Roman military equipment from Justinian to Heraclius

[comitatus (Marco)]

Hi.

How was the roman equipment of the infantrymen and cavalrymen from Justinian to Heraclius?

Regards,
Marco.

[Graham Sumner]

Hello Marco

If possible try and get hold of a copy of 'Roman Military Clothing 3', written by Raffaele D'Amato published by Osprey 2005. It covers the period from Honorius to Heraclius. You will like the clothing of the Emperor Heraclius. Even Robert's helmet is not as impressive!
Graham.

[comitatus (Marco)]

Hello Graham.

I have this book and also Roman Military Clothing 1 and 2. Your illustrations are very well, beautiful. However, I don’t have information how was the helmets, shields, swords, lances, etc. at the end of 6th and early 7th centuries. Do you know information and some illustration of roman soldiers with complete equipment of this period (Justinian, Maurice and, particularly, Heraclius)?

The illustration of Angus McBride from soldiers of the 7th century in Romano-Byzantine Armies 4th-9th Centuries don´t convince me.


Marco.

[comitatus (Marco)]

Graham you drew soldiers of Lanciarii Seniores (a legio palatinae according to the Notitia Dignitatum) in the army on the Danube at the end of the 6th century. Exists evidence for this unit in this time?

Marco.

[Robert Vermaat]

If you can read German, may I recommend this one:
Kolias, Taxiarchis G. (1988): Byzantinische Waffen. Ein Beitrag zur byzantinischen Waffenkunde, Von den Anfängen bis zur lateinischen Eroberung, Byzantina Vindobonensia 17 (Wien).

[Theodosius the Great]

The illustration of Angus McBride from soldiers of the 7th century in Romano-Byzantine Armies 4th-9th Centuries don´t convince me.

I, too, feel this book needs to be updated. So, I'll let Osprey know about it. It'd be nice if Graham Sumner could do the 'Warrior' edition.




~Theo

[perrygray]

There is a great deal of uncertainty about the differences between Byzantine (Roman) military dress in the 6th and 7th centuries. Most of the artistic representations are those of saints dressed as soldiers. These may not be suitable models for contemporary clothing and armour.

Byzantine armour was influenced by neighbouring trends as suggested in the Strategikon. Herul swords, Avar tunics, Bulgar cloaks and other "barbarian" garb are mentioned but this does not mean that Byzantine soldiers commonly wore these items, rather they may be recommendations of the author.

The basic clothing (tunic, trousers and shoes) probably reflected modifications in civilian fashion with some foreign influence. Most of these would be cosmetic and it is likely that day to day dress remained the same. Regional differences are likely so clothes in the Balkans may have been different from clothes in Syria.

Armour was a mix of mail, scale and lamellar and there are some definite changes in construction and appearance.

One of the most likely changes was the introduction of longer spears among the infantry. During the 6th century, infantry may have been armed with weapons much like those used by soldiers of the 4th Century with an emphasis on throwing weapons. Longer spears for use against cavalry may have been introduced in the mid-century as the role of the infantry altered. The longer spear is described as being longer than that carried by the cavalry and may have been more than 3.5 metres. Slings, darts and other missile weapons plus bows continued to be used as well.

Hopefully, a better understanding of the changes in Byzantine arms and armour will be made in Philip Rance's The Roman Art of War in Late Antiquity. (The Strategikon of the Emperor Maurice: a translation with introduction and commentary ISBN 07546 0810 7).

I cannot recommend the Osprey book on Romano-Byzantine armies as there are many errors. It tends to gloss over a lot of the distinctions in arms and clothing for this time frame.

It would be nice to provide more definitive answers, but there is not much evidence to support the various theories on what the soldiers wore.

Perry

[Robert Vermaat]

Hopefully, a better understanding of the changes in Byzantine arms and armour will be made in Philip Rance's The Roman Art of War in Late Antiquity. (The Strategikon of the Emperor Maurice: a translation with introduction and commentary ISBN 07546 0810 7).

I'ver been DESPERATELY waiting for that one to appear for 18 months now! 8)

Can you give me a ref for those long spears?

[perrygray]

I am currently trying to identify when and what was used so it is premature to provide precise sources. There seems to be a lot of discussion but little in the way of specific dimensions.

The use of spear to identify the typical weapon of the Roman/Byzantine soldier blurs the distinction of what the weapon might have been. Yes there are plenty of synonyms, but these can also be misleading because of the writing styles of the historians and others. For example, Procopius was a classicist in that he wrote like Thucydides including the use of words that would not properly describe contemporary things.

There is a tendency to equip soldiers of the past like those of modern times. This may obscure the wide range of weapons, armour and clothing in use. For example, Procopius would have us believe that the typical Roman cavalryman was armed with bow, sword and shield. This is very different from the cavalry as described by earlier historians. Yet how often do we challenge what Procopius would have us accept?

Since the Strategicon and later military manuals seem to confirm that bows were common weapons of the cavalry, there is a tendency to accept the evidence. There is another view in that these books were describing specific examples that were not universal concepts. Procopius writes about the troops of Belisarius, who may have been horse-archers. This troop type may have been common in the field army of the east. The Strategicon also describes a specific army, although which of the several field armies is not clear. Some historians argue that it was a generic model, while others support the view that it was also an eastern field army. The main enemy of both is Persia. Thus the troops and their equipment may have been trained and developed to oppose Persians.

The same models may not have been as useful against other traditional enemies. Although this may be less believable given the operations of Belisarius in Africa and Italy. This may have be more a result of good leadership and other factors. There is some information to support this hunch or hypothesis. Belisarius tended to rely more upon cavalry than infantry. This was a very unconventional trend given the dominant place of infantry in Roman history prior to the 6th Century.

Belisarius may have been more comfortable leading cavalry than infantry. His personal preferences may have affected Procopius's writing in that infantry are rarely mentioned and usually perform poorly. To suggest that his examples can be universally applied to all infantry may be too misleading.

Combined arms or joint operations are among the most difficult to lead. Some leaders are better than others and it is only with hindsight that this knowledge is made apparent.

One question that needs to be answered when considering Roman infantry is "when did they stop being swordsmen and become spearmen". Another is when did defensive tactics become more popular than offensive tactics?

There is one school of thought that has Roman infantry advancing in battle following a set pattern until close combat begins. The specific phases include throwing pila, drawing swords and making contact.

Sometimes, particularly in Late Antiquity, Roman infantry are more inclined to receive the enemy after engaging in an exchange of missile weapons. The introduction of darts, javelins and others suggests that this trend replaced aggressive tactics.

Such things make it difficult to compare soldiers even in a limited time frame as that covered by the emperors from Justinian to Heraclius.

[Robert Vermaat]

The use of spear to identify the typical weapon of the Roman/Byzantine soldier blurs the distinction of what the weapon might have been. Yes there are plenty of synonyms, but these can also be misleading because of the writing styles of the historians and others. For example, Procopius was a classicist in that he wrote like Thucydides including the use of words that would not properly describe contemporary things.

I've found out that it's very difficult to find out what each source actually means.

There is a tendency to equip soldiers of the past like those of modern times. This may obscure the wide range of weapons, armour and clothing in use. For example, Procopius would have us believe that the typical Roman cavalryman was armed with bow, sword and shield. This is very different from the cavalry as described by earlier historians. Yet how often do we challenge what Procopius would have us accept?

Not thát often. Criticism of procopius lies more in his writing on geography and the gossip about Justinian, than his observations while on campaign with belisarius. I would not go so far as to deny what he has to say in order to deny that there was evolution in military equipment.

Since the Strategicon and later military manuals seem to confirm that bows were common weapons of the cavalry, there is a tendency to accept the evidence. There is another view in that these books were describing specific examples that were not universal concepts.

I'm not sure where you're going with this. Are you implying we should deny these works because you think 9on whatever evidence that the do not describe the truth?

The Strategicon also describes a specific army, although which of the several field armies is not clear.

I do not understand what you are referring to. the Strategikon is a manual for the whole army, not just one specific army among many armies? What makes you think that its use is that restricted?

Some historians argue that it was a generic model, while others support the view that it was also an eastern field army. The main enemy of both is Persia. Thus the troops and their equipment may have been trained and developed to oppose Persians.

You're dreaming. The Strategikon clearly describes a whole array of enemies and tactics against each of them.

The same models may not have been as useful against other traditional enemies. Although this may be less believable given the operations of Belisarius in Africa and Italy. This may have be more a result of good leadership and other factors. There is some information to support this hunch or hypothesis. Belisarius tended to rely more upon cavalry than infantry. This was a very unconventional trend given the dominant place of infantry in Roman history prior to the 6th Century.

No it's not, in my opinion. The dominant role of infantry had been challenged a long time before that. Infantry was and remained important, even under Belisarius and narses, but the role of the cavalry had gained in importance since the 3rd century. belisarius was ceratinly not doing anything out of the ordinary.

Belisarius may have been more comfortable leading cavalry than infantry. His personal preferences may have affected Procopius's writing in that infantry are rarely mentioned and usually perform poorly. To suggest that his examples can be universally applied to all infantry may be too misleading.

I'm sorry, can't and won't follow you there.

Combined arms or joint operations are among the most difficult to lead. Some leaders are better than others and it is only with hindsight that this knowledge is made apparent.

Yes, so? What are you trying to suggest here? that we forget about belisarius and Procopius because that was something different? Perhaps you try to suggest that the tactics of the Flavian period persisted into Byzantine times?

One question that needs to be answered when considering Roman infantry is "when did they stop being swordsmen and become spearmen". Another is when did defensive tactics become more popular than offensive tactics?
There is one school of thought that has Roman infantry advancing in battle following a set pattern until close combat begins. The specific phases include throwing pila, drawing swords and making contact.

And you are!

Well, the answer seem to be that this development started during the 3rd century, but id you look at Flavian auxiliaries the answer could be that they never stopped being spearmen, it was always a tactic that remainled available among the varous tactis of the infantry.
Offensive tactics also never became unpopular - you clearly seem to forget each and every time the Romans (ánd Byzantines!) invaded the territory of the Persians. Again and again and again.

That school of thought (hopefully!) also has this tactics end when pila go out of fashion - or rather the other way around. These pahases are clearly no longer valid when we are talking about the later 4th c. and the 5th c. Closing with the enemy they continued doing, but pila had been replaced with an array of missile weapons, of with a continuouis rate of fire was kept up all through the battle.

Sometimes, particularly in Late Antiquity, Roman infantry are more inclined to receive the enemy after engaging in an exchange of missile weapons. The introduction of darts, javelins and others suggests that this trend replaced aggressive tactics.

I disagree. I fyou only have one pilum you háve to engage the enemy after you spent it. With many more missiles available, different tactics become available. And not necessarily less agressive tactics. But all acroos the Empire the role of cavalry increased, including among the enemies. Missile fire was also a development of that increasing role.

Such things make it difficult to compare soldiers even in a limited time frame as that covered by the emperors from Justinian to Heraclius.

Why?

[perrygray]

Robert,

Unfortunately we are debating this subject without knowing what each of us has to offer in the way of information and experience.

I have spent many years researching the Byzantine military. This includes reading as much as I can possible find on the subject, travelling to Byzantine sites and studying the evidence (art, artefacts, reconstructions, practical applications of military theory and doctrine). I have actively cultivated contacts among academics, re-enactors, and war gamers. My approach is to employ a full spectrum of methods to better understand the subject.

Tim Dawson, a published Byzantine scholar is the co-author of the book and has many years of experience as a re-enactor in Australia and now in the UK. He is the author of a soon to be published book on Byzantine infantry from Osprey.

I also have 26 years experience as an army officer, both infantry and intelligence. This includes a two year tour in Cyprus, where I was able to visit a wide variety of Byzantine sites in the region.

There is a trend on this web site to offer "quick responses" therefore I did not provide the equivalent of foot notes and bibliography to support my comments. I am happy to do so as I am confident that my personal opinions are firmly based on research rather than speculations.

Criticism of Procopius is much broader than some would assume. His writing style and use of anecdotes tends to obscure what is fact and what is fiction. His comparison of contemporary horse-archers and Homeric archers may be less of a homage to Belisarius's troops than is usual believed. Interpreting his intentions rather than translating his words may be required to fully appreciate his subtle and sometimes negative view.

The Strategicon describes as specific army rather than a generic one. The author does not state which of the five field armies he is describing and historians theorise that it was the eastern field army garrisoned in modern Syria and defending the frontier with Persia. The name most commonly linked to the book is that of Maurice, who commanded that army before becoming emperor.

The cavalry is the main focus of the book and the section on the infantry may have been added at a later date which means that it could be from another author or another separate treatise on infantry. The translation by George Dennis obscures the military terminology employed by the author as few of the Greek words have been included.

Philip Rance has written a book that provides more details on the Byzantine forces much like that provided by Eric McGeer in Sowing the Dragons Teeth. Philip has been kind enough to provide me with some of his articles and may be I am guilty of assuming he will provide continuity in Roman military doctrine in his discussion of the Strategicon. I must await the release of his book before continuing with this thread.

The writing of military treatises was done by philosophers and others rather than government agencies in antiquity. Assuming that any was officially sanctioned is risky. Their counterparts may be the various treatises authored by professional soldiers and others in later centuries. There are a selection of such discussing military practices in the 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries. I would be hesitant to compare them to official military manuals as used by me during my military career.

The successors to the Strategicon plagiarise much from the preceding manuals. The Tactica attributed to Emperor Leo may have been nothing more than an updating of the Strategicon. Leo was not an active campaigner so what contemporary information he includes is not readily apparent. I am not criticising him, but rather simply trying to assess his role in the presentation of doctrine. Again it would be useful to have a supporting text to explain what influenced Leo.

In terms of tactics, there is a need to define the difference between tactics and strategy. Battlefield operations are tactics, campaigns and wars are strategy. An invasion of Persia is an example of offensive strategy. The use of the fulcum is an example of defensive infantry tactics. The fulcum may or may not be an infantry tactical formation derived from the testudo. It has also been considered a Germanic formation adopted by the Romans.

That Roman infantry carried pila, lancea and other types of spears is not definitive proof that they were primarily spearmen. The gladius and spatha may have been the primary weapons just as is the automatic assault rifle for most infantrymen today. The various spears were disposable weapons and the sword was not. This is a general statement because there are examples of Roman infantry using spears to defend against cavalry and other opponents. Arrian's depiction of a Roman army in battle against Alans may have been a template for standard tactics against cavalry foes including Parthians and Persians. It is one book and to extrapolate too much from it is dangerous because there is insufficient evidence of Roman and Byzantine battles to determine what was done "by the book".

My point is that between Vegetius and "Maurice", there seems to be a transition between sword dominant tactics and spear dominant tactics for the infantry. When this may or may not have occurred is a mystery. The only obvious trend is the inclusion of spearmen as the bulk of the infantry in later treatises.

Trying to distinguish between the soldiers of Justinian and those of Heraclius is difficult because there is a tendency to view them as having more similarities than differences. This is a common trend with Roman militaries. The typical soldier is armed and armoured with items that are subject to evolutionary rather than revolutionary alterations. Such that a soldier of Caesar's army would not be radically different from one of Trajan's army. It would be easy to increase the time separation and still make the same statement.

Would that offend a lot of the RAT audience, yes of course.

We are elitists with a very narrow interest in military history. Family and friends may indulge our quirks, although strangers may consider us odd at best and mad at worst. As a soldier, I am amazed at the lengths to which some re-enactors are willing to go. I have become content with less physically demanding activities than walking along Hadrian's Wall in full military attire with some mates just to experience what it was like. Some times it is better to learn from others than experience everything first hand.

Finally, are any of us so sure of what happened thousands of years ago? It is a challenge to remember what happened yesterday or learn about current events despite the abundance of information. History is based on the perceptions of those that experience it and study it. We all have unique perceptions based on our own knowledge, experience and other factors. We determine what is acceptable and unacceptable.

I shall continue to write with hesitation and reflect this by using words of doubt such as possible, likely, and probably. There are just too many unknowns to convert every hypothesis, theory and personal preference into a undeniable fact.

If we are so certain about how the Roman and other ancient militaries dressed and fought, why is there so much debate?

Consider how little has survived to provide us with any understanding of the past. May be there were a dozen different military treatises including the Strategicon but only it survived.

I highly recommend one book to anyone who wishes to cross pens with me. It is A Canticle for Leibowitz first published in 1959. Much of the story centres on understanding "pound pastrami, can kraut, six bagels–bring home for Emma".

Regards,

Perry

[Robert Vermaat]

Dear Perry,

First of all, I’d like to learn more about your reasons to discount Procopius as a source for the ‘typical’ Byzantine army. As far as I know, Procopius being an eye-witness, his very detailed account of the campaigns of his commander Belisarius have not lead to doubts about the military details that he wrote about.
If you say that there exists a ‘school’ that nevertheless has another opinion, I would appreciate it if you could give me some references, and/or summarize on what grounds that school discounts Procopius.

As a historian, I was taught to study every source, especially the primary sources like Procopius, and value each and every one on its merits. Discounting primary sources is possible, but only if one can prove the reasons for which they are discarded.
So far, I can think of no reasons to judge Procopius’ detailed accounts of Belisarius’ campaigns as such.
If you say that Belisarius’ army looked different from the other Byzantine armies, I would love to see your evidence for that, and where you found the evidence of how the other Byzantine armies looked like.

Same with Maurikios’ Strategikon.
Nowhere in the whole document have I read anything that could lead to a conclusion that Maurikios is writing of one army only, and an army that looked different from the other armies of his day at that.
I’ve discussed the Strategikon at length with Philip Rance (who was kind enough to send me all his articles that he wrote so far), but nowhere did we conclude that the Strategikon is a discussion of an a-typical army. To the contrary, it is a manuscript that meant be a guide for the whole Byzantine military, and later such manuscripts are also based on the Strategikon.

The maxims and guidelines for both infantry never make the suggestion that there is one specific enemy – to the contrary, as I wrote earlier, the whole range of enemies of the Byzantine state is discussed, their tactics, and the ways to counter them.

If you say that there is a ‘school’ that has another opinion, I would very much like some references to read about their arguments myself.

I would also really like to read the articles where the opinion is voiced that the Late Roman and Byzantine infantry did not differ from the infantry of the Flavian period, as a sword-and-pilum force, and the sources where that opinion is based on.

I was also taught that negative evidence is no evidence.
If this argument should be based on a view that ‘no source tells us they changed’, combined with a disregarding of the primary sources that tell us otherwise, we’re quickly done here.

[perrygray]

Dear Robert,

I do not have a single source for suggesting that Prokopios is describing something other than a generic Byzantine army. One of the most recent articles to come into my possession is by Anthony Kaldellis entitled "Classicism, Barbarism and Warfare" to be published in AJAH later this year. I was given a draft copy and will therefore include some quotes from it below. You may also wish to consider what Kaldellis wrote in his book "Procopius of Caesarea: Tyranny, history and philosophy at the end of antiquity".

Kaldellis states "Prokopios' description of "modern" archers is factually misleading and must not influence our understanding of sixth-century warfare". He then writes "Prokopios' mounted archers seem to conflate two types of unit that were generally distinct. The cavalry of the later Roman armies consisted of armored lancers who charged the enemy directly, whereas hippotoxotai, specialized mounted archers...". Kaldellis believes that the latter were in the minority "additional proof for their scarcity will be found when we turn to the actual narrative of the Wars".

For the Vandal campaign, Kaldellis suggests the following "Prokopios emphasizes that only the Huns were hippotoxotai (3.11.11)" as evidence that the Roman cavalry and other contingents were not horse-archers.

In Italy, the absence of horse-archers is also suggested as follows" in early 537 an advance cavalry force accidentally precipitated a major battle near the Milvian bridge that was fought at close quarters with spears and swords (5.18)".

Admittedly Kaldellis may be misreading Prokopios and being too selective in his quotes so as to prove his theory that Roman cavalry included a minority of horse-archers. The enrollment of Vandals and Goths as well as other German cavalry during the wars may provide additional proof that Roman cavalry were not bow-armed. It is quite likely they continued to fight with their traditional weapons, spears and swords.

In Agathias's 'Histories', an account of Belisarios' last campaign in 559 AD is presented in which he opposes Bulgar/Hun raiders. Belisarios had slightly greater than 300 heavily armed troops that he split into two groups. A group of 200 cavalry armed with javelin and shield, which Belisarios placed in ambush on both sides of a wooded glen. The others were placed in the centre under command of Belisarios (Book 5, paragraphs 17-20).

The Armenian general, Sittas, also commanded cavalry armed with spears.

It is surprising to read that negative evidence is no evidence. Many historians have tried to argue their theories despite having no evidence. One prime example is the fictional introduction of stirrups prior to the first historical evidence for them in Europe. The Avars may have been the earliest peoples to introduce the stirrup and yet there are a number of respected books claiming that they were in use prior to the arrival of the Avars.

Michael Grant, who wrote many books on the Roman era, stated "The military expert Vegetius declared that the solution was a reversion to ancient discipline." (page 85, The Fall of the Roman Empire). I would argue that Vegetius was not a military expert; however, he did write a book that was popular through the ages.

Rudi Paul Lindner, a Professor of History at the University of Michigan and author of Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia, part of Indiana University's Uralic and Altaic Series, theorized that the army of Attila the Hun had about 15,000 mounted warriors. This was based on the theory that about 150,000 horses could be grazed in Hun controlled territory and the average number of horses needed by a Hun was 10. This in turn is based on the American pony express using 10 horses.

Peter Heather, an expert on the Visigoths, relied upon the panegyrics of Claudian for his accounts of the campaigns of Stilicho and Alaric. Political poetry is hardly the most reliable source and its ambiguous language can be interpreted in many ways.

IP Stephenson in "Roman Infantry Equipment: The Later Empire" provides limited evidence that the legions comprised of spearmen. Given the number of Roman spears which one was the most common? Can this be proved conclusively? I suggest that the book's title exemplifies its misrepresentations because it deals with the Third Century a period that pre-dates the Dominate also known as the late imperial period.

Most of what we know about the ancient militaries is based on a finite number of sources that are constantly subjected to reinterpretation. Ironically, the evidence is often used to make general statements about those forces. What is or is not extracted varies from historian to historian.

The army of the Strategicon may be one of the six field or mobile armies of the Byzantine military based on the identification of specific units. Optimates formed a single moira in the second line. Foederati were concentrated and then sent to the east during the reign of Emperor Tiberius to fight the Persians. Maurice served as the comes foederatorum and may have commanded them during the transfer.

I question the use of "merits" when appraising primary sources. It is only in relatively recent times that history has acquired anything like a standard methodology. Yet historians continue to make factual errors when they record information. MC Bishop on his website wrote that re-enactors tend to fixate on a single example of an item.

I too correspond with Philip Rance and others.

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Perry,

Since I have not read his recent work yet, I’m not sure what Kaldellis wants to prove, since Late Roman cavalry could also be armoured horse-archers (after Parthian and Persian model) as well as specialised archers, meaning he can be both right and wrong. I have little doubt that Roman cavalry was mainly armed with lances or spears (swords would have been a secondary arm for both lancers as well as archers) as we read in descriptions and the manuals. Sometimes sources make no distinction between what specialist troops were hired and what were actually Roman forces. Sometimes there was no such distinction any longer.

What I would like to see is how Kaldellis judges that Procopius must be wrong, since I doubt there are alternative sources for the armies described by Procopius, by which we can prove that Procopius was wrong or not. And since these are not available, and Procopius was an eye-witness, I have little option but to give Procopius the benefit of the doubt.

I’m also not sure what you want with Kaldellis. If you want to use his writings to show Procopius can be discarded as a source, I fail to see how.

Are there any others who see Procopius’ descriptions of Belisarius’ campaigns as wrong and misinformed, and discard his details about the Byzantine army? Kaldellis alone does not make a ‘school’ you know.
And as far as I can recall, most authors take Procopius writings about the 6th c. Byzantine army VERY serious.

Here we come to the negative evidence. Yes, some historians have used that argument –and they usually get blown out of the water as a result. The stirrup argument is exactly one such argument – good books usually don’t go there.
Bad research is another. If Michael Grant wrote that about Vegetius it’s clear he did not have a proper clue who Vegetius was, or he did not bother to check his basics. Common mistake. I’m still looking for the quote that someone ascribed to Procopius about a plumbata killing the Vandal king’s nephew!
I don’t know Lindner.
I’m sure though that Peter Heather did not solely rely on Claudian’s poems when he described Stilicho’s campaigns!
Stephenson is not the best study for the Late Roman army. But at least he’s brave enough to mention the lack of actual Roman spears found (I take it that’s what you mean by ‘the number of Roman spears’). However, the description of Late Roman infantry as spear infantry rests on more than spears found in Danish bogs!

On to the Strategikon.
I simply do not see where you base that interpretation about the ‘specific army’ on. For the third time I ask you – where do you find the information that the text describes just one specific army. Instead of it being, as the commentators (in my opinion rightly) conclude, a manual for the complete Byzantine army? Foederati were not necessarily a group of foreign troops, they were a name for a Byzantine unit, as were the buccellari, who also were no longer the private armies of the 4th and 5th centuries. We see similar name-changes in earlier times, for instance the auxilia of the 4th c., who no longer were non-citizen units, but a specific class within the Late Roman army. What’s your point with the Optimates?

So who represent this ‘school’ that thinks of the Strategikon in that way?

Perry, what do you want? Bad historians and bad research are just that – is your argument that if bad research exists, it’s valid to do the same?

Arguments like “well it just hasn’t been found yetâ€

[perrygray]

Robert,

You seem confused by my use of Kaldellis as a source and then counter by making this statement "most authors take Procopius writings about the 6th c. Byzantine army VERY serious". Who are these people? Are you referring to modern writers, or all writers since the 6th Century.

Averil Cameron also noted the problems in Procopius and gave the example of what John Malalas wrote about the Battle of Callinicum which is different from the account of Procopius. I suggest that you read Cameron's Procopius and the Sixth Century. There has been a tendency to assume Procopius' material to be either completely trustworthy or completely untrustworthy, but Cameron asserts not only that each passage must be taken on its own terms but also that it must be understood in its own context of his three books (Secret History, Wars and Buildings).

All that can be said about Procopius in comparison to other contemporary historians is that he provides the longest account of the wars that has survived. It is one of contrast in that he mixes his version of the facts with information provided by others. Overall it is a very uneven presentation of events. The reader is left to decide whether or not Procopius is recording events or rumours.

You discount my position, but do not provide anything substantial to defend your own. You give vague references to what might or might not be source material. In English that is known as the pot calling the kettle black.

I do not appreciate it.

You are not sure about Heather's sources, well take the time to study them.

Heather by the way uses Lindner in his "The Fall of the Roman Empire" so much for your believe that bad theories tend to be discounted.

Stephenson is not brave for making statements. He just perpetuates the errors of so many inexperienced writers.

Less than 1% of all the Roman military equipment that may have been produced has been recovered and yet this does not seem to slow down historians and that ilk from making generalisations that become the basis of history.

Alas I am unlikely to change your mind, and you have not changed mine. I would like to attribute that to the fact that English is not your mother tongue; however, you seem to have a very good understanding of it so there must be something else.

Please feel free to offer your advice to others, but what you have achieved in this exchange is to discourage me from being a member of RAT. I am sure that you will not lose any sleep because of it.