How Effective were Spears Against Cavalry?

[Domen]

An example of cavalry breaking infantry square formation (equipped with bayonets on rifles - so "a better version of spears, that can shoot") thanks to brave action of only one horse from the charging unit:

"The Battle of Khushab (1857) is an interesting case in point because it gives examples of cavalry both failing and succeeding to break an unwavering infantry opposition. In this battle, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry charged at a Persian infantry square, but the square held and the cavalry horses either balked or veered away. Then Lieutenant (later Major General) Arthur Moore--an adjutant to the cavalry regiment's commander--took up his reins in both hands, made his horse leap over the first ranks' bayonets, and crashed down on top of the square; Moore's horse was killed and his sword broken in the crash, but the disruption it caused in the Persian square was so great that the cavalrymen were able to batter their way into the gap and tear the square apart. The most important thing to consider here is the stark contrast between the cavalrymen's inability to molest the square at first and the ease with which they broke it after Moore's daring escapade."

[Nathan Ross]

I quoted the Khushab example back here, together with a similar one from Aliwal.

Surely what's important about both these cases is that they were very unusual - that's why they were reported. This sort of 'suicide attack' could certainly be effective, but no commander could count on his troops actually carrying it out, nor on its success if they did.

[Michael Kerr]

Hi, in regards to cavalry attacking an infantry formation. I was reading a book "Alexander The Great Lessons in Strategy" by David J Lonsdale and he was crediting Alexander as the first ancient commander to utilize "Shock Cavalry" by use of a wedge formation. Here are a few lines from the book

"The usual tactical deployment for the cavalry was the wedge formation. Such a formation allowed the cavalry to shift its axis of advance rapidly, and was therefore crucial when seeking and exploiting a gap in the enemy's line. The wedge was ideally suited to penetrate a narrow breach in the enemy's front and widen it. In this sense, the wedge formation gave the cavalry mobility, flexibility and punching power."

Alexander was a genius at combined arms so he usually pinned his opponents front with his phalanx and then went to work with his cavalry to attack flanks and rear. I suppose they could have used echelon formations as well to exploit weaknesses. I doubt if wedge formations were tapered down to one lone rider at the front (popular in RTW etc) but maybe a wedge shape with blocks of cavalry formations timing their charge so that once the first block breached the line the second blocks would hit the flanks on either side of the first breach before the infantry had a chance to react and reform thus widening the gap.

Regards
Michael
Kerr

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

I think the point to take from this is, it is suicidal to try and break an infantry formation with a frontal charge on horseback!

But, once a gap can be exploited, as Alexander wisely chose to utilize as a tactic, because you are then in the flank and possibly the rear of the infantry, it is just a slogging match, depending on the steadfastness of the infantry to close the gap again, or routing....

A one rider pointed wedge is not so useless for exploiting a gap...but if trying to break a shield wall, then you are back to the suicide attack..it may well succeed in starting a breach, but the first few riders will go down too.

I still doubt it's effectiveness against the type of formations the Roman used.

[Macedon]

A basic mistake made when talking about "shock" cavalry is to think that its task was to attack infantry. Instead, such cavalry was mainly developed to attack cavalry. Up to the time of Alexander, the usual tactic followed by all cavalries was to attack the enemy with javelins, then retreat and attack again in a maneuver called (in Greek) exeligmos, performed by ordered cavalry, not dispersed. Armor was mainly useful in order to minimize casualties taken from such exchange of missiles. From time to time, there was the occasional melee, but it was very limited and not the "proper", usual method.

Alexander did not use cavalry against massed infantry, ever... The hetaeroi/companions were armed with the long xyston and their duty was to swiftly attack enemy cavalry, which would either flee (being allowed no space to perform the exeligmos) or stand and receive the companions' charge, which would bring them at a disadvantage, since they were attacked by what we call lancers being javeliners themselves. The wedge formation, supposedly adopted from the Thracians, is mainly praised in the ancient books for its maneuverability which allowed the ile/squadron to more easily change direction and thus choose its target while rectangular formations could not easily do that. The wedge point in this era was supposedly a single man unlike the later wedges (of the Byzantines for example) which practically were trapezoid in shape.

The most usual reason why some people are misled into believing that the Companions attacked infantry is that they neglect the fact that Alexander's attacks against Dareius were not attacks against infantry. The Royal Friends of Dareius, his bodyguard unit, were a cavalry squadron, an ile, not footmen as many mistakenly think. Alexander never attacked massed infantry with his "shock" cavalry but he did use cavalry against dispersed infantry, at least as a deterrent (Issus).

[Macedon]

I think the point to take from this is, it is suicidal to try and break an infantry formation with a frontal charge on horseback!

I would comment here that trying is not suicidal. Doing it is. Cavalry advancing against closed order infantry was uncommon but not something very strange for the medieval/Byzantine years, although almost unheard of in ancient times. They did so, in hope that the infantry would waver and give in, kind of a chicken game. Should the infantry remain calm (all hundreds of yards of its front...) then the cavalry would retreat but some would come close, maybe stab at the infantry and get stabbed in return, some might indeed get suicidal and try to push through the ranks of footmen to prove how valiant knights they were, some would even try to exploit what they considered to be weaknesses in the enemy line (maybe 5, 10, 20 footmen indeed gave way...). On the other hand, should the infantry produce many gaps and points of disorder (not necessarily in the first charge, maybe after 3,4 or more such charges).... things were different and cavalry would get the upper hand. And as all sources agree, should cavalry indeed take the upper hand, the only way to save your life as an infantry man was to immediately form up as closely as possible in some kind of multifaceted close ordered formation (an orb, a square) and then slowly retreat to safety.

[Michael Kerr]

Macedon wrote:

The most usual reason why some people are misled into believing that the Companions attacked infantry is that they neglect the fact that Alexander's attacks against Dareius were not attacks against infantry. The Royal Friends of Dareius, his bodyguard unit, were a cavalry squadron, an ile, not footmen as many mistakenly think. Alexander never attacked massed infantry with his "shock" cavalry but he did use cavalry against dispersed infantry, at least as a deterrent (Issus).

Hi Macedon, I take your point about Darius's bodyguard being horsemen but although I don't know too many details of unit positions, I thought that at the battle of Chaeronea when he led the Companion Cavalry on the left wing for his father Philip II that Philip on the Macedonian Right lured the Allied left wing (Athenians)to move too far forward and created a gap that left the Theban Sacred Band isolated and that Alexander destroyed the Sacred Band to a man with his cavalry (Companions). But technically that was Philip's battle and Alexander would have been under orders to seek an opportunity if it arose.

Regards
Michael Kerr

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

I think the point to take from this is, it is suicidal to try and break an infantry formation with a frontal charge on horseback!

I would comment here that trying is not suicidal. Doing it is. C

My point being, you would only be trying...you would not succeed... ;-)

[Macedon]

@ Michael

Unfortunately, this is only a theory. There is no text in the sources saying that. In all texts about the battle, there is no mentioning of any cavalry partaking in the battle, so, most possibly, Alexander did so leading the left of the phalanx.

[Domen]

Another example, in addition to those provided in these 2 threads... :

http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/17-roma...l?start=90

http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/7-off-t...ssars.html

... of Polish-Lithuanian hussars defeating pike-musket infantry - battle of Cesis, Winter 1601:

I made several simplified illustrations showing what happened in that battle:

(on the day the battle was fought - 7 January 1601 - the Gawia river was completely ice-bound):

Deployment and strength of both armies:



First stage of the battle:



Second stage of the battle:



Last stage of the battle and its aftermath:

[Domen]

This sort of 'suicide attack' could certainly be effective, but no commander could count on his troops actually carrying it out, nor on its success if they did.

Suicide attacks are integral part of the history of warfare - even relatively recently, just to mention WW2 Kamikaze. In fact warfare as such, is a suicidal activity - soldiers constantly risk their lifes during battle. Various battlefield activities only differ regarding the percentage value of that risk of death, but the risk is always there. Sometimes it is 10%, sometimes 50%. All of warfare is more or less suicidal.

Suicidal attacks also often tend to be unusually efficient. Japanese were using Kamikaze not because they were stupid, but because Kamikaze attacks were more efficient than conventional attacks carried out by Japanese bombers and casualty ratios - paradoxically - more favorable. Statistics did not lie.

[koechlyruestow]

Macedon wrote:
Cavalry advancing against closed order infantry was uncommon but not something very strange for the medieval/Byzantine years, although almost unheard of in ancient times.

Actualy, Plutarchus' biography of Crassus suggests the Parthian cataphracts did charge the Roman battle-line. However, after (according to Plutarchus) noting the depth and density of their formation or after ( according to me) noting that the legionaries did not flinch at their advance, they turned and rode around the Roman square, driving back with a hail of arrows the light troops leaving the shelter of the Roman legionaries to discharge their missiles(Crassus 24.3-4).

Herodotus describes something similar when the Persian cavalry invading Greece attacked the contingent of a Greek ally, to test if they would stand their ground, do not have they exact place available. The Greek "collaborators" stood their ground, and the Persian reassured them.

I do not believe there was something essentially different, more "fragile", about ancient cavalry.

[Domen]

Regarding Carrhae:

One should ask themselves a question - why should cataphracts charge the Roman line as long as horse archers were not out of arrows (and they had 1000 pack mules loaded with arrows)?

Maybe it is not the best comparison - but for the same reason, the USA nuked Japan in 1945, rather than carrying out a seaborne invasion (but nobody doubts such an invasion was going to succeed).

The general principles of war were the same in 53 BC and 1945 - economy of force, minimizing losses.

If Parthians could win just with arrows, they didn't need to risk their lifes in close combat. If Americans could win just with nukes, they didn't need to risk another Okinawa on larger scale.

[Macedon]

@Eduard

No, there was nothing fragile regarding "shock" cavalry in the ancient times. They were usually better trained, equipped and supported than most medieval contingents. The main difference that led to such tactics in later years was the vast decrease in the quality of infantry, that made it more probable for it to give way before the psychological shock of an armored cavalry charge.

[Domen]

They were usually better trained, equipped and supported than most medieval contingents.

Technological level of Ancient armor was nowhere near that of Late Medieval and Early Renaissance plate armor. Also horses used by heavy cavalry in the Middle Ages were larger and of better breed.

This had no match in the Antiquity:

The main difference that led to such tactics in later years was the vast decrease in the quality of infantry,

You would have to precise which exactly period and area of the Middle Ages do you mean.