius was supplying the Army.

Again, you must remember that the army does not offcially belong to "the west." It is most likely the army was serving under the payrolls of the Possesores, not the Government. In that case they are called "Bucellarii" (private retainers). The army served on Aetius' payroll and out of loyalty to him. There was still a professional army - it just couldn't be paid by the government anymore. (Also Marcellinus said in a letter to Ricimerus that he had enough troops to conquer italy, and Marcellinus was one of Aetius' benefactors. It's also listed he was the one with the western half of the army invading Africa, and the west supplied like 300 various civilian vessels to carry troops for the invasion of 468. Marcellinus was killed in Sicily by Ricimerus, presumably.)

And what was taking so long was restoring the field armies. Look how long it took after Adrianople - 2/3 of the Army of the East was destroyed (about 80,000-100,000 men if you believe Heather and Goldsworthy's estimates)

@Robert - correct me if I'm wrong but isn't the Notitia incomplete?

Also, I can't remember but I belive the sources list a number of the ships that were being sent in the 440 invasion (The vandals attacked panormus but were repelled that year, and then Aetius arrived in Panormus with his army.)

[starman2012]

The East was only sending ships, not troops.

Then why was the operation cancelled? That only would've been necessary if troops had to go back east, to fight Huns. Ships weren't need for that.
See Goldsworthy How Rome Fell. On pages 329-330 he makes it clear that Theodosius II sent "substantial number of troops" from his eastern army to try to help the west regain Africa.

And what was taking so long was restoring the field armies. Look how long it took after Adrianople - 2/3 of the Army of the East was destroyed (about 80,000-100,000 men

Which must've been largely due to a reluctance to serve by then. It didn't take long to rebuild the army after Trasemene. Or even Cannae--they again engaged Hannibal in 212 and 209 BCE in Italy. I don't think the western regular forces (comitatenses) were ever rebuilt after the desertions of 408. (By 420 they had "regraded' limatanei into pseudocomitatenses but they don't seem to have been effective.) Subsequent campaigns relied heavily on barbarian allies such as the Visigoths in Spain 416-418, the Huns in the 430s etc.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The East was only sending ships, not troops.

Then why was the operation cancelled? That only would've been necessary if troops had to go back east, to fight Huns. Ships weren't need for that.
See Goldsworthy How Rome Fell. On pages 329-330 he makes it clear that Theodosius II sent "substantial number of troops" from his eastern army to try to help the west regain Africa.

And what was taking so long was restoring the field armies. Look how long it took after Adrianople - 2/3 of the Army of the East was destroyed (about 80,000-100,000 men

Which must've been largely due to a reluctance to serve by then. It didn't take long to rebuild the army after Trasemene. Or even Cannae--they again engaged Hannibal in 212 and 209 BCE in Italy. I don't think the western regular forces (comitatenses) were ever rebuilt after the desertions of 408. (By 420 they had "regraded' limatanei into pseudocomitatenses but they don't seem to have been effective.) Subsequent campaigns relied heavily on barbarian allies such as the Visigoths in Spain 416-418, the Huns in the 430s etc.

The Desertion of 408 was approximately 30000 gothic/Amaili/sarmatian Foederati (and probably their nuclear families judging by the size of that number) captured and put into service after the defeat of Radagasius in 406 by stilicho. They weren't the professional field troops (which Constantius III and Gaudentius Aetius had enough of to defeat the Goths and fight the various usurpers in Spain and Gaul, where Gaudentius supposedly died).

EDIT: Also If I can find the source I think there were like 1100 ships the East had sent to help Aetius, detailing that it was enough for 70,000 men and thier horses and supplies or something. If I can get my source on that, 70,000 men is twice the size of the Thracian and Praesentalis 1 field armies, which total would have numbered 30,000. Take into account that the vast majority of horses died when sailing (an example is when symmachus writes how he had 8 prize horses shipped from Spain and 6 (I think) died) and then you have to reduce that total number down to about 15-20000 men from the west left to fill the ships. That alone would equate for most of the Gallic Field army of the time (which was mostly Pseudocomitatenses with a few Core Palatina units most likely, plus private retainers of various roman possesores)

There was indeed a reluctance to serve- it was a reluctance to serve a givernment that would not pay them. That's why the army served the Gallic landlords - they were hosued on their estates and paid. Aetius alone is recorded to have fled to fortresses on numerous estates in 432/433 before going to pannonia.

[starman2012]

The Desertion of 408 was approximately 30000 gothic/Amaili/sarmatian Foederati (and probably their nuclear families judging by the size of that number)

The families were massacred. The army of Stilicho seems to have disappeared after the desertion. Ravenna needed eastern troops; Honorius even called for 10,000 hunnic auxiliaries in 409.

and then you have to reduce that total number down to about 15-20000 men from the west left to fill the ships. That alone would equate for most of the Gallic Field army of the time (which was mostly Pseudocomitatenses with a few Core Palatina units most likely, plus private retainers of various roman possesores)

So the whole western army wasn't enough to stand up to Geiseric--estimates of his army's size were around the same.

There was indeed a reluctance to serve- it was a reluctance to serve a givernment that would not pay them. That's why the army served the Gallic landlords - they were hosued on their estates and paid. Aetius alone is recorded to have fled to fortresses on numerous estates in 432/433 before going to pannonia.

I don't think pay was an acute problem prior to 439 or 440. The Romans had to rely on barbarians, notably visigoths and huns, to do the bulk of their fighting from the 410s to the 430s. They were undoubtedly paid. It appears that few citizens would serve even with pay.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

There is an issue with the usage of the term citizen though - In the 210s or 230s (don't remember what year septimus severus reigned) everyone in the Empire was declared a Citizen.

So Barbarians at the time could technically be Roman Citizens.

And don't forget; there's no such thing as Barbarization. The Romans had been using non-romans since the formation of the senate in 509 BC.

Also, didn't know that bit about Radagasius or the hunnic Auxilia. My knowledge of the 5th century is extensive, but with only memory, notes, a crappy translation of Hydatius and the text of Merobaudes I really can't do much right now.

Also, yeah 80,000 Nuclear families crossed the straits of Gibraltar. So about 15-20K in men. The Gallic field army probably numbered around 10,000, so the Illyrian and Spanish Field Armies probably only added another 15000, all and all I've estimated the Field Army between 439 and 454 to be numbering only around 30,000 men, considering the Loss of Africa and other revenue Issues from almost nonstop combat in gaul and spain.

Spain really wasn't generating much wealth anyways after the Silver mines dried up. That's probably one of the resons Narbonnesis and Arelate were so hotly contested - control of the local silver mines (along with access to mediterranean trade routes)

I think that simply the nonstop warfare ground the army to a hault, although in 425 there were enough men to counter Aetius' army of 60,000 Huns (and nuclear families, so about 10,000-15,00 huns) and there were enough between Bonifatius and Aetius to fight at Rimini (and then Aetius pulled hunnic support to regain power, as it appears the armies annihalated each other considering Aetius suffered his only recorded defeat and the African field army was torn to shreds in the first place.)

Merobaudes does record the success of Aetius leading a Roman Army at mons colubrarius, Hydatius references it too cause both record it to be in 438 and Hydatius mentions 8K in goths were slain in the battle. No record of the huns in that battle and then they were destroyed at toulose. (I belive Hydatius and Jordanes specifically mentions that Litorius attempted to besiege the city with the huns, whom had no knowledge of siege warfare. That's a possibility of where Attila learned his seige tactics for the Balkans campaigns)