Hoplites fighting in Phalanx formation

[Dan Diffendale]

The first bit about open formation is rubish!The man does not only dissagree with a respectful source(Thoucydites)but he simply ignores every single piece of arcaelogical and literal evidence we have!AND common sence,because if you imagine a battle in that formation described,it wouldn't be any different than Homeric battles.And he simply bases his theory on the mobilty needed to achieve a powerful hit.

It's perfectly possible to disagree with a "respectful" source and not be "rubbish." Part of van Wees' argument is that, indeed, things hadn't changed much since Homeric battles -- but ah-ha! Exactly! Homer is describing maybe 8th century warfare, not whatever might or might not have happened in the era of the Trojan War... so maybe we shouldn't dismiss the idea that Homeric battle must be different than slightly later?

I just hope someone takes the time to do an intense study, and hopefully reject Polybius' notion that a hoplite would need 6 feet of space to fight effectively.

I seriously doubt any modern could do a better study than Polybius already did. He was a commander in the army of the Achaean Confederation in 169-168 BC. Besides, Victor Davis Hanson doesn't have any more experience in a phalanx than Hans van Wees does.

[TraderTrey9785]

Besides, Victor Davis Hanson doesn't have any more experience in a phalanx than Hans van Wees does.

Good point -- I find some of the information that both scholars perpetuate as 'incomplete.' It's not to say that they aren't good scholars, but I think sitting back and writing about something based on your own translations of the original Greek is very fluid. When one word can have 30 different meanings in English or other languages, I think there is always going to be information that modern scholars will never obtain from primary sources. I think Hans van Wees has some really novel ideas that might contain a lot of substance, and I feel the same way toward Hanson.

I think it would be a great idea if modern scholars could actually test some of the 'descriptions' that are found in ancient authors. After reading van Wees, I support a lot of his conclusions, and I think that Hanson's basic description of hoplite fighting, while distinguished, is still missing a few pieces. Warfare changes so quickly that it is hard to keep up, and much harder to recreate. Look at the technological changes between World War II and Korea -- that isn't much of a time span but in many ways it is like comparing apples and oranges. I think there is too much information that we don't know and to embrace one single opinion about the way things were is a huge mistake.

I also think that modern academics use a lot of prominent authors as the so-called experts. While Goldsworthy, as all of us would agree, is one of the best concerning matters of the Roman Army, that doesn't mean that myself, or any other member of RAT shouldn't try to question and further some of his ideas....otherwise, how will Classics and Ancient History continue to evolve and survive in a world that constantly wants to forget it? I think when it all boils down in the end, most of us are probably just frustrated that no matter how hard we try, we'll never fully understand the ancient mindset, or the way that they did things -- :? That doesn't mean we shouldn't try though!

[Felix]

But, if one takes Homer's description of a battle seriously, shouldn't one take his description of the shield seriously?

Dan Howard has done a lot of work on this subject, with the view to a practical reconstruction of the beast. It clearly was not a hoplite's aspis. It is described as banging on the ankles and the neck, it is circular, and it is primarily made of hides. In size and material, it is closer to Mycenaean shields than Classical ones. It could not be used like a hoplite's aspis, or vice versa.

Polybius clearly describes a close order for Macedonian sarissas than typical of late Republican legionaries. It is worth pointing out than Macedonians did carry swords, and not purely thrusting ones either. It is also worth pointing out that the Romans did use close order formations - such as the foulkon, and as described by Arrian against the Alans. So a close formation can be used by a man with a cut and thrust sword - it just limits his combat options. He can still thrust, and he could cut downwards.

[Dan Howard]

Not all of the shields described by Homer were full height but there are a few that were both full height and circular. There is definitely nothing about Homeric shields that resemble the hoplite aspis except the circular shape. Homer is very clear about how they were constructed - to the point that a very accurate reconstruction can be made.

[Tarbicus]

Homer is very clear about how they were constructed - to the point that a very accurate reconstruction can be made.

Tease! Show one, or do one :wink:

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

We should all agree that the idea of a "phalanx" with the hoplites 6 feet appart is rediculous.You cannot reject Thoucydides,Xenophon,Tyrtaios,Plato etc etc and all sculptures showing overlapping shields plus vases plus common sence just based on a writer that in his time hoplite phalanx was already forgoten for centuries or in Homer's poems when you know that AFTER Homer(whenever he lived)the hoplite aspis was invented!Plato sais in one of his dialogs that the practise to become a "hoplomachos" is needless!In any open order formation this practise and training is not needless but vital!Van Wees' theory,at this point at least,is rediculous and Hanson has sumarised well all existing evidense,including description of the armour and the mobility you had in it,to conclude to his very convinsing theory.
As for when Homer lived and what time he is describing,there has been much debate and Matt Amt is more apropriate to speak about that.Visit his Bronze Age site for more info.
Khairete
Giannis

[Alexandr K]

Hi,
every theory has its stronger points and its weaker ones. I for example regard the concept of "rugby scrum" or the shoving the man in front of you (which is based on the interpretation of the word othismos, or otheo) similarly ridiculous as you regard the theories of Van Wees. It would be very difficult for the front rankers only to maintain their balance not to say fight with their weapons. Some battles lasted for a long time. It would be physically impossible to endure such a pressure for more than a few minutes. And to take the word othismos or otheo literally is far from justified, if we remember, that Homer, who certainly writes about loose order formations and fights, also uses this words to describe battles and fights.
By the way, Van Wees is not the only one to question the classic look at the hoplite battles a lá Hanson. See Goldworthy, Krentz and others.
Greetings
Alexandr

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

My view is that the othismos,that means just pushing and nothing more was the case in any vast number batlle.Pressure is described also in roman battles at the point that the dead remained in their place as there was no space to fall!The Greeks seem to have just used this fact and transformed their phalanx in order for the othismos to become an advantage.It's interesting that Xenophon sais befor the othosmos took place the "doratismos"=fighting with the spear.Wich means that the pushing did not take place exactly after the clash but slowly as physically the rear rankers pushed the men in front of them.You're probably right that front rankers could not stay for a long time under such pressure.However,there was no need to push for a long time.Sooner or later one of the phalanxes broke most of the times.And in the rare situation that did not brake,we know what huppened in the battle of Koroneia where Xenophon was present.Both phalanxes broke and everything became a mess with much more dead from both sides than usual.Xenophon sais it was the most terrible battle of his time.
Also,in other great battles we see that not all parts of the formation came in contact,some times the enemy broke fefor that clash!
And one more point against loose formation,can anybody tell me what was the need for the Spartans to march in the same step withe the sound of the aulos,if they did not have locked shields?
Khairete
Giannis

PS.Much time befor Homer there have been phalanxes in Sumeria and even pikemen in Minoans.Homer does not speak of othismos but for ranks "one after the other" wich may mean he had primitive phalanxes in his mind or was speaking about the earlier Minoan pike phalanxes that were probably in use in some places.

[Tarbicus]

Pressure is described also in roman battles at the point that the dead remained in their place as there was no space to fall!

How many battles does that apply to? Not many, I'll bet. The whole idea of Roman "push'n'shove" combat is far from proven. Small incursions and group sparring are far more likely. Cannae was an exception.

[floofthegoof]

All this can never be more than pure speculation. It's like our discussions about cavalry charges. Unless you can convince a group of guys to fight to the death phalanx style while you videotape, you really can't know what works and what doesn't.

I would speculate that when your life is on the line in any war, your first priority is your own personal safety. Once you are secure, you then take opportunities to do harm to your enemy from a safe position. If I were to guess on how to use spear and shield in formation, I would put them in a position that first provided them with the utmost safety, even if this dimishes their ability to do harm.

It is compatible with both individual and collective interests to *not* lose the battle, rather than to take any risk in order to win. So long as your force stays somewhat intact, you retain some control over your destiny. Defeating your enemy only makes this control a bit easier, but the goal here is to maintain the control.

I say safety first!

[Marius_Ursus]

Here's something to consider. It's probably somewhere in between.

Here's my own theory based on what happens in actual combat. Mind you, this is with rifles, but still, war influences the way you see things.

When going into battle, the hoplites stayed in a tightly packed phalanx with their sheilds interlocked and performed thrusting and throwing of spears. As the pitch shifted, and depending on the enemies' reaction, the holite commander would then issue an order, probably similar to, "One step right!" and everyone would spread out and pull out their falcatas and scramasaxes or whatever sidearm they were carrying to continue the fight. If there were troops to cover and recover, another shield wall would come forward or would pass lances and spears forward to continue the fight in a tight formation.

Battle is a very fluid activity, and professional soldiers get a lot...I mean a lot of training in how to maneuver and get into position as an automatic reaction to an order. That's how soldiers stay alive. I fully believe that any phalanx that withstood a charge and remained static, especially as the enemy changes their tactics in the heat of battle, would probably get cut down one way or another.

[Tarbicus]

I say safety first!

I have to kind of disagree, I'm afraid :wink: The very act of being in a phalanx, or even maniple, has thrown all safety out of the window to start with. The most overriding motivation in battle, and this takes into account actual accounts from the American Civil War (and there are numerous examples right throughout military history), is the desire and need to prove yourself and not fail in front of your comrades-in-arms. Most may tend to hunker down, but there are those who show incredible bravery and inspire the other men (elected centurions, etc). The ancients were unable to return home if they disgraced themselves in battle, and the bravest were often rewarded and held in high esteem. I'll always point to the madcap antics of the Romans in the Jewish War and at Cremona as examples of this, when personal safety was absolutely thrown out of the window in a number of cases by simple legionaries, and they're only the ones recorded for posterity.

Many ancients fought alongside family and neighbours, and anything they did in battle would be taken home with them; good and bad.

[Alexandr K]

Hi,

Pressure is described also in roman battles at the point that the dead remained in their place as there was no space to fall!

And mostly when something similar happened, things were very bad for the soldiers in the „crowded“ or „pressed“ position, who were butchered often without any possibility to inflict damage on the enemy (Cannae, Sabis, Dyrrhachium, Adrianople, ...). And there are other descriptions of the doom, which comes in battle, when the ranks are to tightly packed (App. B.C. IV. 110, 128; Cass. Dio XXXVI. 49.4-6; Veg. I.26 and certainly other, which I'm not aware of). These situations weren't caused by the physical pressure by the enemy, but mostly by fear and panic among soldiers.

Sooner or later one of the phalanxes broke most of the times.

Some battles lasted for one or more hours or even for „most of the day“. What was happening then, when you agree, that the soldiers couldn'n endure the press for too long?

And one more point against loose formation,can anybody tell me what was the need for the Spartans to march in the same step withe the sound of the aulos,if they did not have locked shields?

Even in looser formation you need to maintain your ranks in good order. Keep in mind, that the battle lines could have been a mile or even more long.

Homer does not speak of othismos but for ranks "one after the other" wich may mean he had primitive phalanxes in his mind or was speaking about the earlier Minoan pike phalanxes that were probably in use in some places.

Well according to Krentz, Pritchett (unfortunately I haven't read Pritchett's books) while studying Homer concluded that „The othismos is as common in Homer as it is in later hoplite warfare, although the noun is not used.“



I absolutely agree with Rich regarding soldiers and their will to fight/live. Tarbicus, there are many examples of bravery and no care of own safety. But these are almost all exceptional deeds by exceptional men in exceptional circumstances. The historians are often describing these events in great detail, because its something extraordinary and therefore interesting for their readers. I believe the majority of men want 1. survive, 2. survive, 3. not get injured, 4. perhaps kill some enemies. In another thread you praised du Picq for his great understanding of soldiers psyche in battle. In the first chapter, du Picq wrote: "Man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. He does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second." I think these are very wise words shaped by experience, which is valid for ancient warfare too. The instinct of self-preservation does not change much in time.

Greetings
Alexandr

[Tarbicus]

Tarbicus, there are many examples of bravery and no care of own safety. But these are almost all exceptional deeds by exceptional men in exceptional circumstances. The historians are often describing these events in great detail, because its something extraordinary and therefore interesting for their readers. I believe the majority of men want 1. survive, 2. survive, 3. not get injured, 4. perhaps kill some enemies.

I'm not denying the instinct for survival is a strong one, but in what manner is that instinct best served? I argue that group cohesion and bonds, and the need to remain within that group and not be ostracised is the same thing. "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." If you don't support your combat buddies then I dare say you won't last long in an extreme situation.

In another thread you praised du Picq for his great understanding of soldiers psyche in battle. In the first chapter, du Picq wrote: "Man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. He does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second." I think these are very wise words shaped by experience, which is valid for ancient warfare too. The instinct of self-preservation does not change much in time.

I did, and I maintain that the very traits of not letting the side down, and proving yourself, amongst your peers is the best way to survive. The simple fact is that in a phalanx or maniple, or cohort, if you find yourself in the front ranks then you've had no choice in the matter; you have no control over your destiny. There are no trees to hide behind, or ditches to lie in, while bullets fly around you. It's very simple - do or die, because you're stood up facing the enemy (sometimes quite literally), and have absolutely no choice except to get stuck in. If you don't then you're dead.

Here's an interesting read on the motivations of soldiers fighting in Iraq:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... ?pubID=179
(you can save the full PDF to hard drive).
It also has many references to other studies from WW2 and Korea, which all have the common theme that group cohesion is the overriding motivation in combat.

Now, take that peer group to ancient times and what do you have? A group of men who probably have common roots by location, and also by blood. Before they even pick up their weapons they are known to each other and will also return to the same place they came from. I believe this applies also to the standing later legions, raised from certain localities and after the battle they return to the same fort or camp. A man who puts self preservation above the good of the group will be in for a very hard time when they return in any of the aforementioned circumstances. In any peer group there will always be at least one who is the bravest, most reckless, etc; a leader, the one who will make a decision to act. It is typical of a group dynamic that the one who leads will be followed, especially if he is respected for his bravery. Such an individual would also usually be the one to help in dire straits, so, it makes sense that the group would also want to protect him as part of the self-preservation instinct.

Here's another reference to duPicq,
"The human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor."

I see no conflict between self-preservation and bravery in battle.

Here's another reference from the PDF I posted, when German Wehrmacht POW's, who had fought to the bitter end even though their cause was lost, were interviewed,
"When the individual's immediate group, and its supporting formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group, was minimised."

Added:
Just to round of with very poignant quotes from the same report, this time from interviews with US soldiers in Iraq:

"I know that as far as myself, sir, I take my squad mates' lives more important than my own."

"That person means more to you than anybody.You will die if he dies. That is why I think that we protect each other in any situation. I know that if he dies and it was my fault, it would be worse than death to me."

And one more;

"I am the lowest ranking private on the Bradley so I am trying to kind of prove something in a way that I could do things. I did not want to let anyone down."

[Felix]

Tarbicus is correct.

What needs to be remembered is that the social pressure in ancient warfare was a lot more intense than anything we can use for comparison. Soldiers throughout history have fought primarily for their comrades, both recently and in the past. Tacitus describes the organization of the Germanic tribesmen in combat for similar reasons.

But in ancient warfare, your buddies are also your peacetime kin and neighbors and tribesmen. They are the guarantee that you have a place in the world. If you are outcast from your city, you are outside of the law everywhere - so if you fail your comrades in battle, you fail the city, and the whole city knows it. A man without a city was an outlaw. Nowadays, if you are a coward in battle and discharged from the army in disgrace, it may affect the kind of job you get, and hurt your chances for a political career ( hock: ) but it is by no means the end of your life as a citizen.