Hoplites fighting in Phalanx formation

[Felix]

All this can never be more than pure speculation. It's like our discussions about cavalry charges. Unless you can convince a group of guys to fight to the death phalanx style while you videotape, you really can't know what works and what doesn't.

I would speculate that when your life is on the line in any war, your first priority is your own personal safety. Once you are secure, you then take opportunities to do harm to your enemy from a safe position. If I were to guess on how to use spear and shield in formation, I would put them in a position that first provided them with the utmost safety, even if this dimishes their ability to do harm.

It is compatible with both individual and collective interests to *not* lose the battle, rather than to take any risk in order to win. So long as your force stays somewhat intact, you retain some control over your destiny. Defeating your enemy only makes this control a bit easier, but the goal here is to maintain the control.

I say safety first!

Alas, the history of war doesn't support this position. Every single battle of the gunpowder age involved some people standing up and advancing into the range of the enemy's weapons, in a situation where the defenders either: could fire first, could fire and reload and refire a lot faster then moving men, and/or were not standing up in the open as targets.

Someone always took this risk and abandoned the safer defensive situation.

[Tarbicus]

And just add another reference to duPicq, asking that you bear in mind that the ancients fought in formation with no opportunity to hide away:

"In practical terms, soldiers overcome by fear attempt to escape from their commanders’ supervision, hide, or “get away from the engagement.â€

[Arthes]

Tarbicus\\n[quote]And just add another reference to duPicq, asking that you bear in mind that the ancients fought in formation with no opportunity to hide away:

"In practical terms, soldiers overcome by fear attempt to escape from their commanders’ supervision, hide, or “get away from the engagement.â€

[Sean Manning]

Arguments against the traditional model for hoplite combat often strike me as too specialized. Yes, by selective use of the few Classical sources you can make an open order thesis look somewhat plausible. But what if you look at other, better known societies?

Historical parallels show that dense shield walls have often been used. They show even more clearly that dense, deep pike blocks on the Macedonian model have been used. Modern reenactors can get small segments of a phalanx to work in the way the traditional model suggests. Historical parallels, and the experience of martial artists with the right skills, also support the idea that hoplite arms are not designed for open order. Thus the traditional model, while it may not be entirely correct, on the balance seems to fit the majority of the Classical evidence and that from other societies. As far as I can tell without reading it, van Wees' model does neither, but one day I shall read it and form a more conclusive opinion.

As Felix has recently noted, during the 17th and 18th century many troops, often cold, wet, hungry, underpaid, and despised by officers and civilians, were willing to stand under cannon and musket fire for hours while 40 or 50% of them died. The winners of many battles and sieges often suffered 20-30% dead, and had a lifetime of the same to look forward to! Never underestimate what good troops can do. That is one of the great and terrible things about war, that it can get men to show such courage in what is often so bad a cause.

Re: Homer, there are strong arguments that it shows a mix of military traditions like it shows a mix of traditions about marraige and burial. There are proto-holpite influences, Mycenaean influences, and Greek Dark Age heroic warrior influences, mediated through the desire to tell tales about warrior superheroes. That said, I'm no Homerist.

[Alexandr K]

Hi all,

Here's an interesting read on the motivations of soldiers fighting in Iraq:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... ?pubID=179
(you can save the full PDF to hard drive).
It also has many references to other studies from WW2 and Korea, which all have the common theme that group cohesion is the overriding motivation in combat.

Very interesting. Thanks for sharing, laus added.
I am certainly not denying the importance of cohesion in combat. You're right, that it greatly helps the soldiers to cope with fear and stress in battle and it can make them do things, which they otherwise wouldn't do. But everything has its borders and in fact the priority of survival and the bonds to your comrades are not contradicting.
I've read one of the studies from WWII mentioned in the study from Iraq – Marshall's Men against fire. It's really very fascinating and enlightening read. What did he find out? That in combats of the WWII only ca. 15 % of American soldiers present in the fight really shot at enemies (the best fighting units had ca. 25 % of active participants). The rest was lying in some hole and did not dare to expose their noses to enemy fire. Moreover, in the 15 % (25 %) mentioned are counted also men, who did not expose themselves and only shot one or more shots somewhere in the direction of enemy lines without aiming from the relative safety of their shelters. What does it mean? More than 75 % of men in combat cared more about their lives than about killing enemies. But this doesn't prevent Marshall to stress the great value of unit cohesion in the next chapters (and the same is in du Picq). If the majority of your comrades is acting in the same way as you are, you won't be regarded as coward and you won't be outcased from your social environment! In the study of American soldiers in Iraq it was interesting to read the conclusion of Moskos about the war in Vietnam: „Interestingly, Moskos argued that the close bonds with other soldiers may be a result of self-interested concern for personal safety rather than an altruistic concern for fellow soldiers.“ And then see the parts of interviews with the soldiers, where they stress the importance that someone is watching their back: „That person means more to you than anybody. You will die if he dies.“ „It becomes almost like your guardian angel“ „Nothing can come to you without going through them first.“ etc. And the conclusion: „Once soldiers are convinced that their own personal safety will by assured by others, they feel empowered to do their job without worry.“ So again, the self-preservation seems to be the primary concern.
Of course the ancient battles were different as was the ancient society. You couldn't simply hide in some hole in a pitched battle and the values and the attitudes to combat and killing were different. So how can this be applied to ancient warfare? I think that the men were simply trying to gain as much protection from their armour and shields as possible and not to expose themselves to enemy. If they could kill or hurt their opponents without being exposed, they would certainly try, however if they had the chance, but would be vulnerable during their attack, they would probably mostly rather remain behind their shields. Only a minority of bold men did fight aggressively, without much care about their lives. What was the proportion of these bold and aggressive soldiers is another matter. I don't know. But I think they were the minority, although there also certainly were exceptions. You must also realize, that to care more about your life than about killing enemies doesn't automatically mean, that you'll fly away as soon as the fight begins or that you won't even advance to enemy. It means that during the clash you'll do your best to survive and if you have the opportunity to attack some enemies, you'll do that only if it doesn't poses greater risk for you.

Alas, the history of war doesn't support this position. Every single battle of the gunpowder age involved some people standing up and advancing into the range of the enemy's weapons, in a situation where the defenders either: could fire first, could fire and reload and refire a lot faster then moving men, and/or were not standing up in the open as targets.

And the studies of this kind of combat revealed, that mostly the soldiers began to shoot from too long a distance, on which their weapons were ineffective. The reason behind this being the stress of battle, the fear and unwillingness to come nearer and expose themselves to concentrated and effective enemy fire.

Arguments against the traditional model for hoplite combat often strike me as too specialized. Yes, by selective use of the few Classical sources you can make an open order thesis look somewhat plausible. But what if you look at other, better known societies?

Historical parallels show that dense shield walls have often been used. They show even more clearly that dense, deep pike blocks on the Macedonian model have been used. Modern reenactors can get small segments of a phalanx to work in the way the traditional model suggests. Historical parallels, and the experience of martial artists with the right skills, also support the idea that hoplite arms are not designed for open order. Thus the traditional model, while it may not be entirely correct, on the balance seems to fit the majority of the Classical evidence and that from other societies. As far as I can tell without reading it, van Wees' model does neither, but one day I shall read it and form a more conclusive opinion.

Well, I didn't say the open order is all correct. I'm not that familiar with sources about Greek warfare to dare so. I was just explaining the main point of my first post - „every theory has its stronger points and its weaker ones“. The open order concepts have flaws. But are they „rubbish“ and „ridiculous“ as they were labelled in this discussion? No, they aren't. The traditional model also has its flaws, which its defenders often don't see or don't want to see. The famous „mass shove“ is I believe one serious of them. The new open order concepts are simply trying to propose new alternatives how to explain some aspects of Greek warfare, which the traditional model failed to explain convincingly. And many of their points are relevant and right.

Greetings
Alexandr

[Anonymous]

I think the point that "playing it safe" is not inconsistent with supporting your mates is very accurate. In re-enacted combat, I have often found my unit in trouble because some members of it took risks and got themselves "killed".

Consider Plataea, where the survivor of Thermopylae tried to win back his name for courage but was actually censured for rashness which could have endangered his comrades.

Those men who rush forward can inspire their mates to follow, but they can also just facilitate the enemy's reduction of the numbers they confront.

As Tarby says, there's nowhere to hide in a phalanx, except behind your shield. Paradoxically, it actually requires a high degree of courage to stay in formation, so that the shieldwall has a chance to work, i.e., "playing it safe" takes a lot of nerve. Again, the "peer regard" pressure operates to help you keep your nerve, in this situation and you have to feel confident that they will stand as you stand.

If you turn sideways on in the phalanx, with your shield resting on your shoulder ( an idea I have advocated for some time), your shield will still project further to your left than to your right, even if it has a central porpax, like mine. In fact, it appears that porpakes were often fixed slightly right of centre, anyway.

The theory used to be that the Romans were often successful because their tight formations effectively gave them local numerical superiority over their longsword-swinging foes. Has that idea now been discarded?
If not, why should dense formations not work equally well for the Greeks?

It's been suggested that the tight phalanx many of us consider accurate, would have been impractical on anything but flat ground and therefore would not have been used. Yet we hear of the Hellenistic phalanx working excellently against the Romans, until the Macedonians pursued their foes into broken ground.

We know that the Classical phalanx was often fighting for control of farmland which is necessarily flat and we have literary evidence for armies agreeing on where to fight, to facilitate the deployment of Hoplite phalanges. Equipping men as Hoplites and then asking them to fight in open order is a contradiction. Spear-armed troops work better in shieldwall. And if open order was such a good idea, why couldn't the Athenians have extended their line at Marathon by spreading each line more thinly rather than by reducing the depth?

Okay, the degree of shoving going on in a Phalanx battle remains debatable - you can have a tight phalanx without necessarily relying on your ability to "bind tight and shove" to win the battle. People say the soldiers would risk being crushed by the pressure of their own mates' shoving. They also say that battles lasted a long time, which would add to this danger and also means that such pressure couldn't be maintained.
I would argue that those being pressed from behind would try damned hard to ease the pressure from in front by desperately trying to remove any obstacles, such as enemy soldiers. This would very much help to overcome the natural inclination of most human beings to avoid killing, even in battle. This inclination is well attested and can be pursued even by someone who is apparently fighting his enemy. Secondly, where the two sides are evenly matched, pressure is likely to build and casualties from crushing are likely to occur but, as the lines become static, more concentration can be applied to using spears to kill the enemy, thus discouraging them from pressing forward quite as enthusiastically and reducing the numbers immediately available for the shoving match. 17th century pike-blocks did it, why shouldn't earlier ones?

[Tarbicus]

Alexandr, I agree about self-survival not being exclusive to unit cohesion and loyalty.

Of course the ancient battles were different as was the ancient society. You couldn't simply hide in some hole in a pitched battle and the values and the attitudes to combat and killing were different. So how can this be applied to ancient warfare? I think that the men were simply trying to gain as much protection from their armour and shields as possible and not to expose themselves to enemy. If they could kill or hurt their opponents without being exposed, they would certainly try, however if they had the chance, but would be vulnerable during their attack, they would probably mostly rather remain behind their shields. Only a minority of bold men did fight aggressively, without much care about their lives. What was the proportion of these bold and aggressive soldiers is another matter. I don't know. But I think they were the minority, although there also certainly were exceptions. You must also realize, that to care more about your life than about killing enemies doesn't automatically mean, that you'll fly away as soon as the fight begins or that you won't even advance to enemy. It means that during the clash you'll do your best to survive and if you have the opportunity to attack some enemies, you'll do that only if it doesn't poses greater risk for you.

There's also another effect that could possibly add something to the discussion: stress. I'm looking into this more, but the sense I get is that with the extreme psychological stress that must be present if standing in a line waiting to be attacked and possibly killed or seriously injured, an individual, with no option to take flight, has little choice but to become aggressive. I don't think the modern analogy can apply here, because we're talking about ancient battle where the men had no option to hunker down under cover, except with what they carried. "Fight or flight" comes to mind. The effects of combat are complex, where the frontal brain almost shuts down and we revert to using our more primal mid brain. But, a high level of training (thinking of the Roman standing legions) can overcome the instinct to stop functioning to a degree (a comparison of firing rates during the Falklands conflict showed the British professional army to be far higher than the Argentinian mostly-conscript army, even though the former had negligible air or artillery support in comparison) and make the men act pro-actively and actually function without freezing up.

From what I can tell, here are the base instinct mammalian options for stressed individuals:

* Flight (Withdrawal from the threat)
* Fight (Defensive aggression)
* Freeze (Crouching and lying still to avoid attention)
* Appeasement (Actively submitting to the attacker)

'Freeze', is obviously not an option to a phalanx or cohort, so we're left with three options. 'Appeasement' comes at the end of a combat phase in the form of surrender, so we're now left wth two options. Compare the two options that are now left with accounts from Caesar's Gallic Wars of the mens' behaviour in battle, where the legionaries seemed to be in control of the battle at times, advancing without orders, etc. Also, when Caesar had to leave his horse, and made his tribunes do so and stand with the men to stop them from taking flight from the Helvetii (good officer material that man). And then here is a really interesting tidbit, during the battle with Ariovistus:

"Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every one might have them as witnesses of his valour. He himself began the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from above."
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10657/10657.txt

That doesn't sound like the odd individual acting exceptionally. Is this a case of aggression through fear and stress (the Romans had been baited for days on end before actually being able to engage the enemy in formal battle) being allowed to focus on the enemy at last?

[Arthes]

Greetings,
well, Polybius sounds straight forward enough here.....
writing after Pydna I suppose...
You also have to allow for the pointy bits on the rear end of the Sarissa otherwise you will have some nasty accidental injuries.... :wink:

Polybius
Histories, Book XVIII, Chapters 28-32:
Excerpt....The Roman Maniple vs. The Macedonian Phalanx

The actual Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae are sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer:

So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm; And man on man; and waving horse-hair plumes In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed In order: in such serried rank they stood. [Iliad, 13.131]

And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about.

Such is the arrangement, general and detailed of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armor also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man---because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing---it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily---seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigor to the use of their swords. Therefore, it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.

Polybius

Regards
Arthes

[hoplite14gr]

Some points.

A square block of men can run,maintain formation and crash as agroup on another group. I know from personal experience.

Why they would do it? Well, motivation, revenge patriotism, you name it.

The Greek hoplite shield is a heavy weapon designed to be used in formation.

At the time of homer the beotian shield and super-heavy armored noble javelineers were the mainstay but they could be checked by tight formations.
(Achena with locked shields dtop Hector.)

The Lilandian War between Eretria and Chalkis settled the issue in favor of tight formation.

Beteewn two good phalanx groups battle would take half day and it would be anihilating (Thyrea)

The phalanx was a psychological warfare weapon. Facing a tight orderes group of "metal-men" was challenging even for the trained hoplite, much more for the Asiatic enemies. Even the ferocious celts did not break the phalanx in Thermopulae.

Most scholars in my opinion know knowthing about armies amd try to make edjucated guesses who might be wide off-mark.

Kind regards

[Tarbicus]

Why they would do it? Well, motivation, revenge patriotism, you name it.

Patriotism is by far the most un-cited reason for acting in combat, over the last couple of hundred years at least. It's even a taboo subject amongst many fighting units. What writers decide to write afterwards is a different matter altogether, but usually in the cause of propaganda for the folks back home and not scientific documentation or analysis of men in combat.

Most scholars in my opinion know knowthing about armies amd try to make edjucated guesses who might be wide off-mark.

But what of those who were qualified military men, interested in the psychology of battle such as Harris and duPicq, and whose research has been borne out by practical application of their theories and observations?

[Alexandr K]

Hi Tarbicus,

I'm looking into this more, but the sense I get is that with the extreme psychological stress that must be present if standing in a line waiting to be attacked and possibly killed or seriously injured, an individual, with no option to take flight, has little choice but to become aggressive. I don't think the modern analogy can apply here, because we're talking about ancient battle where the men had no option to hunker down under cover, except with what they carried. "Fight or flight" comes to mind.

I don't think so. We must remember, that the majority of "passive" fighters is not only on one side of the battlefield, but on the other too. Then if two "passive" fighters met, their fight didn't have to be aggressive and furious, but probably more reluctant, since both tried to survive. This could also partly account for the relatively low casualties on the winner's side (ca. 5 %), which have been calculated by historians for ancient battles. Of course, as I already said, there was the minority of aggressive natural fighters. And of course these soldier also fought against the "passive" ones. The ancient Greeks stressed the importance to put the bravest soldiers (ie. the aggressive fighters) in the front and rear ranks. Those in the front actually fought, those in the rear prevented the others from running away. This is also indirect evidence for the simple fact, that there were many soldiers caring more about their lives than about killing the enemy, who had to be kept in place by rear rankers/optiones/commanders (and this, of course, is true not only for ancient warfare), since otherwise they would flee.
I think that the Romans certainly followed the Greek practice of placing the best soldiers in front ranks, which would partly explain the narrative of Caesar, which you mentioned. Those, who "leaped upon the phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from above" were probably the aggressive front rankers.
But I agree with you, that some special circumstances and perhaps good leadership and personal examples could sometimes inspire similar aggression also in men who would otherwise be "passive".

Greetings
Alexandr

[Tarbicus]

Agreed on the placement of the experienced troops, which Goldsworthy believes was a contributing factor at Cannae. But I find CAesar's account of all front rankers jumping on the enemy to indicate that it was not unusual for the men as a whole to act in what many would view to be a foolhardy way. You have two choices in ancient battle, regardless of experience, and controlled by intense stress behaviour - do or die. Anger is a prevalent emotion amongst combatants, apparently, the trick being to channel it at the enemy, and I think that's exactly what Caesar's men did against Ariovistus' phalanx. This is not a couple of men, but an entire body at the front.

Check out the news coverage over the last couple of days of the football battles between English fans and the Italian and Spanish police. I saw many untrained, unarmed and unarmoured civilians taking on the police through simple rage at their situation, and what was happening to their peer group and friends. Now apply the same principal to a unit of armed, trained and tightly bonded Roman or Greek soldiers in a similar situation.

[hoplite14gr]

Patriotism was one if even minor reason-not THE REASON, I agree.

I said "most" not "all" scholars.

Greek posted experienced men to the rear if they could afford it so as to prevent disintegration.

Good leadership can inspire even to acts of stupidity. I agree.

Kind regards

[Sean Manning]

One thing I have always wanted to see in terms of combat motivation and willingness to kill are good cross-cultural studies. That study someone posted on Iraq was very interesting (if not too surprising) but didn't really go into willingness to kill. Modern studies tend to be from the West (including its margins such as South America and Japan) which means I don't trust them to make general statements about human nature. For the last severral centuries Western society has been quite peaceful internally, and has had a strong strain of anti-violence in its culture. Republican Rome was a disciplined warrior society in many ways, but the Greeks had a more mixed attitude to killing.

Hopefully Stefanos will be able to try getting another mini-phalanx together and having them push at some semi-mobile barricade to see how well the traditional-theory oithsmos works. Again, so far none of the objections to the traditional thesis seems convincing.

[Felix]

...

Alas, the history of war doesn't support this position. Every single battle of the gunpowder age involved some people standing up and advancing into the range of the enemy's weapons, in a situation where the defenders either: could fire first, could fire and reload and refire a lot faster then moving men, and/or were not standing up in the open as targets.

And the studies of this kind of combat revealed, that mostly the soldiers began to shoot from too long a distance, on which their weapons were ineffective. The reason behind this being the stress of battle, the fear and unwillingness to come nearer and expose themselves to concentrated and effective enemy fire.

...

My point was the opposite of the one which was taken. I am pointing out that men do attack en masse, putting themselves into immediate danger which they cannot effectively respond to. If the attackers are allowed or encouraged to fire, the attack usually breaks down. As a general rule, the attackers did hold their fire until they were in effective range of the defenders. The crisis began once the defenders started firing.

There were a few cases when soldiers attacked with unloaded muskets, so they couldn't stop to fire even if they wanted to, and were forced to rely on bayonets and elan to attack - and some of these attacks were successful. Obviously, avoiding danger was not the primary thought in these men's heads. Equally obviously, these attacks were not made only by the naturally aggressive minority of men, but by formations of considerable size.