Athenian Peltasts and Light Infantry

[TraderTrey9785]

Hi all,

I'm currently enrolled in a class discussing Athenian Democracy in the 5th Century. We have a term paper coming up soon, and I have a topic, but I was wondering if the members of RAT might be able to suggest some sources or scholarly works that address the subject.

Basically, I want my paper to address the changes in the Athenian military by Pericles and Themistocles. When Solon established the Democracy in the 6th Century, he divided the city into four socio-economic classes based on how much money they made and how much military equipment they could supply for themselves. In turn, more government opportunities were given to the hoplite infantry class in the constitution, rather than the lower class or thetes. However, with Themistocles urging the city to build and maintain a navy, and later Pericles insisting that the Athenians reject traditional hoplite battle against the Spartans, the hoplite infantry really didn't participate as much as Solon anticipated. Instead, the thetes, being used as rowers in the fleet, and as light-infantry, actually participated more in skirmishes and engagements than many of the hoplites of the city. I wanted to argue that the Democracy which Solon established was founded on the Greek idea of hoplite battle, and that the different strategies of Themistocles and Pericles undercut this emphasis, allowing the thetes to have a greater importance in warfare than Solon anticipated.

Obviously I have read Thucydides and I will continue to analyze the text again and again for further information. I've also read many of the works by Barry Strauss, and by Victor Davis Hanson. I was wondering if RAT members could direct me to other sources and scholarly works that might support or contradict my topic? Anything would be greatly appreciated, and I also welcome comments on my topic altogether.

Thanks!

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

Hi Trey.One of the best books I've read is "The Peloponnesian War" by Donald Keygan.It somehow explains how the ekklesia was working under the influence of whom,or without the influence of anybody.As you understand by the title,however,this is not the main focus of the book.
Thetes of course had more power in the time of Themistoklis and Perikles than befor,but the number of hoplites was not small,compared to other cities,and to tell who had the power we must think how many of the population took part in the ekklesia each time and who were they.For Solon it would have been almost unthinkable to give the power directly to the crowd.Then Kleisthenes made things a bit easier and finally inthe time of Themistoklis and more so later in time of Perikles the crowd was the means for clever and rich men to rule.

[TraderTrey9785]

Thanks Giannis,

I actually just bought Kagan's book a couple of weeks ago, but I haven't had a chance to dive-in. I'll be sure to give it a thorough read. I appreciate the advice!

[hoplite14gr]

Trey please also note:

Kleisthenes reforms and introduction of democracy actually were done to increase the number of Hoplites. Athenian victories over Chalkidians and Beotieans before Marathon were a product of this development.

The fleet development simply offered new tactics and strategic concepts.
Defence of fields was less essential as the victuals could be obtained from the sea. But before diesel engines the rowers were important, so people could serve the city without the hoplite expense. So the Thetes were give a chance.
Also the Spratan could not defend their vast coast line with their hoplites and the light armed psiloi marines (Thetes) could give lots of trouble (Sfacteria)

Kind regards

[TraderTrey9785]

Thanks for the information Stefanos. I'll be sure to look at Cleisthenes' reforms again, as well as Solon's. I know that Marathon was a pivitol battle, and that their hoplites performed very well. However, do you think that Pericles would have utilized peltasts for raiding and chosen the strategy of hiding behind the walls of the city if he hadn't inherited the fleet from Themistocles? If he didn't have the option of relying on a large navy, and the privilege of importing most of the city's needs, do you think that would have changed his mind? Obviously he knew that Athenian hoplites were no match for the army of Sparta, so would he have put them into battle regardless, or would he have chosen to utilize peltasts or other "unconventional forces" to fight off the Spartans? I know this is all speculation, but seeing as how you have a vast knowledge of the subject, your opinion would really help me in refining my thesis. I just feel that the capability and the mobility of peltasts and other forms of light-infantry had great advantages (and of course disadvantages) to hoplite warfare.

Anything would be appreciated!

[hoplite14gr]

Athenian politicians grasped the economic angle of war better than others.

Solons reforms enabled Athenians to wrest Slamis from the Aeginitans.
Kleisthenis reforms enabled Athenians to crash Chalkideans opening Evoia to Athenian dominance and wrest Oropos from the Beotians denying them a good port and hinder their future naval development.

If Parikles had not inherited the fleet he would not have the money to import food staffs, to re equip his Argive and Thessalian allies or hire endless number of Thracian mercenaries. So he would have never started a war without a fleet protecting the trade ways and extort money from allies or loot the ene my coastline into submission.

Thukidises wrote that Archidamos, King of Sparta, was worried of the abudance of Athenian public funds.

Also light infantry and cavalry canb devastate a land before you muster
your heavy troops to drive them off. Laconian helots might be loyal but Messenians would revolt or run to the Athenian ships of the coast leaving the land uncultivated with the resulting food shortage.
Sparta could be driven to each knees because the hoplites cannot outrun light troops.

Kind regards

[TraderTrey9785]

Thanks again for all the information. I remember reading in Thucydides that the Spartans had one hell of a time actually countering the Athenian raids on the Peloponnese because they lacked cavalry and light infantry. That might be the subject for a thesis paper later in the year, which I'll be sure to utilize RAT members.

Stefanos -- did you read Hanson's Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece? I picked it up a couple of months ago and I was amazed at his conclusions. I'm curious because if it was so hard to devastate the land, then why do all of the ancient author's mention ravaging? Seems to me that agricultural devastation was done more to entice the enemy to fight, than to ruin the food supply? I wonder why the Spartans kept coming back year after year if the Athenians never took the bait?

Anyway, thanks for all your comments!

[hoplite14gr]

No I haven't read this book.

As I posted before Athenians could supply themselves from the sea and buy foodstuffs with the money extorted from their allies.
They also settled their livestock n Evoia.
Their craftsmen could be cept protected behind the walls.

But a couple of trirems surprizing a perioikoi town and killing the craftsmen and abducting the women and children would cause a disturbance in weapons and clothes production and hinder the creation of a perioikoi lochos for the respective mora. Dead boys cannot join the army.
Cutting the olives that you cannot burn denies the farmers future harvests. Olive groves burn like having soacked the land with petrol.
And if you are really mean you threw salt to the plouged fields.
Colateral casualties from hanger especially in children can be severe.
compair situation in modern refugee camps in Africa.

Read Thukidedes dissemabrked Thracians raid in Mykalissos for a gruesom description of a shore raid.

Kind regards

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

I've read good comments about this book but I think it's not published in Greek.I'd have to buy it in English :? .The only book of Hanson I've seen here is "The Wastern Way of War" wich I loved...Hanson's view on the extend and purpose of the devastation is really interesting,and very convinsing.

[Felix]

Thanks again for all the information. I remember reading in Thucydides that the Spartans had one hell of a time actually countering the Athenian raids on the Peloponnese because they lacked cavalry and light infantry. That might be the subject for a thesis paper later in the year, which I'll be sure to utilize RAT members.

Stefanos -- did you read Hanson's Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece? I picked it up a couple of months ago and I was amazed at his conclusions. I'm curious because if it was so hard to devastate the land, then why do all of the ancient author's mention ravaging? Seems to me that agricultural devastation was done more to entice the enemy to fight, than to ruin the food supply? I wonder why the Spartans kept coming back year after year if the Athenians never took the bait?

Anyway, thanks for all your comments!

A couple of thoughts: first, the Spartans probably figured they only needed one big battlefield triumph to end the war, and with the vagaries of Athenian democracy, perhaps they thought that sooner or later some Athenian politician would want to charge out against the Spartan army.

Second, Sparta was a land power, and armies do what they are good at and used to - inWW I, the conventional wisdom was to breakthrough with more men and more artillery; it took enormous casualties and some unconventional thinking to come up with tanks or the stosstruppen. Eventually, the Spartans (and their allies) did take to the seas and attack Athens' jugular; but it took a lot of struggle to get that kind of radical plan into their heads.

[TraderTrey9785]

First of all, I'd like to thank everyone for their comments, and lively discussion. Felix, I think you sum up the Spartan ideology very accurately, and I think that your comments demonstrate the lack of change in the Spartan style of warfare, as it took them so long to place more emphasis on their navy and on raiding, rather than ravaging land. Additionally, their lack of development of a Spartan cavalry is also a good example of their reluctance to embrace more efficient tactics.

I was wondering if any members of RAT have anything to say regarding the changing nature of warfare that occurred in the Peloponnesian War? Obviously the mixed formations, the lack of emphasis placed on hoplite ideology, and the use of cavalry, are all aspects that emerged during the Peloponnesian War. Has anyone read anything, or come across a scholar who is dealing with this issue?

Obviously Alexander embraced both cavalry and infantry and used them together to achieve many victories (as did Philip). Were there any instances before both men that might shed light on the changing nature of Greek warfare? Anything would be great and I welcome any advice.

Thanks!

[Felix]

You will want to look up the career of Iphicrates, an Athenian general who was credited with some of these innovations. Part of the impetus for change lay in the widespread theater of war, and prolonged length of it. Cavalry and light infantry never went out of use in some areas adjacent to the hoplite heartland, and as the war spilled out into the periphery, the hoplite armies had to try and cope with other kinds of fighter.

[hoplite14gr]

More on light infantry here:
http://www.romanarmy.com/rat/viewtopic.php?t=8285

Kind regards

[TraderTrey9785]

Thanks Felix and Stephanos. I'll definitely take your advice on the subject. I just ordered Hansons' Western Way of War and Michael Sage's Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook, which I hope will shed light on the subject.

I also read a really good article on the nature of political power in Athens regarding the thetes if anybody is interested. The article is titled "Equalities and Inequalities in Athenian Democracy" by Kurt A. Raaflaub. I think it is in a book edited by Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick titled Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern. It was very enlightening and it really discussed the different class equalities inside the citizen body of Athens. A very good read! If I can find it on-line, I'll be sure to post a link.

Raaflaub uses primary sources and mostly discusses the political rights of the thetes, however, he does dive into the military action of the thetes, and briefly mentions the cavalry class as well. Probably will be helpful to anyone interested in the subject.

[TraderTrey9785]

On google I was able to find the book photocopied for all to see. Here is the link -- Raaflaub's article begins on page 139. It is definitely worth reading if anyone is interested.

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