Late Roman Army during the 5th century

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Adrian,

The charge that Ammianus was 'classicising' when using terms such as 'Auxilliaries', 'Cohorts', 'Maniples', 'Gladius' etc can be countered by the fact that he also uses contemporary terms along side them such as 'Spiculum' for spears and 'Veruta' for javelins. And of course it may just well be the case that the older terms were still in regular use, at least by the 'older generation' such as Ammianus would have been when he wrote his history.

First of all, ‘cohorts’ is not an archaic term and I don’t think anyone mentioned it.
Second, it’s not a ‘charge’ either. It’s a fact. Nor is it meant to be negative, it’s how many authors worked. It’s only meant to warn modern readers not to take the text of a particular author as being literal proof for the existence of an item or a unit or whatever. Which is what every modern reader must realize when using every ancient manuscript. It’s meant as a negative comment towards Ammianus, who is a great sources. Yes, indeed he used ‘contemporary’ terms too, which is logical as he had first-hand experience. The ‘old’ terms he used not to falsify his account but to create a ‘learned’ image.

As to my point about auxilliaries, there appears to have been two types, the auxilia units raised since Diocletian as 'Auxilia Palatina', which also served alongside other auxilia units called 'comitatensis' and 'pseudocomitatensis', which were probably the older auxilia units serving on the frontiers. The second type were troops hired for the occasion such as the 'Skythians' I mentioned plus Sarmatians and other tribes hired or approached during the 4th Century. These appear only to have served for a specific campaign and generally returned home afterwards. That's not to say that more permanent auxilia units could not be raised from them as the Notitia shows that there were units of both Cavalry and Auxilia raised from the Taifali, there was a auxila unit raised from the Heruli that was brigaded with the Batavi auxilia unit to the extent they both shared the same standards.

Well, that’s the whole point.
The ‘Auxilia’ units from the 4th c. onwards are, as you wrote, indeed totally different from the auxilia units of the Principate. That system, where non-citizens served for decades in the regular army until death or discharge did not exist anymore. You can’t refer to troops mentioned by you as the ‘second type of auxilia’, being mercenaries and other short-timers such as Laeti and Foederati, as ‘auxilia’. They were no longer referred to as such, and it’s creating confusion when we would refer them as if they operated under the same system as the old legions vs. auxilia system. They did not.

No, the comitatenses and pseudocomitatenses are NOT “probably the older auxilia units serving on the frontiers”. The comitatenses are the newly raised units of the field army, the pseudocomitatenses are limitanei units promoted into that class later. The limitanei consisted of what remained of both border legions as well as former independent auxilia units of all types. But the limitanei had for about a century been supplied with the same local recruits, signifying the end of the old system.

I fail to see you interpretation of taifali and Batavi as proof of the continuation of the old system. Both units are clearly newly raised regiments belonging to the new model army, not old-style units. There no longer are ‘permanent auxilia units’. There are permanent units ‘named’ Auxilia, but that’s a different thing altogether. The Batavi were once auxilia, but a) all of them had become citizens during Caracalla’s reign at the latest.

We just cannot take these names literally and pin them down as the origin of the unit. We get in trouble with long-gone tribes (Marcomanni, celtae, Sabini, latini, whatever) or impossible names (Defensores, Scutati) etc. if they were to be taken literally. I'm sure there may be a connection to something in the past of such a unit, but that past may or may not be very distant.

[Robert Vermaat]

there are a number of cohorts and alae mentioned in the ND as part of the Egyptian garrison that appear to have a barbarian origin - Vandals, Iuthungi, Franks etc.

I guess Egypt was a good place to send them--too far from home to expect to return if they mutinied and started plundering.

Yes and no. When belisarius defeats the Vandals he sends the remainder to Persia, and we never hear from them again. But during the 2nd century (I think it was?), a group of 'displaced' German vanquished troops stole ships and sailed them through the Med all the way back to Germany!

[Robert Vermaat]

Goldsworthy wrote that, after a string of victories, the Huns were severely defeated at Arelate in 439. I wonder: considering their importance to Aetius, could this setback have emboldened the Suevi in Spain, and Geiseric, to seize Roman territory, notably Carthage?

Are you sure of the place and the date? I don't know of a battle of Arles against the Huns in 439? Attila only becomes king in 445 and before that, the Huns are Roman allies? It was the Visigoths who were active around Arles around that time I think?

EDIT: ah, you mean the battles of Narbo Martius and Tolosa against the Visigoths. Litorius being captured and killed and all that. I doubt that this meant the end of the Huns as allies of the Romans. There were plenty more where these came from. I rather think that Attila put and end to that alliance a few years later.

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Tim,

Elton claimed they were successful wherever they went, but other saw this differently: they controlled only the territory within a two days’ march in any direction. The truth may have been somewhere in between: superior but overextended.

Where was the old/regular force successful in the 430s? According to Heather, Aetius needed the Huns to defeat the Burgundians, and later the Visigoths. The Bagaudae (NW Gaul) were subdued by a Roman force with Alan allies. Seems the regulars couldn't do anything by themselves. The Bagaudae were just civilians AFAIK, so it may say something about the size or effectivenes of the regular forces that they needed Alans to deal with them. Note that Aetius overcame the enemies one at a time. Why couldn't he just concentrate the "overextended" regular units, instead of relying on Huns?

I think the ‘regulars’ were guarding the borders up to a point, and the ‘allies’ were used to do the dirty work. This was standard Roman strategy by the way, unchanged from the Republic down to the Middle Ages. Why blood your own troops (and weaken them) when you can convince or pay an ally to do it for you? Using the Huns against the Burgundians probably also helped to keep the peace with other Germanic tribes (after all the Romans could maintain that it was not them who attacked the Burgundians – the Nibellungenlied proves that this worked). And Attila’s invasion was of such a magnitude that the Romans army 9which was on it’s last legs anyway) would probably not have been able to handle it alone even if if they had had the resources of a century earlier.
About bagaudae, it’s not that they were civilians, they probably were guerillas – fighting ambushes and hiding in the general population. That’s a hard battle for any army, as every general knows, and preferably not fought by regulars. It involved more counterinsurgency actions than pitched battles, and it wears you down. Theodosius could not defeat Alaric in his marshes a century earlier, and the Alans were probably a better way to do this job than the regulars, who were not without work elsewhere. Plus, as with the Burgundians, it’s better PR to have non-Romans do such a dirty job .
The reason for Aetius’ inability to mass his troops was probably the same reason why this did not work for Stilicho when he did so against Alaric – everywhere he pulled his troops away to mass them in Italy, disaster struck. It took decades to repair most (but never all) of the damage of that action. Aetius could never repeat that.

[Robert Vermaat]

I’m sure he does, but then I don’t recall that he has sufficient evidence to prove his case for that doubt.

He made an interesting point: barbarians were able to take over areas, apparently with minimal if any resistance, which in theory were guarded by Roman units (which suggests the units didn't actually exist). North Africa was supposed to be protected by "31 regiments" totalling about 15,000 men, plus 10,000 or more limitanei. These should've been able to deal with a Vandal/Alan force of 20,000 or fewer. But Geiseric doesn't seem to have encountered resistance until he got almost as far as Hippo. Apparently unsure of his strength, Bonafatius must have hoped a long trudge would wear out the Vandals, so he made his stand far to the east. But it still didn't work; they had to send an SOS to the east which sent Aspar. The evidence suggests much of Bonafatius's strength was just on paper.

I’m not sure which areas he meant, but Africa is not a correct one. True, on paper these numbers were available in Africa, BUT all over the diocese I think, which is such an enormous region that you can’t mass all units and leave the borders unguarded (as the regulars did in Gaul).
Plus, those numbers we know date from AD394 (being the Notitia Dignitatum) and it would be bad science to assume that they were correct a generation later.
Plus, that generation had seen quite a bit of conflict within the Empire, causing all kinds of troop movements, which would at least make it logical to assume that Africa, like Gaul and Britain), would have to send troops for the defense of Italy.
Plus, I think you’ve misunderstood Bonifatius’ plans, because the Vandals seem to have arrived as an invited force to begin with, not as an invasion force to be met by all available Roman forces of the beach. That relation may soon have turned sour, but it might well have prevented any massing the available troops for that part of Africa would perhaps have become impossible with the fox in the hen house. It’s perhaps nice to mention that the traditional date of the Anglo-Saxons in Britain (early dating) is in exactly the same year, also by invitation (Vortigern), also with the same results.
About arming the population:

During various emergencies of the republic, the Romans recruited all kinds of untrained people--even slaves after Cannae. And the slaves won a victory too. mile:

I’m sure that was a jest. Most of these slaves were captured tribesmen, most citizens had served in the military. Times changed.
Adrianople:

The post-Adrianople period has learned us it took years to rebuild the Roman army, and even that may never have been achieved.

Because by then most people seem no longer willing to serve. Rome had big armies again only a few years after Trasemine and Cannae and revived militarily after the catastrophes of 252-260; Gallienus slaughtered the barbarians at Naissus in 268.

That’s because the Roman citizens had military training. That, and the armies back then were smaller than the numbers involved with the late Roman army. Training took a lot more time and that was not available. I think they took the wrong approach by hiring barbarians under their own leaders, but perhaps it was necessary. I have no information from sources that unwillingness to serve was a large-scale problem at any time. At any rate there’s no connection between that and the use of barbarians as regulars.

Sure, Caesar hired Germans, there were balearic slingers etc. But the difference is that non-citizens then supplemented a strong central core of legions. Whereas in the late empire barbarians became a substitute for regulars.

Indeed, and that’s what had a large part in demise of the West. But it was no logical process – the East managed to overcome it. The Roman army, when circumstances allowed, did not come to depend on barbarians permanently.

Attila is said to have considered the Roman army of 451 "beneath contempt."

Pride. His biggest mistake. That same army defeated him a few years later, before he succumbed in bed with yet another bride to an overdose of his own vomit. A real warrior’s death.

As for the east, starting in the late fifth century, it was no longer the same, since reforms are said to have reduced its dependence on mercenaries and barbarians.

Political reforms, yes. But not military reforms – that army operated from the same handbooks.

[Robert Vermaat]

Again, you must remember that the army does not offcially belong to "the west." It is most likely the army was serving under the payrolls of the Possesores, not the Government. In that case they are called "Bucellarii" (private retainers). The army served on Aetius' payroll and out of loyalty to him. There was still a professional army - it just couldn't be paid by the government anymore.

I think you are right about the regular army, but I doubt that the buccellarii of Aetius et al were complete private armies. The boast about conquering Italy may have been right, but it tells us more about the size of the regular army than the possibility – if he had done so, he would have been a usurper of course. So the sate still had some level of control – or rather the guy in power. But I agree, it was already slipping.

And what was taking so long was restoring the field armies. Look how long it took after Adrianople - 2/3 of the Army of the East was destroyed (about 80,000-100,000 men if you believe Heather and Goldsworthy's estimates)

constant attrition, civil wars and maybe just political unwillingness. By the time of the 430s building an army could also mean that your political opponent could use it as a weapon. Hence Aetius’Huns, Galla Placidia’s Visigoths, and the steady rise of private forces. Maybe the system broke down as a result of the combination? From Aetius onwards, there were only rich and powerful patricians with their own powerbase who controlled the West, in constant competition with each other. If we can believe Procopius, regular army units even existed during the early 6th century. But I doubt whether the regular army as an organistaion made in past the 470s.

@Robert - correct me if I'm wrong but isn't the Notitia incomplete?

That’s what’s assumed, yes.
And?

[Robert Vermaat]

So the whole western army wasn't enough to stand up to Geiseric--estimates of his army's size were around the same.

It would be impossible to raise the whole of the Western army, march them off to Africa and confront Gaiseric.

There was indeed a reluctance to serve- it was a reluctance to serve a givernment that would not pay them. That's why the army served the Gallic landlords - they were hosued on their estates and paid. Aetius alone is recorded to have fled to fortresses on numerous estates in 432/433 before going to pannonia.

I agree with Tim – I don't think pay was an acute problem prior to 439 or 440. The Romans had to rely on barbarians, notably visigoths and huns, to do the bulk of their fighting from the 410s to the 430s. They were undoubtedly paid. It appears that few citizens would serve even with pay.

I agree about the pay. The state was not broke at that time, although surely strapped for cash. But the system was crashing – allow barbarians to occupy land and pay no taxes (or reap the benefits from those who still do) and you end up with a shortage which will hamper your ability to either raise those taxes or fight those barbarians (that holds true for modern governments as well). But the Romans probably did not have the ability to see all that (economics is a modern development). I doubt very much that the regular army was loyal to Gallic landlords because these could pay – I think it was more a question of being loyal to a local lord.
Huns and other allies were paid for sure. But there was still a Roman army when Clovis finally took over in AD 486, although we can’t be sure how large it was. I think by that time the ‘unwillingness to serve’ had changed to ‘fight for your own lands’.

[starman2012]

But during the 2nd century (I think it was?), a group of 'displaced' German vanquished troops stole ships and sailed them through the Med all the way back to Germany!

I think that was in the third century--around the time of Probus, IIRC.

[starman2012]

There is an issue with the usage of the term citizen though - In the 210s or 230s (don't remember what year septimus severus reigned) everyone in the Empire was declared a Citizen.

Severus died in 211 CE. Caracalla extended citizenship soon afterwards.

Spain really wasn't generating much wealth anyways after the Silver mines dried up.

It was still deemed worthwhile enough for the campaign of Vitus in 446. Btw it's no wonder Romano-British pleas fell on deaf ears at the time. How could Aetius possibly spare troops for Britain when he couldn't even regain Spain?


I think that simply the nonstop warfare ground the army to a hault, although in 425 there were enough men to counter Aetius' army of 60,000 Huns (and nuclear families, so about 10,000-15,00 huns)[/quote]

Enough of whom? Visigoths?

Merobaudes does record the success of Aetius leading a Roman Army at mons colubrarius, Hydatius references it too cause both record it to be in 438 and Hydatius mentions 8K in goths were slain in the battle.

The army was "Roman" in name; Aetius was using huns against the goths.

and then they were destroyed at toulose.

But not until the following year, 439.

[starman2012]

I agree about the pay. The state was not broke at that time, although surely strapped for cash. But the system was crashing – allow barbarians to occupy land and pay no taxes (or reap the benefits from those who still do) and you end up with a shortage which will hamper your ability to either raise those taxes or fight those barbarians (that holds true for modern governments as well).

A thought experiment: What if Alaric had succeeded in taking North africa 410-411 i.e. what if his fleet wasn't wrecked by storms? (a very lucky break for the Romans!) When would the western Empire have fallen if Africa was already gone by 411?

[starman2012]

I’m not sure which areas he meant, but Africa is not a correct one. True, on paper these numbers were available in Africa, BUT all over the diocese I think, which is such an enormous region that you can’t mass all units and leave the borders unguarded (as the regulars did in Gaul).

I don't think there was any threat in Africa comparable to that facing Gaul, except for the Vandals. Considering what was at stake, they could've massed the whole army, and may have but apparently there just weren't enough. Heather mentioned only four quality field grade units, probably barbarians--goths(?)

Plus, those numbers we know date from AD394 (being the Notitia Dignitatum) and it would be bad science to assume that they were correct a generation later.

From what I've read, the African army was beefed up (with comitatenses) only after 411 or so, when the barbarian presence in Spain raised the possibility of an attack.

Plus, that generation had seen quite a bit of conflict within the Empire, causing all kinds of troop movements, which would at least make it logical to assume that Africa, like Gaul and Britain), would have to send troops for the defense of Italy.

Bonafatius did go to Italy to fight Aetius, but only after he had been clobbered near Hippo.

Plus, I think you’ve misunderstood Bonifatius’ plans, because the Vandals seem to have arrived as an invited force to begin with,

There have been claims that Bonafatiius invited them in, but IIRC Heather dismissed that claim, since Bonafatius wasn't vying with political rivals in 429. It was common for Romans to blame setbacks on alleged treachery.

I have no information from sources that unwillingness to serve was a large-scale problem at any time.

Goldsworthy mentioned evidence for the increased frequency of men cutting their thumbs off to avoid service.

Pride. His biggest mistake. That same army defeated him a few years later

When was that? Previously I mentioned 451--i.e. chalons. Attila told his troops to just ignore the Roman regulars and concentrate on the visigoths, who won it.

[starman2012]

EDIT: ah, you mean the battles of Narbo Martius and Tolosa against the Visigoths. Litorius being captured and killed and all that. I doubt that this meant the end of the Huns as allies of the Romans.

I don't think Aetius used them after 439. He used visigoths in 446 while the Huns were threatening the east.

[Robert Vermaat]

A thought experiment: What if Alaric had succeeded in taking North africa 410-411 i.e. what if his fleet wasn't wrecked by storms? (a very lucky break for the Romans!) When would the western Empire have fallen if Africa was already gone by 411?

Interesting. Alaric died of course, but had he lived, perhaps the Goths would have made in an impact there.
However:
It would have meant that Gaul was still fully Roman.
It would have meant that Spain was beset by Alans, Vandals and Sueves.

Very interesting. Maybe a fully Roman Gaul would have made it possible to free Spain after some time, and prevent the Vandals from going to Africa. I don't know how a Gothic Africa would have been different from a Vandal Africa (alliances, raiding, prosecution of catholics) and if the Romans would have been in better shape to retake it sooner.

No idea how this would have influenced the Roman struggle for Italy. The strulle between Gaul and Italy for power might have been very different. Maybe even Britain would have been rejoining the emoire, who knows...

[Robert Vermaat]

I don't think there was any threat in Africa comparable to that facing Gaul, except for the Vandals. Considering what was at stake, they could've massed the whole army, and may have but apparently there just weren't enough. Heather mentioned only four quality field grade units, probably barbarians--goths(?)

Of course there was. Africa is so much larger than Gaul. The entire desert frontier had to be protected. Berbers were giving a lot of grief, Blemyans, a few more.. If you read later comments it was ever more difficult to protect the small towns, and the army finally retreated into the cities along the coast.
Where do you get the evidence for the composition of those units? Goldsworthy guessing away?

From what I've read, the African army was beefed up (with comitatenses) only after 411 or so, when the barbarian presence in Spain raised the possibility of an attack.

Please share where you read that, because as far as I know we have no actual information about the composition or strength of any 5th century field army or border force after the Notitia Dignitatum.

Plus, that generation had seen quite a bit of conflict within the Empire, causing all kinds of troop movements, which would at least make it logical to assume that Africa, like Gaul and Britain), would have to send troops for the defense of Italy.

Bonafatius did go to Italy to fight Aetius, but only after he had been clobbered near Hippo.

I meant before that, when Alaric ran amok in Italy. We have no information about troop strengths in Africa post-400. Bonifatius most likely took more troops with him to fight Aetius. He won, but for the mere insignificant as well as boring little detail that he died from his wounds after the victory.

Plus, I think you’ve misunderstood Bonifatius’ plans, because the Vandals seem to have arrived as an invited force to begin with,

There have been claims that Bonafatiius invited them in, but IIRC Heather dismissed that claim, since Bonafatius wasn't vying with political rivals in 429. It was common for Romans to blame setbacks on alleged treachery.

I disagree with Heather. The event takes place in 428, when Sigisvult is sent against Boniface in Hippo. The Vandals as his allies would have been similarly effective as the Huns backing Aetius. It all goes wrong (déjà vu back to Stilicho, who ALMOST managed to ally himself with Alaric against Constantine III) and the Romans close ranks.

I have no information from sources that unwillingness to serve was a large-scale problem at any time.

Goldsworthy mentioned evidence for the increased frequency of men cutting their thumbs off to avoid service.

If you haven’t noticed by now, I’m not much impressed by Goldsworthy as a historian for the Late Roman period. He much into guesswork and overstatements. In this case, a few laws are all he needs to see ‘increasing evidence’. No-one was actually counting thumbs, plus it’s not a movement that continues throughout the 5th century. So I respectfully disagree with mr G.

Pride. His biggest mistake. That same army defeated him a few years later

When was that? Previously I mentioned 451--i.e. chalons. Attila told his troops to just ignore the Roman regulars and concentrate on the visigoths, who won it.

Oh that’s cheap. Ignore the Romans and give the glory to the Visigoths who were later clobbered at Clermont by Ecdicius and just 18 cavalry. Of course this victory was won by Roman arms. Attila’s boast is typical and makes that even more apparent.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The Records show that Aetius harrassed Attila in the 452 campaigns, which combined with Disease and Lack of Food, proved quite successful. It also reports MArcian was leading an Army and Sending re-inforcements to Aetius so he could take Attila head on in battle.

The Roman Army at chalons is recorded by Jordanes to sound rather quite professional - judging by the wording they formed a Fulcum (Foulkon, as recorded by the Strategikon) at the top of the hill and let the Gepids and Huns charge into their spears.

Also, the Huns focused on the Alan center, when that broke Aetius and Theodoric came in on either side - the weakest section of the army was placed in the center on purpose. The Battle would have become one-fronted again if the Romans had been "swept aside" if they were as weak as attila claims. Clearly the ability of the romans and Goths to drive off the Gepids and Ostrogoths, and then come in from the flanks on attila was what haulted him at chalons. I've spent months looking for the site of the battle on Google Earth and may have found it. Either way - the Roman Army was clearly strong enough to defeat Attila, and Theodoric wouldn't have joined Aetius' coalition if he had thought otherwise.

I also would theorize about great Britian - Germanus of Auxerre had gone in 429 and it's likely Aetius sent him back in 446 to secure their support for his power and against the Hunnic threat.

The Britons in Amorica quickly became loyal after the Romans and Alans led a joint-expedition there in 435.

Also Mr. Vermaat is right - Aetius defeated them at Narbo in 437, Mons Colubrarius in 438, and then Litorius drove the Hunnic Auxillaries to disaster at Tolosa in 439, while Aetius left to deal with the Vandal threat as is recorded by both Hydatius and Merobaudes.