Lets Talk Adrianople

[aligern]

Was it events beyond his control or just that the scouts reported the numbers of the. Goths as being much lower than they actually were and it seemed to Valens that he was very likely to win. Of course there was a rivalry between emperors as to who best exemplified Roman and imperial virtues. As the Goths had proven to to be highly fissiparous in the Balkans with groups breaking up and joining together their numbers could be expected to fluctuate. If Valens thought he had at least parity then he would attack expecting to win.
Roy

[Alanus]

Well, that's possibly true, Roy

But on the eve of the battle, Fritigern sent an envoy with 2 letters to Valens, asking for peace and trying to cut a deal for Thrace. Maybe, Valens took this as a weakness. :unsure:

[Robert Vermaat]

Hello Tim,

Coming late to this thread my answer is in danger of repeating things possibly already posted in replies, but here goes (longish!):

First, why did Valens offer receptio on such attractice terms to the goths begin with? Were the romans that short of manpower on the frontier? Once they became aware of the size of the incoming "horde", why did they not mass more troops to control the process?

A The Romans were always short of manpower. The Goths were not that numerous and they could be resettled. This was standing policy. Constantine had settled many Sarmatians all over the provinces, no doubt there were plans to do the same with the Goths.
B the Romans always had a policy of decreasing a threat by breaking up an enemy. Any group you could pry loose of an alliance was worth absorbing.

Second, it appears that in the preceding Battle of Ad Salices, the Romans suffered a bloody stalemate, despite (pressumably) being beter armed, supplied (they had been starving out the goths), and trained. From the accounts I have read, the goths were armed ad hoc with pilfered roman equipment and "fire hardened clubs." In my mind, the stalemate calls into question the assumed notion that the RA was still "superior" to the barbarians at this point. The notion of a half-starved rag-tag band of goths nearing defeating a contingent of the WRA by throwing wooden clubs from a lager wagon seems hard to believe. What else was going on here? If the Romans were severely outnumberd, why didn;t Richomeres just stick with the "block and starve" strategy.

I think there can be some doubt as to the stories of Goths with clubs vs. fully-armed Romans. I don’t believe it, frankly. The eagerness of the Romans to engage in battle at Adrianople does not speak of a feeling of equality. Perhaps Ad Salices was an ‘artificial’ stalemate? Like Aetius spared his potential Hun allies at Chalons instead of defeating them?

Error: it’s not the Western Roman army at Ad Salices, it’s the east Roman army. Or are you referring to another incident?

Third, from the accounts I have read, it appears that the goths had a devastating effect on the balkans, esp after being joined with the armed gothic contingent from Marcianople. It appears they plundered and laid waste to the entire region. That they were again able to operate with impugnity after Adrianople seems to cut agains the notion that Adrianople "wasn't that big of a deal" that is seemingly popular these days.

I don’t follow. The two things are unrelated. The fact that the Goths were able to pillage the countryside was due to their superiority over the limitanei in the region. When split up due to the blockade, smaller Roman forces were able to deal with the smaller bands, but the Romans (as part of their military strategy never pulled all border forces away from the border to form a large army. They had to wait for the comitatenses (field armies) to do so.

This then took place at Ad Salices (presumably) but for sure at Adrianople. What you may refer to as ‘not such big a deal’ I think is about the notion that Adrianople brought about the fall of the Western Empire. This latter idea I do not support. Adrianople was a major defeat which for decades paralyzed Roman tactics as well as dominated strategy for a long time. It played a severe part in the eventual breakdown of relations between the east and the West, and put in motion a (in my mind disastrous) policy of settling barbarians within the empire (wait for it!) under their own leaders and with a large measure of independence. But as a military defeat, Adrianople was not comparable to Cannae. The East lost most of its army but did in the end not even lose any territory.

Fourth, why was there not better coordination of troop movements between east and west before the battle. It seems that before Valens marched out, the romans had sent a number of smaller contingents that engaged the goths and were defeated or at least reduced in effective fighting capacity. Why not wait to concentrate forces instead of throwing raindrops on a fire?

Hubris. Valens being overconfident and yearning for military glory. I guess, because there’s no interview with him, just accusations afterwards. They could have waited for Gratian, and together licked the Goths. But no… hubris.

Fifth, what led to the Roman intelligence failure as to the size of the gothic forces at Adrianople? It seems Valens rushed in without being prepared. Also, why did he feel the need to force march his forces for nearly a full day under a blazing hot sun before engaging, gather than following the standard practice of making camp, resting, and attacking the next morning? Was he really THAT inept? Would Gratian have been able to arrive and "steal the day", if Valens had waited 24 hours to attack?

See above. Overconfidence. Wanting to catch the Goths unprepared? And finally, yes.

Sixth it appears that the Roman auxilliaries and reserve line fled after the initial gothic cavalry charge during the battle. Why was there no attempt to regroup and reinforce once the main line was in trouble?

Valens had no auxiliaries. The Batavi regiment was a crack comitatenses regiment, no federates or ‘mercenaries’ or whatever. Standing field army troops, very high quality.
Actually, we have but a dim view of what happened after the Gothic cavalry arrived, defeats the left flank and disperses the Roman cavalry. Some reconstruction have them returning and attacking the Romans in the rear, some in the flank – we don’t know. Was it an encirclement like Cannae, or a destabilisation by constantly attacking the flanks? Did the infantry die fighting or slowly retreating, turning into a rout? Fact is that not even Ammianus seems to have been able to get a clear report of what happened when the main body began to falter. That may have been due to chaos from the moment of the cavalry being dispersed. We only know that the reserve are not there, but they may well have been used before to stabilized the Gothic counterattack, unknown to Valens.

Seventh, why did the citizens of Adrianople not allow the suriving forces sanctuary in the city following their defeat. Surely, they would have been able to recognize their own forces?

Sure they recognized them, I think they were in shock and paralyzed with fear, thinking that the retreating troops would allow attacking Goths to enter the city with them. Happened all the time.

Eighth, it appears that after the battle there was essentialy no effective fighting force left in the area and that the Goths had pretty much free reign in the balkans. Theodisius then enters the picture and again either loses battles or fights to costly stalemates, resuling in the Foedereti treaty. Again, why are the Romans incapable of a decesive victory at any point during the gothic war? It seems that "the worlds most professional fighting force" is being beaten again and again by relatively unorganized roaming gothic hordes. Again, this makes me question the whether the goths and romans were not more "evenly matched" in fighting ability at this time.

No that’s incorrect. The borders were not suddenly open to all for a long time. Troops will have been pulled back into strongholds and cities. Theodosius is actually succesful in pushing the sarmatians back that very year, as well as the next. I see no losses and/or costly stalemates only. His general Modares defeats them in 380, Alatheus and Safrax make peace in 380, Athanaric surrenders in 381.
The ‘match’ that you see is an equalising factor: the Goth fight with nothing to lose, the Romans with everything to lose. Gusto vs. caution.

Finally, the more I read about the aftermath of the battle, the unprecedented terms offered to the goths, their mass enrollment as federates, being trained in the roman way of war, and the effect on overall roman fighting ability both east and west, the more I return to the classical view that Adrianople was indeed a catastrophe..arguably even worse than Cannae in that they were never able to recover from the loss or eject the goths from their terrority.
Before the battle and the gothic war, you have a feared, effective fighting force that while being hamstrung by Julian's losses, still semeed to be able to control its borders. After the gothic wars, Rome is dependent on what is really a large, independent and still hostile political entity operating within its borders; they have been forced to make a humiliating peace with their eastern enemies, and the rhine frontier is overrun again and again.

Part of the reason why Adrianople had an impact was the worsening relations between east and West. Theodosius never trusted Gratian and after his death had to fend off several usurpers there. Federates were a necessity after the losses of Adrianople. Had the Goths been defeated, they would still have been enrolled, but no doubt seperated into smaller units all over the Empire. This was normal policy, even the Vandals are treated thus after Belisarius finally defeats them. The Goths are no ‘arch-enemy’, they fight for the Romans within a very few years of Adrianople.

What you fail to see here I think is that the Goths were never a monolithic group. Many leaders (as all the other Germanic groups have), waxing and waning numbers (as Alaric experiences after every victory and defeat) made for an inability to form a ‘Pan-Gothic Peoples Army’, as so often erroneously described over the centuries. The (Visi)goths were a number of groups and Rome constantly tried (with differing succes) to use these groups.

The real reason for the Roman military demise is the constant in-fighting which costs far more troops than the defeat at Adrianople. The east lost that one, yet it’s the Rhine that falter. How come? Because during the usurpers’ wars, Theodosius manages to steal the best forces from the West, during several occasions. Had Stilicho not tried to ‘intervene’ in the east, he would not have engaged Alaric (who was sent after him by Constantinople), but he’d have managed to hold the Rhine with ease.

Adding together: 1) Julians losses in persia; 2) the losses during adrianople and the gothic war; 3) the losses during theodisius' subsequent two major civil wars with the west; and 4) the new found poltiical and military powe of the goths, I am in fact quite surpised the West was able to hold old as long as it did.

Well, there you have it. Apparently the army was better than you thought. :wink:

[Robert Vermaat]

!. Wrong. Up to the Battle of Adrianople when the Romans hired non-Roman troops they were always called auxiliaries, that is what Ammianus always calls the Taifali, Franks, Alamanni and Goths who were hired by the Romans for specific campaigns rather than being enrolled into the Auxilia.
2. Not all the historians who were either contemporary with the events or writing shortly afterwards speak of any ill-feeling between Valens and Gratian. Indeed it could be Christian writers who made up this tale as both Emperors worshiped different forms of Christianity and Valens form was frowned upon at the time.
3. It was clear that the officers sent to oversee the crossing of the Danube were military officers, not landlords. Dux was a military title at the time.
4. We are talking about Adrianople, not the situation when Theodosius took up the purple. The Goths could not be considered lacky's even during Theodosius' reign as they held the balance of power.
5. Are you forgetting Valens three campaigns against the Goths between 367 and 369AD? The campaigns Gratian waged against the Alamanni and other tribes north of the Rhine and Danube? The African campaign fought by Theodosius before Adrianople? Valens campaign against Procopius?
6. No evidence that the Emperors before Adrianople were afraid of upsetting the Christians. In fact there is much evidence of both Valentinian and Valens meddling in Christian matters. Did Valens worry about upsetting the Nicene Christians when he converted Fritigern and his Goths to Arianism?
7. You need to reread Ammianus and then compare his account to the other accounts and then perhaps try and deduce exactly what happened that day.

1.Correct, but the Batavi were neither hired nor non-Roman as far as we know. Normal regiments of the field army. Roman troops. Therefore no foederati, nor auxilia, just ‘reserves’.
2. I agree about Valens and Gratian. We just don’t know for sure. But Valens could have waited for his colleague, and the fact is that he did not do so.
3. Indeed. A dux is commonly a commander of a frontier command.
4. The Goths were neither starving and therefore loyal, nor were they holding the balance of power. But they signed a treaty and stuck with that. It was the enormous losses suffered at Frigidus which helped Alaric into power a commander of a small band of unsatisfied veterans of Frigidus, starting out as brigands in the salt marches.
5. Indeed, Valens was an able commander. Hence his overconfidence I think.
6. Indeed, I see no pressure from the church here. Fear of casualties was a strategic concern, not a religious one.
7. the right wing cavalry seems to have been in place, but the left wing cavalry seems to have been still spread out along the road, no doubt behind the infantry of the left flank, still forming up but eager to join battle. However it was the sagittarii and the scutarii who seem to have joined battle against orders.
Ammianus Marcellinus book 31.16.12:
Eo ad vallum hostile tendente sagittarii et scutarii, quos Bacurius Hiberus quidam tunc regebat et Cassio, avidius impetu calenti progressi iamque adversis conexi, ut inmature proruperant, ita inerti discessu primordia belli foedarunt.
As he was on his way to the enemy's rampart, the archers and the targeteers, then under the command of one Bacurius of Hiberia and Cassio, had rushed forward too eagerly in hot attack, and were already engaged with their adversaries; and as their charge had been untimely, so their retreat was cowardly; and thus they gave an unfavourable omen to the beginning of the battle.
The fact that this is known to Ammianus strengthens my view that afterwards chaos broke out, because we lack names and details later. The troops mentioned may have been the entire left wing or part of it, but after the defeat of their support cavalry they were caught off guard, presumably still not formed up or at least not in deep formation. Anyway they are defeated, with Ammianus only describing dust, blood and chaos, no longer details until he has Valens retreating over heaps of dead bodies, which must have been a much later moment. The varying accounts are telling.

I just realized I’m about the very same age as Valens when he died. :unsure:

[Timianus]

Thanks Robert. Very much appreciated.

One clarification about the batavi. Doesn't ammianus use the word auxillio to refer to them?

[ValentinianVictrix]

My own research, with the last 2.5 years intensive, leads me to believe that the initial Gothic attack was against the Roman right wing cavalry. The Roman left wing was at first unware of this as they had advanced right up to the Gothic wagons and were assaulting the Goths defending behind them when Gothic cavalry, either a group that had split off from the main group who were attacking the Roman right wing or another group coming from the other flank, attacked and drove off the Roman left wing cavalry. This forced the Roman infantry on the left to break off the assault and they moved towards their right and the perceived protection of the legions stationed there.

The Roman army was fully deployed and not straggling along the road by the time the Gothic cavalry appeared, had that been the case then the Roman infantry on the left would not have been in a position to assault the wagons.

[Alanus]

I just realized I’m about the very same age as Valens when he died. :unsure:

I'm a little older, but luckily neither of us are considering a battle on a sweltering day... somewhere around 9 miles from Adrianople. Both you and Adrian have a good handle on the actuality of that day. A few questions still remain. Did Safrax employ Alanic cataphracts?-- along with Alatheus' light cavalry of Greutungi and Huns. Ammianus doesn't go into precise details.

Any battle started in error (the non-ordered advancement of the archers) doesn't bode well for whatever follows. Subsequent orders are then shouted, necks get redder, as compensation overtakes planned strategy. At this stage, 378, everyone was more or less "professional" as we see one side possibly out-gunned (cataphracts) and speedily out-flanked.

[ValentinianVictrix]

There is also the very real question of which route did the Roman's take to the Gothic encampment, and why did they not appear to take the same route the Goth's took to reach Adrianople the day after the battle?

[Alanus]

As you say, there are still questions to be answered, all of which now have to be conjecture. A little late to ask anyone. :dizzy:

Have you checked-out Alessandro Barbero's take on the battle? :unsure:

[Alanus]

Robert wrote:

"I think there can be some doubt as to the stories of Goths with clubs vs. fully-armed Romans. I don’t believe it, frankly. The eagerness of the Romans to engage in battle at Adrianople does not speak of a feeling of equality. Perhaps Ad Salices was an ‘artificial’ stalemate? Like Aetius spared his potential Hun allies at Chalons instead of defeating them?"

Good point. We see the same situation-- twice-- with Stilicho and Alaric.
Ad Salices could have gone either way. Interestingly, that stalemate may have designed by Fritigern, not the other way around. By all accounts, he was not keen on initiating battle, continually attempting to keep the Greutungi and Huns in check, and always trying to find terms for peace. By creating a stalemate, he would once again open a door for negotiation. We would naturally assume the Roman side would initiate that particular stalemate, but Fritigern was a foxy character and knew exactly how to play the game.

We always think of Adrianople as a "pure" military battle, but we forget it was the result of repeated and failed negotiation. Fritigern gained nothing at Adrianople except a pile of casualties. :dizzy:

[Robert Vermaat]

One clarification about the batavi. Doesn't ammianus use the word auxillio to refer to them?

He mentions The Batavi in XX.1.1 (Moto igitur velitari auxilio, Aerulis scilicet et Batavis numerisque Moesiacorum duobus) as a relief force with the Heruli and 2 regiments of Moesiae, but the 'velitari auxilio' cannot refer to either of these, because these regiments are always described as standard heavy infantry, not as 'light auxilia'. Therefore I think that the latter description refers to their status as 'auxilia palatina', which was a description of elite regiments as described here below. The 'auxilia palatina' were not classic 'auxilia' but 'palatine regiments', raised by Constantine I or later. The 'light' (velite) in this passage may (may!) refer to them travelling as light as possible, and therefore without heavy support or perhaps even without body armour (which was transported in a baggage train) for need of speed.

[Robert Vermaat]

Interestingly, that stalemate may have designed by Fritigern, not the other way around. By all accounts, he was not keen on initiating battle, continually attempting to keep the Greutungi and Huns in check, and always trying to find terms for peace. By creating a stalemate, he would once again open a door for negotiation. We would naturally assume the Roman side would initiate that particular stalemate, but Fritigern was a foxy character and knew exactly how to play the game.

We always think of Adrianople as a "pure" military battle, but we forget it was the result of repeated and failed negotiation. Fritigern gained nothing at Adrianople except a pile of casualties. :dizzy:

I think the Goths also lost at Adrianople. What was a certain and crushing tactical victory, was also a strategic disaster. It took decades for the Goths to become a Roman ally with a relatively secure area of settlement, which was (so it seems) always the long-term plan for Gothic leaders. They knew they could defeat the Romans, but they also knew they could never gain total victory, so their goal had to be settlement within the empire as well as a staus of ally. Fritigern as well as Alaric failed to achieve this.

[ValentinianVictrix]

I would have to say that after the Battle of Adrianople the Goth's became the master of the countryside between Moesia and Constantinople. However, they just could not deal with defended cities. Take the following day after the battle, Fritigern and the rest of the Gothic chieftains led the victorious Goths in an assault upon Adrianople itself. The Goths failed dismally, despite attacking througout the day and night. After this Fritigern led his men to devastate the countryside in Thrace before joining up with Huns and Alans who had taken advantage of the situation. Fritigern led the combined mob towards Constantinople with the aim of attempting to take the Eastern capital. However, Queen Mab's Saracen's, who she had sent shortly before to support Valens, sallied out from Constantinople and these troops battled against the horde and although initially both sides fought on equal terms, one of the Saracen's rushed into the Gothic ranks, slit the throat of a Goth and began drinking his blood! This act so startled the Goths that they lost heart and retreated. They were also dishearted by the enormous task before them as they had no idea of how powerful the walls and defences of the city were. So they destroyed their siege equipment and scattered, some arriving as far as Northern Italy.

[Alanus]

We always think of Adrianople as a "pure" military battle, but we forget it was the result of repeated and failed negotiation. Fritigern gained nothing at Adrianople except a pile of casualties. :dizzy:

I think the Goths also lost at Adrianople. What was a certain and crushing tactical victory, was also a strategic disaster. It took decades for the Goths to become a Roman ally with a relatively secure area of settlement...

Exactly, just like Alaric gained nothing with two battles in northern Italy... and then a 3-day vacation in Rome. The tragedy continued. Athaulf tried it next-- even marrying the Slow-Boy's sister-- and nothing was gained until 418. That makes around 45 years of failure on the Goth's part. :errr:

They should have tried the "Old Roxolani Chieftain Ploy." Give the Emperor a nice horse... and smile a lot. mile: mile: mile: mile:

[Michael Kerr]

Alanus wrote:

They should have tried the "Old Roxolani Chieftain Ploy." Give the Emperor a nice horse... and smile a lot.

And in the case of old Rasparaganus and his family, when overthrown and exiled by his own people (Roxolani) to be set up in comfortable exile in the coastal town of Pola at the expense of the Romans for the rest of his life.
Regards
Michael Kerr