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Nameless city in Africa taken by Scipio
#16
Michael wrote:

It does indicate an earlier source because Polybius does not include Minucius Thermus`capture of a supply train and that is because it would conflict with Polybius borrowing of the three spies story by Herodotus.
 
One does not have to go back to Herodotus. According to Frontinus, in 280 BC, during the war with Pyrrhus: “the consul Valerius Laevinus, having caught a spy within his own camp, and having confidence in his own forces ordered the man to be led around, observing that, for the sake of terrifying the enemy, his army was open to inspection by the spies of the enemy, as often as they wished.”
 
Michael wrote:
In Appian`s account, which makes a whole lot more sense than Polybius, the capture of this Carthaginian detactment is the event that compels Hannibal to open negotiations with Scipio.
 
Look at how ridicules Polybius’ account is. When Hannibal was informed by his spies of the events that unfolded, Hannibal, full of admiration for Publius Scipio, had a strong desire to meet Publius Scipio. Hannibal had heralds sent to Publius Scipio to establish a place and time for a meeting. Here we are expected to believe that Hannibal was driven by a strong desire to meet Scipio out of nothing more than admiration. Are we expected to believe this drivel? Livy writes that when both commanders met, for a few moments both commanders gazed upon each other in silent admiration. Well admiration seems to be the latest pop culture among the Romans and Carthaginians. As Hannibal wanted to meet Scipio out of admiration, it would seem Hannibal had achieved his goal. This was not the first time Hannibal was inflicted with admiration for a member of the Scipio family. According to Polybius, when Hannibal learnt that Publius Scipio the Elder had taken the difficult undertaking of travelling from the Rhone to Etruria, Hannibal was filled with amazement and admiration for Publius Scipio the Elder. However, in this incident, Hannibal did not feel the need to request a meeting with Publius Scipio the Elder.
 
Scipio then broke camp and encamped at the town of Naragara, which had adequate water within easy reach (a spear throw from the Roman camp). Scipio then sent word to Hannibal for a meeting. Here we have Scipio dictating events. On receiving this news, Hannibal broke camp, and moved to within some 30 stades from the Roman camp. At this point Polybius wants us to believe that Hannibal moved to a favourable location chosen by his enemy out of admiration for Scipio. I can just see Hannibal jumping up and down with excited about meeting Scipio, and counting down the days. Polybius explains that the site of Hannibal’s camp was convenient for his present design, but was too far away from any water, and this caused his men some considerable hardship. Unfortunately, Polybius fails to explain what Hannibal’s present design was that made him position his camp too far from water. The reason is because it is a broken narrative taken from another source, and a source following historical fact. And if anyone studied the peace terms, they will find Scipio had the full permission of the Roman senate to make peace on whatever term he deemed acceptable, an authority Scipio implemented because Nero had been given the same power of imperium as Scipio, and also the province of Africa. Another rooster was entering the chook yard.
 
So now the story must find a way of getting rid of Nero. Following Livy’s chronology, in 202 BC, the consul Tiberius Claudius Nero was ordered by the Roman senate to take his fleet of 50 quinqueremes from Italy, to Sicily and from there to Africa. This is the same number of quinqueremes allocated to Cnaeus Octavius, and the same number of Carthaginian warships that captured the stranded Roman transports. Therefore, the fleet under the command of Cnaeus Octavius in 203 BC has been substituted for Tiberius Claudius Nero’s consular fleet of 202 BC.
 
And this is where the fabrication begins, and pathetically written. Livy has Tiberius Claudius Nero being extremely slow in getting the fleet ready and putting to sea. When Nero finally left Rome, his fleet was caught in a violent storm between the ports of Cosa and Loretum, but still succeeded in taking refuge in the port of Populonia in Italy. After the storm has past, Nero sailed to Elba, then on to Corsica and then to Sardinia. Unfortunately, whilst rounding the Montes Insani, Nero’s fleet was, oh yes and here it comes, caught in a worse storm than the last one. Many of Nero’s ships were scattered, others wrecked, while others were damaged. Nero’s fleet took refuge in Caralis, and while repairing his fleet, winter set in. When his year of office expired in 201 BC, as Nero was not granted an extension of his imperium, Nero returned to Rome with the fleet.
 
The false narrative has now gotten rid of a somewhat unlucky and lethargic Nero. And this is the first chink that exposes the false narrative and chronology, and that is the number of ships supposedly providing supplies to Scipio’s army. It is a consular fleet, not a supply fleet.
 
In 215 BC, Livy has the Scipio brothers with a force of 16,000 men defeat a Carthaginian army of 60,000 men. Against such great odds, the Scipios’ even manage to capture all three Carthaginian camps. The figure of 16,000 Romans tells the story. It is the number of men for part of a Roman army based on the fleet organisation. However, the 16,000 men states that Gnaeus Scipio was not present. This action belongs elsewhere, and most likely when the Scipio’s were killed. So to boost Gnaeus army, someone invented the story of the 20,000 mercenaries with his army.
 
In relation to the Carthaginian casualties for one battle, Livy writes that according to Claudius Quadrigarius as many as 37,000 Carthaginians were killed and 1,830 were captured. If you take the 1,830 Carthaginian prisoners and rounded them to 1,850 prisoners (+20 men) and then multiplying this by 20, you arrive at 37,000 men.
 
So who could have written all of this embellished rubbish? Is Claudius Quadrigarius our man? The navel engagement of 217 BC concerning Gnaeus Scipio shows it could not have been Polybius making up these legendary accounts surrounding the Scipio family. However, what about Alimentus? Alimentus was a prisoner of the Carthaginians, and supposedly spend his time as a slave under chains the whole time. If Alimentus was part of the Romans prisoners working in the fields of Africa that were freed by Scipio (according to Appian), then Alimentus could have been very beholding to the Scipios and had decided to write exaggerated accounts and battles based on real events, but turning Roman defeats into fictitious Roman victories in another theatre of war. Many of these fabricated stories are interconnected with high Carthaginian casualties, like someone just wants the Carthaginians killed on a mass level, and originating from someone with a deep hatred for the Carthaginians.
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#17
Agreed. Polybius` reasons for the meeting are quite riduculous and Livy follows the original spy story more closely but takes the sudden, surprise appearance of Massinissa`s forces out of the scenario.
Actually, it makes Hannibal`s decision to enter into a major engagement against Scipio`s army with an inferiority in cavalry most unlikely!
Polybius needed to find a cause for Hannibal to be defeated in a major battle but the reality was closer to Appian`s cavalry battle and skirmishes that preceded negotiations.
After the two cavalries camped some distance apart (not at Margaron nor at Zama, but at smaller camps for mobile cavalry forces) Scipio`s cavalry fell back, Hannibal`s cavalry followed and was surprised Scipio`s cavalry turning and being joined with Massinissa, they then counter-attacked Hannibal. Skirmishes followed this battle "near Zama" and a supply train was captured also, which led to Hannibal seeking to negotiate with Scipio with Massinissa as the intermediary. This is a much more credible sequence of events because Massinissa (with his cavalry providing the Roman army`s screen) would have been the most forward Roman-allied commander - naturally he would be first senior commander to receive word from Hannibal`s messengers.
I have referred to Scipo`s cavalry, but I believe it is more likely that they were commanded in the field by Laelius and that Laelius and Massinissa defeated Hannibal at Zama, but this cavalry action was grafted onto the battle that Polybius engineered.
Actually if you look at Appian`s description of the fighting at Zama and set aside the heroic individulised combats between Scipio, Hannibal and Massinissa, you do get an impression of the way in which the cavalry fighting and skirmishes would have ebbed and flowed at the real battle of Zama.

[45] As the battle was long and undecided, the two generals had compassion on their tired soldiers, and rushed upon each other in order to bring it to a more speedy decision. They threw their javelins at the same time. Scipio pierced Hannibal's shield. Hannibal hit Scipio's horse. The horse, smarting from the wound, threw Scipio over backwards. He quickly mounted another and again hurled a dart at Hannibal, but missed him and struck another horseman near him.
At this juncture, Massinissa, hearing of the crisis, came up, and the Romans seeing their general not only serving as a commander but fighting also as a common soldier, fell upon the enemy more vehemently than before, routed them, and pursued them in flight. Nor could Hannibal, who rode by the side of his men and besought them to make a stand and renew the battle, prevail upon them to do so. (Appian The Punic Wars 9.45)
[46] Hannibal in his flight seeing a mass of Numidian horse collected together, ran up and besought them not to desert him. [202 BCE.] Having secured their promise, he led them against the pursuers, hoping still to turn the tide of battle.
The first whom he encountered were the Massylians, and now a single combat between Massinissa and Hannibal took place. Rushing fiercely upon each other, Massinissa drove his spear into Hannibal's shield, and Hannibal wounded his antagonist's horse. Massinissa, being thrown, sprang towards Hannibal on foot, and struck and killed a horseman who was advancing towards him in front of the others. At the same time he received in his shield - made of elephant's hide - several darts, one of which he pulled out and hurled at Hannibal; but, as it happened, it struck another horseman who was near and killed him. While he was pulling out another, he was wounded in the arm, and withdrew from the fight for a brief space.
When Scipio learned this, he feared for Massinissa and hastened to his relief, but he found that the latter had bound up his wound and returned to the fight on a fresh horse. Thus the battle continued doubtful and very severe, the soldiers on either side having the utmost reverence for their commanders, until Hannibal, discovering a body of Spanish and Celtic troops on a hill near by, dashed over to them to bring them into the fight. Those who were still engaged, not knowing the cause of his going, thought that he had fled. Accordingly, they abandoned the fight of their own accord and broke into disorderly rout, not following after Hannibal, but helter-skelter. This band having been dispersed, the Romans thought that the fight was over and pursued them in a disorderly way, not perceiving Hannibal's purpose.
[47] Presently Hannibal returned accompanied by the Spanish and Celtic troops from the hill. Scipio hastened to recall the Romans from the pursuit, and formed a new line of battle much stronger than those who were coming against him, by which means he overcame them without difficulty.
When this last effort had failed, Hannibal despaired utterly, and fled in plain sight...
(Appian, The Punic Wars 10.45-47)

I know, there is reference here to "Spanish and Celtic troops", but the overall impression of it (and Appian does go on to mention "Bruttian and Spanish horsemen"), is of cavalry combats which move and swing from side to side, rather than Polybius` account of comparatively more static infantry fighting.

The tactical decision at Zama was by cavalry action. The strategy of campaign was centred on cavalry superiority and upon the recruitment of Numidian allies. Massinissa gave Scipio cavalry superiority that he needed and once the hope of reinforcement from Vermina was unlikely, Hannibal and then the Carthaginian Senate were forced to accept Scipio`s terms.
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#18
Michael wrote:

Polybius needed to find a cause for Hannibal to be defeated in a major battle but the reality was closer to Appian`s cavalry battle and skirmishes that preceded negotiations.
 
I’m still not one hundred percent convinced Polybius is the fabricator of the major battle of Zama between Hannibal and Scipio that involved 80 elephants. It is the source that Appian has followed that has 140 elephants at Utica that interests me. Polybius criticises Fabius Pictor and other ancient historians, and yet he remains quite about Alimentus.
 
Michael wrote:
I know, there is reference here to "Spanish and Celtic troops," but the overall impression of it (and Appian does go on to mention "Bruttian and Spanish horsemen"), is of cavalry combats which move and swing from side to side, rather than Polybius` account of comparatively more static infantry fighting.
 
Appian’s account of the battle of Zama, the big battle that is, has events belonging to the battle of Baecula. Many of Appian’s battles of the Second Punic War have been confused with other battles. However, I cannot blame Appian; so much fabrication has been added to the mix, Appian, like most other ancient historians, had a difficult time trying to understand what is what.
 
I’ve been reading about a papyrus, which is a fragmented account of the peace treaty between Scipio and the Carthaginians. The papyrus is believed to have been written before the writings of Polybius. The papyrus does not mention the Carthaginian raid on the Roman supply ships and the Carthaginian attack on Scipio’s ambassadors. That is because these events are fabrications based on real events. Appian has the Carthaginians order Hannibal to supply them with food from Hadrumetum, and these ships were caught in a storm and wrecked upon the coast. This is the real story about the supply ships, they were Carthaginian supply ships. There is also a reference from another writer about Hannibal’s army picking or growing fruit while in Africa. It all makes sense when you look at it objectively. Add this to the fact that the Roman supply ships were Nero's consular fleet, and Polybius' story does not hold water.
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#19
The Rylands III 491 Papyrus? Yes, it does cast even more doubt on Polybius reliability.
Those supply ships were from Hadrumetum instead?... possible I guess. I think I missed that. Interesting, did Polybius get this from a Carthaginian source I wonder? And Appian finds himself repeating Polybius in book 7.34.!
I checked the agricultural produce of present-day Tunisa and I guess that Hannibal`s troops may have been conscripted to pick fruit in January/February of 202 and/or 201 BC. Right, but the first round of negotiations failed in 203 anyhow - that naughty Polybius again !

Last night, thinking on it some more, I wondered if Appian did not add one version of the campaign to another, but that there already existed a history that included the cavalry battle (Zama 1.0 if you like) and skirmishes which was followed by a major land battle (and this would be Polybius` Zama 2.0). Just checking and evaluating my ideas to date really. This perhaps made it easier for Antias to misinterpret it as two major land battles. Is this why Antias` stats for his preliminary battle and Appian`s figures for Zama appear to be related? Did Appian use Antias` figures? And if so, where did Antias get them from?

Today, I looked at Livy with reference to other historians and to see where they provided stats that conflicted - it does seem like either Quintus Fabius Pictor or Lucius Cincius Alimentus may be the source for Appian`s (Antias`) Zama 2.0
But the Carthaginian sources necessary to tell Appian`s story (the details about camps, terrain, pursuits, cavalry battles and skirmishes, supply trains, and negotiations), perhaps they came via Coelius Antipater? And so, perhaps Appian`s stats come from Coelius too?
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#20
Michael wrote:

The Rylands III 491 Papyrus? Yes, it does cast even more doubt on Polybius reliability
 
Yes, sorry I should have provided the papyrus reference.
 
Michael wrote:
Those supply ships were from Hadrumetum instead?...possible I guess. I think I missed that. Interesting, did Polybius get this from a Carthaginian source I wonder? And Appian finds himself repeating Polybius in book 7.34.!
 
Unfortunately, Appian also weaves into his narrative Polybius’ account and another account that follows historical fact. The ships mentioned in III 491 I believe are Carthaginian. The Carthaginian ships being ship wrecked are then falsified as being Roman, so as to provide “the great fabricator” his excuse to restart hostilities and the invention of Zama 2, as you call it. This has been done to get the climax for the Second Punic War. Zama 2 is the Roman version of Cannae. What goes hand in hand with the fabricated stories is a source that does not understand Roman military command structures. It is something even modern historians have not grasped, so they are unaware when there is a problem in the primary sources. The Romans are very strict about what a rank is entitled to command, and it is law. So when I see a Roman commander of a specific rank commanding a specific body of troops, I know straight away there is a problem or fabrication. Here is an example as provided by Livy (42 27):
 
“The praetor C. Licinius Crassus was instructed to select out of the old quinqueremes laid up in the dockyards in Rome all that could be made use of, and to repair and fit out fifty vessels. If he was unable to make up that number he was to write to his colleague, C. Memmius, commanding in Sicily, and direct him to refit and get ready for service the ships which were in Sicilian waters, so that they could be sent as soon as possible to Brundisium. C. Licinius Crassus was to enlist crews for twenty-five ships from Roman citizens of the freedman class, and Cn. Sicinius was to requisition the same number from the allies, and also obtain from them a force of 8000 infantry and 500 cavalry. A. Atilius Serranus, who had been praetor the year before, was selected to take over these soldiers at Brundisium and convey them to Macedonia. In order that Cn. Sicinius Crassus might have an army ready to sail, C. Licinius Crassus was authorised by the senate to write to the consul C. Popilius, requesting him to issue orders for the second legion, most of whom had seen service in Liguria, and an allied contingent of 4000 infantry and 200 cavalry, to be at Brundisium by February 13. With this fleet and army Cn. Sicinius was ordered to hold the province of Macedonia until his successor arrived, his command being extended for a year. Thirty-eight quinqueremes were launched from the naval arsenal, and L. Porcius Licinius was placed in command to take them to Brundisium; twelve were sent from Sicily.”
 
Could it be that the 50 ships mentioned at the beginning also include the crews for 25 ships made up of Roman citizens, or are we looking at a total of 75 ships? Could also, the 38 ships launched from the naval arsenal and the 12 ships from Sicily, for a total of 50 ships, be the same 50 ships Livy mentions at the beginning of the paragraph? After all, Livy does mention that Crassus was permitted to obtain ships from Sicily, which could be the 12 ships sent from Sicily. Or is Livy referring to 125 ships in total? Knowing how the Roman command structure works reveals what is going on, and which of those fleet numbers are rounded.
 
Michael wrote:
Today, I looked at Livy with reference to other historians and to see where they provided stats that conflicted - it does seem like either Quintus Fabius Pictor or Lucius Cincius Alimentus may be the source for Appian`s (Antias`) Zama 2. But the Carthaginian sources necessary to tell Appian`s story (the details about camps, terrain, pursuits, cavalry battles and skirmishes, supply trains, and negotiations), perhaps they came via Coelius Antipater? And so, perhaps Appian`s stats come from Coelius too?
 
You could go insane trying to work this out. To answer those questions, requires studying all the data in the primary sources going back to the republic. Only then will the mathematical patterns of the various ancient historians show themselves.
 
Livy claims Fabius Pictor’s numbers are good, and I will back Livy on this. Minutely studying the data in the primary sources shows there are some extremely accurate numbers. They become reference points for all other data to be compared to. Livy’s list of the troops and other dignitaries killed with the consul Marcellus are accurate. It has to be an official record. Livy writes that the cavalry with Marcellus and the other consul were part Latin but mostly Etruscan. Now here is a cover up, and I believe the culprit to be Fabius Pictor, who is hiding the truth. All my research shows that a consul’s bodyguard are selected from the Roman cavalry. They cannot be anything other than Roman for the Second Punic War. This tradition goes back to the beginning of the republic. Because the Roman cavalry protecting the consuls had fled, I believe Fabius Pictor wanted to cover up this embarrassment, so called them Etruscan and Latin. Therefore, I don’t believe the source of the major fabricated events could be Fabius Pictor, who is criticised by other ancient historians, but he has never been accused of fabricating stories. And I don’t believe it could be Alimentus. My reason for this is because whoever makes these extraordinary fabrications is very vague about the Roman military. The study into the Roman fleet for the First and Second Punic Wars proves this beyond doubt. Alimentus was a praetor and propraetor, and was allocated a fleet, so he would know about the minute details of the Roman fleet. Fabius served during the 225 BC campaign against the Celts, so would also know Roman military practices. Many of these dodgy Roman fleet numbers can be found in Livy’s account of the Third Macedonian War. So did Fabius Pictor and Alimentus live that long?
 
Michael wrote:
I checked the agricultural produce of present-day Tunisa and I guess that Hannibal`s troops may have been conscripted to pick fruit in January/February of 202 and/or 201 BC. Right, but the first round of negotiations failed in 203 anyhow - that naughty Polybius again!
 
Polybius is definitely following the Roman propaganda viewpoint.
 
Michael wrote:
Last night, thinking on it some more, I wondered if Appian did not add one version of the campaign to another, but that there already existed a history that included the cavalry battle (Zama 1.0 if you like) and skirmishes which was followed by a major land battle (and this would be Polybius` Zama 2.0).
 
I would investigate this line of thought further. As I already said, Appian is trying to accommodate Polybius with the historical account. It is a matter of Appian not knowing the difference.
 
Michael wrote:
Did Appian use Antias` figures? And if so, where did Antias get them from?
 
Oh I could answer that right away, but will keep it in the book, which is about three volumes now. Some years back I had no reason to doubt Zama 2 as being a fabrication. When I researched Scipio’s army and fleet numbers, I discovered Scipio was using a specialist legion size that had not been used for sometime in the field. All the data for Scipio’s infantry, cavalry and fleet are mana from heaven. When following Polybius about the princeps and triarii forming on the wings of the hastati at Zama 2, I could not accept this as the frontage was too great. So I placed the triarii behind the princeps. The frontage was still too extreme. The battleline was too dangerous, and if it was broken in one part, the whole battleline would be broken. The weakness would be the hastati who had done most of the fighting. It was when I found out how Appian’s army numbers were constructed, which included the reference to Hannibal’s army having about 50,000 men, then I knew the whole story was a fabrication. Since then I have found more evidence, including the fleet information, and how Antias 12,000 killed and 1,700 captured has been constructed. Some of this information was obtained by tracking the movements of individuals and fleets.
 
So now after some years of processing the information how I am in the process of writing about the events after Utica with some confidence and clarity. The two major arenas of fabrication I am writing an alternative history, are the fall of the monarchy, and the Second Punic War. In relation to the fall of the monarchy, I have read that Alimentus has the relationship between the Latins and the Romans were quite hostile and this would example a few problems I have with the traditional account. However, no matter the evidence presented, the traditional view of Zama will remain, as it is the dramatic climax to the Second Punic War. It is too strongly embedded in the psyche of Roman history.
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#21
"You could go insane trying to work this out. "
Well, I`ve just used quick searches for historian`s names in my word docs of Livy`s books 1-10 and 21-45.
Don`t worry Steven, I think I`m holding it together so far!

In several places Livy remarks that Coelius is at odds with Antias` stats. So Antias is getting his figures from a source closer in time to the actual events. I believe it might be Alimentus, but ultimately the source is Fabius Pictor.
Also, it seems that Coelius is the link for the Carthaginian information that would have come from Silenos.
Later of course, Appian is likely to have had access to Antias, Coelius and Pictor, but possibly not Silenos and this may be why he opted for both versions of the battle of Zama.
Silenos, who is missing, would I think have only had the following sequence of events;
Zama 1.0, skirmishes, Thermus` capture of the supply train (which may have been reinforcements from Vermina instead),
negotiations, and then an armistice between Hannibal`s and Scipio`s forces.
It`s not the exciting climax to the campaign that the Romans loved for so long. But then there`s no need to struggle in making Polybius` battle work in the way that it should.
By the way, I fully agree with you about the frontage issue of Scipio`s redeployment and with the remarks you made elsewhere about the author not understanding how war elephants were meant to be employed... and how unrealistic it was that Scipio`s Hastati could fight witout being relieved at all. But if it don`t work... we should attempt to find a more credible version of the Zama campaign.
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#22
Michael wrote:

Also, it seems that Coelius is the link for the Carthaginian information that would have come from Silenos.
 
Once upon a time I believed the Carthaginian army numbers had come from Silenos. Not now, and I doubt anyone even used Silenos as a source. Even Hannibal’s army at Cannae is based on Roman army numbers. Polybius states Hannibal was outnumbered by two to one, or the Roman army was doubled. The Romans had 16 legions, so someone gave Hannibal 8 legions. Polybius claims Hannibal had “over” 40,000 infantry. That works out to be 40,400 infantry for 8 legions. No Silenos here.
 
Polybius’ events in the African campaign are more suited to a Monty Python movie. Following Polybius, Scipio (Africanus) sent three ambassadors to confer with the Carthaginians about the violation of the peace treaty. After the Roman ambassadors addressed the Carthaginian council, they left without waiting for a response from the Carthaginians. However, in a following chapter, Polybius claims the Carthaginian senate dismissed the ambassadors without a reply. As the Carthaginian senate were for war, it was decided, with the Carthaginian fleet anchored off the coast near Utica, for three Carthaginian ships to sink the Roman ambassador’s ship. However, this action was not to take place near Carthage, or in the port of Carthage, but to occur as soon as the Roman ship had passed the river Macar, and as Polybius states, in view of the Roman camp. If the Carthaginians had decided to murder the three Roman ambassadors, then wouldn’t murdering them before they left the city give the Carthaginians a far greater chance of success than waiting until the Roman ship was near the Roman camp before the three Carthaginians ships launched their attack? The Carthaginian attempt to sink the Roman ambassador’s ship proved unsuccessful, mainly due to the Roman ship avoiding the rams of the Carthaginian ships, and beating off any boarding attempt. The Romans foraging near their camp then came to the rescue of the ambassador’s ship. Polybius has most of the men on board the Roman ships killed in the engagement. However, the three ambassadors miraculously escaped injury.
 
What a lot of bollocks. And modern historians just lap this stuff up. The problem is not many modern historians are sceptical of Polybius. They just conform.
 
Michael wrote:
But then there`s no need to struggle in making Polybius` battle work in the way that it should.
 
Exactly, it’s also the same with the Trebbia, and trying to work out how the 10,000 Romans that broke through the Carthaginian centre made it back to Placentia. It is fictitious, and that is why it cannot be resolved. Same with Scipio crossing the Trebbia from Placentia to set up his camp and the Carthaginians harassing his rearguard. Wrong place and wrong time. Unfortunately, for Polybius, the Ticinus and the Trebbia were just one bridge too many for Polybius, created from his own confusion. Appian is correct, Scipio took refuge in Placentia, but poor Appian is not on the modern historians reliable list, Polybius is number one man for that. Polybius is claimed to be the most reliable by nearly every modern historian, and yet not one can show any investigation that proves this, not one of them. However, J.S. Reid, a lone voice, written in 1913, had this to say on Polybius:
 
“One tendency that has grown in my case with the years is to lower my estimate of Polybius as an authority, and to raise my opinion of Livy, great and undeniable though his shortcomings be. The faults of the Roman historian (Livy) have been exposed to an unrelenting fire by critics, while Polybius, for the most part, has been taken at his own valuation. In reality, by carrying out the process which he himself recommends, the process of “interrogating the facts,” it can be shown that he (Polybius) is far from being so correct, so unimpassioned, so deep-thinking, so far-seeing, as he supposed himself to be. There is no error which he condemns in others into which he does not at times fall himself. His self-exaltations, his pedantic and petulant animadversions on other writers, his hard and narrow applications of doctrine and logic to the fluidity of motives and events, render little less than absurd to comparison often instituted between him and Thucydides.” J. S. Reid, “The Problems of the Second Punic War,” The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 3 Part 2, (1913), Page 175-196
 
Another example of confused battles is Baecula and Ilipa. I have no idea of how Lazenby has the whole Roman infantry doing the outflanking manoeuvre and why. You can get the same result just by having the Roman infantry move straight ahead. The outflanking manoeuvre was the standard consul’s bodyguard cavalry accompanied by the standard velites attached to each standard sized cavalry squadron. Same number of men as used at the Ticinus, except modern historians has interpreted “all his light infantry,” at the Ticinus as being all the light infantry in the whole consular army. The Romans are so standardised, when you understand it, you don’t even need to have some ancient historian provide the numbers, you know automatically how many there are. When Publius Scipio the Elder in Iberia goes on a reconnaissance mission, I know actually the troops types involved and how many. This is one of the great benefits the Romans left us, there chronic standardisation, and their strict adherence to procedure, and this is the same for the Roman fleet. Just provide the rank of the commander and I know how many ships he can command, and if it exceeds that number, it always ends in being a distribution confusion by the ancient historian, so you end up with 50 ships moving, instead of 10 ships moving and 50 ships staying.
 
Michael wrote:
But if it don`t work... we should attempt to find a more credible version of the Zama campaign.
 
You must understand that no matter the evidence, it will meet with resistance. The traditional battle of Zama is too ingrained with people. And many people don’t like change, and don’t want to be proven wrong. In the academic world, it is not about finding the truth, it is about protecting egos. I had one academic castigate me because she believed my work will destroy the reputation of many academics, past and present, and questioned me if I was prepared for that. This academic had studied under Lily Ross Taylor who had supposedly written the definitive book on the Roman tribes. She viewed me as a threat, and all she saw was Lily Ross Taylor’s legacy was going to be for nothing. My problem with Lily Ross Taylor was she based a lot of her material on conjecture. She allowed her imagination to get the better of her, so I responded I had no qualms about proving Taylor to be wrong.
 
Michael, what I have learnt from my research, is people will hate you for knowing more than they do. I get anonymous emails of pure hate directed at me. Some I know are wargamers, others just resentful people. It’s like I was the guy who pulled Excalibur from the stone when so many others had tried, and had deemed that they should be the one. In another example, one so called great Pythagorean researcher demanded I produce references pertaining to Pythagoras that he believed I had made up. I produced them, and realised he never knew about these references, even though I had obtained them from books written by modern historians. I set out to research and understand the mathematical data in the primary sources. This has never been done before, so I had virgin territory to explore. It has taken down a road I never imagine would happen. In fact, I believed it would end nowhere, and the army sizes and unit numbers in the primary sources would just be unexplained numbers. I was proven wrong. It was when I turned the Servian constitution into the tribal structure, I knew I had opened a door into the Roman world. When I found the connection between the Roman tribes and the Pythagorean cosmos, I even had a professor (my mentor) vigorously telling me so far I had done good work and not to go down that road.
 
So now I am finishing the last stages of my research, and that is to address the contradictions in the primary sources. Again, this is paying great dividends, especially for the Second Punic War and the overthrow of Tarquinius Superbus. It’s not the Romans that wanted to overthrow Tarquinius Superbus, but Tarquinius Superbus trying to overthrow Latin hegemony. In relation to the Second Punic War, most of the battles fought in Iberia are fabrications, and like Zama, very small events turned into major battles. Carthaginian army and fleet numbers are farcical, elephant numbers are exaggerated, the chronology has been distorted, and Polybius is a blatant liar. All in all, it is very disappointing.
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#23
Steven,
I`ve seen some of the online debates that you`ve mentioned. It is rather sad that you`ve been treated in this highly personalised manner. And I think I know where you`re coming from, when you say that people will hate you for knowing more than they think you do and if they have no answer they just ignore you, or claim not to be interested anymore! (we should have t-shirts printed!) But new research and the new understandings they produce are going to be challenging. Doubtless some folk still believe that allied fighter pilots in the blitz of 1940 could shoot down more Nazi bombers, because having been fed carrots, they could see in the dark better than the Germans could!
Keep going - great work!
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#24
Michael wrote:

I`ve seen some of the online debates that you`ve mentioned. It is rather sad that you`ve been treated in this highly personalised manner.
 
Many of those people are friends of some well known published historian or academic specialising in the Roman army. They have an agenda. Out of blind loyalty, they believe they have to protect their friends. It is important that I cannot be seen to be right. That would be catastrophic, because it means their friend could be wrong, and that cannot happen.
 
Michael wrote:
And I think I know where you`re coming from, when you say that people will hate you for knowing more than they think you do and if they have no answer they just ignore you, or claim not to be interested anymore! (we should have t-shirts printed!).
 
It’s the times we live in. If you do not conform to the traditional view you are either ostracised or ridiculed. You are perceived as a threat. The worst ones are those that call you a crack pot but have never studied your research. Those are the most ignorant of all. We are now living in a time when hate movements are on the rise, all in the name of making it a better world.
 
No academic Michael is going to shake your hand and thank you for proving them to be wrong while advancing our understanding of the Roman army. It will never happen, the egos are too great, and their reputations must be protected. If you study the historiography of academia in relation to the study of the Roman legion, you will be left in disbelief that nothing really has changed since Lipsius’ first book on the Roman army released around 1596. I do not include the study or Roman arms and armour here. You will find hundreds of years of conforming from one generation to the next. Universities should be places that teach people HOW to think, instead of teaching them WHAT to think. As one retired academic told me, if I had gone through the university system and presented my work, I would have been given such a hard time designed to make me leave. In the words of Keith Woodford:
 
“Given that reviewers are often the people with established reputations in the field, they can hold powerful positions that prevent new and competing ideas seeing the light of day. Indeed, many scientists find that they have considerable difficulty getting work published that questions established thinking.”
 
If many people tell you that Goldsworthy is brilliant, then as most people run with the crowd, then Goldsworthy must be brilliant, and it’s time to jump on the bandwagon. Such is humanity. You run with the crowd, you end up where the crowd goes.
 
Michael wrote
Keep going - great work!
 
Many thanks for that Michael, it is uplifting. The more one studies Polybius’ version of events, the more one sees the corruption and fabrication. For example, compare Appian’s account of the battle of Utica with that of Polybius. Appian has the Romans on learning that the Carthaginians planned to attack the Romans the next day, decided to attack the Carthaginians that night. But only to attack Hasdrubal’s camp. While attacking Hasdrubal’s camp, some Romans managed to set some huts on fire. The aim of the attack was not to fire the camp, it happened in some places. Polybius decides to turn this into Scipio’s actual plan, and to attack both camps and set them on fire. At times, Polybius only mentions an attack to be made on one camp, which shows he is using the historical account. Polybius has the entrances and exits of the camps, blocked with mules, horses and half dead men, trapping the men inside the camp, but somehow Hasdrubal with some cavalry miraculously manage to escape. Polybius claims that envoys and spies went into the camps for intelligence, but Polybius only mentions peace negotiations with Syphax, and that Syphax had to relay the information onto Hasdrubal. So why does Syphax have to inform Hasdrubal if Roman envoys are discussing peace terms with Hasdrubal and surveying his camp?
 
Now if Polybius is the culprit for all this false events occurring during the Second Punic War? I am requestioning his role and my methodology as well. Polybius writes about Gnaeus Scipio defeating a Carthaginian fleet with 35 ships. Livy has the same event. However, as Livy and Polybius give different ship sizes for the reinforcements, this lead me to believe that Polybius could not be the fabricator of the naval battle with the Carthaginian fleet. But if I drew a line between the events, the naval battle and the arrival of the reinforcements are two different events. This leaves the possibility Polybius could be the fabricator. Why? Because every event involving a Scipio has contradicition. However, if Alimentus was one of those Romans freed by Scipio while in Africa, then Alimentus could have wanted to sing the praises of Scipio from the rooftop. It’s like a pendulum, back and forth between Polybius and Alimentus, with more of a leaning to Polybius. I need a time machine.
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#25
Right, but you`ll need to bring Scipio himself back to give evidence. But, even then...
I have been looking at Utica recently, yes. Working backwards from Zama; if we doubt Polybius with respect to Zama, we should also question his reliability for the rest of the War in Africa.
If there is just some doubt concerning the battles at Utica and the Great Plains, then it adds to Polybius` unreliability for subsequent events.
Polybius account of the battle of the Great Plains seems quite unconvincing; it`s not clear how the Carthaginian infantry could have fled along with their cavalry and leave only the Celtiberians to stand. It`s not much of a battle, more of an excuse to have the Carthaginians run away! Which actually seems to be what they did after the night attack at Utica, with only Syphax then being pursued by Laelius and Massinissa, and Husdrubal managing to get away.
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#26
Michael wrote:

if we doubt Polybius with respect to Zama, we should also question his reliability for the rest of the War in Africa. If there is just some doubt concerning the battles at Utica and the Great Plains, then it adds to Polybius` unreliability for subsequent events.
 
With academics beholding to Polybius as the most reliable of historians, and I will add, without any deep study, they have well and truly painted themselves into a corner. You have to question Polybius’ whole account of the Second Punic War. Much of the fabrication begins with events concerning the Scipio family. From 205 BC, the style of fighting in the Gallic uprising, plus Mago’s battle in Northern Italy is similar in style to Polybius’ Zama. Most of the battles are duplicates of one battle involving a Roman consular army attacked on the march. During the Gallic uprising, Scipio Africanus makes an appearance fighting the Celts.
 
There is a difference between an ancient author confusing events in a battle, such as Asculum which was fought over two days and both days confused, or the battle of Carrhae, which suffers from a chronology problem. However, a fabricated battle is just blatant corruption. Other events have glossed over Roman humiliations, like the Roman infantry in the centre at the Trebbia ran before contact was made, the Roman cavalry at Cannae ran, Marcellus’ bodyguard cavalry ran, leaving him unprotected, the Roman fleet failed to prevent the Carthaginian fleet and Hannibal uniting a Pisa. I have found that some of the minor ancient writers, or those branded as being not so reliable, have provided some deep insights into events we take for granted as only happening in a particular way.
 
Michael wrote:
Polybius account of the battle of the Great Plains seems quite unconvincing; it`s not clear how the Carthaginian infantry could have fled along with their cavalry and leave only the Celtiberians to stand. It`s not much of a battle, more of an excuse to have the Carthaginians run away!
 
The Great Plains is another fabricated battle based on the skirmish concerning Hannibal’s supply train at Zama. I think it was inserted so as to give Scipio a victory in a set piece battle against Hasdrubal. After all, Utica was a sneak attack, and has less glory and honour than victory in a set piece battle. This would explain why Polybius overstates Scipio’s achievement at Utica. Many of the battles fought by the Scipio brothers in Iberia are either embellishments of fabrications.
 
Michael wrote:
Which actually seems to be what they did after the night attack at Utica, with only Syphax then being pursued by Laelius and Massinissa, and Husdrubal managing to get away.
 
Appian has Syphax clear out in the early morning when the Romans went in pursuit of Hasdrubal’s forces. I don’t buy into Polybius’ Roman command structure of Laelius leading half the legionnaires to attack Syphax’s camp, this is a fabrication. Appian makes it clear that Scipio left Masinissa to contain Syphax from sending reinforcements to Hasdrubal’s camp, while the whole Roman force attacked Hasdrubal’s camp. Therefore, Syphax’s force must have been small, as was Masinissa.
 
A lot of my research is backed up by other events that occur during the Second Punic War. The reinforcements of ships numbers that arrive with Publius Scipio the Elder in 217 BC and the 35 ships belonging to his brother Gnaeus. This event reinforces that in 217 BC, the Romans changed the ratio of allied cavalry to Roman cavalry from three to one to two to one. The Scipio brothers left Iberia with 60 ships, 35 are returned to Italy, leaving Gnaeus with 25 ships. Livy has 30 ships replacing the 35 ships, giving a total of 55 ships. Polybius has 20 ships as replacements. This is because Polybius believed 35 ships remained, so to bring to total up to 55, he adds 20 ships. The reason why 35 ships are returned to Italy and only 30 ships sent to Iberia (as per Livy), is because the ratio of allied cavalry to Roman cavalry had changed to less allied cavalry. Therefore, more cavalry were shipped back to Italy and less cavalry sent to Iberia, so the Scipio’s fleet of 60 ships was now reduced to 55 ships. So much information in the primary sources corroborating other information that it has become quite difficult to dispute.
 
Unfortunately, and I do say this with a heavy heart, but so much of the Second Punic War is just Roman propaganda, as is the overthrow of Tarquinius Superbus. Hannibal has defeated the Romans more times than they could accept. By the end of 217 BC, I have 14 legions defeated rather than the standard 12 legions (8 at Trebbia, 4 at Trasimene).
 
So no Great Plains, no Zama, and no breaking of the truce by capturing Roman supply ships.
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#27
"So no Great Plains, no Zama, and no breaking of the truce by capturing Roman supply ships."

Right and don`t forget the naval force limitation of 10 warships supposedly part of Scipio`s 201 BC final peace terms!
We should point out that it`s not just a question of a fanciful interpretation of historical source material, the archaeological evidence points to Polybius` purposefully embellishing the truth to flatter Scipio and exaggerate the real nature of Hannibal`s and Carthage`s defeat.
This can be found in Henry Hurst`s publication of the excavations at Carthage (1994)... a review of this report can be found online in the Review of Nautical Archaeology of 1995 and it describes the way in which the circular military harbour in Carthage has been dated.

By the way Steven, would you like to PM me... I have an idea.
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#28
Michael wrote:

Right and don`t forget the naval force limitation of 10 warships supposedly part of Scipio`s 201 BC final peace terms!
 
The peace terms were that the Carthaginians evacuate Italy, the Romans evacuate Africa, and both countries continue occupying the countries they held. This would mean the Romans kept Iberia, Sicily and Sardinia. No indemnity, no burning of the ships, no restriction on elephants.
 
Scipio was given full power by the senate to negotiate peace terms on what he thought was right. Many of the ancient historians say the same thing. Now with Nero arriving in Africa with an army and the same powers of imperium as Scipio, it is not hard to imagine that Scipio was in a hurry to secure peace. Appian even claims he did not want Nero to take the glory. However, while waiting for the peace terms to be ratified, the armistice nearly falls apart, and this is the period in which the skirmish at Zama happens. After the Carthaginian supply ships are shipwrecked, Hannibal has to move inland towards Carthage as Scipio’s presence in the area is preventing the land from being harvested. This is creating hunger in Carthage. Now Appian, does explain what was the cause of the armistice nearly breaking down and the war resuming. However, if only Polybius’ version of events is recognised, then the general reader will have no idea another story exists. At this point, I would accept a meeting between Hannibal and Scipio to resolve the problem, which was an extension of time. The Carthaginians could also have handed over to Scipio, 150 hostages in exchange for the extension of time. In case of war breaking out, in which the Romans would have to face the armies of Hannibal, Margo and Hasdrubal, the Roman senate sent Nero to Africa with a consular fleet as reinforcements. This is a good move, but one that would had worried Scipio Africanus.
 
Michael wrote:
We should point out that it`s not just a question of a fanciful interpretation of historical source material, the archaeological evidence points to Polybius` purposefully embellishing the truth to flatter Scipio and exaggerate the real nature of Hannibal`s and Carthage`s defeat.
 
Oh that is without a doubt. There was no climatic defeat of Hannibal. The peace terms did not have the Carthaginians being brutally persecuted. This would explain Cato’s hate of the Carthaginians. Polybius has Scipio (Africanus) defeat Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula, when it was Hasdrubal Gisgo at Baecula. The role of the Romans in Iberia was to prevent reinforcements reaching Hannibal from Iberia. Scipio Africanus failed in his mission, so that had to be covered up. The difference between Scipio Africanus and his father in Iberia, was Scipio Africanus went on the offensive. Before that, the Romans in Iberia had a defensive strategy. So credit to Scipio Africanus when due. The battle between Scipio’s father in Iberia against Hasdrubal Barca is also a fabrication. However, it has been stolen from another battle. The Roman light infantry and cavalry engagement before the battle of the Trebbia, in which Sempronius commanded, has been taken from events belonging to Flaminius before the battle of Trasimene. Polybius has Hannibal give a speech to his army after crossing the Rhone. This belongs to after the Ticinus, in which Hannibal’s army advanced to fight Publius Scipio the Elder. There is no battle because Publius Scipio the Elder would not leave his camp to fight. That same night, the Romans flee to Placentia. Polybius omits the real reason for the retreat. It is not hard to find when fact and fiction begin in Polybius’ history.
 
Have you read some of the responses to people arguing the battle of Zama was historical? One claimed how could the Romans have silenced Scipio’ army from talking and telling the truth there was no battle when they got back to Rome? This stupidity has nothing to do with it. The question remains, when did Polybius’ work become mainstream with the Romans? Did Diodorus, who is the first Greek I know who mentions Polybius, was it Diodorus who made Polybius mainstream with the Romans in the first century BC? Can we be certain that Polybius’ history was not rewritten at a later date? Could it be that by the time of Polybius’ writing, there was already a propaganda version of the Second Punic War in circulation?
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#29
"Have you read some of the responses to people arguing the battle of Zama was historical? One claimed how could the Romans have silenced Scipio’ army from talking and telling the truth there was no battle when they got back to Rome?"

Yes, I have read responses like like this and I have a similar answer to yours; that Polybius` version of the battle was only written up some time after 160 when, as I understand it he and Gaius Laelius met.
In the meantime, the soldiers were well-paid, the army`s veterans received grants of land in territories belonging to Hannibal`s Italian allies, the generals in the campaign gained public houours and commissions (Thermus, Octavius, and Laelius included).
Cato, replaced by Laelius had returned to Rome early in 202 and so was not a witness.
In the years that followed, many of those soldiers would have "volunteered" to take part in the Macedonian War against Phillip and so were otherwise distracted by any historians working in Rome or Carthage at the time. And this, I think was true of the people who mattered in Rome also.

Livy tells us how the conclusion of the Second Punic War was reported in Rome in 201. The news was welcomed and the reaction jubillant, but it is quite an understated announcement, with no mention of Zama, the dramatic nature of the battle and Livy finds enough editorial space here to mention again the defeat of Vermina in November 202.

"Can we be certain that Polybius’ history was not rewritten at a later date?"
I guess not. In book 15 Polybius the account jumps from the battle and straight to the terms of the peace treaty. I would think this is more of an omission in the original Polybius - a lot of copies would have needed to be destroyed before an edited, rewritten one could replace it.

"Could it be that by the time of Polybius’ writing, there was already a propaganda version of the Second Punic War in circulation?"

Yes, I suspect that any earlier propaganda version would have been based on Antias` battle quoted in Livy, but because he knows about Polybius` version of events he misplaced this earlier report of a major battle before Zama. Another history, another version of events existed which Appian later follows, had talks between Hannibal and Scipio take place after a cavalry battle at Zama and so Antias confused the real battle with the early propaganda version.
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#30
Michael wrote:

as I understand it he and Gaius Laelius met.
 
I do not put any credence of Polybius having met with Laelius. It is more than likely an invention to give his work some authority. Remember, it is Polybius who claimed that he found Hannibal’s sea tablet giving the size of Hannibal’s army that arrived in Italy. But was it less than 20,000 men or 26,000 men as Polybius tells us on separate occasions. If this sea tablet supposedly left by Hannibal was highly detailed, as a historian Polybius failed to exploit its worth. All we end up with is Hannibal’s infantry at the Trebbia had over 20,000 men, over 10,000 cavalry, at Cannae, over 40,000 infantry, over 10,000 cavalry. In both battles, Hannibal is outnumbered two to one in infantry. At Cannae, 14 legions faced Hannibal, while two legions attacked the camp. The 14 legions at Cannae amount to 70,000 men. Polybius has 70,000 men killed, which indicates Polybius believed the whole 14 legions were killed. And yet he is rated as the most reliable historian. Even Plutarch provides an example of how bad Polybius’ military figures are for the Macedonian war.
 
A critical study needs to be undertaken in relation to the Second Punic War. All the contradictions need to be examined. It has never been done. Today, the masses of phd’s on the Roman army being produced are nothing but cut and paste jobs, with nothing original being presented. It gets worse. They get turned into books. There are good reviews about Christa Steinby’s book “Rome versus Carthage, the war at sea.” Steinby refers to Lazenby around 47 times. This is an old academic trick, when it becomes tricky to understand something in the primary sources, fall back to someone’s else’s theory that has been accepted by the masses. Another example is Gregory Daly’s book “Cannae: the Experience of Battle.” When it comes to explaining line relief, Daly falls back on Peter Connolly’s theory. It’s the easy way out, and informs the reader Daly has no idea. Gilliver’s book on the Roman Art of War, again falls back on someone else’s (and plenty of them) conclusions, that I had to question whether the author had their own concept about anything. It is not hard to understand why research into the Roman army is in a rut.
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