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Battle of Charrea and other questions
#16
I am quite familiar with the work, but can make no claim to be an academic and really cannot say how it is viewed in those circles. My professor commented that it was a slightly 'odd' work, but did not really go into the matter.<br>
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Regarding the work, it was one of the principle secondary sources I used to help clairify Ammianus. His maps were especially invaluable, as I had no access to detailed maps of the region around Ctesiphon. In fact, the only other detailed map of that area I could find was a copy of pilots maps from the gulf war. Interestingly enough, most of the cities Matthews lists are shown as ruins on the modern maps.<br>
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I understand your pattern of reading it; the author has an alarming tendency to go on multi-page tangents. He does seem to back up his conclusions with logic and facts, unlike many other authors.<br>
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WWB <p></p><i></i>
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#17
I'm inclined to agree with the despotic aspects of Julian. I think we've exaggerated a little here, but there are certainly echoes that he did not have hte full support of his military commanders in Ammianus. I've seen him described as pathalogically stubborn (a great phrase I thought).<br>
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As to Romans knowing about the territory they were invading, I'm sure they knew the geography and the climate, but whether they knew how to supply an army in those conditions is unclear. Julian's invasion was the first by a Roman army in over 70 years. This must have been an issue, certainly there were morale problems involved in persuading hte troops httat they wanted to cross the border. there were significant numbers of Christians in the Eastern armies who may not have been fully behind Julian as he tried to reestablish paganism, and the pagans amy not have been fully behind him either. Julian's philosophising paganism was not the same as the 'beliefs' (if one can use that word with regard to Roman religion) of the ordinary troops. Significantly he was ignoring the sorts of ill omens that the common troops laid great stock in, probably whether they were pagan or not.<br>
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If you read Ammianus there is a very strong impression as his account of the campaign goes on. He demonstates increasing anger and is tempremental, there's plenty of raging and gnashing of teeth. Moral fell low, as demonstrated by the attempt at decimation as he began to panic.<br>
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At this rate my entire essay will get posted, I might as well cut and paste<br>
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As to Matthews book, to quote the reading list my lecturer wrote 'a magesterial study of Ammianus and his times, and the basic 'textbook' for this module'. Hence I've hardly seen it, because it's been out of the library virtually all year, and I've only glanced at it. Such is the way of the world.<br>
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<p>It's not a bug, it's a feature</p><i></i>
In the name of heaven Catiline, how long do you propose to exploit our patience..
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#18
By all means, Cataline, post the essay away.<br>
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But more seriously, your comment about the beliefs of the eastern army brings up a very interesting point. Who exactly was fighting under Justinian on his fatal campaign. I am actually inclined to believe it was, at least to a large extent, troops which came from the west with him in 362. There is some evidence for this, for Ammianus describes some of the quite germanic behavior of the troops (war cries, fighting in wedge formations, etc.) and it also makes sense on a political level. When going east would Julian put himself in the possibly decietful hands of an army he has not yet met? Or would he bring a core of proven, loyal troops with him?<br>
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WWB <p></p><i></i>
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#19
The troops were, I think, largely Eastern ones. It has to be rememberdered that Constantius was planning a campaign against the Persians, Julain simply took over hte preperations. Also I think politically it was necessary to gain the support of the eastern legions rather than to alienate at them . The most effective way to do this would have been to lead them on a successful campaign. As Sander has mentioned elsewhere today, when it came to political intrigue it was the officer class rather than the squaddies who needed to be purged. <p>It's not a bug, it's a feature</p><i></i>
In the name of heaven Catiline, how long do you propose to exploit our patience..
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#20
Salvete,<br>
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The field army of Julianus contained troops from both the Western and Eastern parts of the empire. Though some units are mentioned by name in Ammianus, it is not correct to use the much later Notitia Dignitatum as a reference to place them in either the western or the eastern field armies for there was much shuffling about of field army formations in the intervening years. Part of the western troops objected to serving beyond the agreed territorial limits when they were to be used as reinforcements for the original campaign, though they seem to have gone there without raising objections when Julianus led them east.<br>
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There is nothing specifically Germanic about Roman troops fighting in wedges in the fourth century CE. They had been doing that from republican times.<br>
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Matthews is one of the great authorities on Ammianus Marcellinus. Some other publications of interest on this historian are:<br>
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Austin, N.J.E., <i> Ammianus on warfare</i> (Brussels, 1979).<br>
Crump, G.A., 'Ammianus and the Late Roman Army' in: <i> Historia</i> 22 (1973), 91-103.<br>
Crump, G.A., <i> Ammianus Marcellinus as a Military Historian, Historia Einzelschriften 27</i> (Wiesbaden, 1975).<br>
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On Alexander not being chained to supply lines I would have to disagree. There was careful planning of logistics in his campaigns and only on a few occasions did the supply of his army go drastically wrong, as in the Gedrosian desert.<br>
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The matter of the Roman eastern campaigns going wrong is very interesting. Despite centuries of warfare over the same grounds campaigns could still go wrong with Roman and Byzantine armies loosing their way. Though the Roman state did have the means at its disposal to gather and disseminate information and intelligence this does not appear to have resulted in a systematic collection of data on foreign territories to be available for later consultation. It appears to have been necessary to reinvent the wheel over and over again whenever a Roman general felt like emulating Alexander and start their own campaign to subdue the east.<br>
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Regards,<br>
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Sander van Dorst<br>
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Another book on Ammianus Marcellinus:<br>
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T.D. Barnes, <i> Ammianus Marcellinus and the representation of historical reality</i> (Ithaca 1998).<br>
<p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 5/6/01 7:55:28 pm<br></i>
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#21
You are right. I guess what I tried to say was that the impression I get from Alexander's campaign is that they simply left on a "who knows how long it will take" adventure. The fact that he ended up going after Darius and then more means that it wasn't a planned expedition but was, from a certain point onwards, entirely improvised.<br>
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<p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 5/6/01 6:11:00 pm<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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