Battle Studies - Colonel Ardant du Picq

[Tarbicus]

I found this to be an excellent read on ancient warfare, particularly related to the Romans. Very insightful from a man with actual experience of formation battles.

"Battle Studies - Ancient and Modern Battle"
by: Colonel Charles Jean Jacques Joseph Ardant du Picq

http://www.bellum.nu/literature/ardantdupicq003.html

Downloadable here:
http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/we ... p?num=7294

And the Wiki on the man:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ardant_du_Picq

[Alexandr K]

Hi,
yes, very interesting read. Mitra, member of RAT, has made the Italian translation of this work, see this thread
Greetings
Alexandr

[Tarbicus]

Ahhhh, sorry, I completely missed that thread. But I'm glad I raised it again as I'm amazed it's not quoted from more often, and should be pretty much standard reading given du Picq's abilities as both a soldier and a "been there, seen it, done it" analyst.

What's interesting is his depiction of how battle went at the actual front ranks. Not the push and shove and close contact, but each side keeping a "safe" distance with sporadic groups or individuals making an attack here and there. This also seems to be what many modern historians are coming around to as well, so du Picq is certainly worth taking seriously IMHO.

[Robert Vermaat]

What's interesting is his depiction of how battle went at the actual front ranks. Not the push and shove and close contact, but each side keeping a "safe" distance with sporadic groups or individuals making an attack here and there.

It would also mean there's far less need to 'refresh' the front ranks, as they would not tire as fast as is currently thought.

[Felix]

I would use de Picq with care. He was, after all, a man of his time. Victorian authors of the same era produced some invaluable works, but not without significant flaws - for example, the understanding of medieval armour (i.e. mail) was profoundly mistaken. Du Picq was writing before Freud and Jung, who revolutionized our understanding of the workings of the human mind (although much of what they wrote was imperfect as well).

More to the point, du Picq died in the Franco-Prussian War, which was a splendid demonstration of the disastrous results of tactics not fitting technology. Shortly after the American Civil War, it showed the Europeans exactly what they could have seen in America about the effects of long range rifle fire and long range artillery with explosive shells. Instead, the French and Prussians made almost exactly the same tactical blunders that the Americans did, with severe loss of life in a relatively short time. So, in a very real sense, du Picq is a very late Napoleonic (Bonaparte, that is) writer.

Du Picq is also writing a position paper, meant to convince, not a balanced historical evaluation. Consider this line from the introduction:

"The Gaul, a fool in war, used barbarian tactics. After the first surprise, he was always beaten by the Greeks and Romans. "

Off hand, I can think of only one grand "surprise" by and Gallic force against the Greeks or Romans; and that was by the Nervii. Of course, it is also true that the Gauls and their ilk won a few battles against their Mediterranean enemies.

[Felix]

From Chapter 2,

"There is a point beyond which man cannot bear the anxiety of combat in
the front lines without being engaged. The Romans did not so increase
the number of ranks as to bring about this condition. The Greeks did
not observe and calculate so well. They sometimes brought the number
of files up to thirty-two and their last files, which in their minds,
were doubtless their reserves, found themselves forcibly dragged into
the material disorder of the first ones"

There is some merit to this (which by the way corroborates what is being discussed on the Roman cavalry thread - that units may crumble from the rear, not from the front). However, this does raise the question: when Epimanondas led the Thebans to victory over Sparta, what was he doing with a phalanx some 50 rows deep? If this was an incredible waste of manpower, why did he do it, and how did he win anyway?

[Tarbicus]

But that was phalanx against phalanx. I think du Picq was comparing the more flexible and superior tactical deployment of the Romans compared to the Greeks, which kept the rear ranks and reserves well away from the forward ranks?

[Felix]

Yes, but think of the alternative.

Fifty ranks were opposed to the traditional eight. The Thebans could have deployed eight ranks deep, and had five times the frontage. They were hardly the entire army opposing Sparta, but at five times their own frontage, they certainly could have outflanked the Spartans.

Instead of outflanking the Spartans, they chose to outmatch them in depth. Either this was a colossal blunder, but Thebes won anyhow; or there was some sort of rationale for this massive formation.

[Tarbicus]

The Spartans weren't expecting such an opposing mass on their right at Leuktra when, usually, a strong right would encounter a weaker left wing the usual twelve or so deep? With the Peloponnesians making up pretty much the rest of the Spartan force they crumbled once the Spartan right had almost literally been walked over, IIRC.

[Felix]

Exactly. So du Picq is generalizing, and ignores the specific situation which might justify the otherwise outrageous formation. His work needs to be handled with caution.

[Tarbicus]

Exactly. So du Picq is generalizing, and ignores the specific situation which might justify the otherwise outrageous formation. His work needs to be handled with caution.

But he was talking about the phalanx in a general way, wasn't he, and not specifically about Leuktra?

I think I see your point, but he was still a serving officer and military analyst in an age where men fought in formation on the open battlefield, and both saw it with his own eyes and took part. Is it possible that makes him more reliable than a modern analyst? He seems to show a keen understanding of men's behaviour in battle which is even reflected in more modern works like 'The Face of Battle'. I refer specifically to the part where two opposing infantry units bump into each other by accident, and instead of forming up and firing their rifles they instead throw rocks at each other and run.

[Felix]

I agree, his observations do have great value; particularly as they refer to the 19th century.

However, in regards to the ancients, discretion is warranted. In the passage about the deep phalanx, du Picq does not qualify his statement to indicate that this was a unique formation for a specific purpose, and that it succeeded in that purpose (as far as we can tell). It was not standard, or even common among Greek hoplites.

The Crimean incident with two groups throwing stones at each other is very striking. However, this was a case where neither side expected to see the enemy any time soon. It cannot be safely generalized to situations of formal full scale battle where two armies are drawn up in plain view, sometimes hours or days before the attack begins (i.e. almost all Classical battles).

There is one other large assumption, which needs to be investigated. Is it clear that forces with little missile capacity (i.e. Greek hoplites, medieval knights, Swiss or Macedonian pikemen) act the same way as men armed with primary missile weapons (i.e. velites, bowmen, musketeers)? If you have a missile weapon, you can stay some distance from the enemy and still damage them; there is a rationalization for not pressing an attack into close quarters. If you have no good missile weapon - i.e. you are a pikeman - does this same psychology apply? If you stop, you cannot damage the enemy. He may or may not still be able to harm you. If you are in any kind of mass formation, you don't really have a way to leave the battlefield and avoid harm altogether. So what do you do?

[Tarbicus]

The merge of opposing phalanxes is a tricky one, and I feel the options are that they would march steadily into each other when finding themselves opposite or nearby to each other, or hold their position for a while as each ensures it is properly formed and in a prepared state to advance. It may have even been a race to get ready, especially if the phalanxes were at angles to each other. But if approaching each other square on, then I imagine it's a case of simply marching towards each other and getting stuck in. Almost like two warships preparing to pass each other for a broadsides? But the one who is in a state to attack first has the advantage that the opposition may be unprepared to receive them. Given the wayward movement of a phalanx it's a bit possible?

Interestingly (or dumbly), it's something that du Picq mentions that made me think of an outlandish, but not entirely unimagineable way for the Romans to have penetrated the Macedonian phalanx. It basically involves playing dead :? Some of the Romans pretend to be dead and wait for the phalanx to march over them, then attack from within. With phalangites occupied with keeping formation and both hands on their sarissa,... Far fetched, I know, and outflanking them is the obvious way, but stranger things have happened.

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

Or force a passage through the Sarrissas. Once under and inside the points, it would be difficult to stop a person. Unless the sarrissa was droped to defend yourself.

[Tarbicus]

Or force a passage through the Sarrissas. Once under and inside the points, it would be difficult to stop a person. Unless the sarrissa was droped to defend yourself.

That's been discussed before and often discounted as being feasible. I think it's also in the source texts somewhere that it wasn't possible, or pretty much so, IIRC. The sarissa had a long reach, and to make it all the way underneath or between a few ranks' worth of them is a long shot, again IIRC. You weren't just facing one set of points.