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04-19-2002, 08:42 AM

Salve, 
 
The clades Variana was a major defeat, resulting in the loss of a significant portion of Roman military strength, but its implications on long term Roman military policy may have been more limited than at first sight seems to be the case. To the Roman eye a definite break with previous policy to conquer the Germanic north may not have been as apparent as to us, who have the benefit of hindsight. It may have been the result of a range of ad hoc decisions influenced by a range of considerations rather than a single strategic choice inspired by a single event. Augustus may have given up hopes of immediate reconquest and have advised his successor to leave the empire more or less what it was (thus securing his own image of greatness), but this did not prevent other emperors to seek new conquests. 
 
The Roman view of their empire was not so much one that held territories as well as one that consisted of people. It was more fluid than the modern concept of empires defined by geographical maps. Roman Dacia was for instance eventually evacuated, but the (relevant) people resettled on the western bank of the Danube where a new province of Dacia was created. The Roman empire also used various means and degrees of control. At various times parts of the empire were placed in the hands of client states and client tribes. Thus parts of the Germans across the Rhine would at certain times have been considered clients well within the sphere of Roman influence, though due to the social structure where arrangements and treaties were dependent on the personal relations between the two parties, void when one or both of them died, such influence was always tenuous. Roman power periodically and iregularly extended beyond the Rhine, though the looser nature of barbarian groupings made these extensions not permanent. 
 
Roman knowledge of the world outside the immediate borders of their empire was sketchy and they are likely to have been much less aware of the exact lay of the land than modern man with his better maps. Though lack of precise maps on a relatively small scale can still bug the modern military from time to time, due to aerial - and space reconnaissance the great outlines at least are known. Such knowledge was not available to the Romans. Though the territories within the borders could be measured and mapped with some degree of accuracy, the Romans faced huge difficulties when trying to figure out what was in the barbaricum. Our modern perception is so distorted by our better understanding of geography that there might be a tendency to see logical arrangements and conclusions where the Romans through lack of information would have been in the dark. 
 
Some reading on strategy, intelligence and establishment of frontiers 
 
Austin, N.J.E. and N.B. Rankov, Exploratio. Military intelligence in the Roman world from the second Punic war to the battle of Adrianople (London 1995) 
292p. 
Dilke, O.A.W., Greek and Roman maps (London 1985) 224p. 
Luttwak, E.N., The grand strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore 1976) 255p. 
Mann, J.C., 'The frontiers of the principate' in: ANRW II-1 (1975), 508-533. 
Mann, J.C., 'Power, force and the frontiers of the empire' in: JRS 69 (1979), 175-183. 
Mattern, S.P., Rome and the enemy. Imperial strategy in the principate (Berkeley 1999) 259p. 
Millar, F., 'Emperors, frontiers and foreign relations, 31 BC to AD 378' in: Britannia 13 (1982), 1-23. 
Sherk, R.K., 'Roman geographical exploration and military maps' in: ANRW II-1 (1974), 534-562. 
 
Regards, 
 
Sander van Dorst Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 4/19/02 10:45:39 am

04-19-2002, 10:25 AM

Being a pragmatic roman, I am used at calling a cat a cat and a strategic defeat a strategic defeat. And the Clades Variana was one and was viewed as such by the Romans, I think. 
Actually that battle was only part of a grander disaster: the Romans had planned a gigantic pincer movement against free Germany from the west (the Rhine) and the south (Illyricum). That strategic move was blown to bits by the illyrian rebellion in 6 CE and it certainly has something to do with the ill-fated Varus' expedition three years later. 
The roman "frontier" policies were always the same and consisted in implanting "islands" or romanity in conquered lands, by building legionary fortresses at strategic points and establishing colonies for veterans along the main commercial routes. I don't see why these policies should have been any different in Germany. What is obvious is that they failed and that although indeed roman influence was very strong among the germanic clans or "kingdoms" close to the limes, it is clear that Augustus and his successors viewed the free Germans as an hopelessly "un-romanizable" bunch. 
If they hadn't, being themselves a very persistent bunch, the Romans would have tried again and again to romanize them. 
Yet they didn't and all the roman military inroads into free Germany afterwards were of punitive nature, meaning that the Empire had gone from an offensive to a defensive stance. Instead of being the threat themselves they responded to a threat from the free Germans. 
Would things have been different without the Clades Variana? I think not. Empires, like all living organisms reach a point of maximum development, then they grow old and die. 
The Romans reached the Elbe river, Denmark and the scottish highlands in the north, the Persian Gulf in the east and the Sudan in the south. That's quite an impressive record already.. 
In a grander strategic and commercial view, I wonder if the Romans were not also seeking through Germany a "north-east passage" towards Asia that would bypass the Parthian empire? 
And after all, didn't eventually the Germans became romanized? 
Charlemagne, a German, was a "roman emperor" agreed by the Holy See itself. Germany for a long while was the "Holy Roman Germanic Empire", although as the saying goes it was "neither holy, nor roman and much less an empire" . 
At the prussian court of Frederick the Great, french --a latin language-- was spoken and finally it's the Germans, not the Italians who not so long ago, were ruled by a "Kaiser/Caesar".. 
Roma capta cepit victores...

Goffredo · 04-19-2002, 10:45 AM

Those of western culture are an incredible mix of germanic and roman/greek contributions. But in my opinion the roman culture ultimately won. "History" is a Greek and hence Roman contribution to humanity and the fact we even know about Arminius is because the romans admired him and wanted to tell the "STORY". 
 
I find it incredible that the "Germans" forgot him! They learned about him when Tacitus' work on germany was found 1000 years later! I believe that there is only a very tenuous trace of him in german myths (is this true?) but certainly no rock carvings have been found in germany to tell the story of Arminius, nothing tangible whatsoever! The Persians (Sassanians) left no written history (strange that all was lost), but they did document the capture of Valerian by Shapur. They had a notion of SELF. They were a STATE that needed to re-assert its existence and artists were payed to produce a permanent record, for the eternal glory of Shapur and the eternal disgrace of Rome! What did the germans DO? What WERE the germans? What did they LEAVE? The very fact I, and maybe all of us, LAMENT the lack of TRACEs is so very WESTERN. We like HISTORY and not just telling myths. The "germans" weren't good even at preserving the story/myth of Arminius! 
 
Rome really won in my opinion, even beating christianity in sublte ways as the Church, the roman catholic one explicitely, took much from rome (organization, architecture, costumes). 
 
Of course I am "joking", but am I really? Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 4/19/02 6:10:02 pm

04-19-2002, 03:51 PM

Sorry, Tim. I certainly did NOT intend to be rude. I was under the impression (erroneous, as it turns out) that this was some anonymous question someone posted on a web site, not something you were asking RAT members. It was my misunderstanding and my fault that I inadvertently offended you. I sincerely apologize. DE EM

Thiudareiks Flavius · 04-20-2002, 12:24 AM

Julius Caesr wrote: 
 
Tim. I have one idea to put forth before the group though. Don't you think that IF the Romans had REALLY wanted to, they could have reconquered/finally conquered Germany, irrespective of the Varian disaster? After all, the Dacians were much more formidable on the battlefield, and they, with a good deal of effort and strain, of course, were subdued and Romanized quite nicely. 
 
I have absolutely no doubt that the Romans definitely could have reconquered Germania, but chose not to because it simply wasn't worth the effort. But it strikes me as odd that some people are arguing that this means Arminius' victory wasn't significant. They already had conquered the place - communications links were being established, colony towns like the one at Waldgirmes were being built, chains of forts had been set up along strategic routes, Germanic nobles were sending their sons to serve with the Roman army, Roman religion was being established (with some of the Germanic ruling class serving as priests), and merchants and traders were importing Roman goods and selling them in markets set up for the purpose. 
 
In other words, everything which had been seen in the establishment of Gaul as a new province was being repeated in Germania. The province was well on the way to being Romanised and there was every indication that this process would continue. There is no indication that the Romans had any doubts about the viability of Germania as a new province or had any intention of leaving. 
 
Then came the events of September 9 AD. 
 
In the immediate aftermath Rome itself was in a panic, with wild rumours of a Germanic invasion of Italy. The forts, settlements and colonies were abandoned or sacked and Tiberius imposed strict diciplines on the movements of any troops east of the Rhine. Tacitus tells us that he and Germanicus led campaigns over the Rhine in the wake of Varus' defeat, but that they weren't offered any concerted resistance and withdrew without scoring any decisive victories and without re-establishing any permanent Roman presence in Germania Magna. 
 
And that's how things stayed. Germanicus' campaigns in the early years of Tiberius' rule were similarly indecisive and also didn't result in any re-establishment of Roman settlement and rule. Of course, Rome continued to raid into Germania, maintained relations with tribes east of the Rhine and influenced Germanic politics from afar - but the scheme of settling the province was abandoned. 
 
There is no indication that this would have happened if Varus' army had not been destroyed. 
Cheers, 
 
Tim O'Neill Tim O'Neill / Thiudareiks Flavius 

Visit Clades Variana - Home of the Varus Film Project

Thiudareiks Flavius · 04-20-2002, 01:43 AM

StrategyM wrote: 
 
Flavius - read Goffredo's response to the Dacia/Germania comparison. When you can point me to any proof that there was any good reason to conquor Germania, then we can discuss whether or not Varus's defeat had any real impact. 
 
As I've already stated a few times, we are in complete agreement on why the Romans chose not to bother reconquering Germania - it simply wasn't worth the effort and expense. But as I've already mentioned in my reply to Julius Caesr (above), I find it odd that some people think this means Arminius' victory over Varus had no 'real impact'. They had conquered Germania - they'd established transport routes, forts, colony towns, trading posts and settlements and were busily establishing Roman administration, religion and culture. Dio tells us that this policy was accelerated under Varus and implies that it was a factor in the support that Arminius received in his uprising. 
 
But in the wake of the Varian disaster this policy, and the fledgling province, were abandoned. To pretend that this had nothing to do with the defeat of Varus and was purely motivated by economic concerns is, to me, quite wrongheaded. Is there any evidence that this policy would have been abandoned if Arminius' uprising had either never happened or if it had been crushed by Varus? 
 
I have to stress that I am definitely not arguing that the Romans were so militarily crushed by the Battle of the Teutoburgerwald that they were somehow incapable of reconquering Germania - that would be ridiculous. But I find it equally difficult to accept that Varus' had no 'real impact'. Before his uprising there was a province of Germania Magna. After it, there wasn't. That sounds like a very 'real impact' to me. 
 
Your "strategic" reasons with the bulge I don't buy; the Roman concept of strategy was significantly different from the modern concept. There are many reasons for this (many cultural), but a good example is that you can see the bulge because you look at modern maps. The Romans did not have such maps. I would seriously contend (unless you can point to definite ancient evidence) that the Emperor was even awareof such a bulge in the frontier existing! 
 
It's not really 'my' idea - several writers on Roman frontier policy argue along these lines. Whether they saw the issue in terms of a 'bulge' or vulnerable salient in the Rhine/Danube frontier or not is speculation, but there are good reasons to believe that the extensive campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius were at least partially motivated by a need to shorten this frontier by pushing it eastward. Once Germania Magna was abandoned, there is also evidence that the juncture of the Rhine/Danube frontier was still regarded as a vulnerability: one which came to be strengthened by the limes. 
 
 
If it was simply these economic and strategic concerns which caused this decision, do you really think the Romans would have withdrawn without the Varian Defeat? 
 
But they did not withdraw, even with the Varian defeat. When considering Roman strategy, you have to realize that their vision of "control" and "strategic zones" is not the same as modern strategic thought. Tiberius, Drusus, Germanicus and Corbulo all had their "fun" in the Germannic forests. I verymuch doubt you'd have a contemporary Roman commander considering this to be a withdrawal. 
 
The abandonment of the policy of colonising, settling and Romanising Germania much as Gaul had been colonised and Romanised is definitely a withdrawal. It strikes me that pretending occasional (rather indecisive) military strikes over the Rhine and the previous Augustan policy are both much the same thing is a bit fanciful. The Augustan plan of a Roman Germania was abandoned as a direct result of the Varian disaster. 
 
In general, I think the following summarization of the Germans probably catches the Roman reasoning quite well:too backward and poor to exploit efficiently, too savage to conquor easily. 
 
That's what the Roman policy became after the Clades Variana. Look at what Dio tells us Augustus' policy was before that defeat - it was quite different. AD 9 changed all that. 
 
Apart from underlining the "too savage to conquor easily" -- something the Romans would have learnt along the way in any case (or already knew) -- I don't see the Varus disaster as having any effect on this reasoning at all. Conquest only makes sense as long as you can get it to pay for itself. Theconquest of Germania couldn't. 
 
Prior to 9 AD, the Emperor Augustus completely disagreed with you. After 9 AD is another story. Do you really think the Varus disaster had 'no effect on this reasoning'?! What caused the change in policy then? And why does it seem to co-incide with 9 AD? 
 
On to Adrianople ... 
 
 
But the battle was a significant tactical defeat because an army of elite Eastern Roman units was crushed by a far less disciplined and generally weaker force whic had been on the defensive. 
 
Which statement is something I'd consider part of the myth. 
 
Really? Which part? 
 
Most current commentary on this battle agrees that the two armies were fairly evenly matched in numbers, but no-one would argue they were evenly matched in quality, discipline, training and equipment. The Romans had a massive advantage in all of those respects, as Fritigern realised. This is why he tried everything he could to avoid a battle and why Valens was so confident of victory. A false confidence, as it turned out. 
 
 
This force was large enough to hold off Theodosius, force a settlement from him and go on to follow Alaric to Italy and carve out a kingdom in Gaul. 
 
 
In itself a good arguement that the Gothic army was of significantly larger size than the Roman one at Adrianople. 
 
Actually, it isn't. There were enough of Fritigern's people for them to continue to be a problem to the Empire certainly. But this is no indication of the relative strengths of Valens' and Fritigern's armies at Adrianople at all. As I've said, current estimates agree that the two armies were of about the same size. 
 
But quite apart from this, I consider the failure of Theodosius the (not so) Great's inability to either defeat the Goths, or come to a suitable settlement to be a much more significant factor. From the other point of view, one can speculate that a Roman victory at Adrianople would not have changed the resulting years much - after all Theodosius (and Gratian) had quite a number of successes against the Goths, without beingable to "destroy" them. Why should the result of Adrianople have been any different? 
 
Because of evidence of what happened in parallel situations. Fritgern, Alatheus and Saphrax weren't the only leaders to bring refugee groups over the Danube. Farnobius led a force of Greuthungian Goths and Taifali into Thrace in 377 and was defeated by Frigeridus and the Illyrian army. The survivors were split up and settled in upper Italy and Aquitania. Similarly, it seems that after Alatheus and Saphrax's forces parted company from Fritgern, they too were defeated and broken up. There's little doubt Fritigern's forces would have been handled in a similar way if Valens had won at Adrianople (he'd hardly simply give them a pat on the head and let them continue ravaging Thrace, after all). 
 
But Valens lost. 
 
As purely military disasters, though, I agree that Teutoburger Wald and Adrianople were significant. 
 
No disagreements there. 
 
But Cannae and Arausio still top that list by far. 
 
Indeed. The difference lies in the strategic impacts that the Teutoburgerwald and Adrianople had. 
Cheers, 
Tim O'Neill / Thiudareiks Flavius 

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