Lorica Hamata being pierced by arrows

[Alanus]

All of the above could be reasons for the debacle. Crassus was simply overpowered by an archery barrage perhaps never encountered before. So, Adrian Bivar's analysis appears viable.

This is what Plutarch had to say, "Crassus commanded his light-armed soldiers to charge, but they had not gone far before they received such a shower of arrows that they were glad to retire amongst the heavy-armed, with whom this was the first occasion of disorder and terror, when they perceived the strength and force of their darts, which pierced their arms, and passed through every kind of covering, hard and soft alike."

Plutarch was a conscientious historian, and he usually interviewed trustworthy eye-witnesses. He continues, "The Parthians, now placing themselves at a distance, began to shoot from all sides, not aiming at any mark (the Romans so tightly packed)... but simply sent their arrows with great force out of strong bent bows, the strokes from which came with extreme violence."

This could have been the first time Romans encountered the larger Sarmat-Hunnic model. If so, they faced a weapon that easily outperformed the older Scythian bow; and it certainly sounds like arrows were penetrating armor. Crassus' forces were demoralized by a never-before-seen technology. Essentially, this was the beginning of a whole new era. :-|

[Michael Kerr]

I think approximately 7 legions accompanied Crassus on his expedition and three of those were the Syrian legions he was entitled to as the governor of Roman Syria. So he probably had to raise 3 or 4 legions from scratch. As one of the Triumvirs he would have had a hostile Senate to deal with so he would probably have had to finance a large portion of the equipping of his army himself. There must have been a bit of scouring and looting of temples for arms and armour as well as veterans' settlements for recruits or any unwanted available arms, armourers would have been in short supply and high demand and therefore very expensive so maybe the' old moneylender' in Crassus thought cheap is quick and best. I don't think there were as many 'fabricae' or armanents workshops scattered around in late Republican times like in the Late Empire & if there were they would already be pretty busy.
It seems to me that Crassus totally underestimated the Parthians and was equipping his army for a massive looting expedition rather than a military one, as he chose the direct route down the Euphrates rather than through Armenia whose king offered him extra troops and more importantly cavalry. Poor equipment and manpower, maybe a lack of quality officers and centurions, and superior weapons and tactics from the Parthians, bad tactics and some inept leadership from Crassus. A toxic recipe for defeat and disaster. Even a Soldier/Emperor like Trajan, who died on his journey back to Rome a broken man, found out that if you conquer Mesopotamia you don't necessarily conquer the Parthians , their empire was centred further east. It might have seemed easy to conquer Mesopotamia but extremely hard to hang on to it. 8+)

Regards
Michael Kerr

[Mark Hygate]

You also have to wonder about the quality of both the troops and their equipment for Crassus's Parthian campaign as both Caesar & Pompey had large armies in Gaul & Spain. In the 50s Caesar would have had between 4 & 11 legions & Pompey had 4 in Spain so the barrel would be scraped bare in regards to manpower, armour & weapons...................

Between 10 and 30 years later (not that much change in population certainly) some 60 odd legions were fielded between both sides. With sufficent iron and manpower available why not be able to equip them all with mail? By the turn of the century there are still 28 legions and a likely equal amount of auxiliaries (all also armoured), so there seems no real reason that sufficient mail armour cannot be provided for ->300,000 men.

Maintaining those numbers seems to have been perfectly possible over those 50 years.

[Mark Hygate]

...................... Essentially, this was the beginning of a whole new era. :-|

But was it?

In the West the bow was never as prevalent, until much later. Did the Roman army (ever ones to adopt good ideas) suddenly transition to the bow? No, not until later which is much better explained by a range requirement.

Carrhae was a disaster, yes, but reading the accounts makes it fairly clear that it was, in fact, not a single battle, but a process of attrition (not dissimilar to Xenophon's earlier as noted). 'Wounds' are the most noticeable, particularly on the exposed portions. Crassus, not entirely unreasonably as at least someone on his staff would have hoped for logistic difficulties, was initially hopeful of simply waiting for the arrows to run out - queue the camel trains. :oops:

Post-Carrhae the Romans often won their battles with the Parthians, particularly sieges, when one might think that archers now firing from inside walls might be even more devastating - but no.

The evidence for consistent armour-piercing bowfire does not seem to exist. If it did, then we would have seen a step-change. That step-change did not occur until the introduction of the crossbow and then the musket - and there are excellent reasons for that.

I particularly wish to point out the composition and arms and armour of the Parthians themselves. The majority the common, and future classic, unarmoured steppe/desert style of rider with the bow - the other, the more noble, fully armoured cataphract - armoured completely sufficiently (with a mix of scale and mail and leather, horse included) that the arrows cannot penetrate - so much so that he doesn't even need a shield!

The nobles' armour can stop an arrow - why not the Romans? Unless, as we see, the arrows come think and fast from every direction - and thus catch the exposed portions (bits the cataphract doesn't have :wink: ).

[Dan Howard]

An arrow in the foot will incapacitate a soldier just as surely as an arrow through the heart.

[Alanus]

Mark,

I never said that arrows could consistently pierce hamate, just that it's possible-- and probable-- that they could and did. I'm talking about a whole new era in archery, in which even the Romans adopted this new bow style. I don't care if the Romans won later battles against the Parthians. That's not the subject at hand. Frankly, I wouldn't care if the Romans ever won a battle. I'm a barbarian with a bow. Enough said. :grin:

[Alanus]

An arrow in the foot will incapacitate a soldier just as surely as an arrow through the heart.

Agreed. Carrhae was an arrow in the foot... and elsewhere. It was a disaster before it even began, Crassus being overconfident and undermanned. I don't want to get off-topic, but the Parthian cataphracts were impaling the infantry two at a time. Within the first ten minutes, the Romans were shaken to the core... and it went downhill from there. I'm not saying hamata didn't do its job. I'm just quoting Abraham Lincoln-- "You can stop some of the arrows some of the time, but you can't stop all of the arrows all of the time."

[Alexandr K]

I think approximately 7 legions accompanied Crassus on his expedition and three of those were the Syrian legions he was entitled to as the governor of Roman Syria. So he probably had to raise 3 or 4 legions from scratch. As one of the Triumvirs he would have had a hostile Senate to deal with so he would probably have had to finance a large portion of the equipping of his army himself. There must have been a bit of scouring and looting of temples for arms and armour as well as veterans' settlements for recruits or any unwanted available arms, armourers would have been in short supply and high demand and therefore very expensive so maybe the' old moneylender' in Crassus thought cheap is quick and best. I don't think there were as many 'fabricae' or armanents workshops scattered around in late Republican times like in the Late Empire & if there were they would already be pretty busy.
It seems to me that Crassus totally underestimated the Parthians and was equipping his army for a massive looting expedition rather than a military one, as he chose the direct route down the Euphrates rather than through Armenia whose king offered him extra troops and more importantly cavalry. Poor equipment and manpower, maybe a lack of quality officers and centurions, and superior weapons and tactics from the Parthians, bad tactics and some inept leadership from Crassus. A toxic recipe for defeat and disaster.[/align]

- There are several assumptions here, that are not backed-up by our sources and sometimes even the contrary is true.

1) Actually we do not know how many new legions Crassus had to recruit and how many of them were seasoned troops. Senate was partly hostile to Crassus, but on the other hand the other triumvires supported his campaign. Certainly we know that there were veterans from Pompey's army with Crassus, so although there were many rookie soldiers in his army, there surely was a backbone of experienced soldiers, centurions and officers (I don't have access to my literature now, so I will provide source for this later).

2) Poor armour - this is just your assumption. I would say the defensive equipment of the Romans worked quite well with regard to the circumstances and especially against the Parthian arrows. The Parthians had the best conditions for shooting one can imagine. Given the very low numbers of light, long-range troops and cavalry regiments in Crassus army, they could shoot from short distances. They were able to encircle the Roman army, so they could shoot from different angles at the same times, which means that it was more difficult for the Romans to defend (you can hold your shield in one direction only. Due to their high mobility (and very low mobility of the Romans) they could choose when and where they will attack - the initiative was totally on their side. They could shoot on the Roman formation under these great conditions for a very long time (probably up to 7 hours). The Parthians showered the legionaries with a very high number of arrows. I have calculated that some 270 000 arrows is the minimum number of arrows fired on the Romans during the main battle (ie. not counting the retreat during next days). But the real number was very, very probably much higher. Personally I think that some number between 500 000 - 1 000 000 arrows is most probable. See also previous post of Michael Kerr about Farrokh's estimate. Although his calculations are a bit problematic they can also provide a hint about what the Romans had to face. In spite of all this the number of casualties to the arrows in the main battle was probably not that high - according to my calculations and estimates they were between some 5500 and 12000 dead and wounded (to a similar estimate came A. Günther, who has 6-7000 casualties in the main battle - see Günther, A.: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kriege zwischen Römern und Parthern, Berlin, 1922, p. 36, note 3).

Given the almost perfect conditions the Parthians had, the number of arrows fired and the number of probable casualties, it seems to me pretty obvious, that the reports of Cassius Dio and Plutarch are exaggerated and the Roman shields and armour did a good job. Surely most of the missiles were blocked by the large shields. However, given the long time the Romans had to spend under the terrific barrage of Parthian arrows coming form more angles, many arrows must have reached past the shields and these must have been blocked by chain-mail. Just for your information, there is no mention in our sources about the Romans forming a testudo, although it is possible that they may have used it at least partly. This is confirmed by a description of later battles of the Romans under Mark Antony with the Parthians, where the legionaries formed a testudo and thus withstood similar attacks of Parthian horse archers (Front. Strat. II. 3. 15; see also Cass. Dio XLIX. 29–30; Plut. Antonius 45 and 49). So - yes, the Parthian arrows could sometimes pierce Roman shields or chain-mail armours (as Plutarch and Cassius Dio claim), but even at Carrhae this did not happen often or regularly. The true disaster for the Romans happened during the next days during their retreat. This is where the Roman army virtually ceased to exist. Everybody, who wants to know how I came to the above estimated numbers and all my reasoning with citations of primary and secondary sources, please check my article I mentioned in one of my previous posts in this tread.

Greetings
Alexandr

[PhilusEstilius]

I think we can go around and round the houses all day long about Crassus or who ever and how heavy battles might have been, but at the end of the day I would consider an arrow can go through chainmail for is this not why soldiers carried a shield to cover themselves when the rain comes in.

[Vindex]

Armor was kept in superb condition by the soldiers. It wouldn't have been worn and torn, although it would have seen a lot of action. Roman armor was of excellent quality, and very well maintained, far better than pretty much anything else until the 15th century.

Evidence or supposition?

[Walhaz]

That was exactly my point, its not a matter of hyperbole or the well respected quality of a good soldiers armor but of what was available how well kept it was. I am sure a wealthy soldier had nigh indestructible armor for the time but what of the poor? How well would a repair really have held up? What could a new recruit who was poor really expect or be afforded when their were sparse but apparently better soldiers or wealthier ones?

It would not even need to be a matter of poorly-kept armor, although the points about the potential quality of Crassus' army made in this thread are well taken. Even if the armor was of the best quality, dealing with so many arrows over the course of the day would have degraded the armor even if the troops had maintained it that morning. Simply put, the aggregate damage sustained by the armor over the course of the day at Carrhae could not have been repaired, and eventually armor would have started failing.

[Michael Kerr]

Hi Alexandre, at the time Crassus was raising troops, things were not going that well for Caesar in Gaul and Pompey was in Rome and had just lost his wife and was letting deputies run things for him in his alloted territory Spain. Maybe he wanted Crassus to fail so that he could relive old glories like in his younger days and be the hero called on by the people of Rome to retrieve the situation if Crassus failed. Caesar did give him 1000 Gallic cavalry and Pompey probably some troops but I don't think too many. Cassius Dio mentions that Crassus had to recruit low quality troops from Italy. Crassus as governor of Syria had 3 legions at his disposal and I wouldn't know how many he could cobble together from Asia Minor. if maybe two legions then he still would have had to build 2 legions from scratch.
As to terrain, the Romans chose that so I don't really know what your point is regarding their difficulty in fighting the Parthian/Saka cavalry. The other examples you mentioned about testudio formations were in Syria and Armenia, terrain less favourable to Parthian cavalry which probably had the usual resupply problems horse archers face. But Surena ensured that they did not face that problem at Carrhae. Ventidius showed a few years after Carrhae how deadly slingers could be against Parthian cavalry on hilly ground but Crassus was not the soldier Ventidius was.
The number of arrows used at Carrhae are debatable but if you look at the situation mathematically if you have 9000 horse archers and 1000 supply camels then that is 1 camel per 9 men. If the camel can carry 180 lb and say for argument's sake the arrows weigh 1 oz then that works out at 3000 arrows per camel or roughly 300-333 arrows per man and that is not including any that the riders may carry themselves, say a quiver at 30 arrows, some may have a few quivers. That works out at just under 3 million arrows. If the arrows were heavier say 2 oz then there still would have been 1.5 million arrows.
Crassus probably formed his army into a dense square & must have assumed that the Parthians would exhaust their supply of arrows and then either attack his square or withdraw. John Peddie in his book 'The Roman War Machine' says each side of the square probably presented a dense1000 yard frontage, probably 9 men deep with the cavalry in the middle, so the Parthians would not have had to aim and with the amount of arrows they had at their disposal & not all of them would have been deflected by shields. The horse archers could get up close and fire and retreat as Crassus or his commanders sent out light troops to drive them away and pick the lightly armed troops off and then return to their original firing positions (just out of javelin range), it would have been like shooting fish in a barrel. Eventually Crassus must have realised that the arrow storm was not going to abate, and then sent his son out with a mixed force of allied cavalry, archers and infantry (about 5800 men) to chase off a certain group of Parthian horse archers that must have been creating real problems for the Romans. Things were obviously getting desperate, so he must have been taking steady casualties otherwise he could have waited till darkness to retreat. Unfortunately for Publius Crassus he fell for the old steppe ‘feigned retreat’ where the Parhian/Saka light horse archers lured the Romans well away from their square and towards the waiting cataphracts, turning and joining the cataphracts by hitting the Romans in the flanks while the cataphracts would have attacked the front and destroying the breakout force. Basically the battle of Carrhae was over then as Crassus lost his son and his cavalry as well as his will to fight on and the rest of his army were sitting ducks. The retreat just put the icing on the cake for Surena as it turned into a rout. Sampson writes that the only thing Surena wanted was either the body or capture of Crassus so that the Romans could not save face, and he got his wish as the Roman troops basically forced a broken Crassus to meet with Surena and of course get captured. Yes my opinion I know.
Both sources, Plutarch and Dio talk about the penetration by Parthian arrows yet you think they exaggerated but without other contemporary evidence I see no reason to disbelieve them. But we always quote the sources when they back up our arguments but dismiss them when they don't. I am no different and one thing that bugs me is how Cassius comes out of the battle as the hero and a bit of a military genius where he basically deserted. Gareth Sampson in his book thinks that he must have written some sort of now lost battlefield report that both Plutarch and Dio seemed to know about. Of course he came out of the battle smelling like a rose while Crassus copped all the criticism for the disaster that occurred. A bit later he turned out to be such a trustworthy person.
By the way I did enjoy your article on the battle of Carrhae even though we disagree on a lot of points. :-) :-) :-)

Regards
Michael Kerr

[Gregg]

Nearly identical discussion almost 5 years ago. Interesting to see some of the same conclusions/contentions:

http://www.romanarmytalk.com/17-roman-mi...oh-my.html

[Alanus]

Thanks for the link, Gregg. mile:
Hopefully, this review can offer more on the subject.

[Alexandr K]

Hi Michael,

Reading your post it seems we are quite in agreement with regard to the basic, general outlines of the battle and we differ rather in those little, uncertain details mile: Anyway, it is always good to read different opinions and arguments and learn from them.

Just as an explanation, those references to the other battles by Mark Antony are meant as supporting arguments for my main opinion, that Parthian arrows are not normally able to penetrate Roman defensive equipment. Otherwise I agree that the circumstances were a bit different.

I agree also with your opinion that the battle was lost for Crassus as soon as his son Publius with the Gallic cavalry was annihilated. But at this time I think it wasn't a complete disaster yet. When the day ended a larger part of the army was still alive and able to fight (although with hugely shattered morale). Numerically the Romans were probably still stronger than the Parthians at this time (although as you know I do not believe the "9000 horse archers, 1000 cataphracts" theory). May be a better general could still save a larger part of the army and bring it back to Syria. May be not. Who knows

And lastly, I wholeheartedly agree with you with regard to Cassius. Yes, we cannot deny his merits in the following years after Carrhae, when he successfully defended Syria against Parthian incursions and invasions. But from what we know at Carrhae he didn't help his general, he didn't try to help the army, he simply took his horse and deserted.

Greetings,
Alexandr