If Hannibal decide to join Roman army....

[StrategyM]

I really do have to finish writing that article which I've been working on for ages now, but haven't had the time to finish: "In Defence of the Carthaginian Senate".<br>
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A. Barca - go back to the "original" historical sources, instead of uncritically swallowing the assessments of 19th and early 20th historians (do I detect yet another person to swallow T. H. Dodge raw?). All the evidence is there for anyone to read in the original sources, and it in no way supports the idea that Hannibal received anything but the full and unqualified backing of the Carthaginian Senate throughout the war.<br>
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Dodge's assessment of Scipio (which yours resembles) is obviously coloured by bitterness that someone actually managed to outwit and defeat Hannibal. He was in fact neither the first, nor the last general to do so.<br>
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Going on at length about how Scipio is merely a copy of Hannibal ignores the accounts in Polybius of the strategies of Xanthippos and Hamilcar Barca, both of whom employed all the strategies later used by Hannibal: double envelopments, ambushes, elephants, etc.. Are we then to say that Hannibal is not a great General because 99% of the stratagems and tactics he used were well-known and used before his time by Xantippos and Hamilcar Barca (and in fact many other Generals as well)? Then how can we say that Scipio is less of a general (especially considering that the majority of his stratagems have little in common with those of Hannibal except the result - victory)? This sort of arguement is silly, and can only recoil on the person arguing for it. Military science is simple - it is the application of this science in a real-life situation that is hard. At this problem, both Hannibal and Scipio excelled.<br>
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Talking of legends, it is interesting to note that for most of the ancient and medieval period, Scipio - not Hannibal - was considered the greater legend. It is primarily with the fervent propaganda efforts of the historians of 18th and 19th centuries that this trend was changed and Scipio (like another great general, Wellington) was eclipsed by the modern mindset of always favoring the underdog.<br>
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Regarding GZ's questions:<br>
1. The Roman system of government was designed to prevent any one person from achieving pre-eminence. Thus Hannibal would have had his 1 or 2 consulships of glory, and have passed on in history as yet another of the many illustrious military heroes of the Roman world: Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the Scipios, the Decius Mus's, Fabius Maximus, etc.<br>
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2. The Roman conquest of "Europe" took place over a period of more than 250 years. Yet another military man would not have changed this progression of events significantly.<br>
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3. Whether or not Rome could have defeated Persia depends very much on what time period you're looking at. At the time of Alexander's invasion, Persia was ripe to fall - as Xenophon's march of the 10,000 clearly indicated. Any competent conquoror could probably have destroyed it, given the military ressources required. It was a far more dynamic (and resilient) entity during the time of Cyrus the Great (incidentally, a man that Scipio is supposed to have admired greatly and sought to emulate) and Darius the Great. It is worth noting however that Rome repeatedly "conquered" Parthia (which covered most of the Persian empire), though these campaigns did not result in a permanent presence. <p>Strategy<br>
Designer/Developer<br>
Imperium - Rise of Rome</p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ustrategym.showPublicProfile?language=EN>StrategyM</A> at: 4/14/02 3:02:44 pm<br></i>

[Anonymous]

At the Granicus river battle, Darius was not present, actually. And the Persians deployed their cavalry in the front line --a big tactical blunder-- despite the advice of the greek general Memnon, in persian service, to withdraw and follow a scorched earth policy. This is the only one of the three big battles against the Persians where they actually made a tactical mistake as far as deployment is concerned. This was most certainly due to the fact that the six satraps in charge of the battle were pretty sure it would be easy to defeat the macedonian "barbarian" and his puny little army. They forgot the first commandment of warfare: "Thou shalt NEVER underestimate your enemy".<br>
At Issos, Darius, or rather his generals actually managed to outmaneuver Alexander and position themselves between the Macedonian and his rear.<br>
The battle was then very hard fought and the Persians actually used the same hammer and anvil tactics as Alexander by massing a lot of cavalry on their right in the hope of achieving a breakthrough and wheel around the rear of the macedonian army. In charge of the macedonian left wing, Parmenio had a hard time repelling that persian onslaught. When Alexander finally broke through the persian center-left --at a heavy price-- Darius fled, triggering a rout of the persian left and center. But Alexander could not pursue Darius because he had to rush to support Parmenio who at that point was in very dire straits. It is only when the persian horsemen saw that the rest of the army was running that they finally broke and fled.<br>
The Persian didn't make any tactical mistake there. They fought hard and bravely, but they were pitted against Alexander.<br>
At Gaugameles, the Macedonian performed one of the most elegant --if not the most elegant-- moves in military history : a refused left flank, with two mutually supporting lines, moving obliquely out of the battlefield which Darius had carefully chosen to be able to use his famous but totally unefficient war chariots.<br>
Darius was going for a double envelopment and Alexander won against all odds. A double envelopment was indeed the right thing to do and it was a very close call. Alexander's movement forced the Persians to extend their left and that opened gaps in their line. But the macedonian left led again by Permanio was outflanked by the persian cavalry, and gaps also opened in the macedonian center. Those gaps were exploited by the Persian cavalry which broke through. But they went for Alexander's camp and supply train instead of attacking his rear, and they were repelled by the second line. This was an enormous mistake and the turning point of the battle, as Alexander's situation was then desperate. But he finally managed to slip through the gaps in the persian left, using his usual tactics of heavy cavalry charge supported by infantry. Again he went straight for the king, who, again fled, triggering the rout of his whole army. However, Alexander had to hack his way through persian warriors to come to the rescue of Parmenio, and that again prevented him to catch Darius on the battlefield.<br>
The fact that the persian cavalry went for the supply train and the camp rather than for Alexander's rear has probably more to do with local tradition in warfare than tactics. Or maybe it's just indiscipline. But the weaknesses of the macedonian organisation were exploited by the Persians: its small size (the double envelopment) and the gaps (the cavalry breakthrough).<br>
All those three battles were very close call affairs. The king Darius lost them by fleeing. But his generals and his army cannot be held accountable for their king's cowardly behaviour.<br>
As for Scipio, there is one lesser known battle he fought at Ilipa, in Spain, where he demonstrated that he too could use "hannibalistic" tactics. Even improve on them.. I strongly recommend the study of that battle. Very elegant too.<br>
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[StrategyM]

Actually, I think one could make a very strong case that Darius only fled when the battles were in fact mostly lost and not - as many texts would have us think - causing the loss of the battles (IIRC, this case has actually been made in at least one article). And while this might not be the most chivalrous thing to do, it was clearly the smartest thing to do in terms of keeping the Persian empire alive - if he hadn't fled at Issos, there would have been no Gaugemela.<br>
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After all, there was always the chance that Alexander would die in one of these battles (as almost happened several times, due to Alexander's preference for being in the thick of the action [and incidentally, during this time unable to command his army]). <p>Strategy<br>
Designer/Developer<br>
Imperium - Rise of Rome</p><i></i>

[Anonymous]

There should be a "delete" function on that thing when one puts something on the board by mistake...<br>
The next one should be the good one..<br>
<p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=antoninuslucretius>Antoninus Lucretius</A> at: 4/16/02 2:15:38 pm<br></i>

[Anonymous]

The fact that Darius fled only after his army broke is indeed a possibility. However, the Great King obviously did not demonstrate the least amount of personal courage or charisma. For reasons that have mostly to do with local cultural traditions he did not have the means to galvanize his troops in a crisis situation. At that point the only answer he had was fleeing.<br>
The Great King stood behind the King's servants, who did the dying for him.<br>
The king Alexander stood among his companions, ready to die at their side, and that made the difference.<br>
And of course there is the Goddess Fortuna, a.k.a. Lady Luck, a.k.a. the Guardian Angel in which all the great conquerors believe blindly and on which they actually rely. In all the great captain's campaigns, luck is prominent. Hearing praises of a general who was recommended to him, Napoleon had this simple answer: "He's good. Fine. But is he lucky?"<br>
Actually you can make it: in all military campaigns, luck is prominent.<br>
And now about Ilipa. Won by Scipio against the Carthaginians in Spain and where he actually produced a sort of negative print of Hannibal's deployment at Cannae. A very elegant battle too.<br>
At Cannae Hannibal stood his infantry on the defensive and let his center fall back until the Romans were surrounded by his pikemen on the wings. Meanwhile his excellent cavalry had chased the pathetic roman cavalry off the field and came back to complete the encirclement of the legions.<br>
At Ilipa Scipio proceeded on the move, following the same lines: the center made of Iberians auxiliaries advanced slower than the wings, made up of legionaries. After an initial cavalry/light troops fight, those withdrew behind the wings then they both advanced in column on the double before deploying scissors like on both flanks of the Carthaginians. A very complicated maneuver whose details are very well explained in Connolly's "Greece and Rome at war". Such a maneuver implies a total control over the infantry's movement as well as a cavalry body that doesn't gallop away from the field at the first opportunity. Two things the Romans did not have at Cannae.<br>
With a Scipio and trained men like at Ilipa, Rome would definitely have won at Cannae, I think. <p></p><i></i>

[StrategyM]

I don't think their command styles made much of a difference in (or the other) battles. As you state - this was purely cultural, and Darius seems to have behaved as a Persian King was expected to (i.e., stay behind the front lines and command), while Alexander did as a Macedonian King was expected to (i.e., fight in the front lines).<br>
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Personally, I believe that Darius was a competent commander - though also an unfortunate one.<br>
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But otherwise I agree with you.<br>
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A point to remember (often ignored) about all the truly great commanders is that all of them had great subordinates. Philip and Alexander had Parmenio (to name just one - the commanders of the individual units of the phalanx: men like Ptolemy, Seleukos, etc., were clearly no slouches either); Caesar had Titus Labienus, Hannibal had Maharbal and Mago Barca (among many others), and Scipio Africanus had Laelius. The ability to recoqnize and use other men of ability is (IMO) one of the most important strengths of these commanders. <p>Strategy<br>
Designer/Developer<br>
Imperium - Rise of Rome</p><i></i>