Concealing Infantry movements

[Matthew]

Every third man doesn't divide very well into Century paper strength , but it does divide well into Cohort strength. I think he probably just moved two centuries of every cohort, but on the other hand, it is odd that the text wouldn't just say that. Still, it seems quite likely to me.

Matthew James Stanham

[Tarbicus]

Or he could have taken one cohort from each legion of the third line, and created a fourth line of six cohorts, positioned to the right to receive Pompey's flanking move.

At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the signal whenever he wished them to do so.

http://www.livius.org/pha-phd/pharsalus/battle.html

[sulla felix]

The point about this is that Caesar acheived this without Pompey's knowledge, hence the surprise when Pompey's cavalry tried to outflank the tenth legion on the right flank (where, according to Appian, Ceasar placed himself to apparently draw this very manouvre?). If Pompey had observed largescale infantry movement to the right he would surely have re-assessed his options. Do not forget that these two armies had been face to face for a number days prior to the final battle, and Pompey had continually refused to engage Caesar's army (perhaps a sign that he was no confidant of the large, but inferior army he had at his disposal?). Pompey's army was numerically superior but did contain many non-Italian allies (according to Appian). Ceasar was running low on food and water and needed to act decisively. His "trademark" was fast, decisive, and some would say down right impetuous, action.

The success of the manouvere (the fine detail of which we can speculate upon for ever) was IMHO clearly down to a trap being set by Caesar which Pompey was unaware of. Once the cavalry were disperesed (and yes Appian does describe the infantry driving their spears into the faces and upper bodies of the cavalry troops) Appian describes the tenth legion turning in on the flanks of Pompeys infantry and gradually grinding them down (that must have been some sight!). The feeling cavalry and oncoming tenth caused many of Pompey's non-Italina alies to turn and run, stopping only to raid and pillage Pompey's own camp along the way. Pompey's Italian troops were attempting to make an orderly retreat, but Ceasar implored his own troops not to pursue the Italians but to instead concentrate on Pompeys non-Italian allies.

As you can see I spent last night reading the relevant book from Appian (Penguin classics edition) - and interesting stuff it was :lol:

[Gaius_Calvus]

Athena,

Here are some answers:

"What caused Pompeys infantry to rout? I realize that it must be demoralizing to see ones cavalry force repulsed, but Pompey still outnumbered Caesar 2 to 1."

The rout of Pompey's cavalry on his Army's left flank uncovered the left flank of Pompey's entire line, which always has a huge impact on an Army's morale. (Even today, modern tactics are designed to force the enemy to fight in multiple directions by placing the point of main effort on an opponent's flanks and/or rear). Battles and wars are won by morale, and not numbers.

As the theorist Ardant du Picq stated: "The moral is to the physical as three is to one."

The Romans made an industry out of defeating numerically larger opponents. Then, as today, numbers do not necessarily mean victory. Morale is THE crucial element in any contest.

Vale,

Calvus

[sulla felix]

I agree Calvus,

Caesar's men needed to win or die of starvation or thirst -great motivation!

Also do not underestimate the confusion, noise, dust etc. on a battlefield. The slightest hint that things are not going too well (eg. seeing cavalry returning bloodied and battered) would lead to widespread panic in the rear ranks and reserve forces (the non-Italian allies are a prime example of this as noted by Appian).

[M. Demetrius]

I can't remember the source, but it said that Pompey's cavalry collided with his flank infantry as they ran in rout, and caused confusion on the lines, then when Caesar's troops showed up, the flank began to roll up. One running rank collided with another, and since order wasn't restored, a general untidy retreat was the result. Cavalry love to run down fleeing enemies...

[Tarbicus]

Don't forget that Caesar's units were veterans and used to working together, whereas Pompey had received legions (Scipio's?) who were not used to working in such a massed combined force. The latter were also greener compared to Caesar's, and would probably respond to panic far more readily.

Pompey was also arrogant through strength in numbers, ordering his troops to hold and let Caesar's initial charge tire his men out, as if they were new to the scrap. When Caesar's officers didn't fall for this and realised what was going on they paused to regroup, and regained their breath halfway between the lines. This is a good indicator of the experience these men had who were reasonably, at that point in the battle, under their own command so long as they stuck to the objectives.

[sulla felix]

Good Point Tarbicus

[RUBICON]

Athena,

I have just finished re reading Julius Caesars, THE GALLIC WARS AN THE CIVIL WARS. It gives detailed accounts of how he predicted and carried out his defeats and even his setbacks. He describes his account of Pharsarlus, the fact he was outnumbered by Pompeys armies but I think it was Caesars armies trust in his command and his continued luck that saw victory.

On the final day whereby Pompey felt he had victory, assuming how Caesar would fight, Pompey ordered his armies to stand ground and await Caesars advance. Caesar having given the order to charge led by Crastinus, Pompeys front line stood and waited, thinking the long advance would tire the front line of Caesars battle ready legions, plus having been convinced by his senior officers that this tactic would actually bring them into disarray thus allowing Pompeys armies to attack and easily control the centre.

Seeing this, Caesars front lines stopped, and after a few minutes noticing that Pompeys front lines were just sitting their, threw pilum and then charged. At this Pompeys calvary, followed by archers, charged on Caesars right gaining ground, and this was Caesars intelligence, he ordered his Fourth Line, veterans to move to the right and oppose the calvary, while sending his Third line forward to reinforce the main centre. The fact that the centre had not been controlled by Pompey, would have meant that the centre was at risk of flanking Pompeys Calvary. Cetain death to be surrounded and cut off from your own support. It was such tactics of disciplined reinforcement and renewed thinking, that I think allowed Caesar to accomplish what he did.

Pompeys calvary retreated when met by a total new line of fresh soldiers. the retreating calvary exposed the right flank of Pompeys armies, now with the reinforced centre, Pompeys armies were overwhelmed and began to be cut down.

Though we accept that Julius Casar was exceptional at 'talking up' his exploits, the accounts in the book (his very own accounts) give a wonderful insight into how he thought and the reasoning behind how he fought.

Hope this may help, other great books are RUBICON by Tom Holland & IN THE NAM E OF ROME by Adrian Goldsworthy.

Cheers

[RUBICON]

That would be left flank of Pompeys army exposed by the retreating Calvary.

Sorry having trouble typing upside down!

[RUBICON]

Tarbicus & Demetrius have touched on it too. Once those armies were overrun and fleeing, Caesars calvary had no trouble helping them retreat even quicker, I would imagine, even saving some of them the trouble of even running full stop.

[AthenaK]

That would be left flank of Pompeys army exposed by the retreating Calvary.

Sorry having trouble typing upside down!

P

Thanks for the clarifications, they help a lot!

Was it true that Pompey was coerced into fighting prematurely by the politicians? It was depicted as such in the BBC film, but I am curious what accounts verify that claim.

Athena

[Salvianus]

Clearly this sort of sneakiness continued in popularity and perhaps developed over time: aside from advice on actual ambushes and surprise attacks, the author of Maurice's late C6th-early C7th Strategikon recommends three or four units specifically designated 'ambush troops' should routinely be assigned to the rear of each wing in addition to flankguards, outflankers and reserves. In a perfect world, I imagine

In fact, they suggest the whole second line be kept concealed by woods or lower ground when possible if the main charge is delayed. If no cover is available for the advance, the second line should march close to the first for concealment. One or two units should be kept a mile or two in advance of the main body to obscure the formation used and units should be of irregular strength so that simply counting banners would not allow a very accurate estimate of strength.

Interestingly, they recommend forming up out of sight of large enemies for a different reason: to avoid one's own troops becoming disheartened!

[Robert Vermaat]

I split the comments about Pompey off to make a new thread in Civ Talk.