Alexander the Great was antiquity\'s greatest commander

[geala]

This is very good stuff to think about. For me the question is wether the "greatness" of a commander can/should be judged in a more technical way only or in the light of everything known and related about his time or in the light we feel about him and his time.

Unfortunately every scholar being a human with a partly predefined view of the world is biased so objective statements are not possible but that's not bad as far as the terms of the statements are clear.

So speaking with my feelings about what polititians and commanders should rather do, Hannibal, Alexander, Caesar and all the other unscrupulous great men who forced people and murdered their way through history for their or their countries "good cause" should be send to jail. They were no great men indeed compared with many of the boring politicians, scientists and businessmen who quietly did a lot more for the development of a (more or less) more human world.

When I take into account the limited view f.e. of Hannibal facing a cruel and mighty opponent, unable to tie up to a developed supernational legal system and living in a time where war, enslaving and killing people was seen as normal or even positive, I cannot blame him for the trial to deal with Rome the way he did. And technically he did well considering his limited sources.

[M.H. White]

This is very good stuff to think about. For me the question is wether the "greatness" of a commander can/should be judged in a more technical way only or in the light of everything known and related about his time or in the light we feel about him and his time.

Unfortunately every scholar being a human with a partly predefined view of the world is biased so objective statements are not possible but that's not bad as far as the terms of the statements are clear.

So speaking with my feelings about what polititians and commanders should rather do, Hannibal, Alexander, Caesar and all the other unscrupulous great men who forced people and murdered their way through history for their or their countries "good cause" should be send to jail. They were no great men indeed compared with many of the boring politicians, scientists and businessmen who quietly did a lot more for the development of a (more or less) more human world.

When I take into account the limited view f.e. of Hannibal facing a cruel and mighty opponent, unable to tie up to a developed supernational legal system and living in a time where war, enslaving and killing people was seen as normal or even positive, I cannot blame him for the trial to deal with Rome the way he did. And technically he did well considering his limited sources.

I'd caution you very strongly against applying modern morals on the ancient world. Things modern sensibilities might find abhorrent were things they found neccessary. You can't fairly say men who led armies were murderers and criminals. They were a product of their time: its what elite men were expected to do, and the men we're talking about here were celebrated for doing it better than anyone else. Also, most of these generals were politicians as well.

[Spartan JKM]

Great stuff!

Forgive me if I repeat myself, not to mention by bout of prolixness, with all the upcoming jumbled information; I a pasted a lot of prior material of mine, and added some new stuff.

About Hannibal, Paul, I doubt he was a megolomaniac (comparitively); nothing in his conduct suggests any pathological behavior. His insistence that Carthage make peace after Zama is not the conduct of a fanatic, but a realist. He could have supervised a defence of the city and taken many, many Romans with him before Carthage would have inevitably fallen. In my opinion, Hannibal possessed no attributes of delusionary greatness, and I don't think he was obsessed with achieving things just for the sake of merely achieving them, like Alexander and Napoleon etc.

Rich, in my opinion, you are overlooking the intracies of Hannibal's situation, and that he had to make decisions in the exigencies of moments which allowed no deep reflection of sitting around. I think Paul just hit the nail on the head:

What you say here still depends on the underlying assumption that Hannibal's decision to go to war was unnecessary. My contention is that, if we look at the course of the Punic Wars and the history of Rome's rise to dominance in Italy, it is apparent that there are only two ways to deal with Rome; destroy her or be destroyed by her...

True, but that wasn't as evident until much later, when Carthage could not make war outside of its walls, and thus could be physically destroyed. Hannibal certainly knew they were as resilient as anyone, but he wasn't foolish to assume they could easily be broken. Gosh, there's so much about Hannibal we could go over. How about I go over the beginning, In Spain, for now?

Polybius, whose account of the affair surrounding the fate of Saguntum is, seemingly, a little nebulous right at the juncture when he purports the issues of cause and effect and war-guilt, there is no reason to doubt it when he tells us Hannibal sent to Carthage for instructions (Book 3.15), and after Rome declared war, in which Carthage itself rejected Rome's ultimatum, there is no reason for anyone to think Hannibal was not justified in believing his state would support him (even if not with unanimity in the governing body), in what was the biggest conflict she would face.

Hannibal was not some condottiere like John Hawkwood or Albecht von Wallenstein; he was a general in the service of Carthage. A unique aspect of Carthage was separation of power between the governing body and its strategos (viz., in this case, Hannibal had a free hand and plenty of arbitrary power, but he couldn't impose war on his government, etc.).

Sure, if Hannibal had received more help from his allies in Pella, Carthage, Syracuse and/or Carthage itself, Rome likely would have succumbed to too much pressure. The shock waves that would have filtered through northern Italy upon Hasdrubal Barca's arrival in 215 B.C., or those in the south in response to a landing of a Macedonian army at Brundisium or Tarentum (probabaly never in the cards), would have been too much for Rome to overcome, as her allies would have wavered throughout Iberia and the southern (even northern, notbaly Etrurian and Umbrian communities) lands of Italy to the point which would have tipped the balance in Carthage's favor. But she probably would have won in the long run, even if temporarily defeated, and even if not until long after Hannibal's death. But I don't believe Hannibal was ever rash or assumed things foolishly. As Helmuth von Moltke the Elder stated,

[size=85:1a2uj0at]"No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is compelled...to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted."[/size]

Hannibal knew all too well that both friction and unfolding events could force alterations of his immediate plans to every scenario, but the only way Rome could be seriously weakened to ensure Carthage's prosperity was to strike at Italy and detach her from her main source of strength - her allies. He never wavered from that. What escapes much acknowledgement is that his strategy was working more than in a minor or 'annoying' capacity: in 209 B.C., twelve of the thirty Latin colonies were bled white, probably something fostering, and finally caused by Hannibal's destruction of a Roman army near Herdonea the year before. These were the Latin colonies - the largest and most important to Rome's war cause, with the most surrounding territory. They were strategically planted years before on important sites to supply Rome with money and men for war, among other administrative things. Let's be clear: these colonies had no interest for Hannibal's cause, but he came to Italy to enervate exactly this - Rome being deprived of her economic and manpower pool. The steadfast loyal eighteen are alleged to have stated they pick up the slack, but given their locations in the 'firing zones' (the recalcitrant twelve were located in the 'inner ring', aiding Rome more directly), this is unlikely. For one to state Hannibal 'underestimated' Rome's resolve will simply not do (IMHO, of course), albeit the results could supprt such a verdict. He beat them to a pulp like no other has done to another in history and ultimately lost (except for probably the Soviets in WWII). He either compelled them to fight him in battle, in which he knew he carried an advantage, or their people would suffer; if so, those people would forsake themselves from Roman hegemony, being they could not be sufficiently protected. This is where Fabius was not such a 'good guy', and Varro was. We'll discuss that assessment soon. Moreover, serious disaffection began to spread the following year in the north, among the allies in Umbria and Etruria (Livy, Book 27.9, 27.21, 27.24, and 28.10).

Following Livy from Book 22.58, the manner in which he addressed the Roman prisoners after Cannae, and the treaty with Philip V of Macedon (Polybius Book 7.9), Hannibal never envisaged the destruction of Rome, which seems, in retrospect, the only way Rome was not going to dominate the Mediterranean. Actually, according to Polybius, the treaty with Philip V does not mention the specificity of a Macedonian landing in Italy, nor a Carthaginian one in the Greek lands. It seems a Carthaginian fleet did arrive in Greek waters (Livy Book 27.30), but very late to help significantly. It seemed that Philip would hopefully benefit from Rome's preoccupation with Hannibal in Italy, thus giving him a free hand in Illyria, while Hannibal no doubt hoped that Roman forces would be diverted to Greece, thus dissipating Rome's naval strength which was guarding the sea approaches in Sicily and Italy. Rome simply had the reserves to meet the challenges. But what is not emphasized is that by 207 B.C., Philip had gained the edge in the Greek theater against the Roman-Aetolian-Pergamunian alliance. This sate, whose political institutions formed very strong bonds of nationhood, didn't come to dominate the Western World because she was even slightly passive.

Not just with her brusque rejection of Hannibal's embassy after Cannae, but indeed Rome's whole history suggested she would never negotiate (this is hindsight, of course), even from a seemingly inauspicious situation. As I wrote on another thread, I think Hannibal's subtleties were simply wasted on such a determined people. But he couldn't have known it until the huge test was applied. One issue, that 'Hannibal made Rome the imperial aggressor she became' is not tenable, IMHO; when war broke with him, they were a nascent international power (Sicily became the first province from which tribute was exacted, and her conduct over Sardinia exemplifies such 'bullying' policies). Moreover, why would Roman envoys be in Saguntum, yet with no subsequent material help afforded to Saguntum when hostilities blew?

The basic causes, as Polybius saw it, of the 2nd Punic War were the 'wrath' of the House of Barca, the unjustified seizure by Rome of Sardinia, and the confidence of Carthage to embark on war after Rome's warnings to Hannibal over Saguntum due to the threat he posed with his increasing buildup in the Iberian Peninsula, which was wrought efficaciously by the Barcine faction the past near two decades. Remember, it was Rome who declared war, or 'admonished' it, if you will.

I state that Rome's seizure of Sardinia was unjustified simply because at first she seemed to behave quite fairly (a somewhat ambiguous term under such circumstances); when the mutiny of 241-238 B.C. reached Sardinia, the Romans refused the mutineers' offer to hand over the island. The Senate also refused the submission of Utica (Polybius 1.83), also in revolt against Carthage, a little later. Appian tells us that Rome even used her good offices to bring an end to the Mercenary War, as she allowed Carthage to hire mercenaries in Italy (History of Sicily and the Islands 2.3). But when Carthage began to prepare for the re-subjugation of Sardinia, Rome took a turn and declared war, as she felt Sardinia too close to her western shores for a foreign power to have suzerainty over. That's understandable, but Carthage was in no position to fight in the wake of the Mercenary War. Polybius tells us that a second offer was accepted by Rome from the mutineers to offer the island to her, and by 238 B.C. Rome regarded control of the island necessary for the security of Italy (Polybius. But Carthage was also compelled to pay a further indemnity to restore peaceful relations, as Polybius told us in Book 1.88

However, Polybius seemed to feel that Rome's seizure of Sardinia was a cynical disregard for anything but her own interests (3.15), an attitude which clearly pervaded over to Iberia, though his narrative is a little loose. Remember, Polybius never quite achieved the objective style of Thucydides. Perhaps nobody ever has, but Thucydides did record a great conflict which was fought between people with more in common with each other (and who allied admirably with each other when faced with the greatest threat to Greece) than Rome and Carthage. At the risk of being guilty of 'picking and chossing' in favor of Hannibal, I feel Polybius must be questioned in asserting, Book 3.15,

[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts, as men are wont to do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion. How much better would it have been for him to demand from the Romans the restitution of Sardinia, and at the same time of the tribute which they had so unjustly exacted, availing themselves of the misfortunes of Carthage, and to threaten war in the event of refusal! But as it was, by keeping silent as to the real cause and by inventing a non-existing one about Saguntum, he gave the idea that he was entering on the war not only unsupported by reason but without justice on his side..."[/size]

Violent anger, Polybius? Hannibal always sought policy before any significant action, and this is where Appian can possibly, and rarely, be chosen over Polybius for veracity. Appian tells us that Hannibal demanded the Saguntines and his tribal allies (probably the Edetani and/or Sedetani, both of who lived near Saguntum) discuss their differences with each other (Roman History, Iberia Book 2.10). But Appian also tells thinks the hostility was a pretext for Hannibal to foment the war against Rome. But why would Hannibal wish for them to conciliate each other, if he indeed needed a pretext for going to war? What if they had came to terms amid discussions, even if Hannibal admonished his allies to not come to any agreement? Answer to the latter - no pretext would be extant anymore. On the other hand, however, Hannibal was a master of double-standards (especially of bluffing his enemies etc.), thus maybe he wanted to give the semblance of playing 'good politics', yet, indeed, furtively told his tribal friends to continue aggressive actions against the Saguntines.

Did Hannibal violate any treaty(ies) by taking Saguntum? Livy and Appian certainly think so, but their patriotic rhetoric has to be taken with caution, and in this case, an issue of causation and justification in the greatest war Rome ever fought, they seem to be wrong. They imply that Hannibal attacked a Saguntum, a 'free city', and that the city was north of the Ebro (Livy Book 21.2 and Appian Iberia 7), but a simple glance at the map belies this, and Polybius' silence that a clause that secured the 'freedom' of Saguntum from the Ebro covenant (a little different by definition than a formal treaty) should be more readily accepted, in my opinion, that such a clause never existed. I think by Livy's and Appian's time, it was realized that geography was against them and they were trying to justify Rome's actions with other reasons.

Actually, it's more than just implying: this is Appian's statement from his Roman History, Iberia,

[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...The Saguntines, a colony of the island of Zacynthus, who lived about midway between the Pyrenees and the river Iberus, and other Greeks who dwelt in the neighborhood of Emporia and other Spanish towns, having apprehensions for their safety, sent ambassadors to Rome..."[/size]

Livy also states the same thing (Book 21.7). But this is probably nothing more than a fable, due to the resemblance of the two colonies' names. Saguntum, which is now Sagunto, was almost cetainly a native settlement, though a Greek admixture was very possible, and they certainly had a commercial relationship with the Massiliotes (of modern Marseille). The coins of Saguntum bear the name Arseken (or Arse), which perhaps influenced Livy's claim that some of Saguntum's roots lay in the Latium colony of Ardea (Book 21.7).

Livy says Saguntum was exempt from the Ebro Covenant, Book 21.2,

[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...Owing to the marvellous tact he had shown in winning over the tribes and incorporating them into his dominions, the Romans had renewed the treaty with Hasdrubal. Under its terms, the River Ebro was to form the boundary between the two empires, and Saguntum, occupying an intermediate position between them, was to be a free city..."[/size]

As we know, the probable basic nature (we don't have details) of the agreement in c. 226 B.C. between the Senate and Hasdrubal 'the Handsome', Hamilcar's successor, basically, was that Hasdrubal agreed not to cross the Ebro for warlike purposes (Polybius 2.13). The Ebro is clearly a good 80 miles north of Saguntum, and neither Hasdrubal nor Hannibal ventured anywhere near the river before 218 B.C. Actually, Carthaginian activities never passed north of the Jucar, which lay a little south of Saguntum. One would think this is the river Rome should have imposed her boundary terms on Hasdrubal (depending what her actual interests at the time when the 'treaty' was drawn up), but the river mentioned in the accounts is clearly the Iber, and no other river over or under Saguntum carries a similar name, thus eliminating any excuses, even specious ones, for Rome.

Let's clear something up with regards whether Hannibal violated the treaty of Lutatius in 241 B.C., which stipulated that Rome's allies should be free from Carthaginian aggressive involvement, and vice versa, coupled with much indemnity. Saguntum was not on the list of Sicilian allies at the time, but Polybius tells us that the treaty included 'future' allies, specifically saying a clause providing for future allies was not needed. This is the type of thing that leaves open opportunity for much discord, but a 'careful' reading of Polybius shows he was not presenting Rome's case at the time, but what they claimed afterwards (Book 3.29). Carthage could easily argue that 'future allies' needed to be mentioned in 241 B.C., or at least sometime thereafter before an event, such as the Ebro/Saguntum contention, took place. Regardless, it doesn't significantly matter because the spirit of the Ebro covenant nullified anything the treaty of 241 B.C., as far as Carthaginian actions in Iberia were concerned, may or may have not stipulated. Think of a new contract drawn up; a prior one is now meaningless, in terms of legality.

So we can probably forget the treaty of Lutatius, as far as trying to claim Hannibal violated anything there, other than shrewdly maneuvering for war. Unfortunately, the Ebro covenant cannot be related chronologically to Rome's alliance with Saguntum with complete accuracy, and even its validity was questioned, as the Carthaginians claimed they never ratified it within the Suffete. It was an agreement between Hasdrubal and the Roman Senate. It was probably ratified in Rome, and they regarded it as legally binding on both parties. They may have a point here, as the Suffete didn't disavow Hasdrubal who made it, or Hannibal, who, according to the Romans, transgressed it. The one issue that should be understood is that the Ebro covenant, probably, and from Rome's perspective, was not so much that it imposed any serious restriction on Hasdrubal, but that the Carthaginians, by accepting it, recognized Rome's right to interfere in Iberia; this may be why Carthage later denied that it was valid on the grounds that their government didn't ratify it (Polybius 3.21). Some allege Hasdrubal had no choice to accept the covenant, as he was in the weaker position - a member of the conquered state from 15 years earlier. This is slightly credible, but the basic Carthaginian attitude could very well have been that the Ebro Covenant defined the spheres of influence between Rome and Carthage and, as they wouldn't cross north of the Ebro in arms, Rome could not interfere south of the Ebro. Most likely, Hasdrubal saw that Rome was tied up with real threats far away. But that wasn't specifically mentioned, and neither was Saguntum; Polybius makes no mention of Saguntum in his accounts of the covenant (Book 2.13, 3.6, 3.15 and 3.29), unless we include his claim that Hannibal violated the agreement by attacking Saguntum (Book 3.30). But when the covenant occured, he specifically tells us in Book 2.13,

"...Accordingly, after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts..."

This seems to create a problem with his comment that it was 'a good many years' before Hannibal's time that Saguntum entered into relations with Rome (Book 3.30). If so, Saguntum, an important ally with a vital strategic point, would surely have been mentioned and provided for. We also do not know the exact nature of this alliance. Was it a foedus (formal alliance) or merely a deditio in fidem (a throwing oneself upon the protection of) on the part of Saguntum? Polybius uses the term symmachia (alliance), and Livy describes the Saguntines as socii (allies). Whatever, it is safe to assume that an alliance did exist.

What is probable (forgive all the garrulousness; I feel compelled to emphasize that everything is conjectural) is that the Romans, facing Gallic and piracy troubles (in the Adriatic), were content to leave Hasdrubal free to extend his Iberian domain up to the Ebro. How this affected Rome's alliance to the Saguntines depends on when they actually formed an alliance. If the alliance was extant in time before the treaty with Hasdrubal, then, just like the treaty from 241 B.C., the alliance was annulled by the terms of this new agreement, assuming Livy and Appian are erroneous with their claims of Saguntum being mentioned, which I doubt it was, even though Polybius isn't free of errors, as he seems to contradict himself throughout his accounts, presumably in an inadvertent manner, with the location of the river, whether it was north or south of the Ebro.

Now, if the alliance with between Rome and Saguntum was formed after the covenant with Hasdrubal in c. 226 B.C., then she had no legal grounds to interfere in an area where she in effect recognized Carthaginian control, at least how Carthage saw it. Thus whichever time-frame is correct with the Saguntine/Roman alliance, Rome had no legal ground to restrain Hannibal from attacking Saguntum (assuming we follow Polybius). Whether or not Hannibal had been gearing for war as a child with Rome, he certainly was prepared in 218 B.C.

The Ebro Covenant may have been nothing more than 'polite' fiat (decree) handed down by the Romans, and because of the distance from Rome's 'serious' theaters at this time from Spain, they couldn't impose upon Hasdrubal this limit if he wanted to cause a fuss. the Ebro was far from Carthaginian activity and interests at the time, thus they probably figured he wouldn't object. It can be assumed, loosely, the Romans would not feel free to cross south of the Ebro in arms. But they may have had one eye on Spain for the future, and were going to stir up trouble more furtively. It should be considered that Rome must have known she was opening a bone of contention for the future by accepting Saguntum as a protectorate (or whatever form the alliance was); the city was situated right next to Carthage's sphere of domination.

The 2nd Punic War was testament of Rome's great quality of a martial state. But they could have been fiddling around in Saguntum with the prime task of undermining Punic power in Iberia, and eventually driving them out. If so, it worked, but Hannibal delayed things for along time. But perhaps at first Rome was merely considering the interests of their friends in Massilia; it was them that had a reason to safeguard the self-governing position of Saguntum: we don't have any direct evidence, but they had established colonies along the east coast of Spain, such as Rhode and Emporium (Rosas and Ampurias). But they had also established settlements much further south, at Hemeroskopeion (modern Denia) and Akra Leuke (modern Alicante) - both which were located between Saguntum and New Carthage, along the modern Cosat Blanca. It can be assumed that these colonies of Massilia had by Hannibal's time fallen under Punic domination, thus the Massiliotes' trade was undermined and they had a griveance with Carthage. Maybe they had a significant hand in helping Rome dig her claws into the Iberian Peninsula.If so, they would not have been wholly unjustified, as their other footholds were threatened by Carthaginian hegemony.

Hannibal doubtless carried a strong enmity for Rome, and he was determined to fight in Italy to break her growing empire, but we shouldn't believe Roman historiography that he was a pathological fanatic. None of his actions support any claim he carried an 'inveterate' hatred (Polybius 3.86) of them. To reiterate, the story of Hannibal's 'oath' may be apocryphal, like possibly so many good stories, such as Maharbal's exhortation after Cannae, Hannibal's famous meeting with Scipio in Ephesus in c. 190 B.C. A boy does not necessarily carry childhood vows into adult life, especially when the man in question insisted Carthage make peace after Zama (Polybius 15.19); this hardly suggests a fanatic, and the 'oath' story 'Hannibal critics of his jump on was told by Hannibal himself to Antiochus III (Polybius Book 3.11-12), in the context of trying convince the King of Syria of his undying hatred of Rome, to procure the Syrian king's material help to attack Italy again. It clearly worked, as far as gaining Antiochus III's trust (though Rome got to the Near East before Italy could ever be invaded again). The words are worth putting up,

"...Of the fact that Hamilcar, although he died ten years before the beginning of the Second Punic War, contributed much to its origin many evidences can be found; but the anecdote I am about to relate suffices, I think, to confirm this. At the time when Hannibal on his final defeat by the Romans had left his native land and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, who saw through the project of the Aetolians, sent an embassy to Antiochus, wishing to be fully aware what the king's purpose was. The legates, as they saw that Antiochus was lending an ear to the Aetolians and was disposed to go to war with Rome, paid many attentions to Hannibal, wishing to make Antiochus suspicious of him, as in fact they succeeded in doing. For as time went on, the king's mistrust of Hannibal grew ever more strong; and it fell out on one occasion that they came to have a talk about the alienation which had been secretly growing up between them. In the course of the conversation Hannibal defended himself on various grounds, and at length, being at a loss for further arguments, resorted to the following. He said that at the time when his father was about to start with his army on his expedition to Spain, he himself, then nine years of age, was standing by the altar, while Hamilcar was sacrificing to Zeus. When, on the omens being favourable, Hamilcar had poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites, he ordered the others who were attending the sacrifice to withdraw to a slight distance and calling Hannibal to him asked him kindly if he wished to accompany him on the expedition. On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans. He begged Antiochus, then, now he knew this for a fact, as long as his intentions were hostile to Rome, to rely on him confidently and believe that he would have in him his sincerest supporter, but from the moment he made peace and alliance with her he had no need to wait for accusations but should mistrust and beware of him; for there was nothing he would not do against the Romans. Antiochus, listening to this, thought he spoke genuinely and sincerely and in consequence abandoned all his former mistrust..."

Saguntum was attacked after warnings for them to stop molesting local tribes friendly to Hannibal. One could ask why would they risk war with Hannibal over a territorial dispute, who had just 'cleared the decks' in Iberia for a possible war with Rome, but they could very well have assumed Rome would protect them. Moreover, it seems likely Roman agents were stirring up the pro-Roman faction in the city, and we do know many leading pro-Carthaginians were executed (Polybius 3.15), and the Saguntines refused Hannibal's wish for them to state their case regarding the quarrel with the local tribes in question (again, probably the Edetani or Sedatani), if we can sustain Appian (History of Spain 2.10). Polybius tells us the executed leaders in Saguntun were 'leading citizens', but it's a safe assumption they were Carthaginian apologists, or against Rome's involvement.

Hannibal's actions in Iberia do not necessarily confirm any notions of 'calculated' and personal revenge against Rome. However, by staying clear of Roman attention, perhaps, his campaigns, in part, could have reflected a 'clearing of the decks' to commit to war with Rome, but I feel this scenario is less likely. What is certain is that war with Rome, again, was a strong possibility (nothing is ever 'inevitable'), and the Barcids would simply be ready this time (after all, it was a painful dose of reality how Rome endured once both sides reached breaking points of exhaustion), which does indeed mean that the 'Barcid Empire' involved enhancing Carthaginian military might. John Rich is correct, IMHO, that this would only be necessary 'unless with a view to a possible renewal of the war with Rome', in his fine article titled The Origins of the Second Punic War (p. 18 of the book The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, pp. 1-37 comprises the whole article). However, Rich's concludes with Polybius that Hannibal and his father had always hoped for a second chance against Rome, and I feel Rich is a little more eloquent than convincing. The Barcids were soldiers, thus they were hardly appalled to war, but the 'wrath of Hannibal' - in terms of a pathological hatred which drove Hannibal's every thought - is almost surely belongs to a later Roman tradition to justify their errors at the time (c. 220-218 B.C.), most notably in geography!

An integral element of the strategy which Hannibal unleashed depended on the Celts of the Po Valley, and this was not feasible before 225 B.C. Hannibal's campaigning of 221-220 B.C., which included a staggering victory over a confederated tribal army of some 100,000 men (perhaps an exaggerated number from Polybius) on the Tagus River in central Spain, may have been getting his Iberian house in order for war with Rome, but could just as likely been the continuation of the empire-building begun by his father and brother-in-law. Hannibal, like Hasdrubal didn't go anywhere near the Ebro from his succession to the declaration of war by Rome in 218 B.C. (or acceptance of war by Carthage). Hannibal was not his father; he never committed any alleged actions of terrible cruelty which were gratuitous. What Marcus Marcellus did the people of Casilinum upon their surrender (Livy Book 24.19), after which Fabius reputedly agreed with them that their lives were to be spared if they left the city (Marcellus cut them down when they did), what Nero did to the body of Hasdrubal Barca or Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' exceeds anything Hannibal did in terms of 'cruelty' or 'treachery' beyond the 'reasonable' measures of war. I am in total agreement with Marshal's previous assessment of the standards of the times.

That Hannibal killed Italians who refused to continue with him to Africa, or that he slaughtered deserters of Syphax' once in Africa army comes from Livy, Appian and Diodorus, but not mentioned by Polybius. In this period we lose Polybius again, but from the others such serious charges should still be treated with critical caution. He garrisoned the few towns still holding out in Bruttium, and killing many of his soldiers now showing refusal to go with him, would have been very impolitic; his Bruttians would surely not agree to do such a thing, and there is no mention that they specifically were forsaking him to join Rome. Secondly, there was still hope of ultimate victory, albeit a very slim hope by this time. He was in desperate need of horsemen once in Africa. Maybe he did kill deserters and took their horses, but the fact he was provided with riders from Tychaeus and Mazaetullus (Vermina, Syphax' son, didn't come to Carthage's aid until after Zama), some 3,000 of them, and the fact he only had, at most, 4,000 total cavalry at Zama, means he was clealry depleted of both riders and horses.

Moreover, Polybius says, Book 3.33,

"...Hannibal, who was wintering in New Carthage, in the first place dismissed the Iberians to their own cities hoping thus to make them readily disposed to help in the future; next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent; in the third place he took precautions for the security of Africa, adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Africa to Spain, and vice versa, binding by this measure the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty..."

Taking these words at face value, Hannibal was a sober calculator and planner, and he possibly had not made completely up his mind about an invasion of Italy until after the Roman declaration of war, though we can guess that was the most suitable option under the augmenting conditions. But maybe not; I'll get to the other option.

Anyway, Rich, he probably arrived in Africa in 203 B.C., with some 15,000 men at most (no horses could be transported), of which only a handful were his 'Old Guard'. To throw out a number, they may have numbered some 4,000. They clearly formed the front ranks of his third line at Zama, as Polybius states they levelled their spears to prevent fugitives from the first two defeated lines to enter from the front, indicating they were indeed his African spearmen (not pikes).

Hannibal did offer terms to the Saguntines. This from Livy Book 21.12,

"...The conditions were that restitution should be made to the Turdetani, all the gold and silver should be delivered up, and the inhabitants should depart with one garment each and take up their abode wherever the Carthaginians should order them. As Alco insisted that the Saguntines would not accept peace on these terms..."

Hannibal horribly sacked Turin upon descending into the Po Valley, and slaughtered the inhabitants only after they rejected his appeals; this is ghastly, but not gratuitous, as their elimination would serve a larger startegic end. The Gallic tribes of the Upper Po didn't hesitate to join his alliance after the destruction, along with her people, of Turin, as the act was one of effective terror, as well as the securing of his rear from interference as he advanced. Why should the Saguntines be offered clemency to men who, in desperation, either fought to the death or set fire to their homes and burned themselves alive, along with their wives and children? Sure, Hannibal's terms probably meant slavery, but their actions do not merit leniency, he probably concluded. They were killing themselves anyway. There are many other examples, but as Theodor Mommsen tells us in his History of Rome, Book 3, Ch. 4,

"...the Romans charged him with cruelty, the Carthaginians with covetousness; and it is true that he hated as only Oriental natures know how to hate, and that a general who never fell short of money and stores can hardly have been other than covetous. But though anger and envy and meanness have written his history, they have not been able to mar the pure and noble image which it presents. Laying aside wretched inventions which furnish their own refutation, and some things which his lieutenants, particularly Hannibal Monomachus and Mago the Samnite, were guilty of doing in his name, nothing occurs in the accounts regarding him which may not be justified under the circumstances, and according to the international law, of the times; and all agree in this, that he combined in rare perfection discretion and enthusiasm, caution and energy. He was peculiarly marked by that inventive craftiness,..."

Why should he have backed down to Roman demands with Saguntum? The Romans surely would have interfered further into Iberia, as all her actions before and after suggest. Hannibal's reaction probably does not have anything to do with a notion of 'revenge', but merely to his position being threatened by Rome. Why should he tolerate this? Why should Carthage tolerate it? Saguntum had appealed to Rome, and if he kowtowed to their demands, what next, once word got out he was acquiescing to Roman demands, something Carthage had done before? New Carthage's appeal to Rome? Gades? Utica? It is very ironic with regards to the attitude of the Romans and Carthaginians; it seems the Romans were somewhat the imperialistic bullies, but the Carthaginians, not a martial people, but traders and middlemen, exacted heavier tribute from her subjects, treating them somewhat like cash cows out to pasture. Hannibal's 'aggression' at the onset of the 2nd Punic War was a superb example of attack is the best form of defence. In the long run, a defensive war would be ruinous, given Rome's manpower reserves and resources; even a drawn war would not weaken Rome's power. The only way to overcome Rome was to cut her away from those resources, which included the manpower from her allies, and this entailed fighting in Italy. In Hannibal's eyes, Carthage's very survival was at stake, and in this he proved to be all too correct. War is the ultimate test, the terrible event in which one risks all against fates. Hannibal was too complex an individual to be understood from a single incident that occured when he was a little boy; his war with Rome had even much deeper roots.

I actually find the traditional view of Hannibal being schooled from childhood to hate Rome as the type of thing that gets made up as part of the legend...

Indeed, and the 'oath' story, Polybius was told, came from Hannibal himself (Polybius, Book 3.11), who only told the story later to Antiochus III, and on top of that, only in the context of trying to persuade the Hellenic king of Syria to believe he hated the Romans enough to trust him with command of an army to invade Italy again. Who told Polybius, I wonder? Perhaps one of the Aetolians with whom he would have been acquainted with while he and they, presumably, where in exile in Italy following the final defeat of Macedon (viz., as of 168 B.C.). maybe Nicander of Trichonium; Nicander was in touch with Antiochus III the same time as was Hannibal, and probably was the direct source for Polybius' accounts of events in Greece amid Rome's involvement there, notably the Aetolians' deliberations for peace in 191 B.C., which Livy tells us about in more detail (Ab Urbe Condita, Book 36.29). But it must remain speculative, as Polybius doesn't tell us concretely (see professor Frank W. Walbank's monumental Historical Commentaries on Polybius, Vol. 1, pp. 314-315, and his Philip V of Macedon, the footnote on p. 279).

Capua and Tarentum were won over because of the politic attitude displayed to many of their citizens, as well as to those throughout Italy, who fought at Trasimene and Cannae, and it was the Romans who were displaying a gratuitous level of cruelty. These incidents were where his stratey was bearing fruit. Hannibal was bred for war, and cruelty and war are inseparable. From personal avarice he is certainly free. I hope nobody puts much stock in what Massinissa claimed, according to Polybius. Hannibal never used money for personal ends, and he was very much a tribal chieftain in the sense that he learned form his father how to gain the loyalty of mercenary troops, as well as others who a made up his polyglot army. But his manner of command was truly unique, not only impressed upon him by his father's tenacity and cruel discipline, but also the patient, reasonable and cautionary level of self-controlled diplomacy exhibited by Hasdrubal, his older brother-in-law. As for charges layed upon him of 'cruelty', he was a general who had to make war pay for itself - to feed, clothe, and provide for his army, of which the prospect of booty was a major incentive for an army largely composed of mercenaries. How could he show any scruples, when opposed by the indigenous peoples, when his army had to be sustained in a foreign land, with but only scanty quantities of supplies to be expected (at least at in the first years). He knew full well, once in Italy beyond the Po Valley, he couldn't be substantially be re-supplied or re-enforced. Part of his grand strategy was to fight Rome with her own resources against her. His entire plight was a huge gamble, and he nearly pulled it off. But staying in Spain would have been a more foolish option. Brian Caven's assessment that that would have been wiser is convicingly countered by professor J. F. Lazenby.

Hannibal knew the Romans were resilient and carried a fight-to-the-death attitude, but we must excuse him for thinking even they had a breaking point; immediately after Cannae, as Adrian Goldsworthy put in a certain perspective, they were beaten but didn't have the sense to realize it. We can also admire Rome for her indomitableness, but at the time her decision to not even come to the table with Hannibal was more obstinate than any decision he ever made; nobody could have predicted that supreme moments of the upcoming war; the Carthaginians' egregious failure in not ridding Spain of the beleaguered 9,000 or so Roman legionnaires holding the Ebro line was paramount; Catalonia would invaluably serve as a base of operations for the crucial upcoming campaign. Bomilcar not even attempting to fight the Romans, who had a smaller fleet off Cape Pachynon (SE tip of Sicily) was abysmal. The issue with Muttines would never have happened in the Roman (or Mongol) chain of command, at least in the mid-Republic. The Romans barely broke a sweat in successfuly (and prudently) playing the Greeks off each other, thanks largely to the Anatolians. Hannibal cannot be blamed for assuming Philip V could have diverted Rome's forces at least a little more than the miniscule degree he did.

But perhaps Hannibal was decided about invading Italy before he took Saguntum. Alliances have not, throughout history, ever been unyielding, and treaties have always left room for discord if the parties at a later date, in this case, a couple of decades, are in the mood. In Iberia, for example, plenty of allies of both Rome and Carthage forsook one or the other when one side seemed to gain the intiative. This is why the Scipio brothers' expedition into the Iberian interior ended in disaster. I guess it just comes down to how people, including us here on RAT in the 21st century, interpret things. They have always been questioned with time, and some have always thought treaties were sanctioned by time, as the political climate changes etc. Thus the statute of limitations within our laws (I know - it does not apply to everything). The fact that Roman annalists committed the topographical errors regarding the proximity of the Ebro River, and the fact they never lifted a finger to help Saguntum once the city came under siege does not favor their justifications, and, possibly, Hannibal called what was merely a bluff on their part. They had issues to attend to in Illyria and Cisalpine Gaul, but Polybius' figures concerning Roman resources in 225 B.C. suggest they could have spared ships and troops to help the Saguntines.

My view is that the legal technicalities are too loose to define with certainty as to whether Rome or Carthage, under the actions of Hannibal, was morally responsible for the war's outbreak. The Roman claims to justifiably intervene on Saguntum's behalf do not seem substantial, but Hannibal's attack upon the city was unjust unless the Saguntunes were indeed guilty of aggression against his allies. Unfortunately, this is something we cannot answer 2,226 years later, at least as to who was the aggressor. But the legal aspects of this question probably concern Carthage and Saguntum more than Carthage and Rome. There are two important questions:

1) Why did Hannibal discard the Roman ultimatum surrounding Saguntum?

2) Why did the Romans make such an issue over Saguntum?

The 1st question is easier to assess. If Hannibal had backed down to Roman demands, there is little doubt that Roman interference in the Punic sphere of influence on the Peninsula would not end there; this would have merely been the thin edge of the wedge, and Roman meddling into Spain would open any Iberian community which simply didn't favor Carthaginian suzerainty (a situation which Hannibal was hoping to effectuate in Italy against Roman suzerainty). If the Roman challenge, though very dangerous, was not taken up it would not only do irreparable damage to Punic prestige among the Iberians who did favor their authority, an authority skillfuly assimilated by Hasdrubal, but also, in one swift blow, ruin 20 years of work, which began with Hamilcar, which necessitated Carthage's revitalization after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. Hannibal's attitude is understandable even if his preparations for war with Rome were not shaped by a war of revenge.

The 2nd question is not as clear (in my view). Carthaginian activity in Iberia didn't threaten Roman interests at the time (unless one wants to count her interests as digging their claws in a land for imperialistic objectives for the future), let alone her security. The envoys sent to ask Hamilcar about his intentions seemed content of his 'expalnation', that his build-up was primarily to swiften the payments of the war indemnity from the 1st Punic War. There is nothing to suggest that Saguntum refused to acknowledge Punic hegemony upon Hasdrubal's accession. Their allaince with Rome was no doubt influenced from the mutual friendship between them and Rome with the Massiliotes. Though Rome did not help Saguntum, she did in 211 B.C., when in a better position to do something, restored the survivors from Hannibal's siege to the city, and punished those tribes in question with whom they had originally quarreled (Livy 24.42). The most powerful factor in Roman eyes may be that, as an imperially minded state, she wanted to become embroiled in Iberia. The poor people of Saguntum simply got caught in the crossfire

Hannibal certainly orchestrated, in a shrewd manner, things to incur Rome's ire. He knew war was very likely, and recognized the folly of leaving Saguntum astride his rear lines, that he planned to carry the war into Italy. This supports one case that he did indeed decide to attack Italy before Rome declared war. By Rome's declaring war, he would now be justified in crossing the Ebro and attacking their lands. The Roman bluff over Saguntum, if that's what it was, was not completely unreasonable. They never thought the impending war could be fought on Italian soil, and they perhaps figured that the succession in 221 B.C. of a new, young general seemed a suitable moment to apply pressure to the Carthgainians (much like perhaps the Greeks' attitude following Alexander's succession), whose new found prosperity in Iberia certainly merited some concern, if not a direct threat. If so, and though they couldn't have foreseen what was to happen, they couldn't have made a bigger mistake. But they stood firm in the long run.

From probably May to November, 219 B.C., the Saguntines withstood a ferocious siege, but finally fell to Hannibal. In his famous (but turgid) epic poem of the 2nd Punic War, Silius Italicus states the Roman declaration of war came before Saguntum fell (Punica, Book 2. 391); Italicus drew from Livy and Virgil, the former for historical research, the latter for a poetic model.

Now, with all that pro-Hannibalic opining, it should be understood that no man is infallible, and just because something 'favors' Hannibal from pro-Roman writers, doesn't necessarily mean it is so, from the logic of why would they say something in his favor; and just because something is pro-Roman from our original sources, doesn't unilaterally and automatically mean it is colored or even outright false. We have to look at each situation and decide what may mean what, and read betwen the lines. We'll never come to incontrovertible conclusions.

There's plenty more to cover!

Thanks, James

[Arthes]

I'd caution you very strongly against applying modern morals on the ancient world. Things modern sensibilities might find abhorrent were things they found neccessary. You can't fairly say men who led armies were murderers and criminals. They were a product of their time: its what elite men were expected to do, and the men we're talking about here were celebrated for doing it better than anyone else. Also, most of these generals were politicians as well.

Very true......we can not comprehend the world these people lived in by experience..only by interpretation.
We call peoples with very little contact of the outside world 'uncivilised' as we place our own morals and standards upon them. Yet these peoples have their own standards of what is considered right or wrong in their communities.
A cannibal does not consider eating his enemy wrongful....the outside world has made that decision for them.
If one of our modern generals was transported in time and placed in the position of an ancient one, faced with the same enemy army.....and the same men fighting under him....what would he do I wonder...???
His values and fighting methods are totally at odds with the circumstances....does he use his modern knowledge or adopt the attitudes and tactics of the past...?

[Spartan JKM]

Marshal and Cristina,

I agree with your astute assertions; we have to be discerning in completely assuming the modern world is 'nicer' than they were back then. True, what was considered necessary back then, particularly for one to attain a strategic efficacy, or religious rites (human sacrifice) can be construed nowadays as horrrendously 'cruel'. But remember, they fought back then with weapons that wouldn't 'teach lessons' from afar. Someone can go to work nowadays, press a button, and thousands die he not only has to see, but die thousands of miles away. I hope I can presume we are all susceptible in judging with moral condemnations. That is seemingly very righteous, but the political world has become extremely rife with platitudes etc. to justify actions down the ages (such as 'we are attacking them to preserve our peoples' freedom').

I think it is safe to assume war is always cruel, in any time or form. We have to decide for ourselves what is 'justified'; Alexander's horrible suppression of the Thebans in 335 B.C. was a, from an amoral point of view, an oject lesson to the rest of Greece to not be seditious in any manner, and in doing so assured him of a stable home base for his future enterprise in Asia.

Hannibal's capture of Tarentum in 212 B.C. was invaluable for his cause, and he smartly exploited the contempt that many of the nobles in the great port had for their Roman masters. When he captured the great port through treachery, he methodically ordered for every Roman citizen to be slain, and every Tarentine to be spared. Many Romans surely tried to surrender, but this unfortunate demonstration greatly appeased the Tarentines who favored an alliance with him, and the others were conciliated because of his leniency. Actually, the Tarentine nobles approached him in the first place beacuse of his good treatment of defeated allies of Rome's; it should not be underestimated how discerning Hannibal was of the fact policy wins wars.

Many Gallic peoples proved they would acquiesce and work under Julius Caesar, thus his 'lessons' inflicted upon the poor Eburones and inhabitants of Uxellodunum were probably not necessary; but in the long term, he had decimated the Gauls so thoroughly that they were incapable of rising up in arms against Rome in the near future, when Rome was dangerously vulnerable with the upcoming civil war. Whether Caesar considered this, or whether he perpetuated some things because there existed a demoniacal part in his nature, we don't know for sure. In my opinion, Caesar was possessed of every attribute, good and bad.

Anyway, there a thousands of variants and examples, and not just from the famous leaders. Again, war is intrinsically cruel. Sun Tzu (or whomever really wrote the Art of War; he probably at least wrote a good chunk of it, with other material being contributed by unknown authors over along period), was very considerant with his proclamation that the greatest battle is the one never fought. But such a goal, as history as unwaveringly shown, is impracticable.

But I guess one could argue the first two examples are basically not much worse than the agenda of a terrible dictator. Achieving one's goal via 'necessary' bloodshed can be accepted depending on the sitaution; in the case of Alexander and Caesar, there was an element of despotism involved. Not so with Hannibal, and it would perhaps more evident if not everyhting we read of him came from an unfriendly pen. But we can't be certain.

Stalin efficiently controlled more people with his pernicious personal power, for a quarter of a century, probably more than any other tyrant in history; because of his methods, he efficaciously precluded any establishment of an independent power within his realm. Pol Pot (Saloth Sar)[/b], contrarily, was probably just as proportionately ruthless, but lasted just three years before being ousted.

In many cases of ancient times, a massacre of townspeople was a military measure to break the citizens' will to resist. An example can be found with Scipio at New Carthage in 210 B.C., in which he immediately gave the order to his men to stop the killing when he received the citadel's surrender. He subsequently displayed a generous level of diplomacy to the defeated. However, the towns of Iliturgi (probably modern Lorqui) and Astapa (modern Estepa) suffered fatyes in 205 B.C. due to personal reasons for Scipio: they had turned on the Romans when the tide turned in the conflict here in Spain against the Scipios, and had been complicit in the destruction of his father and uncle (at least Iliturgi, or Ilorci, with regards to Gnaeus Scipio). We can't blame people for doig what's best for their own interests, but I guess we shouldn't expect Scipio to not take such a personal tragedy, well, personally.

But how far should we respect the 'necessity' of certain actions? The Mongols were noted for their post-apocalyptic destruction of peoples; but they did stop, or even not begin, if submission was received when they demanded it, and they wanted to facilitate trade and culture through the people they conquered (they even promoted freedom of religion). However, unlike the other great empires - China, Alexander's, Rome, and the Arabs, they left no sustained military strength and viable administrative presence. This is peculiar, because Genghis Khan was an able statesman, in his advocacy of religious toleration and encouragement of international trade. Moreover, his imperial ordinances promoted a mingling of cultures that helped in commercially linking Europe and Asia. But for the rivers of blood he shed, so to speak, there is seemingly no forgiveness.

We must remember that modern times see plenty of false-flagging, and when modern chroniclers etc. accuse the ancients of a level of cruelty far beyond today's standards, we can question the legitimacy of such accusations. Yes, times are different, and from our basic values and what we are accustomed to, we would loathe life back then. But terror bombing of civilians, ethnic cleansing, and genocide were far more prevalent in modern times. Few commanders of antiquity meet measure by those standards. But maybe one can argue that because the world became bigger, 'cruelty' in war simply followed the ratio.

Not an easy topic to conclude, though. Perhaps there is no conclusion; merely perspective.

Thnaks, James

[floofthegoof]

And what about Julius Caesar, taking on Pompey, the greatest general of his time, Pompey Magnus, when Pompey had far more men?

Oh! don't get me started on Caesar! Here's a guy whos every manuever was in service of himself alone. A Roman from a very different mold than Camillus or Fabius Maximus. Pompey should have had him! Pompey said, "let them starve. Why chance a battle?" and his peers said "nah, lets fight! What are you, a coward?" Pompey went against his cautious instincts, and recieved one of the rudest shocks in military history.

Monty was effective only as long as he remained his overly cautious self. Once he responded to those criticisms, we got Market-Garden. Ouch.

I'm not saying that fighting from an inferior position is always a mistake. You have to look at the consequences of losing. If you are fighting for independance, which you currently lack, and the consequence of losing is simply a continued lack of independance, it makes sense to take the chance. If it is in your country's best interest to fight on in spite of disadvantages, such is the case in George Washington or Robert E. Lee, then you have no choice.

I think that a commanders motivation for fighting is a very important criteria for judging his quality. War is a political function. With that in mind, I don't think that commanders who fight for their own prominance should be put in the same catagory as those who fight for the common interest. I don't think this is a 'modern' sensibility; I think it goes all the way back to Miltiades. Ancient authors are always warning us of the dangers of human pride.

I can see your point that perhaps Hannibal felt that he alone saw the threat Rome presented and decided, with the interest Carthage in mind, that now was the time. If that could be shown, I'd have to give him more credit. He was wrong though.... It looks like his confidence as a field commander clouded his judgment as a strategic commander. That being the role he assumed when he said, "Now".

[geala]

I'd caution you very strongly against applying modern morals on the ancient world. Things modern sensibilities might find abhorrent were things they found neccessary. You can't fairly say men who led armies were murderers and criminals. They were a product of their time: its what elite men were expected to do, and the men we're talking about here were celebrated for doing it better than anyone else. Also, most of these generals were politicians as well.

I concur and will take your warning very seriously.

But I think I did not say something totally contradictionary to what you said. You can judge historical persons and situations from the modern point of view or you can judge concerning the limited visions of the people and the whole contemporary situation. You only have to make it clear what your starting point is so the audience can evaluate the worth of the arguments. The methods may be good for different purposes.

If the "greatness" of a commander is the object of thoughts I would prefer the method you proposed and the op used. I just had the feeling the methods were mixed in some posts.

[Roy]

Oh! don't get me started on Caesar! Here's a guy whos every manuever was in service of himself alone.

That, I'm afraid, is something we'll never know for sure :wink:

[Felix]

....
I'm not saying that fighting from an inferior position is always a mistake. You have to look at the consequences of losing. If you are fighting for independance, which you currently lack, and the consequence of losing is simply a continued lack of independance, it makes sense to take the chance. If it is in your country's best interest to fight on in spite of disadvantages, such is the case in George Washington or Robert E. Lee, then you have no choice.

I think that a commanders motivation for fighting is a very important criteria for judging his quality. War is a political function. With that in mind, I don't think that commanders who fight for their own prominance should be put in the same catagory as those who fight for the common interest. I don't think this is a 'modern' sensibility; I think it goes all the way back to Miltiades. Ancient authors are always warning us of the dangers of human pride.

I can see your point that perhaps Hannibal felt that he alone saw the threat Rome presented and decided, with the interest Carthage in mind, that now was the time. If that could be shown, I'd have to give him more credit. He was wrong though.... It looks like his confidence as a field commander clouded his judgment as a strategic commander. That being the role he assumed when he said, "Now".

We can never know Hannibal's motives with certainty, unless his personal diary is dug up somewhere in the ruins of Carthage; and the main sources for this war are all Roman, so their interpretations of Hannibal's personal thoughts have to be taken with plenty of salt.

As for being wrong about the war, that assumption leaves a lot of unasked questions. For example, what could be expected to happen if the war was delayed? Rome already had Sardinia, and Roman fingers were now reaching across the Ebro into Spain. The idea that Rome would somehow weaken and Carthage gain in strength (so that the war might be fought with better odds in the future) doesn't seem too plausible. Rome had other potential foes, but would it have been practical to wait for some Grand Alliance of Macedonia, Carthage, and a "United Gauls" against Rome? Given the results of the war, such an alliance would likely have never happened.

If a strategic situation is progressively deteriorating, (and I suspect this one was, from the Carthginian point of view), the options are limited. Either start fighting now, before things get worse, or pre emptively surrender, (and learn Latin).

[floofthegoof]

If a strategic situation is progressively deteriorating, (and I suspect this one was, from the Carthginian point of view), the options are limited. Either start fighting now, before things get worse, or pre emptively surrender, (and learn Latin).

The thing is, Hannibal's view was rather different than the Carthaginian view. It's very odd that the Carthaginian senate was informed of Hannibals actions by a Roman envoy. If that's not a breach in military discipline, I don't know what is. Their senate was obviously not thinking along those lines.

We know Rome today as a predatory state, but I don't think this was so clear cut in Hannibal's time. They had a war, and both sides decided to stop the war. What changed in the interim? Our sources tell us that that Rome had hoped to avoid war even after the attack by Hannibal. According to the sources, Hannibal's action looks like a fairly outragious pre-emptive strike that he wasn't even authorized to make.

When you are alone in your opinion on something, and by your action force everyone to go your way, and you turn to be wrong in that opinion to the ruin of everyone, I think you open yourself up to serious criticism. :lol:

I remember in "Patton" the movie, Patton wanted to attack the Soviets straight away after Hitler died. Imagine if he just went ahead and did it on his own authority! That would have been some movie!

[Felix]

When you are alone in your opinion on something[*], and by your action force everyone to go your way, and you turn to be wrong in that opinion to the ruin of everyone, I think you open yourself up to serious criticism.

*[i]But you (Hannibal) happen to be right - Rome is a predatory state, and delaying or appeasing them will just make the future confrontation even worse. Compare this to the situation in Europe in the 1930's, when (in retrospect) everyone now agrees that appeasing an aggressive expansionist power was not a good thing.

[floofthegoof]

But you (Hannibal) happen to be right - Rome is a predatory state, and delaying or appeasing them will just make the future confrontation even worse.

Jeez, what could be worse than the fate of Carthage?

There may be some gaps in my knowledge of republican Rome, but until the late republic, I can't recall any instance of Rome subjugating a weaker state that did not openly and deliberately threaten Rome's interests. We're more or less stuck with Roman sources on these matters, but in the absence of other information, it would seem that Rome conducted it's foreign relations quite honorably in those days. If not for Hannibal, we could reasonably say that Carthage might have endured longer than the Roman republic itself. Rome was perfectly capeable of getting along with Egypt until that time. Why not Carthage?

[Felix]

But you (Hannibal) happen to be right - Rome is a predatory state, and delaying or appeasing them will just make the future confrontation even worse.

Jeez, what could be worse than the fate of Carthage?

There may be some gaps in my knowledge of republican Rome, but until the late republic, I can't recall any instance of Rome subjugating a weaker state that did not openly and deliberately threaten Rome's interests. We're more or less stuck with Roman sources on these matters, but in the absence of other information, it would seem that Rome conducted it's foreign relations quite honorably in those days. If not for Hannibal, we could reasonably say that Carthage might have endured longer than the Roman republic itself. Rome was perfectly capeable of getting along with Egypt until that time. Why not Carthage?

The answer is easy - Carthage could have been annihilated a couple of generations earlier.

As to the second question, please look back at the material already posted on this thread, in re Saguntum and Sardinia. You seem to be unique in your evaluation of Roman benignity.

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

Considering Carthages ambitions, which were thwarted previously by Rome, I can't really agree that they would ahve gotten along peacefully forever. It was a case of us or them, in a very big way! Or so I believe anyway!

[Spartan JKM]

Hello everyone!

I elevated Timoleon, Lucullus (Ponticus), and Agricola to TIER 2 (and that's just off the top of my head!). I wonder, possibly, are both Flavius Aetius and Attila 'overrated' and 'underrated', respectively, in terms of their levels of fame? Aetius was surely an adept and resilient 'diplomat in the field', so to speak, but the one success which he is renowned for, none other than Chalons (or Catalaunian Plains), was indeed a battle of nations (viz., he was one of three leaders who exercised independent command on the victorious side) resulted in compromising the security of Italy for riding the Hunnic threat of NW Europe. But they were already in a rearguard. Attila may be better than a consensus may reflect, if the studies of one expert on this era, Christopher Kelly, sustain relatively well. Or in the case of Aetius, is he 'underrated'? Mmmmm. This isn't my strong point, so forgive any paramount data I may be ignorant of. They stay on TIER 2 for now, pending my further research, and/or, possibly, another poster's more discerning views.

I have not posted in along time. I would like to convey my congratulations and admiration for what I came across the past summer in the two major bookstores (in terms of easy-access chains) around the USA:



Above: Ancient Warfare Magazine stands out effulgently amid the magazine racks at Borders Books and Barnes & Noble Booksellers (the former in Salt lake City, Utah, which is directly above; the top image is the Barnes & Noble in Lincoln Square, New York City). I promise you - I didn't rearrange them! Above is how they stood. Congrats to Jasper and Co. :wink:

Alexandr K astutely observed:

...interesting list. Just don't see Titus Labienus, a man who contributed significantly to Caesar's successes in Gaul and who then almost destroyed this great military genius in Africa...

Thanks! That was a noticeable omission. Titus Labienus, a Tribune of the Plebs, died in 45 B.C.

Johnny Shumate - the singularly virtuosic illustrator of extremely vivid depictions of ancient soldiery - identified:

Good article..!
B.H. Liddle Hart would rate Scipio Africanus as number 1. Simply because he had to deal with Hannibal and his tough army instead of Darius and the Persian army.

Did you include the Roman general Venditius..? He was the only one who was successful against the Parthians...

Thanks to you as well, Johnny. I love your work, as do the people I show it to .

Hart's classic book is invaluable. He elucidates, overall, how balanced and near-flawless Scipio was as a general, and he argues well that Scipio has been comparatively less received by history than other leaders; but he may have gone overboard with his tendentious views, and his book reads like a handbook of his theories on warfare which have been imputed to Scipio. However, that isn't wrong, just not balanced. Professor Howard H. Scullard's studies on Rome's greatest general (yes, quite arguable) are more comprehensive. Scipio was alike an ancient Marlborough, not greater than Napoleon without criterial specifics. Richard A. Gabriel, who also gave us a fine military bio on Scipio, has come out with a new book on Philip II. I would love to grab it as soon as possible! This military author, while fallible (like every other human being, present or historical), is a superb expert on war studies and strategy, etc. But I saw the title - Philip II of Macedonia: Greater Than Alexander - without a question mark at the end! No, no. Without a specific viewpoint (eg., a composed applicator with policy and patience), 'ranking' the great father over his mercurially fiery son is not acceptable (IMHO). Without an arbitrary set of guidelines (which is anyone's right to do so), Alexander may be the only Captain-General (and conqueror, visionary, stimulator, etc. - however revised the traditional 'romance' should be) in history who can be stated as greater than any other - without any set criterion (IMHO, of course!).

D B Campbell wrote, after showing Johnny I placed Publius Ventidius Bassus on TIER 2

...Same guy, although the late Sir Ronald Syme argued that the cognomen Bassus is a mistake...

Love your work, too, Duncan, particularly your convincing arguments concerning ancient artillery (in that field, Biton seems very underrated).

Great reference there. Thank you. I cannot imagine that any good general in history, let alone a great one, was not thoroughly au courant with movement and supply. All we have, AFAIK, to detail anything about this very under-appreciated general (he was not a member of any eminent gens, and his Parthian triumph, which was punitive and limited, seemed not to be in accord with Augustus' politics as of a decade later. That's up for grabs, though!) is Aulus Gellius, and, for whatever it may be worth, Eutropius writes 'Bassus' as well (Abridgement of Roman History, Book 7.5). But Eutropius wrote verbatim, 'Lucius Ventidius Bassus defeated the Persians' in three engagements. But Ventidius is mentioned by Cicero, Livy, Tacitus, Frontinus, Appian, Cassius Dio, and others make reference to him ('no less than twenty-six ancient writers make mention of Publius Ventidius or Publius Ventidius Bassus', wrote one James E. Seaver, in his article Publius Ventidius - Neglected Roman Military Hero, The Classical Journal, Vol. 47, No. 7, p. 275, April of 1952). But the cognomen of Bassus come only from Gellius, Eutrpoius, and Festus (Breviarium, Book 2.18, who wrote, 'P. Ventidius Bassus'). The aforementioned sources probably hold more credulity overall, albeit omissions are less evincing than actually refuting a topic. But that still leaves room for dispute. Arrrghh! Where did the three writers get their data?

All those interested, look for a recent article by one Emma Strugnell (Ventidius' Parthian War: Rome's Forgotten Eastern Triumph, Acta Antiqua, Vol. 46, No. 3, June of 2006), who offers a hypothesis to unravel what seems to be an amazing lack of acknowledgment for Ventidius, even by usual standards, I myself propose, of 'overrated' and 'underrated' lines of judgment. Basically, Ventidius, à la Miltiades at Marathon, effectively neutralized the Asiatic superiority in movement and missile power by getting them into close-quarter fighting. But he beat them three times and marched east to besiege Samosata (located in the modern Ad?yaman Province), at which point Antony dismissed him. Rumors began to spread that Ventidius was accepting bribes, yet Antony 'negotiated a settlement' for the Roman departure from Samosata. According to Cassius Dio, Antony was jealous of Ventidius' exploits (Roman History, Book 49.21.1). Speaking of Miltides, his tactical conduct at Marathon seems quite sophisticated for its time. But in judging his rank is difficult as we do not know how much he concocted on his own - was he divorced from the other nine of the strategoi, and only his novel thinking - to charge the approaching Persian-led army, arrayed for battle no less, to get them at close-quarters - 'saved the day'? As if all this were simple...

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, Book 15.4,

"...The story of Ventidius Bassus, a man of obscure birth, who is reported to have been the first to celebrate a triumph over the Parthians.

It was lately remarked in the conversation of certain old and learned men that in ancient times many persons of most obscure birth, who were previously held in great contempt, had risen to the highest grade of dignity. Nothing that was said about anyone, however, excited so much wonder as the story recorded of Ventidius Bassus. He was born in Picenum in a humble station, and with his mother was taken prisoner by Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompey the Great, in the Social War, in the course of which Strabo subdued the Aesculani. Afterwards, when Pompeius Strabo triumphed, the boy also was carried in his mother's arms amid the rest of the captives before the general's chariot. Later, when he had grown up, he worked hard to gain a livelihood, resorting to the humble calling of a buyer of mules and carriages, which he had contracted with the State to furnish to the magistrates who had been allotted provinces. In that occupation he made the acquaintance of Gaius Caesar and went with him to the Gallic provinces. Then, because he had shown commendable energy in that province, and later during the civil war had executed numerous commissions with promptness and vigor, he not only gained Caesar's friendship, but because of it rose even to the highest rank. Afterwards he was also made tribune of the commons, and then praetor, and at that time he was declared a public enemy by the senate along with Mark Antony. Afterwards, however, when the parties were united, he not only recovered his former rank, but gained first the pontificate and then the consulship. At this the Roman people, who remembered that Ventidius Bassus had made a living by taking care of mules, were so indignant that these verses were posted everywhere about the streets of the city:

Assemble, soothsayers and augurs all!
A portent strange has taken place of late;
For he who curried mules is consul now..."

Jona Lendering wrote:

Although he was defeated at Issus and Gaugamela, I think that Darius III Codomannus deserves a place. He was a very brave man and a great organizer: take the cost of life in Babylon when he was mustering an army (the same as usual) and compare it to 323, when Alexander was there (prizes sky high). Or take the brilliance of his campaign in 331: Alexander behaved like a puppet and walked straight into the trap Darius had set at Gaugamela. Darius would have won, if the omens had been better; see my essay over here or the website here.

I totally acquiesce without even slight questioning, Jona. I love your site, BTW. I often never need supplementing. Thanks for all your contributions

In both battles, Darius actually was more than a match for Alexander in the strategic preliminaries, particularly at Issus.

The realm of the Achaemenid Great King by the time of Darius III, ruling mainly from Susa (modern Shush, western Iran), was a tremendous accomplishment laid down by Cyrus the Great two centuries earlier, which within one generation after the latter's death had been expanded and re-solidified by Darius I (the Great): the states within the vast cultural diversity, permeating the lands from the Aegean-Syr Darya-Egyptian region to the Indus River Valley, were autonomous states liable to a central authority. The sagacious imperial foresight of Cyrus was forwarded by Darius I within few decades following the death of the former: a stable process of the Great King's authority was established by the dawn of the 5th century B.C., in which an ethno-cultural absorption was realized, centered on a sound administrative network of tributary regions - satrapies; they constituted twenty regional divisions among twenty-two regions, following Herodotus' breakdown in The Histories (Book 3.90-97). All the satrapies were subject to Darius I at the culmination of his reign. There was no uniformity regarding Persian rule entailing direct control from the center; each satrapie's legal systems were codified, tribute exacted through appointed officials with established regional treasuries, and an advanced form of communications was established through engineered roads and bridges which streamlining travel, which in turn greatly facilitated commerce. An innovative 'postal service' was realized, most notably exploited viably via the famous Susa-Sardis Royal Road. All this reflected an efficient territorialization which linked the Great King's rule from his center.

Moreover, a universal currency was introduced, the daric, which standardized the increasingly flowing commerce which permeated the diverse languages and customs of Darius I's growing hegemony. But the satrapies' own distinctive structures were not altered, and they effectively continued their own traditional ways, with some native kings (now effectively 'client kings' of the Great King) still in place despite the appointed satraps. Of course things were bound (not necessarily 'inevitable'?) to go awry at times. But for two centuries the Achaemenid Persian Empire endured with overall superb handling, due very much because of Darius I's (and surely an administrative counsel he had) codifications and standardizations. Cyrus was an ingenious visionary leader in conciliating various peoples, and Darius I, an innovator in far-reaching administration and commerce.

The Achaemenid sphere of influence was huge by the time of the Ionian revolt (the springboard to the epoch struggle between Persians and Hellenes) in 499 B.C., and the proclivities of 'political inertia and cupidity' (John Cook, The Persian Empire, Pg. 70) cannot be estimated with no room for error, etc. Indeed, the numerous revolts and inability of the Royal Court to limit independent powers within many of the satraps (the 'protectors of the Kingdom's authority') became a recurring problem: the satraps were the provincial leaders of the Great King, and often members of the royal line, such as Artaphernes, were in charge of the internal administration and security of their own satrapie, as well as its responsibilities to the Great King, including the provision of military levies if called upon), on a relatively minimal scale, from this time until the 340s B.C. indeed illustrated the problem of a fragility of the Achaemenid imperial framework, of which Cyrus and Darius I were certainly not unaware; however, all the suppressions and re-conquests of those rebellions reveal a resilience of the Persian overlords, effectuated with an efficient martial and mustering capacity to move and deploy armies over vast swaths of territories. The Empire at the accession of Darius III may have been economically weaker due to the loss of revenue in some satrapies, but is so, it wasn't exorbitantly so, and the realm was probably no less well administered, nor smaller, than two generations prior; all the aspects of immense resources and centralized commerce (internally within each satrap and their tributary allocations to the Great King) was still under strong and able administrative control from a good Great King (the Empire under Darius III 'was irrefutably not moribund', writes Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, Pg. 812 of the English edition).

Achaemenid control of Asia Minor had been re-established by 386 B.C., and likewise in Phoenicia and Egypt in the mid-late 340s B.C., and the rising power of Macedon which included incursions east into the regions of Perinthus and Byzantium, was met with Persian aid for defensive measures at the Bosporus Straits, for the time being, which helped stave off that threat. When it was reported to Artaxerxes III of the increasing power of Philip II of Macedon, he reacted to the Macedonian threat with alarm (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.75), and Pausanias (the travel writer of the 2nd century A.D.) tells us it was the satrap of Phrygia, Arsites, who sent the mercenary force to aid against Philip's attacks (Description of Greece, Book 1.29.10) on the two major strongholds linking the bridgehead to Asia from Europe.

The direct line of the Achaemenid Royal House was effectively wiped out in 336 B.C., the result of murderous acts of the powerful minister turned vizier Bagoas. The accession of Codomannus (Darius III was immediately assumed as his regal name upon becoming the Great King), was an appointment with an aim of procuring control of the Court of the Great King by the powerful vizier and his associates, including Mentor, who was along with Bogoas a hero in re-conquering Egypt; but Darius III was a member of the royal stock, hence a legitimate Great King. It seems he had been a very capable military leader, something we know thanks to the accounts of Justin, who epitomized the lost works, to our misfortune, of Gnaeus Pompeius Trogus: Justin tells us, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 10.3,

"…Possession of the throne was given to Ochus [Artaxerxes III], who, dreading a similar conspiracy, filled the palace with the blood and dead bodies of his kinsmen and the nobility, being touched with compassion neither for consanguinity, nor sex, nor age, lest, apparently, he should be thought less wicked than his brothers that had meditated parricide.

Having thus, as it were, purified his kingdom, he made war upon the Cadusii. In the course of this campaign Codomannus [Darius III], followed by applause from all the Persians, challenged a volunteering enemy soldier in single combat, and, having killed his antagonist, regained the victory for his fellow soldiers, as well as the glory which they had almost lost. For this honorable service Codomannus was made governor of Armenia. Some time after, on the death of Ochus, he was chosen king by the people from regard to his former merits, and, that nothing might be wanting to his royal dignity, honored with the name of Darius. He maintained a long war, with various success, but with great efforts, against Alexander the Great. But being at last overcome by Alexander, and slain by his relations, he terminated his life and the kingdom of the Persians together…"

This is also in Diodorus (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 17.6.1-3, with a slight variance). The last few words there from Justin are not unprejudiced, IMHO, taking them at face value: the organized resistance of Achaemenid authority fell in the face of the formidable Macedonian juggernaut on the huge plain around Gaugamela in October of 331 B.C. (or with a stamp the next year with Alexander's circumvention of the defense mustered at the Persian Gates, then the horrid sack of Persepolis), but Darius III is not personally responsible for the 'termination' of his kingdom, nor his life. He didn't flee cowardly, as many attest: his person was needed for a planned further resistance, hence he was heading to the eastern satrapies once he saw his cause at Gaugamela was hopeless. He was then betrayed, and was overall one of the few not 'incompetent' figures (eg, Gaius Terentius Varro at Cannae, Vercingetorix amid the Gallic revolt, Johann Tserclaes at Breitenfeld) who was unfortunate to lead men in battle against a genius of war. As Great King, Darius III had the capacity to draw on abundant sources of revenue, despite perhaps a weaker economy of his realm than the 'mature' days some six or so generations prior (maybe it wasn't so at all), and he deployed a vast array of military contingents no less ample than the previous generations; he proved he was determined to adapt to changing conditions he identified. His strategy outdid Alexander by flanking the Macedonians and placing his larger force (though not substantially, as even 'revised' accounts claim) astride their communications just before the Battle of Issus (he seems to have been mobilizing a contemporaneous land and sea offensive against Alexander and the Greek League, and Memnon's death may have been a fortunate occurrence for the Greeks). Using elephants at one point, an influence from the eastern subjects of the Indus (though we read nothing of their action, if any took place), was not without tactical credence, and Darius drilled his men with newer weapons more conducive to facing the Macedonians after the lesson of Issus; scythed chariots had worked well before against Hellenic troops (most notably when 700 hoplites, not at the ready, where stymied by 400 Persian horsemen spearheaded by just two scythed chariots, in 395 B.C., at the backdrop of Agesilaus II's incursion in Asia Minor), and when he tried to create initial damage to the enemy with them (clearly not stubbornly banking solely on the chariot charges), he had a huge preponderance in numerical superiority in all arms - and he had even adopted better Greek-style weaponry between the battles fought at Issus and Gaugamela, as Alexander sojourned in Egypt. Moreover, he prudently awaited Alexander to come to his chosen position into the hinterland, as Artaxerxes II did with his younger brother Cyrus within his probable strategy of the famed blood feud of the royal brothers over six decades earlier. Whatever the details of how much Darius III could avail himself of Hellenic mercenary hoplites, or the intricacies behind the kardaces (they were probably lighter than a conventional hoplites, but crack infantrymen of some sort), there is nothing to indicate that Achaemenid levied infantrymen had lost any adeptness since their role in the Battle of Cunaxa in 401 B.C. (even though by the time of Granicus front-line infantry had been replaced by cavalry along a their battle front, perhaps a reflection of the rising supremacy in Macedonian horsemanship, to which they had no heavy foot to stand up to). Darius III was faced with a 'smart bomb' of antiquity to which he could parry no successful answer; Artaxerxes II, with his able subordinates (Tissaphernes was probably the brainchild behind the Cunaxa campaign), was not.

If we can sustain couple substantial snippets from Xenophon, followed by Plutarch (the Carian historian and physician in the Achaemenid Court, Ctesias, was doubtless used and filtered) the army under the Great King's general Teribazus were well-marshaled and disciplined to a degree which amazed the Hellenic 'observers' when the opposing lines were being drawn up; this reeks of irony, because although we know there certainly was not a figure of 900,000 men under Teribazus (cited by Plutarch), Hellenic authors thought so (perhaps disingenuous, if not wholly), thus a superb discipline was exercised here by a 'marshaled' (ie, the type of army typically mustered by the Achaemenid court) army of the astronomical numbers they themselves often believed was the case - one affecting aspect part and parcel of the growing idealization of Panhellenism, and to the whole perception of martial 'Persian inferiority'. Modern estimates, drawing on logistic realities and the simple logic that Cyrus the Younger would not have marched into the hinterland if he knew his older brother could muster such a colossal force, conclude the armies were of similar size, perhaps neither exceeding 60,000 men (the Royal Army was probably larger). The campaign was a huge domestic wrangle, of which the Greek participation is blown far out of proportion by the Greek polemical tradition to their actual role in the campaign.

Xenophon, Anabasis, Book 1.8.12-14, at the onset of the action at Cunaxa,

"...At this moment Cyrus rode along the line, attended only by Pigres, his interpreter, and three or four others, and shouted to Clearchus to lead his army against the enemy's center, for the reason that the King was stationed there; 'and if,' he said, 'we are victorious there, our whole task is accomplished.' Clearchus [the Spartan leader of the 13,600 Greek mercenary force], however, since he saw the compact body at the enemy's center and heard from Cyrus that the King was beyond his left wing (for the King was so superior in numbers that, although occupying the center of his own line, he was beyond Cyrus' left wing), was unwilling to draw the right wing away from the river, for fear that he might be turned on both flanks; and he told Cyrus, in reply, that he was taking care to make everything go well.

At this critical time the King's army was advancing evenly, while the Greek force, still remaining in the same place, was forming its line from those who were still coming up. And Cyrus, riding along at some distance from his army, was taking a survey, looking in either direction, both at his enemies and his friends..."

Plutarch, Life of Artaxerxes, Ch. 7 (more pronounced),

"...As Cyrus proceeded on his march, rumours and reports kept coming to his ears that the king had decided not to give battle at once, and was not desirous of coming to close quarters with him, but rather of waiting in Persia until his forces should assemble there from all parts. For he had run a trench, ten fathoms in width and as many in depth, four hundred furlongs through the plain; and yet he allowed Cyrus to cross this and to come within a short distance of Babylon itself. And it was Teribazus, as we are told, who first plucked up courage to tell the king that he ought not to shun a battle, nor to retire from Media and Babylon, as well as Susa, and hide himself in Persia, when he had a force many times as numerous as that of the enemy, and countless satraps and generals who surpassed Cyrus in wisdom and military skill. The king therefore determined to fight the issue out as soon as possible.

So, to begin with, by his sudden appearance with an army of 900,000 men in brilliant array, he so terrified and confounded the enemy, who were marching along in loose order and without arms because of their boldness and contempt for the king, that Cyrus could with difficulty bring them into battle array amid much tumult and shouting; and again, by leading his forces up slowly and in silence, he filled the Greeks with amazement at his good discipline, since they had expected in so vast a host random shouting, and leaping, with great confusion and dissipation of their lines. Besides this, he did well to draw up in front of his own line, and over against the Greeks, the mightiest of his scythe-bearing chariots, in order that by the force of their charge they might cut to pieces the ranks of the Greeks before they had come to close quarters..."

We are to believe, unless the tacit revealings above of the disciplined ability of the Royal Army are incorrect, under adept generals (Tissaphernes, particularly, who was very familiar with Greek arms) no less, that, upon the advance of the men of bronze, the thousands of men on the Great King's left fled like cowards before the Greeks even came within missile range, which would have meant their execution (many were Egyptian soldiers, far from home)? I don't think so. Many of the chariots which arrived at the Greek ranks were riderless, and Tissaphernes swiftly threw Cyrus' right, now sans the Greeks, into defeat. The Persians could win battles more subtly, and used what they had to work in their favor (such grand tactical maneuvering in antiquity reached a pinnacle with the likes of Hannibal). Basically, the Greek force was drawn away from the main battle, hence effectively isolated far from home, thus in turn, strategically neutralized. The subsequent great journey 'home to the sea' certainly merits legendary status, but that's a separate context, for another time...

At the risk of over-simplifying, the underlying reason, why the organization of the great Achaemenid Persian realm of its 'land' and 'peoples' (empire is an anachronistic term), or the khora basileos (royal territories) of the Great King's arkhe (power) in Greek linguistics, crumbled by early 330 B.C. was not due to any significant element in connexion with 'decadence', 'weakness' or mishandled administration. The Empire of the Great King fell because one of the greatest, standing (ie, professional), balanced, adaptable, and overall most scientifically developed armies of warfare for its era, built by one of the most underestimated men of political and military action of any era (specifically from a reflection of surviving sources), Philip II of Macedon, was launched into Asia led by his far more mercurially fiery, but no less ingenious, son; Alexander was one of the most brilliant yet vainglorious (a necessary attribute for what took place from 334-324 B.C.; plenty more 'humble' leaders would have stopped much further west) battlefield commanders of all time. In the Macedonian-led army of conquest, a cohering military base was established for the invading army under a system of logistical application brilliantly created by a master, and applied by a brilliant practitioner. Alexander was determined with the total conquest of the Achaemenid realm, and Darius III and his subalterns, though afflicted with some extremely circumstantial bad luck, simply could find no military answer against this supreme instrument of war designed with all the aspects which make a flexible and disciplined army of conquest so great. The army of conquest (not one mustered to just win battles, as Greeks basically did before Philip II), to reiterate, had a military genius at its helm, arguably the greatest of all time (if that 'title' must be sought). But a strong spirit did not die in the wake of the transfer of power, and the dynastic outgrowths of Parthia and the Sassanids stood strong against the later aggressions of Rome. At Carrhae in 53 B.C., the superiority of the principles of shock, missile power, and logistics by a horse-army was overtly demonstrated by the Parthians against heavy infantrymen superior to anything that came out of Greece (other than perhaps the hypaspistai, but they were not as preponderant as the best Roman legionaries).

Heavy heavy crack infantryman from rugged NW Iran, the Dailamites (or Daylami, who fought at close-quarters, armed with swords, battle-axes, two-pronged javelins, etc., and wore heavy mail) arrived on the warring scene under the Sassanids, most predominantly under the reign of Khosrau (Khosrow) I in the early 6th century A.D. These heavy infantrymen were a compliment to the vaunted Savaran cavalry (Sassanid knights every bit a match for their Byzantine counterparts). The Dailamites (aluh = 'eagle', amu[kh]t = 'taught') hailed from the rugged terrain of northern Persia (modern Gilan and environs). They are 'the only Persian infantry force positively praised by Greco-Roman sources', writes Dr. Kaveh Farrokh (in his excellent Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War, pg. 232, although not as strong on issues concerning the Achaemenids as with later Persian eras).

If the Daylami were indeed descended from the Median Dimilii tribe, the biggest question may be why their capacity to fight as heavy close-quarter infantrymen was never utilized, even marginally, until the c. late 4th century A.D. I wish they received better press. Do you know much about these soldiers? I realize it's far removed from the epoch of the Achaemenids.

Agathias, Histories, Book 3.17.7-9,

"...The Dilimnites are among the largest of the nations on the far side of the Tigris whose territory borders on Persia. They are warlike in the extreme and, unlike most of the Persians, do not fight principally with the bow and the sling. The carry spears and pikes and wear a sword slung across one shoulder. To the left arm they tie a very small dirk and they hold out shields and bucklers to protect themselves with. One could hardly describe them simply as light armed troops, nor for that matter as the type of heavy infantry that fight exclusively at close quarters. For they both discharge missiles at a distance when the occasion arises and engage in hand to hand fighting, and are expert at charging an enemy phalanx and breaking its close-knit ranks with the weight of their charge. They can reform their own ranks with ease and adapt themselves to any contingency. Even steep hills they run up without difficulty thus seizing in advance all points of vantage, and when they are put to flight they escape with lightning rapidity whereas when they are the attackers they press the pursuit with perfect timing and co-ordination. Well-versed as they are in practically every type of warfare they inflict considerable harm to their enemies. They are accustomed for the most part to fight alongside the Persians, though not as the conscript contingents of a subject people since they are in fact free and independent and it is not in their nature to submit to any form of compulsion..."

Moreover, Procopius mentions the Dolomitai infantrymen (in the same context as Agathias, beginning in 551 A.D.) as having shields, yet also wielding swords and three javelins apiece in each hand (as the image above seems to show), and that they were exceptionally nimble in mountain country (Wars of Justinian, Book 8.14.6-9). This particular Persian army is described as, apart from a few men, comprising 'all cavalry' (8.13.4); thus it seems only the Dolomitai made up any of the Persian-led infantry (at least during the Lazic War).

The Dailamites (aluh = 'eagle', amu[kh]t = 'taught') who served the Sassanids (mercenaries, not subjects, as Agathias tells us) usually fought in the Caucasus against enemy incursions (mainly Byzantine and Turkic) into Caucasian Albania (modern Azerbaijan). Agathias seems to describe the 'Dilimnites' as professional and well-drilled in action amid the Lazic War - "the Dilimnites brought round their wings and encircled" a smaller force of Romans and their allies (from Agathias' Histories, Book 3.22.6). Their rows of infantry in battle order revealed large shields painted with sparkling colors, and in facing the enemy their two-pointed javelins (jupin) were their primary weapons. To develop more initiative, the aid of cavalry was necessary and in this facet the Turks rendered a largely unappreciated service. When the power of Sassanian Persia fell to the Arabs by 651 A.D., the Dailamites remained at large, never submitting to the Caliphate. Interestingly, Dailamite arms were roughly the same as those brandished by none other than the vaunted Savaran (not the mailed heavy armor).



Top: I found this depiction of ranks of Dailamite infantry (here, specifically), certianly not considered 'light', but not encumbered so as to preclude their natural swiftness (Agathias, Histories, Book 3.28.7). Directly above: around a millennia earlier, there existed the Achaemenid dathabam (a file of ten men), which followed the Assyrian tradition of archers shooting behind a shield (spara) wall. The shield-bearer (hence sparabara) fought behind his spara with a six-seven ft. spear and, if need be, a long dagger (the akinaka). He was also the dathapatis, the leader of the dathabam (should he fall and enemy soldiers reach them, the archers defended themselves as best as they could with an akinakes, a short sword not unlike the Greek xiphos); ten dathaba constituted the infantry tactical unit known as a satabam; ten sataba of a hundred men formed the thousand-man regiment called a hazarabam; ten hazaraba, in turn, comprised a baivarabam (the convenient 10,000 'myriad' to the Greeks; the Mongol tümen), hence Turkic in origin, was the field army numbering 10,000 men) of which the most renowned was the Amrtaka (the 'Immortals'), who were always kept up to full strength (traditional). Otherwise, the decimal system was certainly not always maintained at these paper-strengths amid campaigns, a military historical reality for all 'parade-strengths' of every national army's organized units. By the early/mid 4th century B.C., this tactical concept had disappeared.

Different scholarly hypotheses can often be equally convincing, and the various explanations often reflect the current beliefs and attitudes of the society in which certain archaeologists and historians live and work. It gets complicated, and Territorial expansion by ancient states is influenced by macro-sociological aspects free of the paramount (though basic) influencing agent of environment (ie, waterways and deltas). There is a great variation in the qualitative and quantitative evidence that different ancient cultures have left for modern archaeological scholarship; Egyptian civilization, throughout its staple periods left great monuments, a wealth of artifacts, and a rich literary legacy (albeit not in prose form), while other cultural centers, such as Meroë and Carthage (the horrifically thorough destruction of the latter in 146 B.C. notwithstanding) are hitherto more mysterious, even staying within conventional science (ie, no Lemuria or Atlantis!). The controversy surrounding the interesting Jiroft theory seems to reflect an overview of what can be seen as independent or part of a whole 'culture' with the various city-states. Much of the evidence of life and warfare in antiquity always entails interpretation, perhaps the strongest 'catalyst' of controversy, if I may; fascinating stuff bequeathed by antiquity is often partial and even contradictory, thus scholars always draw thought-provoking but imprecise conclusions.

Literary and archaeological evidence, and the occasional interjection of circular reasoning (which doesn't always lift the interpretation issue), can often offset each other now and then, and focalized changes can upsurge with newly uncovered data. To each his/her own, though, and many great and differing scholars are a joy to study: passionate disinterest and melancholic yearning both exist among the nostalgic, but that we are availed the balance of more 'balanced' professionals such as Samuel Kramer (Sumer), Ian Shaw (Egypt), Pierre Briant (Achaemenid Persia; I'm sure we can add one Jona Lendering in there, too!), Nicholas G. Hammond (a multitude of topics on Greek warfare!), to name a few, we should consider ourselves quite fortunate. Of course it runs deeper, particularly with ancient Persia (Elamites, Sassanids etc.), and I'm going off on tangents from the issue of Hellas and the Achaemenids for our topic. But I'll never feel bad for thinking so pensively about the indirectly connected aspects of the ancient history of 'Europe' (mainland Greece and Roman eras), the Near East (Asia Minor, Egypt, and Phoenicia, etc.), and 'Asia' (Sumerian and Persian dynasties).

From my view, the multicultural and social issue of 'let's be fair to the Persians' should not be undertaken for the stroking of political correctness per se, at least for students etc. interested in the grand topic who are not political pundits or lobbyists for historical figures and subjects (ie, those who kiss babies and exhort in a manner influenced by their forensic requirements, etc.). Moreover, I feel, such a feeling shouldn’t be coupled with an overlapping denigration of the traditional historiography laid down by Hellenes, of which the advent lay with Herodotus of Halicarnassus, who, whichever school of thought about him various scholars and aficionados, etc., of this subject decide to advocate, was the first to not only adeptly narrate for us an accurate account (historicity beyond the surface will never be proven, particularly in antiquity, and Herodotus' works are not free from unevenness) of a monumental past event, but to imbue it with what he saw as intent, cause, and effect; he was indeed the Father of History, or at least the architect, putatively for his classic The Histories, the first account of prose work we have which can be valued as a tremendous historical source; The Histories, almost certainly, were to be directed at readers rather than listeners, evidenced by the frequent use of the past tense when referring to Herodotus' own time, thereby adopting the perspective of future absorbers of his work. From the get-go Herodotus clearly assumes the role as an historic abutment of Homer. Reliance is almost solely dependent on Herodotus for the great events of the early 5th century B.C. which decided the fate of the overall political course of the eastern Mediterranean Basin and 'Europe'. Moreover, he furnishes much data about Achaemenid Persia in the decades prior; he was well placed to hear and learn much, coming from the Carian port of Halicarnassus, traveling extensively when his mind was mature and knew what he was looking for. But the backdrop isn't exclusive with Herodotus, as professor John F. Lazenby, one the finest modern scholars dealing with the momentous events of ancient Greece and Republican Rome, lucidly writes on the first page of Ch. 1 of his superb The Defence of Greece 490-479 B.C.,

"…The Persian Wars without Herodotus would not so much be Hamlet without the prince, as Hamlet without Shakespeare…"

Food for thought.

Thanks and enjoy, James K MacKinnon