09-08-2019, 04:52 AM
Michael wrote:
It is quite probable, that he was sent back to Rome with Gaius Laelius.
Yes possible, but also speculate. Does it solve anything about Zama being a fabrication? There are two versions of the Second Punic War in play, the historical account and the propaganda account. The propaganda account is the most dominant, in which Polybius, Livy and many others follow. Interlaced with the propaganda account is the historical account. Those minor ancient historians or those deemed unreliable by modern scholars have a tendency to try and balance both historical and propaganda accounts by rolling them into one. Some of those ancient historians branded as unreliable, produce a comment that for me is akin to splitting the atom. It may appear small and inconsequential, but the impact is far reaching.
I have also changed my methodology and have now used these contradictions as edit points. From the beginning of one edit point to the next edit points is cut from the narrative. The end result is still a coherence story. Those events cut from the narrative I have catalogued as being fabricated….until proven otherwise.
I have accumulated more contradictions relating to the African campaign of Scipio Africanus. And not just contradictions, the same event repeated elsewhere and the names changed. The bonus is, I have found events in Polybius that conform to the historical narrative. Because Polybius is contradicting himself, he has become my best witness. The propaganda version of the Second Punic War existed before the writings of Polybius, so I cannot point the finger at Polybius. The Roman propaganda version of their history begins with the reign of the kings and ends after the Second Punic War or possibly the Gallic War, in which Scipio Africanus played a part.
On other fronts, I have found, or I should say, had it thrown in my face, is how the Romans reinforced the legions to compensate for losses in the field. It relates to the old ascriptivi system of the early republic, now magnified (16 times) due to the massive availability of manpower between the early republic and the Third Macedonian War. It is a matter of reading the primary sources and forcing oneself to change the line of question. When I hit a problem I change my perception and the manner in how I interpret the material. I have to make myself change lanes and head in a new direction of questioning. The Romans are not like us. They have completely different way of using mathematics. Varro’s comment that the Romans doubled the size of a century but still called it a century should not be ignored. They do this on a regular basis.
In the Third Macedonian War, the Romans are shipping legions of 6,000 infantry, therefore they are naval legions, not land organised legions. To continually test every piece of data, I calculated the fleet need to transport a consular army of this size. The problem was the legion organisation ended with an odd number of ships. By switching to the fleet’s squadron organisation there was no problem. Livy and others claim a Roman squadron had 10 ships. And yet Polybius has the whole Roman fleet at Ecnomus in 256 BC consisting of 330 ships, organised into four legions or four squadrons. So for the Romans, when is a squadron a squadron? Again, we must go back to Varro. In his account of the naval battle of Ecnomus, Polybius gets confused with the fleet’s various organisations.
Also found the Roman fleet has a vexillation organisation. Not sure why it took so long to see it, as it was obvious looking at the deployment of a Roman fleet. One look at the organisation and the geometrical patterns it creates, which allows it to break into so many directions, you can see the Carthaginian plan of encirclement at Ecnomus was doomed from the start. A clear indication of this can be found in Livy’s (37 29-30) account of the engagement between a Roman fleet supported by the Rhodian and a Seleucid fleet in 190 BC. Livy writes:
“Leaving Eudamus to conduct his own operations, Aemilius led the way out of the harbour into the open sea, and meeting each ship as it came up, assigned its place in the line. Eudamus with his Rhodians remained along shore, in order that they might embark without confusion and each ship sail out as soon as it was ready. Thus the first line was formed under the praetor's eye, the Rhodians brought up the rear, and the combined fleet sailed out to sea in battle formation, as though the enemy were actually in sight…The king's fleet (Selucid), which was advancing in a long column, two ships abreast, also deployed into line and extended its left far enough to be able to envelop the Roman right. When Eudamus saw this, and realised that the Romans could not make their line equal in length to that of the enemy, and that their right would be enveloped, he speeded up his ships, which were by far the swiftest in the whole fleet, and after extending his line as far as the enemy's, placed his own vessel opposite to that of Polyxenidas.”
Here the Romans have merely advanced in their standard fleet formation. Eudamus did not realise that the Romans did not care if they were being surrounded. The Roman fleet organisation is designed to cope with this. Eudamus would have been better off staying behind the Roman formation. Livy further writes: “The Romans broke through the enemy's centre, and then working round they attacked from the rear the ships which were engaged with the Rhodians, and in a very short space of time Antiochus' centre and the ships of the left division were being surrounded and sunk.”
Ok, sorry rant over. Just getting excited about all the stuff I have been finding lately. Back to Zama, and that battle that never was.
It is quite probable, that he was sent back to Rome with Gaius Laelius.
Yes possible, but also speculate. Does it solve anything about Zama being a fabrication? There are two versions of the Second Punic War in play, the historical account and the propaganda account. The propaganda account is the most dominant, in which Polybius, Livy and many others follow. Interlaced with the propaganda account is the historical account. Those minor ancient historians or those deemed unreliable by modern scholars have a tendency to try and balance both historical and propaganda accounts by rolling them into one. Some of those ancient historians branded as unreliable, produce a comment that for me is akin to splitting the atom. It may appear small and inconsequential, but the impact is far reaching.
I have also changed my methodology and have now used these contradictions as edit points. From the beginning of one edit point to the next edit points is cut from the narrative. The end result is still a coherence story. Those events cut from the narrative I have catalogued as being fabricated….until proven otherwise.
I have accumulated more contradictions relating to the African campaign of Scipio Africanus. And not just contradictions, the same event repeated elsewhere and the names changed. The bonus is, I have found events in Polybius that conform to the historical narrative. Because Polybius is contradicting himself, he has become my best witness. The propaganda version of the Second Punic War existed before the writings of Polybius, so I cannot point the finger at Polybius. The Roman propaganda version of their history begins with the reign of the kings and ends after the Second Punic War or possibly the Gallic War, in which Scipio Africanus played a part.
On other fronts, I have found, or I should say, had it thrown in my face, is how the Romans reinforced the legions to compensate for losses in the field. It relates to the old ascriptivi system of the early republic, now magnified (16 times) due to the massive availability of manpower between the early republic and the Third Macedonian War. It is a matter of reading the primary sources and forcing oneself to change the line of question. When I hit a problem I change my perception and the manner in how I interpret the material. I have to make myself change lanes and head in a new direction of questioning. The Romans are not like us. They have completely different way of using mathematics. Varro’s comment that the Romans doubled the size of a century but still called it a century should not be ignored. They do this on a regular basis.
In the Third Macedonian War, the Romans are shipping legions of 6,000 infantry, therefore they are naval legions, not land organised legions. To continually test every piece of data, I calculated the fleet need to transport a consular army of this size. The problem was the legion organisation ended with an odd number of ships. By switching to the fleet’s squadron organisation there was no problem. Livy and others claim a Roman squadron had 10 ships. And yet Polybius has the whole Roman fleet at Ecnomus in 256 BC consisting of 330 ships, organised into four legions or four squadrons. So for the Romans, when is a squadron a squadron? Again, we must go back to Varro. In his account of the naval battle of Ecnomus, Polybius gets confused with the fleet’s various organisations.
Also found the Roman fleet has a vexillation organisation. Not sure why it took so long to see it, as it was obvious looking at the deployment of a Roman fleet. One look at the organisation and the geometrical patterns it creates, which allows it to break into so many directions, you can see the Carthaginian plan of encirclement at Ecnomus was doomed from the start. A clear indication of this can be found in Livy’s (37 29-30) account of the engagement between a Roman fleet supported by the Rhodian and a Seleucid fleet in 190 BC. Livy writes:
“Leaving Eudamus to conduct his own operations, Aemilius led the way out of the harbour into the open sea, and meeting each ship as it came up, assigned its place in the line. Eudamus with his Rhodians remained along shore, in order that they might embark without confusion and each ship sail out as soon as it was ready. Thus the first line was formed under the praetor's eye, the Rhodians brought up the rear, and the combined fleet sailed out to sea in battle formation, as though the enemy were actually in sight…The king's fleet (Selucid), which was advancing in a long column, two ships abreast, also deployed into line and extended its left far enough to be able to envelop the Roman right. When Eudamus saw this, and realised that the Romans could not make their line equal in length to that of the enemy, and that their right would be enveloped, he speeded up his ships, which were by far the swiftest in the whole fleet, and after extending his line as far as the enemy's, placed his own vessel opposite to that of Polyxenidas.”
Here the Romans have merely advanced in their standard fleet formation. Eudamus did not realise that the Romans did not care if they were being surrounded. The Roman fleet organisation is designed to cope with this. Eudamus would have been better off staying behind the Roman formation. Livy further writes: “The Romans broke through the enemy's centre, and then working round they attacked from the rear the ships which were engaged with the Rhodians, and in a very short space of time Antiochus' centre and the ships of the left division were being surrounded and sunk.”
Ok, sorry rant over. Just getting excited about all the stuff I have been finding lately. Back to Zama, and that battle that never was.
