The Dacians: Rome\'s Greatest Enemy?

[diegis]

I'd say the Parthians remained at the top, and overall I think it's a Tie between the Sassanid Persians and the Hunnic Empire.

Goths and Vandals probably did more damage overall. They broke the back of the West.

Well, Goths was at least partially Getae/Dacians but they (and Vandals, Huns etc) come later, at the time when Roman empire passed its peak of power (which was reached during the Trajan and the "five good emperors" period) and was heavily affected by the third century crisis, epidemics and especially endless internal strugles for power, economic problems, split of the empire and such

[Nikanor]

Rome's greatest enemy in political terms had beem Carthage - the only city that could amass such big overall armies as Rome could in the Mediterranean of the 3rd BC century. In military terms, the kingdom of Macedonia was the most difficult opponent Rome ever faced: they had won alredy the overwall war even before 200 BC when the 95% of Greek navies were one way or another already allied to them, including Minor Asian Greeks of Pergamos, Rhodes, Athens, then even neighbouring Thessalians while others including Epirots were so convienently neutral, all that all while facing the break-out of core-Macedonian tribes such as the Orestes (tribe of Parmenion...) who became Roman allies. On top of that, Rome alone could mobilise from Italy on the overall more than 250,000 men while the Macedonian kingdom could hardly amass 45,000 troops on the overall... including the traitor Companions...

What else would Romans need to win the tactical military side of war? How many years? 1,2,3 years? 10 years? Mercy!!!

... in reality it took Rome 6 to 7 decades (and generals suffering nervous breakdowns years after...) to really apply full rule over the overall of north Greece, numerous forgotten lost battles, managing eventually to win over 2 major battles only thanks to a combination of use of allied local Aetolian light hoplites as well as being based on the pre-prepared treason among the aristocrats of the Macedonian cavalry.

... evidently because Roman legions, despite their numbers and supposed valor were not up to the task themselves, facing a superior enemy, albeit in tactical military only terms (cos if we talk about diplomacy the picture is inversed...).

Just to put the time/ressources comparison:
In comparison, Cyrus the Great would had conquered all of Eurasia in the same time of 6-7 decades with less than the overall Roman army. Alexander the Great would had conquered Eurasia, Africa and America in that time and with less than half the overall Roman army!

Apart from the Macedonian kingdom, it had been the Partho-Persians the ones who proved the worst nightmare for Romans. By far the most difficult though Romans eventually learnt how to fight them (by abolishing the legion system and establishing more Persian-like military structures). The northern tribes such as Goths and Vandals became a problem only when more Goths and Vandals were manning the Roman army than those on the raiders' side. It is like the fact that you can't expect to fight sunni muslims with sunni muslims as a majority in your armies, can you? You must at least get those shia ones. Romans did not. Goths and Vandals cannot be measured under that light. Goths and Vandals seemed like minor annoyance gone big due to inner Roman ongoing politics. If, for example, compared to the later mighty Bulgarians who moved concentrated forces on average 3 to 4 times bigger and who were almost as well-armed as the Eastern Roman army, Goths and Vandals look like a bunch of villagers - who can forget that after Alarich's unexpected success in raiding Greece (due to Roman complacent politics), Alarich's demand was to... arm his army with weapons (i.e. what they had done so far then they had done it half-naked - more of a moving circus than a proper army).

Rome in the 3rd c. AD had it easy for too long to be able to resist even to such minor annoyances. Inner politics is always the reason behind but then the Empire never really fell. It just got rid of its half, that constituted however only the 15% of its economy back then. The Empire finally fell some 10 centuries later to its worst enemies: its own banking oligarchies finding their way to the fiscal paradise of Venice.

[starman2012]

... at the time when Roman empire passed its peak of power (which was reached during the Trajan and the "five good emperors" period)

Debatable. I recall Ferrill wrote "..the army of Septimius Severus was as effective as the army of Trajan."

..and was heavily affected by the third century crisis, epidemics and especially endless internal strugles for power, economic problems, split of the empire and such

Bad as the mid third century was, the Empire rebounded and still seemed strong down to about late 4rth/5th century. The 5th century West certainly looked weak, but for reasons unrelated to most of the above.

[Nikanor]

(Deleted for having been pasted on wrong discussion! Apologies!)

[Nikanor]

Again as said, these are facts coming from other ages but it is always good to keep them on the back of our heads when trying to analyse periods that are lesser known.

As some analysts have noted - our perception of ancient and medieval armies is very distorted by our modern experiences and by the "wipe-out" of the last 500 years in which land-based warfare was dominated by the abandonment of armour and the wide use of gunpowder and in naval warfare by the abandonment of oars and the use of sails, the abandonment of fire-based weapons and the use of canons.

Certainly sail-ships went on average faster than oar ships in ideal conditions. But of the Atlantic, the Indian and the Pacific Ocean. Not of the Mediterranean! It is outstanding that with all the development of the sea-faring techniques and ships travelling the oceans, no western European power ever fared into the Mediterranean no matter if this was ruled by the Ottomans (who new little of ships, mostly employing forced-Greek labour) or the Barbary pirates (who from being camel riders learnt overnight their trade!). Spain struggled and France too, occasionally reaching to raid Algers but not yield any effective control but that was all about it - all while Barbary pirates managed to raid themselves and get in 200 years about 2 to 3 million slaves from Spain, France and Italy (when England, Holland, Flemish, France, Spain and Portugal managed to buy some 10 to 12 million slaves from western African slave-master tribes from the whole western Africa). Nobody ever mentioned it but that had to do something with the oceanic vessels as these were developed and their inability to compete in the Mediterranean which was ruled by smaller agile vessels (in the lack of use of oared vessels, given the lack of use of fire-weaponry and the employment of the potent canons).

Similarly, muskets were a most powerful infantry weapon compared to all other, all while canons were the most powerful weapon overall. But its almost-instant adoption by all was hiding other elements such as the higher mobility (to transport armies from the one end of the world to the other) and the massive reduction of costs. It is not the same cost to gather 10,000 villagers, given them 10,000 muskets, train them in 1 week how to shoot and send them to battle with maintaining 10,000 professional soldiers training in the cross-bow or the English long-bow or dressing them in clibanarii or (worse!!!) cataphract panoplies!!!

However, taking out the cost-effectiveness factor, the sad reality is that up to the advent of steam-powered ships as well as the advent of machine-guns (i.e. we talk already post-1850s) there is practically no post-gunpowder army that would tactically (i.e. on a battlefield) fare well against ancient and medieval armies. Similarly no navy of the 15th-early/19th century would ever stand easily against the Eastern Roman one or the Arab medieval ones.

At some point, at least in specialist editions, we need to address the fact that "progress" is a very complicated process that does not move in a straight line to the front. Let us remember, that the first British-made machine gun advertised itself as the next best thing in military after the longbow. Not after the arquebuse, nor after the musket.

[Frostwulf]

@Nathan Ross
Sorry for my late reply, but life gets in the way :-)

It should be said that we have no actual evidence of the composition of the force that Fuscus led into Dacia, except that it apparently included units of the praetorian guard. Neither do we know for sure that an entire legion was lost. Tacitus (Agricola 41.2) mentions 'so many armies lost through the rashness of their commanders', which is vague. Dio (68.9.3) mentions a single standard (not an eagle) recovered by Trajan (although I seem to remember the Column shows an eagle...). Suetonius mentions a legion lost to the Sarmatians c.92, but nothing about one lost to the Dacians earlier.

Placing V Alaudae in Moesia, or in Fuscus's army, might seem convenient but is not necessary. It still remains very possible that were destroyed or disbanded after 69/70 (Ritterling and Brian Jones believe so, among others). IIII Flavia were likely still based in Dalmatia until c.86. Fuscus's force most likely involved elements of the legions of the still-united Moesia: VII Claudia, V Macedonica and I Italica, perhaps with vexillations from elsewhere.

I will not disagree with what your saying, much of conjecture on the parts of historians. That being said there can be ways of reasonably determining which units may have been used, as you have done. Regardless it seems very unlikely that much if any over two legions were used by Fuscus because of the arrangements in the area. Blanchard has his reasoning:

Fuscus had two options for the 86 CE campaign. He could advance immediately with the VII Claudia and V Alaude or wait for the millarian cohorts from the I Italica and the V Macedonia to reinforce his column. Stationed at Oescus, the V Macedonia some 325 km away and the I Italica was stationed at Novae some 400 km away. It would take perhaps six to seven weeks, without any complications to mobilize the millarian cohorts from these legions and march them to Viminacium. The effectiveness of both of these legions was doubtful given that both were responsible for the demoralizing and disgraceful defeat in 84 CE and had campaigned aggressively with Fuscus in 85 CE. Perhaps by 86 CE elements of the I Adiutrix and the IIII Flavia were available to participate in the campaign of Fuscus. The arrival of the II Adiutrix in Moesia did not occur until after the Fuscus’ campaign. However, the IIII Flavia was engaged in the construction of a fortress near the Pannonian border at Singidunum and the I Adiutrix reinforced the dangerously undermanned Pannonian limes and was stationed at Brigetio. These legions may well have provided Fuscus vexillations, but certainly neither legion participated in the upcoming campaign with its full compliment.
Fuscus had two options for the 86 CE campaign. He could advance immediately with the VII Claudia and V Alaude or wait for the millarian cohorts from the I Italica and the V Macedonia to reinforce his column. Stationed at Oescus, the V Macedonia some 325 km away and the I Italica was stationed at Novae some 400 km away. It would take perhaps six to seven weeks, without any complications to mobilize the millarian cohorts from these legions and march them to Viminacium. The effectiveness of both of these legions was doubtful given that both were responsible for the demoralizing and disgraceful defeat in 84 CE and had campaigned aggressively with Fuscus in 85 CE. Perhaps by 86 CE elements of the I Adiutrix and the IIII Flavia were available to participate in the campaign of Fuscus. The arrival of the II Adiutrix in Moesia did not occur until after the Fuscus’ campaign. However, the IIII Flavia was engaged in the construction of a fortress near the Pannonian border at Singidunum and the I Adiutrix reinforced the dangerously undermanned Pannonian limes and was stationed at Brigetio. These legions may well have provided Fuscus vexillations, but certainly neither legion participated in the upcoming campaign with its full compliment.

Perhaps. Alternatively, perhaps both expeditions - Fuscus and Julianus - were intended as punitive campaigns, rather than attempts at conquest. Domitian himself accompanied neither force, which he may well have done if he expected the complete subjegation of Dacia. But we will never know for sure...

Once again I will agree with you that this could be a possibility, but it seems more likely that more was involved:

Despite the derision of contemporary observers, all writing after the fact, it is clear that Domitian’s Suebic-Sarmatic wars were the necessary preliminaries to an intended military settlement of the Dacian problem. And such a settlement was required, to avenge the defeats of Sabinus and Fuscus and to escape the crippling subsidies agreed with Decebalus for his neutrality after the debacle of 89, which included large sums of money ‘as well as artisans of every trade pertaining to both peace and war’. In the event, Domitians never resumed hostilities against the Dacians, perhaps because intermittent warfare with the Suebi continued for another five years. Pg.31

The victory at Tapae was not followed up by occupation and annexation of Dacian territory. This may never have been part of Domitian’s plan, but even if it had been there was a hiatus at this stage of the Danubian wars. It is suggested that the preparations were under way at the end of 88 for the continuation of the war in 89, but before the army could take the field, or the Emperor himself could take any action, he had to deal with the revolt of Saturninus in Upper Germany. Pg.101

[Frostwulf]

Sorry it took so long to reply diegis.

What i want to point out is that Romans suffered heavy losses and not just that Domitian already bring lots of troops near Dacian frontiers (i think around 8 legions based along Danube from Panonia all along Moesia)

Pannonia had an increase from 2 to 4 legions, that was not from the Dacians but from the Suebi(Marcomanni,Quadi) and Sarmatians.

The number of legions in Pannonia had grown from the original two to four, and Domitian did nothing to diminish that number. This is significant when it is remembered that no other province held more then three legions. Pg.108

Yes the Romans suffered heavy losses, but not just by the Dacians!

but Trajan bring other two and form another two for those wars. This beside the very numerous auxiliar troops and iregular troops raised just for these wars (like German mercenaries showed on the Column half naked and armed just with clubs).

Karl Strobel is one of those who mention numbers as 175,000 Roman soldiers strong army assembled by Trajan in the war zone area

Yes "in or on the flanks" of the war zone which would include, Pannonia, Dalmatia, etc. etc. not just the war zone itself. Did you read the next paragraph about "heady stuff" and "in great need of proof"? Again this certainly could be possible, but this does not present the amount that went into the war zone. I think Nathan Ross came up with a good figure, a little less the Leper and Frere but possibly more then J.Bennet. Of course no need to go into this part again, as I have seen nothing new since our previous discussion(an enjoyable discussion at that).

Both Domitian and later Trajan did take troops from other frontiers and from all over the empire for these wars. The conquest of Caledonia is halted and Agricola and his troops are called back for ex. Legions from Orient, Britania and Germania (alongside Germanic mercenaries, probably bring both as "cannon foder" and to weaken the possibility of troubles in Germania) was bring in by Trajan.

This show the emergency and importance of this confrontation, with the risk of weakening the Parthian and German borders.

Yes after the Fuscus ambush some troops were sent for the Dacian war:

The scenario thus forming is that Domitian drew extra troops for the Dacian war from Britain, which measure rendered it imperative to abandon Scotland. This may have occurred as early as the winter of 86/7, not long after the loss of Fuscus and his army in Dacia. Pg.73

But also note, that units were taken from Britain at other times:

It is but a short step to the conclusion that Agricola’s sixth season belonged to 82, that Domitian was collecting troops in 82 for the Chattan war fought in 83, and that he took a number of men from at least one of the legions of Britain. Pg.71

Strobel assigns the vexillations to the expedition against the Marcomanni and Quadi. This would place the special command and the withdrawal of troops from Britain in 89, long after Agricola’s campaigns.

Yes this wasn't as urgent as the upcoming front against the Dacians, but what was the reason for making a treaty with the Dacians as opposed to the Marcomanni? Remember the Dacians had just been heavily defeated by the Romans (Tetius Julianus), the Marcomanni had not. Decebalus had been asking for treaties(real ones this time) and perhaps the Marcomanni and Sarmatians were not after defeating the Romans.

Domitian, then, visited Moesia for the first time in 85, immediately after Oppius Sabinus’s defeat (expeditione... in Dacos... prima, Oppio Sabino oppresso: Dom. 6.1) refusing to accept peace overtures from the Dacians and ultimately sending Fuscus out against them (Dio 67.6.3-5). Pg. 139

And the danger posed by Dacians, if we look at the very few ancient mentions preserved today (beside Tacitus who was already mention and who talk about Roman armies lost to Dacians):

Excellent quotes, one of the reasons I enjoy debating with you. But here is the question, what is "large" in terms of men? When Augustus lost 3 legions to the Germani, was he not lamenting of this huge loss? "Varus, give me back my legions!". No where does it seem in any of those quotes equaling the loss of three legions lost by Varus, which is why Fuscus may have had a large force, but it was around 2 legions.

Then Romans was forced to pay a tribute to Dacians, who kept anyway the captured battle standards and war booty, plus receiving lots of money from the empire, and engineers and military instructors which allow them to profesionalize even more their army, in Roman style, including the construction and use of "artilery" as scorpions, balistae or catapults as its seen on Trajan Column

To avoid a two front war this is what he did, but according to both Southern and Bennet, Domitian was getting ready for another thrust into Dacia, that is until problems arose:

Despite the derision of contemporary observers, all writing after the fact, it is clear that Domitian’s Suebic-Sarmatic wars were the necessary preliminaries to an intended military settlement of the Dacian problem. And such a settlement was required, to avenge the defeats of Sabinus and Fuscus and to escape the crippling subsidies agreed with Decebalus for his neutrality after the debacle of 89, which included large sums of money ‘as well as artisans of every trade pertaining to both peace and war’. In the event, Domitians never resumed hostilities against the Dacians, perhaps because intermittent warfare with the Suebi continued for another five years. Pg.31

I wont answer the rest of you post, as we have had this discussion before, though as I said a very interesting discussion. But I will give you this reminder, Tettius Julianus heavily defeated Decebalus and his Dacians at Tapae with around 4 legions, there is no reason for Trajan to need more then that.

I did forget one other thing, I do agree that the aux. troops were used to spare "citizen blood", but it should be noted that the aux. troops did the majority of the fighting and therefore the majority of the winning. Spiedel points out the club men in particular on Trajans column.

[diegis]

Sorry it took so long to reply diegis.

Salve Frostwulf. Thats OK, i dont have much time either, and my answer now will be rather short

Yes the Romans suffered heavy losses, but not just by the Dacians!

Mostly by Dacians

Karl Strobel is one of those who mention numbers as 175,000 Roman soldiers strong army assembled by Trajan in the war zone area

Yes "in or on the flanks" of the war zone which would include, Pannonia, Dalmatia, etc. etc. not just the war zone itself. Did you read the next paragraph about "heady stuff" and "in great need of proof"? Again this certainly could be possible, but this does not present the amount that went into the war zone. I think Nathan Ross came up with a good figure, a little less the Leper and Frere but possibly more then J.Bennet. Of course no need to go into this part again, as I have seen nothing new since our previous discussion(an enjoyable discussion at that).[/quote]

Dalmatia? This mean Illyria, is not the flank but the back of the front so no need to protect it, against who?. Panonia wasnt a big problem either, there was the Yaziges, Roman clients and allies. In fact the reason why they was supposedly brought there was to make a buffer zone and a kind of early alarm system for Panonia, in case of DAcian attacks.

Not to mention that the second war between Trajan and Decebalus started having as official reason the attack of Dacians in Panonia and the conquering of some Yaziges teritories. Romans considered this the reason for war, a war expected anyway by both sides and the reason why Dacians conquered those Yazigi teritories (and which Trajan refused to give back to Yaziges after the war) was to secure his flank.

Most of Roman troops bring by Trajan was more then probably used for invasion of Dacia, leaving behind just garrisons to secure the cities and bases from Moesia. We know that because when Dacians counterattacked in the winter of 101/102 in Moesia those troops left there was unable to resist and was needed that Trajan himself with an important part of his invasion army to retreat and fight back the Dacian "counter-invasion" army from Moesia, that threatened his logistic bases there.

So, even if Strobel exaggerate a little (i dont think however that he exaggerate), is surely not by much if we consider the number of legions used (12-14) the auxiliar troops (close as number, if not a bigger number) and the iregular/mercenary troops raised just for this wars.

This mean that the army used by Trajan for invasion was probably over 100,000, maybe 150,00 as i saw other estimates, and the battle of Tapae was one of the biggest in ancient times.
Tere are couple books and articles (Stefan, Everet Wheeler etc. dont have time to search for them now) that talk about the extraordinary fortification system of Dacians, including huge towers erected in mountains and used as artilery platforms. This fortified mountains was very hard to conquest, it was a fantastic realization by Romans, thats a letter of Pliny the Young talking about this

<<It is an excellent idea of yours to write about the Dacian war. There is no subject which offers such scope and such a wealth of original material, no subject so poetic and almost legendary although its facts are true. You will describe new rivers set flowing over the land, new bridges built across rivers, and camps clinging to sheer precipices; you will tell of a king driven from his capital and finally to death, but courageous to the end; you will record a double triumph one the first over a nation hitherto unconquered, the other a final victory.
—Pliny the Younger: Letters (Book VIII, Letter 4: To Caninius Rufus)>>

Yes after the Fuscus ambush some troops were sent for the Dacian war:

Fuscus wasnt quite ambushed, i think Dio Cassius said he was surprised, which may imply he and his army didnt expected the apparition of Dacian army nor the development of the battle

Yes this wasn't as urgent as the upcoming front against the Dacians, but what was the reason for making a treaty with the Dacians as opposed to the Marcomanni? Remember the Dacians had just been heavily defeated by the Romans (Tetius Julianus), the Marcomanni had not. Decebalus had been asking for treaties(real ones this time) and perhaps the Marcomanni and Sarmatians were not after defeating the Romans.

Domitian, then, visited Moesia for the first time in 85, immediately after Oppius Sabinus’s defeat (expeditione... in Dacos... prima, Oppio Sabino oppresso: Dom. 6.1) refusing to accept peace overtures from the Dacians and ultimately sending Fuscus out against them (Dio 67.6.3-5). Pg. 139

Who said that Dacians was heavily defeated? Dio Cassius or some Roman authors, same people that talk about large armies destroyed by Dacians and same authors who refused to write about the Roman losses. How was heavily defeated if Tetius Iulianus retreated imediatly after the battle?
Presumably (according with the same Dio Cassius) scared by the aparition of new Dacian army, but which was actually just trees cut at human height and dressed in armors and with weapons put on them to look as soldiers from the distance.
I dont know why but this sound kinda fishy to me. I mean, really, if they just scored a big victory and tried to march further in Dacia they didnt dare to send at least some scouts to see whats about with that new Dacian army?

Excellent quotes, one of the reasons I enjoy debating with you. But here is the question, what is "large" in terms of men? When Augustus lost 3 legions to the Germani, was he not lamenting of this huge loss? "Varus, give me back my legions!". No where does it seem in any of those quotes equaling the loss of three legions lost by Varus, which is why Fuscus may have had a large force, but it was around 2 legions.

Good God my friend, are you serious? How the heck 2 legions is a "large force"? Tacitus, Dio Cassius, Paulus Orosius, Jordanes, all talk about large armies, large forces etc. I know we disagree about Germans vs Dacians but this is a bit hilarious to believe thats a "large army" or a "large force". (btw, i will send you or post here an article of Guy Hallsal about Germanic migrations and barbarians etc).

I usually saw 5-6 legions for Fuscus, i think even Sabinus had more then 2 legions.

To avoid a two front war this is what he did, but according to both Southern and Bennet, Domitian was getting ready for another thrust into Dacia, that is until problems arose:

Domitian resolved the problem with both Marcomani and with Saturninus in Germania by 89 i think. And he was assasinated in 96. Plenty of time to attack again Dacia or at least to end the payment of the tribute.
In fact, Marcomani wasnt any threat for the empire, Domitian just wanted to punish them because they didnt followed him in the war against Dacians. They asked for peace twice before to be attacked. The problem with them was resolved in 89 i think, and the problem in Germania was resolved same year, by some local governors there without Domitian even reaching there.
So he have at least 6 years to attack again Dacia or at least stop the tribute, which he didnt, as Nerva didnt either and continued to pay that tribute during his reign.
It was just Trajan that stopped that and started imediatly the preparation for war, for 3 years

I wont answer the rest of you post, as we have had this discussion before, though as I said a very interesting discussion. But I will give you this reminder, Tettius Julianus heavily defeated Decebalus and his Dacians at Tapae with around 4 legions, there is no reason for Trajan to need more then that.

Again, thats a little hilarious to say that Trajan used just 4 legions, no offence. Not to mention the double standards used, like Tettius Iulianus victory considered a great one and in the same time downplaying or ignoring the writings of same Roman authors who talk about large armies lost, legions lost, large forces lost etc.
And we know from Orosius that Roman authors agreed eachother to not talk much about the Dacian wars of Domitian and the extent of Roman losses. This may come just from one thing, it was too humiliating for Romans and badly affected their pride. You know that Latin words, "verba volant, scripta manent"? Thats what they did in this situation

Trajan with 12-13 legions (you can say with 8-10 legions if you wish) needed one year in both wars to reach Sarmizegetusa, the Dacian capital, failling to obtain a decisive victory in first war. Is laughable to think that Tettius Iulianus with 4 legions not just that defeated the Dacian army but was able to push to conquer the Dacian capital

The problems with some (many) historians who dealt with the subjects, as i saw them, are that quite many (fortunately not all) Romanian historians are in awe/veneration for Romans and naturally downplay the Dacians as much as possible. In the same time some (again, fortunately not all) foreign historians inspire from them about this subject or are in awe of their own "barbarians", meaning Celts or Germanics, so downplay or not give many attention to other "barbarians".

Thats why primary sources are sometime most trustfull then some modern interpretations

[Frostwulf]

Hello again diegis.

Mostly by Dacians

Depends of the time frame, if your looking at the 80's, then most likely, we don't know how many troops were lost to the Marcomanni during this one time. If your looking prior at the 70's or 90's, you need to look to the Suebi once again and to the Sarmatians(Rapax).

Tere are couple books and articles (Stefan, Everet Wheeler etc. dont have time to search for them now) that talk about the extraordinary fortification system of Dacians, including huge towers erected in mountains and used as artilery platforms. This fortified mountains was very hard to conquest, it was a fantastic realization by Romans, thats a letter of Pliny the Young talking about this

I skipped the first part about numbers because it will be addressed later. For this part I don't doubt this except the artillery platforms didn't exist until after 89, if your saying before that, you will need to provide source material. As for Stefan(interesting article) and Everet Wheeler(Did you see what he said about the Gothic culture and how it simultaneously existed with a Dacian culture?)the were good articles from the most part that I read(its has been about 6 months since I skimmed them).

Fuscus wasnt quite ambushed, i think Dio Cassius said he was surprised, which may imply he and his army didnt expected the apparition of Dacian army nor the development of the battle

I can't recall where they received their information from- Tacitus, Oros,Juv,Suet,Jord, the Ha,etc, etc. But the ones I have read say these things:

The Emperor Domitian decided to restore order and organized defenses on the basis of an Upper and Lower Moesia. The following year General Cornelius Fuscus crossed the Danube and was marching on Sarmizegetusa, when he was killed in an ambush and his army massacred. pg.10-11

There are others who write about the same thing or can be inferred by and also the previous links I posted. There is more to this then just Dio.

Who said that Dacians was heavily defeated? Dio Cassius or some Roman authors, same people that talk about large armies destroyed by Dacians and same authors who refused to write about the Roman losses. How was heavily defeated if Tetius Iulianus retreated imediatly after the battle?
Presumably (according with the same Dio Cassius) scared by the aparition of new Dacian army, but which was actually just trees cut at human height and dressed in armors and with weapons put on them to look as soldiers from the distance.
I dont know why but this sound kinda fishy to me. I mean, really, if they just scored a big victory and tried to march further in Dacia they didnt dare to send at least some scouts to see whats about with that new Dacian army?

Blanchard for one, then there are these for not continuing on:

Shortly after, news reached Rome of Julianus’ victory over the Dacians at Tapae, only the lateness of the season preventing him from pressing home the advantage. Domitian took his fifteenth and sixteenth imperial salutations at the end of the year, and with the gateway to the Dacian Basileion stormed, could reasonably look forward that winter to outright victory in the coming season - only to be distracted from achieving his aims once again, this time by an insurrection fomented by L. Antoninus Saturninus, army commander of Moguntiacum (Mainz) and Upper Germany. Pg.29

It is suggested that Julianus based himself at Viminacium when the time came to enter Dacia, since this is the gateway to the heartland, leading to the Dacian stronghold of Sarmizegethusa. This would lead him across the Banat- on the same route that Trajan followed in 101- leading to Tapae on the south-western edge of Transylvania, where the final battle was fought, a victory for the Romans. Little is known of the details of the preliminaries of the battle, or the troops involved. The Dacians were soundly defeated, but not eradicated. Dio describes how Vezinas, next in rank to Decebalus, pretended to be dead and later escaped. The story continues with the bizarre description of how Decebalus cut down trees and placed armour on the remaining stumps so that the Romans would think they were warriors and withdraw, instead of attacking the royal residence. Nothing more is known of the fighting, save the decorations won by a centurion of II Adiutrix may have been won during the campaign. The battle of Tapae may have been fought too late in the year to pursue the Dacians right into their capital. Domitian had recieved two further Imperial salutations by September 88, and another by October, reaching a total of 17. Julianus probably thought it prudent to avoid pursuing the campaign in hostile territory in winter and Domitian may have approved or advocated plans for another attack beginning in the following spring. But before the victory could be followed up and the coup de grace delivered, another rather more immediate problem had arisen. Pg.100

Good God my friend, are you serious? How the heck 2 legions is a "large force"? Tacitus, Dio Cassius, Paulus Orosius, Jordanes, all talk about large armies, large forces etc. I know we disagree about Germans vs Dacians but this is a bit hilarious to believe thats a "large army" or a "large force". (btw, i will send you or post here an article of Guy Hallsal about Germanic migrations and barbarians etc).

Well from the quote you posted here:
<< Eutropius, Book VII, 23
"Oppius Sabinus, a man of consular rank, and Cornelius Fuscus, the praetorian prefect, were slain with large armies by the Dacians." >>
Eutorpis says here that both Oppius Sabinus and Cornelius Fuscus were slain with large armies. Well lets see what large army is attested to by these authors:

Strobel argues instead for summer 85, and reconstructs a timetable which takes into account Domitians’s two Imperial salutations between September 85 when he was still IMP IX and February 86, by which time he was IMP XI. According to Strobel’s argument, Diurpaneus crossed the Danube in June 85, Oppius Sabinus mobilized V Macedonial from Oescus and I Italica from Movae, met the Dacians and defeat simultaneously, and news of the disaster reached Rome in July. Domitian and Fuscus mobilized an pushed the Dacians back by October, resulting in two Imperial salutations at very close intervals in September and October 85. At the same time, Domitian became censor for life. Pg96

In 84 CE Oppius Sabinus, Governor of Moesia, moved an army into the Dobrogea region to counter a threat by the Dacians, which had once more crossed the Danube. With the I Italica and a strong vexillation from the V Macedonia along with a collection of auxilia, he met the Dacians near Novae and was destroyed.

So according to these authors about 2 legions is what Oppius Sabinus had. According to Eutropius, Oppius Sabinus had a large army, which again is about 2 legions. So yes 2 legions is a large army!

I usually saw 5-6 legions for Fuscus, i think even Sabinus had more then 2 legions.

Wikipedia used to say 5-6 legions, they have since changed the article. The only other place I saw 5-6 legions(I at one time was mistaken as well about the 5-6 legions)was at the UNRV article, which has a few differences then do Southern,Blanchard,Bennett and Jones. UNRV article is not referenced nor does it explain where Fuscus could have gotten his 5-6 legions. Where could he possibly get that many legions?

Domitian resolved the problem with both Marcomani and with Saturninus in Germania by 89 i think. And he was assasinated in 96. Plenty of time to attack again Dacia or at least to end the payment of the tribute.
In fact, Marcomani wasnt any threat for the empire, Domitian just wanted to punish them because they didnt followed him in the war against Dacians. They asked for peace twice before to be attacked. The problem with them was resolved in 89 i think, and the problem in Germania was resolved same year, by some local governors there without Domitian even reaching there.

Again, not according to the professionals:

Despite the derision of contemporary observers, all writing after the fact, it is clear that Domitian’s Suebic-Sarmatic wars were the necessary preliminaries to an intended military settlement of the Dacian problem. And such a settlement was required, to avenge the defeats of Sabinus and Fuscus and to escape the crippling subsidies agreed with Decebalus for his neutrality after the debacle of 89, which included large sums of money ‘as well as artisans of every trade pertaining to both peace and war’. In the event, Domitians never resumed hostilities against the Dacians, perhaps because intermittent warfare with the Suebi continued to occupy his armies. That, at least, can be inferred from the lack of even an ovatio over the Suebi, and an active state of war against them seems to have continued for another five years.
Pg.31

In the last years of Domitian’s reign, then, there was a notable concentration of forces on the middle Danube. Five legions in Pannonia, numerous auxiliaries in Upper Moesia (presumably to deal with the possibility of intervention from Dacia) and vexillations from legions normally stationed outside the province assume a foe, not Dacia, but the Germani et Sarmatae. Appropriate senior appointment and transfers were made. Attention was paid first to the Sarmatians and later to the Suebi. By October 97 it was all over. Pg155

As the two above authors pointed out, Domitian couldn't continue his assault on the Dacians until the Marcomanni/Sarmatians were taken care of. As I have shown you in other quotes, Domitian had intention to attack Dacia but was unable to until he took care of the Marcomanni situation first. He was unable to in his lifetime to take care of the Germani et Sarmatae.

So he have at least 6 years to attack again Dacia or at least stop the tribute, which he didnt, as Nerva didnt either and continued to pay that tribute during his reign.
It was just Trajan that stopped that and started imediatly the preparation for war, for 3 years

I don't know much about Nerva, but where did you get that he started preparing 3yrs in advance? According to Bennet the policy of building defensive and logistical support "should the need arise".

Again, thats a little hilarious to say that Trajan used just 4 legions, no offence. Not to mention the double standards used, like Tettius Iulianus victory considered a great one and in the same time downplaying or ignoring the writings of same Roman authors who talk about large armies lost, legions lost, large forces lost etc.

I didn't say Trajan used 4 legions, I was merely pointing out the Tettius Julianus was able to crush the Dacians with around 4 legions. That being the case it's not likely that Trajan would need more(though I do believe the Dacians were stronger at this point due to improvements and the best fighter of the Dacians being the Roman deserters). Also as pointed out above, the large armies were about 2 legions.

Trajan with 12-13 legions (you can say with 8-10 legions if you wish) needed one year in both wars to reach Sarmizegetusa, the Dacian capital, failling to obtain a decisive victory in first war. Is laughable to think that Tettius Iulianus with 4 legions not just that defeated the Dacian army but was able to push to conquer the Dacian capital

I agree with Bennett(pg.88) and Goldsworthy of 9 legions. Moving men through that territory takes time, just like Tettius Julianus. The professionals I have read say that Trajan was being cautious and moving a good amount of men takes time.

"A slow and methodical advance, consolidating as they went, was characteristic of the Roman army; and with the memory of Fuscus' defeat still fresh in their minds, Trajan and his generals were doubly wary of being caught unprepared. Trajan's balance of grand strategy and tactical purpose, a more effective method than the rapid movement and shock tactics used by the impetuous Domitian and his generals, is emphasized on the Column. pg.92

Note, that is was not 1 year, but 1 campaign season, there is a difference. There is also no reason to assume that Tettius Julianus given more time could not have put an end to Decebaulus. He had already defeated him and given the time would have chased him to his capitol and taken it.

As for the number of legions is of no account. Did Domitian really nead 50,000-60,000 men to conquer the Chatti whom he had taken by surprise? That many men for one tribe(haven't seen any other tribe mentioned other then Chatti), would be hardly needed. What of the 12 legions against Maroboduus and the Marcomanni? Do you think it would really take that many legions to win? Of course not, it was overkill just like for Trajan and the Dacians. Tettius proved that victory could be attained over the Dacians with about 4 legions, for further conquest a few more men may be needed.

The problems with some (many) historians who dealt with the subjects, as i saw them, are that quite many (fortunately not all) Romanian historians are in awe/veneration for Romans and naturally downplay the Dacians as much as possible. In the same time some (again, fortunately not all) foreign historians inspire from them about this subject or are in awe of their own "barbarians", meaning Celts or Germanics, so downplay or not give many attention to other "barbarians".

You mean Romanian historians like Lica:

It is well-known that the Getae and the Dacians were reputed for their military value, to which one could add the recollection of their joining Pompeis’ party.

pg.98(21)

At the end of three difficult campaigns, during which the Dacians fought with a bravery matching their reputation, Decebalus had to ask for peace.

pg.201
Georgescu, Chrisan,Berciu,Haraszti,Pascu,Grumeza, etc. etc. who say about the same thing as Lica? Have you even bothered to read their books? I already know the answer is no, because you would hardly be saying that if you had!

Thats why primary sources are sometime most trustfull then some modern interpretations

Hence part of the problem, you only take what you like from the classical authors(Jordanes for instance) and you simply haven't read all the other classical authors which pertain to the said events, like the professionals have(at least for the most part.

[Nathan Ross]

So yes 2 legions is a large army!

It is. If we can assume an equal number of auxiliaries (not certain, but a good bet), then the force could number 20,000. No paltry number of men.

Besides, a provincial governor, in normal circumstances, could only command the legions based in his own province. Oppius Sabinus ruled a united Moesia, so had four legions at his disposal - but he was surprised by a raid across the Danube and would probably only have been able to summon two of them at most to meet the threat.

Fuscus, as an equestrian, was officially not permitted to lead legions at all! Quite possibly his army was made up of vexillations of a number of different legions supported by praetorian cohorts. Alternatively, given a special command, he could have led the two legions of Moesia Superior with detachments of others. Tettius Julianus was governor of the (divided) Moesia Superior, so had two legions - but his army, again, probably included strong detachments of others.

If these seem small, it's worth comparing them to other attested non-imperial field forces of the period (attested in sources, that is, not modern conjecture): Varus in Germany in AD9 had 3 legions, Germanicus had 4 (although 8 at his final battle), Plautius invaded Britain with 4, Corbulo had 3 plus a vexillation in Armenia in AD58, Paulinus had 1 plus a vexillation against Boudica in AD61, Vespasian had 4 in Judea, Paetus led 2 into Armenia, Agricola led a maximum of 4 into north Britain (although he only had c.20,000 men with him at the final battle), Arrian planned to lead 2 against the Alans, and so on. 2-4 legions appears to have been quite the norm for provincial offensive operations. If the emperor himself was in charge, of course, the number could increase - but few reliable sources I can find mention more than 8-10 legions total.

[diegis]

Hello again diegis.

Salve Frostwulf, and sorry i dont have time to answer you too detailed

The Emperor Domitian decided to restore order and organized defenses on the basis of an Upper and Lower Moesia. The following year General Cornelius Fuscus crossed the Danube and was marching on Sarmizegetusa, when he was killed in an ambush and his army massacred. pg.10-11

I will like to see a primary source talking about an ambush, not some modern interpretation, because such interpretations i can do myself too

It is suggested that Julianus based himself at Viminacium when the time came to enter Dacia, since this is the gateway to the heartland, leading to the Dacian stronghold of Sarmizegethusa. This would lead him across the Banat- on the same route that Trajan followed in 101- leading to Tapae on the south-western edge of Transylvania, where the final battle was fought, a victory for the Romans. Little is known of the details of the preliminaries of the battle, or the troops involved. The Dacians were soundly defeated, but not eradicated. Dio describes how Vezinas, next in rank to Decebalus, pretended to be dead and later escaped. The story continues with the bizarre description of how Decebalus cut down trees and placed armour on the remaining stumps so that the Romans would think they were warriors and withdraw, instead of attacking the royal residence. Nothing more is known of the fighting, save the decorations won by a centurion of II Adiutrix may have been won during the campaign. The battle of Tapae may have been fought too late in the year to pursue the Dacians right into their capital. Domitian had recieved two further Imperial salutations by September 88, and another by October, reaching a total of 17. Julianus probably thought it prudent to avoid pursuing the campaign in hostile territory in winter and Domitian may have approved or advocated plans for another attack beginning in the following spring. But before the victory could be followed up and the coup de grace delivered, another rather more immediate problem had arisen. Pg.100

The story continues with the bizarre description of how Decebalus cut down trees and placed armour on the remaining stumps so that the Romans would think they were warriors and withdraw, instead of attacking the royal residence.
This is the phrase that need to look at a bit more deeply, and which i consider is no more then Roman propaganda.
If Domitian received an Imperial salutation by September 88 it means that the battle was already fought by then, and the news reached Rome in late August or September. The winter seasons here start in late November lets say, with 1st December being considered the begining of winter
However, Tapae is at maybe two days of walk from Sarmizegetusa. Why do you think Tettius Iulianus, achieveing such a great victory and eliminating a big part of Dacian army and having his way open to the Dacian capital, just turned around and retreated back in the empire? Still having some two months maybe until the winter will come?

Most logically is that Tettius Iulianus advanced by surprise and meet some local Dacian troops (probably from garrisons in that area), gathered in a hurry by Vezina, second in comand after Decebalus, and who was probably left to protect the area. Decebalus, who usually comanded the army wasnt even present. Romans scored a tactical victory (not without suffering too losses) against that hastly assembled (and rather very small) Dacian army who fight to delay their advance and then retreated before to face the main Dacian army which probably started to gather coming from all over Dacia, under Decebalus comand.

This was enough to empower Domitian vanity who get an Imperial Salutation soon after.
Then Domitian, instead to go against Dacia to finish the business after that, switched against Marcomani. The reason isnt at all that Marcomani was some danger for Romans, but because (Dio CAssius book http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Ro...o/67*.html

<<7 1 Domitian, wishing to requite the Quadi and the Marcomani because they had not assisted him against the Dacians, entered Pannonia with the intention of making war upon them; and he put to death the second group of envoys which had been sent by the enemy to propose terms of peace.>>

Basically Domitian tried to find a weaker oponent to win over and score some successes for himself too. He knew Dacians are too strong so he just found a whatever reason to attack Quadi and Marcomani, who not just didnt threatened the Romans but send too couple envoys to ask for peace. Actually Domitian did same thing with Suebii, when he get the throne and conquered some region in Germania, it was something more symbolically, to show he is a good comander.

Choosing an convenient adversary (not too weak, but not too strong either) was the best way to do it, before to advance to harder ones (same thing as in professional boxing if you wish, when the "new hope" for the belt isnt throw from the begining against the champion or the stronger adversaries, but start with smaller names to get experience, make a name and get self thrust)

If he would be that bend on to eliminate Dacians, and thought thats possible, he would just invade them, as Quadi and Marcomani wasnt in any situation to attack the empire.

Btw, about the peace proposal coming from Dacians, those sound like this (from same Dio Cassius)

<<5 Decebalus, the king of the Dacians, was making overtures to Domitian, promising him peace; but Domitian sent Fuscus against him with a large force. On learning of this Decebalus sent to him an embassy anew with the insulting proposal to make peace with the emperor, on condition that every Roman should elect to pay two obols to Decebalus each year; otherwise, he declared, he would make war and inflict great ills upon the Romans. >>

Interesting thing is that probably Romans accepted at the end that insulting proposal and paid to Dacians about 1% of total empire revenues.

In a sort of modern alternative history comparation was something like this:

Lets say that US for ex. in the 50'-60', had Mexic invading Texas, burning the cities there, destroying US army they find there, killing the governor and the general in charge etc. Then, US president himself arrive there, bringing troops from Vietnam, Korea (abandoning the wars there), and he manage to drive out the mexican army, and send the highest rank general of the country, with quite a big army, to invade Mexic and punish the attack. But, he is killed too, his army defeated quite bad, first division of US marines is pretty much destroyed and its flag is captured.
Then US attack again by surprise, win a tactical battle and then quickly retreat back to US. Then the president instead to prepare another attack in Mexic give the order to attack Cuba, because they didnt joined him in the war, but is defeated there too.
Then, after previously refused the insulting peace offers coming from Mexican president he hurry to ask him for peace. This one doesnt even bother to come to sign the peace and send just the prime-minister to meet the US president. Peace is signed, US agree to pay huge amounts of money to Mexic (something like 2000 $ for each american citizen), send engineers to build them tanks and aircrafts, and instructors to show them US military style, and mexican companies are allowed to come free in US and make any bussines freely, without to be bothered by IRS. The flag of that division who was captured is not returned, nor most of the war booty and even prisoners.
Then, US president celebrate his victory at Washington, dressing some poor canadians and cubanese refugees in mexican uniforms and show them as they are mexican prisoners and from the national treasure he took lots of money to make gold statues of him everywhere in US.

This is the appropiate comparation with what happened betwen Domitian and Decebalus back then. And even more, Romans was more proud and we can say even racist compared with Americans, when it comes about their glory, preeminence in the world and views and comparation with "Barbarians".

So i think is more clear now why Roman historians of that era prefered to keep silence, as Paulus Orosius said. And probably why even a rather small victory as that of Tettius Iulianus was presented as such a big one, and the number of Roman losses wasnt mentioned at all, except something like "large armies, large forces, legions lost" etc

So yes 2 legions is a large army!

I agree with Bennett(pg.88) and Goldsworthy of 9 legions. Moving men through that territory takes time, just like Tettius Julianus. The professionals I have read say that Trajan was being cautious and moving a good amount of men takes time.

Gosh my friend, if 2 legions is a large army, then 9 legions is an imense, almost incomensurable army. Dont forget quite few other historians talk about 12-14 legions.

So please allow me to consider the 5-6 legions hypotheses more appropiate of "a large army"

About moving cautious, i agree, but keep in mind that the distance from the Danube to Sarmizegetusa can be covered in maybe one week of walk (maybe even less, Legionars marched up to 40 km per day, but here is about a mountaneus area were is harder to march).
And Trajan needed up to a year to reach there, in both wars, 101-102 AD and 105-106 AD

It is well-known that the Getae and the Dacians were reputed for their military value, to which one could add the recollection of their joining Pompeis’ party.

pg.98(21)

At the end of three difficult campaigns, during which the Dacians fought with a bravery matching their reputation, Decebalus had to ask for peace.

pg.201
Georgescu, Chrisan,Berciu,Haraszti,Pascu,Grumeza, etc. etc. who say about the same thing as Lica? Have you even bothered to read their books? I already know the answer is no, because you would hardly be saying that if you had!

Trust me, i do read quite few history books here. Is not that they dont present DAcians/Getae as reputed for their military qualities. Is that many exaggerate Romans and so can't pass over an invisible border (which i think shouldnt exist) when comparing the two, and are mostly Romanophiles and dont want to "denigrate" too much the Romans

[Frostwulf]

It is. If we can assume an equal number of auxiliaries (not certain, but a good bet), then the force could number 20,000. No paltry number of men.

Besides, a provincial governor, in normal circumstances, could only command the legions based in his own province. Oppius Sabinus ruled a united Moesia, so had four legions at his disposal - but he was surprised by a raid across the Danube and would probably only have been able to summon two of them at most to meet the threat.

So, presumably, the emperor went back to the Danube c. August 86. Immediately, he divided the province into two, retaining Cornelius Nigrinus in Lower Moesia (to the east) and, for Upper Moesia (to the west), moving L. Funisulanus Vettonianus from Pannonia. pg.141

Most authors represent the measure as an immediate response to the invasion, rather than a considered precation put into effect before the Dacian crossed the river. The division may have been put into effect in 84/85, or 85/6. Strobel and others date the creation of the two provinces to 86, as part of the reorganization after the disastrous loss of Fuscus and his army but there is no firm dating evidence. pg.94

Regardless it seems that according to what I have read it was 2 legions used. Blanchard says Sabinus left with a collection of auxiliaries, which to me denotes nothing large or equaling of the legionnaires numbers. This being the case we have to remember some were left behind for garrison and other duties.

Cf.J.C. Mann, Legionarry Recruitment and Veteran Settlement During the Principate (1983), 54-5. Even in times of peace, a legion with a nominal strength of 5,000 could expect to lose an average of 200 ment per year through the expiration of their period of service, while as much as 66 per cent of any army unit could be unavailable for duty at any one time because of illness, detached duties, and the liek: J. Bennett, "The Setting, Development and Function of the Hadrianic Frontier in Britain' (1990), 91 and 486-7. pg.232

As to the exact number, just like in most of these cases its up to interpretation,Strobel tends to max out his numbers and Blancard tries to make educated guesses.

Fuscus, as an equestrian, was officially not permitted to lead legions at all! Quite possibly his army was made up of vexillations of a number of different legions supported by praetorian cohorts. Alternatively, given a special command, he could have led the two legions of Moesia Superior with detachments of others. Tettius Julianus was governor of the (divided) Moesia Superior, so had two legions - but his army, again, probably included strong detachments of others.

If these seem small, it's worth comparing them to other attested non-imperial field forces of the period (attested in sources, that is, not modern conjecture): Varus in Germany in AD9 had 3 legions, Germanicus had 4 (although 8 at his final battle), Plautius invaded Britain with 4, Corbulo had 3 plus a vexillation in Armenia in AD58, Paulinus had 1 plus a vexillation against Boudica in AD61, Vespasian had 4 in Judea, Paetus led 2 into Armenia, Agricola led a maximum of 4 into north Britain (although he only had c.20,000 men with him at the final battle), Arrian planned to lead 2 against the Alans, and so on. 2-4 legions appears to have been quite the norm for provincial offensive operations. If the emperor himself was in charge, of course, the number could increase - but few reliable sources I can find mention more than 8-10 legions total.

As you seem to point out it is all relative. For me I'm not a professional, nor do I have time to dig into all the related sources, therefore I rely on them. When there tends to be a consensus(unless something stands out) I tend to go with what they say. Again you have made some excellent points, thank you.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Just my 2 cents - by the time the goths arrived in Dacia in the early-4th century the Dacians had already mixed in with the local sarmatian population.

the Goths were a distinct culturegroup compared to the sarmatians/others already there. The Dacii and Getae may have somewhat mixed, but it wasn't enough to note a comparison. They still got smashed by the Huns, then Stilicho, then Constantius III, and then Aetius anyways. By the time of Aetius and afterwards the Visigoths and Amalic-Goths, plus the toher 6 Gothic Groups, were more roman than anything else.

Think of Civilization like effusion - the civilized technology and culture is gonna spread from areas of high concentration to low concentration.

Not only to mention the military capacity of the Vandals, Goths, and Huns was much greater than the Dacii.

[Frostwulf]

I will like to see a primary source talking about an ambush, not some modern interpretation, because such interpretations i can do myself too

Yes, and that could very well be the problem is your interpretation(Goffart for instance). You still have to give credence to amount of historians who say it was an ambush, even Schmidt says so.

If Domitian received an Imperial salutation by September 88 it means that the battle was already fought by then, and the news reached Rome in late August or September. The winter seasons here start in late November lets say, with 1st December being considered the begining of winter
However, Tapae is at maybe two days of walk from Sarmizegetusa. Why do you think Tettius Iulianus, achieveing such a great victory and eliminating a big part of Dacian army and having his way open to the Dacian capital, just turned around and retreated back in the empire? Still having some two months maybe until the winter will come?

Because as usual the professionals know what they are talking about. They may not know the exact reason for Tettius not going on to crush the remaining Dacians, but they do know when the campaign season ends, which you apparently do not. The Roman campaign season ends in October(Bennet pg.248), which gave Tettius Julianus little time to vacate hostile territory(both human and terrain).

Most logically is that Tettius Iulianus advanced by surprise and meet some local Dacian troops (probably from garrisons in that area), gathered in a hurry by Vezina, second in comand after Decebalus, and who was probably left to protect the area. Decebalus, who usually comanded the army wasnt even present. Romans scored a tactical victory (not without suffering too losses) against that hastly assembled (and rather very small) Dacian army who fight to delay their advance and then retreated before to face the main Dacian army which probably started to gather coming from all over Dacia, under Decebalus comand.

So somehow Tettius Julianus with around 4 legions was able to go through that whole area without being seen? Yet both Fuscus and Trajan were seen? Decebaulus was there with Vezina, it's just that Vezina got caught up in the slaughter of his troops and Decebalus had the good sense to flee. When Romans try to ambush/surprise an opponent, it is usually written in the passage. The answer to your version is this:
Protochronism

This was enough to empower Domitian vanity who get an Imperial Salutation soon after.
Then Domitian, instead to go against Dacia to finish the business after that, switched against Marcomani. The reason isnt at all that Marcomani was some danger for Romans, but because (Dio CAssius book penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/67*.html

<<7 1 Domitian, wishing to requite the Quadi and the Marcomani because they had not assisted him against the Dacians, entered Pannonia with the intention of making war upon them; and he put to death the second group of envoys which had been sent by the enemy to propose terms of peace.>>

I have no doubt that what Dio says is true, but what you are forgetting or ignoring is that there had already been preparations for attacks against the Marcomanni, perhaps that is why the Marcomanni didn't help Domitian.

Basically Domitian tried to find a weaker oponent to win over and score some successes for himself too. He knew Dacians are too strong so he just found a whatever reason to attack Quadi and Marcomani, who not just didnt threatened the Romans but send too couple envoys to ask for peace. Actually Domitian did same thing with Suebii, when he get the throne and conquered some region in Germania, it was something more symbolically, to show he is a good comander.

Choosing an convenient adversary (not too weak, but not too strong either) was the best way to do it, before to advance to harder ones (same thing as in professional boxing if you wish, when the "new hope" for the belt isnt throw from the begining against the champion or the stronger adversaries, but start with smaller names to get experience, make a name and get self thrust)

Just like Maroboduus before or any enemy that seems to be getting to strong, the Romans will try to justify attacking them. Domitian already had his "victory"(I put the quotes over victory because the classical authors don't see it that way) over the Chatti, there was no need to go after any more Germani since he was already Germanicus.

If he would be that bend on to eliminate Dacians, and thought thats possible, he would just invade them, as Quadi and Marcomani wasnt in any situation to attack the empire.

Once again there were plans to invade Dacia once the more dangerous Marcomanni/Sarmatians were dealt with. Did you miss the quotes I put in?

Despite the derision of contemporary observers, all writing after the fact, it is clear that Domitian’s Suebic-Sarmatic wars were the necessary preliminaries to an intended military settlement of the Dacian problem. And such a settlement was required, to avenge the defeats of Sabinus and Fuscus and to escape the crippling subsidies agreed with Decebalus for his neutrality after the debacle of 89, which included large sums of money ‘as well as artisans of every trade pertaining to both peace and war’. In the event, Domitians never resumed hostilities against the Dacians, perhaps because intermittent warfare with the Suebi continued for another five years. Pg.31

The victory at Tapae was not followed up by occupation and annexation of Dacian territory. This may never have been part of Domitian’s plan, but even if it had been there was a hiatus at this stage of the Danubian wars. It is suggested that the preparations were under way at the end of 88 for the continuation of the war in 89, but before the army could take the field, or the Emperor himself could take any action, he had to deal with the revolt of Saturninus in Upper Germany. Pg.101

Btw, about the peace proposal coming from Dacians, those sound like this (from same Dio Cassius)

<<5 Decebalus, the king of the Dacians, was making overtures to Domitian, promising him peace; but Domitian sent Fuscus against him with a large force. On learning of this Decebalus sent to him an embassy anew with the insulting proposal to make peace with the emperor, on condition that every Roman should elect to pay two obols to Decebalus each year; otherwise, he declared, he would make war and inflict great ills upon the Romans. >>

Yet afterwards he offered frequent treaties towards Domitian, real ones not the one you quoted. Yes Domitian had to quickly buy off Decebalus so he could deal with the more dangerous Suebi/Sarmatians, but he did require him to wear a diadem, which meant: "just as if he had truly conquered and could give the Dacians anyone he pleased to be their king". Decebalus knew that after the fiasco with Tettius Julianus where "He encountered the enemy at Tapae, and slew great numbers of them" he also had no choice. That is the reason for the frequent offers of treaty and also allowing the Romans to walz through Dacian territory, both men were desperate. Decebalus was desperate after getting crushed by Tettius Julianus and Domitian for a two front war against the grave danger of the Suebi/Sarmatian alliance.

Gosh my friend, if 2 legions is a large army, then 9 legions is an imense, almost incomensurable army. Dont forget quite few other historians talk about 12-14 legions.

Name them! Who says there were that many legions, what book, what article, where? And yes 9 legions is a huge, enormous amount of men.

So please allow me to consider the 5-6 legions hypotheses more appropiate of "a large army"

Yet I have shown you an actual correlation of what large meant to one of your sources, you only have what you consider large. You have no idea what Tacitus or the others meant. Now show me a source where there were 5-6 legions.

Trust me, i do read quite few history books here. Is not that they dont present DAcians/Getae as reputed for their military qualities. Is that many exaggerate Romans and so can't pass over an invisible border (which i think shouldnt exist) when comparing the two, and are mostly Romanophiles and dont want to "denigrate" too much the Romans

Are you trying to say the Dacians were on par with the Romans? If so you are mistaken badly, especially militarily. There is allot to admire about the dacians, but you just put to much protochronism in you beliefs.

[diegis]

First of all, Merry Christmas and Happy New Year for everyone

Yes, and that could very well be the problem is your interpretation(Goffart for instance). You still have to give credence to amount of historians who say it was an ambush, even Schmidt says so.

This is a useless and complicated way to tell me that isnt any primary source talking about any ambush. There are just interpretations, i can come even with some talking about Cornelius Fuscus being defeated and killed at Adamclisi and others who talk about another route he took, along Olt river valley (so not at Tapae)

Because as usual the professionals know what they are talking about. They may not know the exact reason for Tettius not going on to crush the remaining Dacians, but they do know when the campaign season ends, which you apparently do not. The Roman campaign season ends in October(Bennet pg.248), which gave Tettius Julianus little time to vacate hostile territory(both human and terrain).

I think you have little idea about the geography here. Going from Tapae to Sarmizegetusa it takes maybe 2 days. Having Dacian army so badly crushed (as Roman propaganda and you seem to believe) in late August or early September (as Domitian received the salutation in September) it will take little effort to go to Dacian capital, even if not conquering, bt at least lay a short siege and show to enemy who's the boss.
It is ilogical as well to assume that Romans started the campaign to conquer Dacia right before the end of the season.

So, you either believe what Cassius said, that Tetius Iulianus was tricked by Decebalus, and Romans was scared and turn around. Or, more logical, that Iulianus made a surprise raid near the end of the season in order to revenge Fuscus defeat and show to Dacians that Romans are still able to fight back.
Dacians was surprised by Roman advance and managed to gather a small army made from local garrisons and some locals there, who tried to block the Romans at Tapae until the main army will start forming under Decebalus comand.
Romans scored a tactical victory (probably sufering heavy losses to, which stop them to go further) and then retreated back to their forts in the empire.
To comfort their badly wounded pride they make this raid too look as a big victory in their imperial propaganda and to explain the fact they didnt advanced to meet the main DAcian army or at least to see the Sarmizegetusa walls they come with that strange explanation with a forest cut by Decebalus and trees dressed in armors and looking as real Dacian soldiers. This may make sense for military uneducated people at Rome, but is very weird for someone who know a little about armies and wars. I mean, they surely can send some scouts to see whats about exactly with that unflinching Dacian army in front of them, even as just to be sure that army dont chase them back to attack again the empire

So somehow Tettius Julianus with around 4 legions was able to go through that whole area without being seen? Yet both Fuscus and Trajan were seen? Decebaulus was there with Vezina, it's just that Vezina got caught up in the slaughter of his troops and Decebalus had the good sense to flee. When Romans try to ambush/surprise an opponent, it is usually written in the passage. The answer to your version is this:
Protochronism

First of all, Fuscus probably used another route, not trough Tapae, and he was expected by Dacians as he and Domitian just managed to push the Dacian army out of Moesia. Trajan invasion was again expected as Roman preparations at Danube took a long time and included even engineering works on Danube course.
Tettius advance didnt take much, from Roman borders to Tapae it didnt take you more then 3 days maybe. As Dacians didnt had a huge professional standing army, it was required time to gather the main army. So Iulianus meet more then probably just the local garrisons from the fortresses and towns near the Sarmizegetusa (obviously the capital and sourounding fortresses kept much of their garrisons in case they would be besieged).

About protochronism, i am sorry but i doubt you have much ideas about that. And please, dont tell me you use that wikipedia aticle for that (not to mention that my supposed protochronism is no more exaggerated then your pan-germanism). Protochronism refer mostly to the connection betwen Dacians (and Romanians) with the "Pelasgian empire" (see Vinca-Turdas and Cucuteni cultures) and the fact that was the dominant entity and rulers of Europe back then.
Those cultures are still discussed with new archaelogical findings and such and the pejorative meaning of the term comes after 1990 under multiculturalism ideas pushed by few historians "trained" with grants offered by Soros foundations for example.
One mentioned in wiki article, Lucian Boia, is actually a historian of ideas, he is not specialized in either ancient history or military history. The other one, a woman called Verdery is of Hungarian origin, and the conflict betwen the two historiographies is well known so to put thrust in her affirmations is like asking today Macedonians about ancient Greek history

I have no doubt that what Dio says is true, but what you are forgetting or ignoring is that there had already been preparations for attacks against the Marcomanni, perhaps that is why the Marcomanni didn't help Domitian.

Just like Maroboduus before or any enemy that seems to be getting to strong, the Romans will try to justify attacking them. Domitian already had his "victory"(I put the quotes over victory because the classical authors don't see it that way) over the Chatti, there was no need to go after any more Germani since he was already Germanicus.

He wanted to show off in Rome as a great general too, after few disasters. And as Dacians was too dangerous then, he chosed a lesser danger, Marcomani, who he thought can defeat more easily

Once again there were plans to invade Dacia once the more dangerous Marcomanni/Sarmatians were dealt with. Did you miss the quotes I put in?

Despite the derision of contemporary observers, all writing after the fact, it is clear that Domitian’s Suebic-Sarmatic wars were the necessary preliminaries to an intended military settlement of the Dacian problem.

Yes, there was plans for Dacia, but you realize that you shoot in your foot (figuratively speaking) with this qoute? Bennett just say that Domitian want to get rid of some less important but annoying problem, so he can focus on the really big one. Thats why Suebic-Sarmatic one was just a preliminary, how he said, something to do before get on the main thing

The victory at Tapae was not followed up by occupation and annexation of Dacian territory. This may never have been part of Domitian’s plan, but even if it had been there was a hiatus at this stage of the Danubian wars. It is suggested that the preparations were under way at the end of 88 for the continuation of the war in 89, but before the army could take the field, or the Emperor himself could take any action, he had to deal with the revolt of Saturninus in Upper Germany. Pg.101

Saturninus revolt was resolved quickly in same year, even without Domitian reached there. Marcomani was resolved too, and they never threatened the empire borders anyway and even asked for peace.
Is just that Domitian need time to preapre for such big war with Dacians, and was affected too by the important losses suffered

Name them! Who says there were that many legions, what book, what article, where? And yes 9 legions is a huge, enormous amount of men.

Beside the 175,000 soldiers from Strobel? Well, we can quote for example Michael Schmitz - "The Dacian Threat", you know the book. Look at pag. 15 and see he mention 14 legions of 27 the empire had back then, plus 60,000 auxiliar troops, and this without to put too the irregular troops raised just for these wars.

If you put the legion as the usual war number of troops, so around 6,000 soldiers, you may reack a close number

Yet I have shown you an actual correlation of what large meant to one of your sources, you only have what you consider large. You have no idea what Tacitus or the others meant. Now show me a source where there were 5-6 legions.

I am sorry, i dont see anything thrustfull in that Blanchard quote or what you show me. To say 2 legions is a large army is laughable, sorry to say that. To think someone tried to invade Dacia with the intent of conquering with just 2 legions is hilarious.
Just look again at Trajan army and see the huge difference

Then look here

http://www.institutarheologie-istoriaart...VII-03.pdf

It is mentioned that was possible Domitian wished to have 5 legions at Moesia border (after he arrived there and after Dacian invasion) but the history of the legions involved in the conflict with Dacians is hazy.
The reason why, i already mentioned what Paulus Orosius write, and that was most probably because was too humiliating for Romans.
Anyway, beside those 5 legions there was no less then 3 Alaes and 14 Cohors just in Moesia Superior.
There was an obviously bigger number in both Moesia provinces, and as we know that Romans purposedly kept silence about those troop numbers and we know from ancient authors that Domitian bring troops from almost all the empire, it is clear enough that the number of troops there was quite big.

And Trajan bring even more, weakening the Germania frontiers (he actually brought even Germanic mercenaries from there, so weakening the tribes over the frontier as well)