Alexander the Great was antiquity\'s greatest commander

[Robert Vermaat]

Alexander had to overcome many more challenges than Hannibal and Pyrrhus put together.

I'm not saying I disagree with you on the qualities of Alexander, but is that above analysis entirely correct? Alexander, at least, had plenty of reinforcements to sustain his campaighns. Imagine: what would Alexander have done if his original force with which he crossed into Asia (Turkey) would never have been resupplied with Macedonian troops? My guess is that he would have been forced to rmain in Syria, unable to challenge darius In Persia. And then what would we have thought about his qualities?

Alexander had a free hand, unlike Hannibal who was very much at the mercy of a state committe. Pyrrhus, if able to get more reinforcements, would perhaps have conquered Italy, as would have been possible for Hannibal.

[Paullus Scipio]

A very good point, Robert.....indeed one may well point out that as an absolute ruler, Alexander had a free hand to do as he wished, and almost limitless resources to do it with - Greek re-inforcements and mercenaries to provide garrisons, freeing his Macedonian "field" army, and once he was in Asia, ever-increasing amounts of money until he became the wealthiest ruler in the world, and pretty limitless sources of manpower, so much so that by the time he invaded India his army contained many thousands of Asiatics. By comparison, Hannibal and Pyrrhus (and other Historical Military Commanders) operated on a shoestring, with distinctly limited money and manpower resources.......seen in that light, it makes their accomplishments harder to achieve than Alexander's.......

[Paralus]

Surely Lysander deserved it more! :wink:

You inveterate bloody homoioi you...

Intrigued you didn't suggest the arch imperialist Agesilaos.

[Paralus]

Alexander had to overcome many more challenges than Hannibal and Pyrrhus put together.

But nothing near what his father faced. To use an Athenian comparison, Alexander succeeded Pericles whereas Philip found himself in the position of Conon post Aegespotami.

He inherited his kingdom at a very young age, so he had to first be able to convince his own men and then the rest of Greece and barbarian world that he was no puppy on a throne.

He inherited the most powerful state in Europe: unchallenged on the battlefield. With a cowed, vacillating Athens and a Sparta with eyes west, there never really was an alliance that could hope to counter what Macedon could put into the field. Granted the new ruler had to establish his authority – something he did with (pardon the Pythonesque phrase) a ruthless efficiency and a fanatical devotion to disposing of threats perceived or real.

His campaigns soon brought him deep into the barbarian Balkans, where Phillip had never even thought of venturing before, clearly showing the extent of his ambition.

That is not quite right. Philip was indeed interested in the “barbarian Balkans” and his campaigns attest to it. The difference is strategic: Philip had Athens and her allies to deal with in the north. Thus much of his campaigning in this direction was aimed at neutering her renascent imperial ambitions. His campaigns against Thrace and his campaign into the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus are examples.

Pays to keep in mind also that Philip did not have a “pacified” Greece during his forays northeast. Whilst Alexander might have had to deal with his succession he had a recently annihilated Greece facilitating his adventure northwards. Philip was much engaged in politics and warfare attempting to but Greek heads into some sort of compliance. If anything is clear about Alex’s old man it is this: he wanted Greece behind him – by political as much as military methods or belted and cowed if necessary which, in the end it was. Clearly he wanted Macedonia to be part of Greece – the part that mattered of course; the ruler – but, at heart, Greek as did Macedonian monarchs before him who had not the means to achieve it. Alexander saw it rather differently: at Thebes he demonstrated that Greece was now Macedonian; a subject for her king to rule and do not forget it.

As proof that he was not as "reckless" as we consider him to be (again forgetting how commanders of the era generally fought), he did not fight in the first line against the Illyrians, I don't remember him receiving wounds during that campaign nor did he storm himself any Greek city soon afterwards as he did later on.

Hmmm…. I don’t think that can be said with any real certainty…

Arrian, Anabasis from those northern campaigns…

1.1.11-12:
Alexander ordered his archers to march from the right wing in front of the rest of the phalanx, because there the passage was easier, and to shoot at the Thracians wherever they advanced. He himself took his own guard, the shield-bearing infantry and the Agrianians, and led them to the left […] The consequence was, they no longer waited to receive Alexander marching against them…

1.2.4-6
And those who were surprised drew themselves up in battle array in a woody glen along the bank of the river. Alexander drew out his phalanx into a deep column, and led it on in person […]But when Alexander had drawn them thus out of the woody glen, he ordered Philotas to take the cavalry which came from upper Macedonia, and to charge their right wing […] while he himself extended the phalanx of infantry and the rest of the horse in front of the phalanx and led them against the enemy’s centre.

1.6.6-7
He also ordered the shield-bearing guards to cross the river, and after them the regiments of Macedonian infantry, with instructions that, as soon as they had succeeded in crossing, they should draw out in rank towards the left, so that the phalanx of men crossing might appear compact at once. He himself, in the vanguard, was all the time observing from the ridge the enemy’s advance. They, seeing the force crossing the river, marched down the mountains to meet them, with the purpose of attacking Alexander’s rear in its retreat. But, as they were just drawing near, Alexander rushed forth with his own attendants…

The results of this campaign were critical as the barbarian threat was eliminated for many years to come. Even if for some reason Alexander had stopped there, getting murdered or something, he would still have been regarded as great as Philip...

.

There was no barbarian threat from across the Danube to my knowledge. There had been no concerted barbarian threat from the Illyrians (aside from the pitifully documented campaign where a certain hypaspist called Pausanias stepped in front of Philip). Indeed Philip had created a secure Macedonian border.

Had Alexander been murdered after his northern campaign he will have been remembered as a short-lived inheritor of a dominant Macedonian state who added to the kingdom – if not greatly – unlike his namesake Alexander II.

And then the preparation for his eastern campaign came... Alexander and not Philip was the one who decided on the number and composition of the invading army.

Unlikely. The expeditionary force was already in Asia executing Philip’s orders and Alexander will well have known what was to follow. Unless we are supposing he was kept out of any planning. The forces to remain in Europe and those to invade will have been well discussed and the young king’s “general staff” would only have been too well aware as well.

Alexander may have tinkered but the plan was well set.

By now many of his generals (in the broad sense that we use the term in the Macedonian army of the era, more like commanders) were his and not Philip's Companions and allies. He had at his disposal troops that Philip did not, he had to learn how to field and co-ordinate them, how to use and keep them happy.

The first part of that is incorrect. Parmenion – Philip’s “only general” – was the second highest ranking officer in the army. His son (Philotas) commanded the Companion Cavalry and another the Hypaspists whilst Cleitus commanded the Ile Basilikoi: the most important commands in the army. Parmenion's son in law commanded a battalion of the phalanx as did a son of Andromenes. The claim that "many of his generals were his and not Philip's" in the invasion army in no way stands scrutiny. That would certainly come later in what appears strongly, if in retrospect, as a purge of the old guard. Certainly by India we have “Alexander’s men” and those who became such (Coenus, Craterus for example) in control.

Which troops did the army of invasion have that Philip did not that may have needed special attention?

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

Replying to Robert's and Paul's objections, why isn't the assurance of supplies a virtue attributed to the commander? Why did he "persuade" and force Greeks and Macedonians to follow him? How did he keep and increased his power after Filip died? And above all,would he be able to "persuade" or "force" greeks and macedonian to re-enforce him,had he not been as successful as he was? Regarding the re-enforcements supplies of Alexander,keep in mind that he was an invading force none the less,and not Rome in defence. Rome that was much more populated than Greece at the time. Why didn't Hannibal secure his position back at home by force of arms or persuation if he thought that his war in Italy was the crucial thing for his country?
Alexander was a kid when he started his campaign,and if his generals and his subordinates both in the army and in Greece didn't trust,love,believe and fear him,they could have easily put someone else on his thone,of their own liking. The mere thing that Alexander survived the throne is a great virtue on its own. A politician's virtue,rather than a general's? Maybe yes in today's criteria,but much more relevant back then.
Khairete
Giannis

[Paralus]

Why did he "persuade" and force Greeks and Macedonians to follow him? How did he keep and increased his power after Filip died? And above all,would he be able to "persuade" or "force" greeks and macedonian to re-enforce him,had he not been as successful as he was?

Antipater had him acclaimed as king and the Macedonians present assented. From there Alexander eliminated any possible resistance. Parmenion, acquisecing in the murder of his son-in-law, brought his support and bought his positon as well as that of his adherents. That Alexander "forced the Greeks" is plain: resistance was, pardon the Borg-like tone, rendered futile.

"Forcing" the Makedones would wait until after Persia fell. From there on the anabasis is replete with grandeloquent speeches as well as more frequent coercion and bribery to convinve his Makedones to continue lovingly following him. Although it might be remembered that Amyntas had to take some young'ns east from "under the skirts" of Olympias: seems not all willingly went.

The reinforcements, early on, show many Macedonains. The rest are, usually, mercenaries, Illyrians or Thracians and such like. Mercenaries went for pay and the others had no choice.

Why didn't Hannibal secure his position back at home by force of arms or persuation if he thought that his war in Italy was the crucial thing for his country?

That begets a comparison between Carthage and Macedon. That is slippery ground. Macedonia was a monarchy and, recent arguments aside, was no "constitutional monarchy" as we would think of England or even Sparta for that matter. Alexander was working with a totally different state apparratus to Hannibal.

Alexander was a kid when he started his campaign,and if his generals and his subordinates both in the army and in Greece didn't trust,love,believe and fear him,they could have easily put someone else on his thone,of their own liking.

I doubt love had anything to do with it at the start. Fear? Absolutely. His acclamation was a fait accompli after his father's death and engineered by Antipater. Who was to gainsay it? Possible claimants were - literally - eliminated and the only other army operating was in Asia and Parmenion sold his right to choose for his security and his family's.

[Robert Vermaat]

Replying to Robert's and Paul's objections, why isn't the assurance of supplies a virtue attributed to the commander?

I wasn't speaking about the virtue of the commander, but rather against the remark that "Alexander had to overcome many more challenges than Hannibal and Pyrrhus put together", which i think is hardly fair to say.

Sure, you could say that, had Hannibal been a better commander, he could have overthrown the Carthage state, have become king and then have destroyed Rome.
But carthage was no kingdom, as macedon was, and where Alexander could inherit a position, power and prestige of a royal house, Hannibal could not.

Again, I don't think that this reflects on either of them as a commander, but it's unfair to say that Alexander had more challenges. Different, but by no means more.

Now Phyrros.. wasn't he a despot?

[PMBardunias]

You inveterate bloody homoioi you...Intrigued you didn't suggest the arch imperialist Agesilaos.

Not me, but the humble citizens of Samos. Many do not know that the Samians made Lysander a God after he liberated them. They sang hymns and had festivals in his honor. Clearchus of Heraclea enjoyed the same treatment. The Thasians offered Agiselaos Godhood and he flat refused them!

This is important for Alexander, because one of the common tropes on his megalomania is that his quest for godhood is somehow tied to his wanting to be like an Asian despot. But, clearly the tradition of deification was not strictly oriental in character.

As a side note, Agiselaos could have marched as far east as he wished had he not been recalled. The army that he reared in Asia and marched back to fight with at Coronea was easily the best the Greeks had ever seen pound for pound. His hoplites of course were supreme, but more importantly his cavalry was superior to both Persian and Thessalian. The difference between Agiselaos and Alexander is that Agiselaos was an agent of his state and rapidly left his Asian adventure/razzia the moment they wer threatened at home (By you Athenian Persian-puppets!). Judging from Nemea, they may not evean have needed him. Alexander ignored the threat to his nation, even sucking off man power for the east at the time it was needed most. Had Agis III defeated Antipater at Megalopolis (the "battle of mice"), as he came very close to doing, or the Thracians revolted a bit earlier, we would be reading of Alexander the "Pretty Good". This is not only luck, super-luck, because Alexander did everything he could to weaken his homeland.

[Macedon]

1st post

Alexander had to overcome many more challenges than Hannibal and Pyrrhus put together.

I'm not saying I disagree with you on the qualities of Alexander, but is that above analysis entirely correct? Alexander, at least, had plenty of reinforcements to sustain his campaighns. Imagine: what would Alexander have done if his original force with which he crossed into Asia (Turkey) would never have been resupplied with Macedonian troops? My guess is that he would have been forced to rmain in Syria, unable to challenge darius In Persia. And then what would we have thought about his qualities?

Alexander had a free hand, unlike Hannibal who was very much at the mercy of a state committe. Pyrrhus, if able to get more reinforcements, would perhaps have conquered Italy, as would have been possible for Hannibal.

Alexander had access to reinforcements only because he was able to manage his interior and exterior affairs better than Hannibal and Pyrrhus as well as because he was able to keep his supply lines open. His initial force was smaller than that of H., similar to that of P. H. and P. relied heavily on the local manpower from the first moment, Alexander did not. Hannibal was sent huge reinforcements (many more men than Alexander ever received from home) but they were slaughtered along the way unable to reach him. He also did not have the full support of the Carthaginian Senate, which in itself is also a point where N. proved less than A. As for the locals, he drew heavily from them till the end, but as he progressively lost control over them, he also lost his reinforcement pool. The same applies to Pyrrhus. He started with a mixed Greek mercenary army, just like Alexander, came to Magna Grecia where he was put in charge of a large body of men there. He trained and used them as well as he could, gained some victories but then, for political reasons he lost their "love", he passed on to Sicily, came back to Italy and after a single loss in a great battle he was unable to continue his campaign against Rome. Yet, he was never short of recruits until the end, when he totally lost control of his allies. His main attested problem was losses in his veteran and officer pool, which is a direct consequence of many losses in battle and during campaigning, a problem Alexander seemingly did not encounter until very late in his campaign and after he had formed the administrative basis that would ensure him the draft of new forces.

In conclusion, Alexander only had a steady flow of reinforcements that proved sufficient because he was able to :

A. keep control of his dominions even in his absence
B. keep his supply lines open and secure
C. form and sustain an administrative system and relations that ensured him access to local populations during his Eastern campaigns
D. because he never had to deal with high losses

all of which, again are points we have to judge in a great commander.

A very good point, Robert.....indeed one may well point out that as an absolute ruler, Alexander had a free hand to do as he wished, and almost limitless resources to do it with - Greek re-inforcements and mercenaries to provide garrisons, freeing his Macedonian "field" army, and once he was in Asia, ever-increasing amounts of money until he became the wealthiest ruler in the world, and pretty limitless sources of manpower, so much so that by the time he invaded India his army contained many thousands of Asiatics. By comparison, Hannibal and Pyrrhus (and other Historical Military Commanders) operated on a shoestring, with distinctly limited money and manpower resources.......seen in that light, it makes their accomplishments harder to achieve than Alexander's.......

Alexander did not have limitless resources and even the resources he secured he secured through war. Why should we view upon his eastern campaign as something so distant from his Balkan campaign? It was his ability that ensured him stability in Greece and the Balkans. Apart from that, he had to leave in Greece a Macedonian army, large enough to be able to deal with any problem (as indeed Antipater did when necessary). His pool was not limitless and his gold was even less than enough (do not forget that the Macedonian treasury was empty and that Alexander paid off debts with the income of the sale of the Thebans) What gold and treasures he took he fought for and what you claim is true but not until he was done with the Persians... On the other hand both Pyrrhus and Hannibal never are attested to not have enough gold. Hannibal had access to the lucrative mines of Iberia and Pyrrhus drew what money he needed from his allies. What was the value and contribution of any of Alexander's gold in his campaigns? Was he able to use it before Gaugamela to his advantage? He only used it to pay his and his men's debts. He didn't pay for any new armies, his campaigning force didn't swell from 50 to 100.000. Actually, even if gold is an issue, isn't it a great commander's job to be able to secure resources? Had Hannibal secured Iberia against Scipio or had Pyrrhus conquered Rome, would they have not more resources to put in their war efforts?

Alexander started off as the poorest of the three, not the richest. He ended up the richest after many battles and strategical organization.

[Paralus]

Not me, but the humble citizens of Samos. Many do not know that the Samians made Lysander a God after he liberated them. They sang hymns and had festivals in his honor. Clearchus of Heraclea enjoyed the same treatment. The Thasians offered Agiselaos Godhood and he flat refused them!

This is important for Alexander, because one of the common tropes on his megalomania is that his quest for godhood is somehow tied to his wanting to be like an Asian despot. But, clearly the tradition of deification was not strictly oriental in character.

Or, strictly, religious. Athens, always at the forefront of flattery when it concerned powerful Macedonians, could put any Greek state in the shade. Antenaeus, Deipnosophistae, VI 253.E:

Hail, ever-mighty Poseidon's mightier son;
Hail, son of Aphrodite.
For other gods do at a distance keep,
Or have no ears,
Or no existence; and they heed not us -
But you are present,
Not made of wood or stone, a genuine god.
We pray to you.
First of all give us peace, O dearest god -
For you are lord of peace -
And crush for us yourself, for you've the power,
This odious Sphinx;
Which now destroys not Thebes alone, but Greece -
The whole of Greece...

As a side note, Agiselaos could have marched as far east as he wished had he not been recalled. The army that he reared in Asia and marched back to fight with at Coronea was easily the best the Greeks had ever seen pound for pound.

The Persian response - supplying a fleet to Conon and Pharnabazus, a trial run for Egypt - stopped the Spartan's trashing of their alliance obligations dead in the water. Literally. We've been here before and we'll likely not agree. As for marching as far as he wanted, he did not do that prior to his recall (alternately raiding and making treaties with either satrap - something the King put an abrupt end to) and the fate of the 10,000 is salutary.

Had Agis III defeated Antipater at Megalopolis (the "battle of mice"), as he came very close to doing, or the Thracians revolted a bit earlier, we would be reading of Alexander the "Pretty Good". This is not only luck, super-luck, because Alexander did everything he could to weaken his homeland.

The Thracian "revolt", though poorly transmitted in the sources, clearly discombobulated the Old Rope who had to settle matters with a certain Memnon before attempting to deal with the insurrection in the Peloponnese. In that time Corrhagus was done over and the sun shone breifly on the southern Greeks.

There is no doubt that Alexander's homeland was, at his death, far weaker than what Philip had left it. The Old Rope's utter embarrassment in the field (and Leonnatus') are testament to it.

[Macedon]

2nd Post

Paralus wrote : But nothing near what his father faced. To use an Athenian comparison, Alexander succeeded Pericles whereas Philip found himself in the position of Conon post Aegespotami.

No, the challenges faced by Alexander were far more diverse than those faced by Philip. Philip might have organized a powerful Macedonian state and had he lived more, he might have done everything Alexander did and more. Yet, he died before being able to realize his Eastern campaign and so the comparison must be made accordingly. And in the entirety of possible challenges, Alexander had, at least due to the nature of his campaigns, to deal with more.

Paralus wrote : He inherited the most powerful state in Europe: unchallenged on the battlefield. With a cowed, vacillating Athens and a Sparta with eyes west, there never really was an alliance that could hope to counter what Macedon could put into the field. Granted the new ruler had to establish his authority – something he did with (pardon the Pythonesque phrase) a ruthless efficiency and a fanatical devotion to disposing of threats perceived or real.

How do you come to this conclusion? The most powerful state in Europe? Why not Carthage or Rome? Unchallenged on the battlefield? Why? Because Philip won at Cheronea? Philip fought many battles and actually lost some. Alexander and Antipater also had to fight against European opponents, so there were forces who doubted the Macedonian military might. Of course to state that the Macedonian army was invulnerable is too bold and we have to keep in mind that an army can win only if properly commanded and led. And here is again where Alexander's ability comes to the picture. What we certainly know is that Macedonia was heavily indebted and Alexander had to swiftly deal with the fear of possible challengers in this "loose" kingdom of customarily semi-independent tribes that was Macedonia, a problem also faced by his father. And Athens was ready to rebel too and would have too unless Alexander hadn't shown the "barbaric" resoluteness in his swift punishment of Thebes. And of course he was ruthless in this endeavor as any ruler has to be in these circumstances. As to an alliance against Macedon, had Alexander allowed Thebes to organize better, I doubt that a new alliance would have been thwarted.

Paralus wrote : That is not quite right. Philip was indeed interested in the “barbarian Balkans” and his campaigns attest to it. The difference is strategic: Philip had Athens and her allies to deal with in the north. Thus much of his campaigning in this direction was aimed at neutering her renascent imperial ambitions. His campaigns against Thrace and his campaign into the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus are examples.

Pays to keep in mind also that Philip did not have a “pacified” Greece during his forays northeast. Whilst Alexander might have had to deal with his succession he had a recently annihilated Greece facilitating his adventure northwards. Philip was much engaged in politics and warfare attempting to but Greek heads into some sort of compliance. If anything is clear about Alex’s old man it is this: he wanted Greece behind him – by political as much as military methods or belted and cowed if necessary which, in the end it was. Clearly he wanted Macedonia to be part of Greece – the part that mattered of course; the ruler – but, at heart, Greek as did Macedonian monarchs before him who had not the means to achieve it. Alexander saw it rather differently: at Thebes he demonstrated that Greece was now Macedonian; a subject for her king to rule and do not forget it.

Of course he was interested and he fought himself against them as against Bardylis. I never made any effort to lessen Philip's genius, which may have been equal or even greater than Alexander's. This of course does not lessen Alexander's exploits, just makes us wonder where Philip would have reached had he lived. I did not comment on why Philip did not venture as far to the north, I just reminded of what Alexander did and offered it as a prelude to his ambition. Philip mostly occupied himself with Greek Thrace and would, according to my opinion also have made a march to the north before crossing the Hellespont. I do not think there is any reason for us to strategically explain why Alexander did what he did in order to determine his value, the fact that he did it is what counts.

Paralus wrote : Hmmm…. I don’t think that can be said with any real certainty…

Arrian, Anabasis from those northern campaigns…

Of course he was at the battles and of course he led his army. But, he is not attested, even in those passages, to fight at the head of the cavalry or fight hand to hand. He always is in full tactical control of the situation somewhere among the lines. His "leading"his army does not imply his rushing against an enemy. All this has nothing to do with the image of Alexander fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents, being the target of thrusts, storming walls, as we later hear in Asia... Hannibal fought in the center of his line, Pyrrhus was among his own Companions in the first line receiving a direct attack from a Roman horseman! Darius was in the head of his army, even surrounded by his friends, Demetrius, Antigonus, Antiochus, countless Persian commanders, Porus, Leonidas, Philopoemen, Epaminondas, Pelopidas...so many other Greek strategoi... Philip... why should we condemn Alexander for doing what customarily was done ?

Paralus wrote :There was no barbarian threat from across the Danube to my knowledge. There had been no concerted barbarian threat from the Illyrians (aside from the pitifully documented campaign where a certain hypaspist called Pausanias stepped in front of Philip). Indeed Philip had created a secure Macedonian border.

Had Alexander been murdered after his northern campaign he will have been remembered as a short-lived inheritor of a dominant Macedonian state who added to the kingdom – if not greatly – unlike his namesake Alexander II.

Alexander crossed the Istrus and on the way secured the Balkans. Crossing the river helped him secure stability among the barbarians and his protection even more desirable, since Macedon had nothing to fear from the Celts in the north but his allies had. The Thracian and the Illyrian tribes were not secure at the moment since Philip was dead. The same feeling of disrespect that the southern Greeks had towards Alexander the barbarians had also. As he had to reestablish himself in Greece, he had to also among the barbarians. No Thracian warlord would keep away from the vulnerable Macedonian holdings now that Philip was gone. In the end, he had to fight, he did not just stroll through the Balkans drinking and partying...

Paralus wrote : Unlikely. The expeditionary force was already in Asia executing Philip’s orders and Alexander will well have known what was to follow. Unless we are supposing he was kept out of any planning. The forces to remain in Europe and those to invade will have been well discussed and the young king’s “general staff” would only have been too well aware as well.

Alexander may have tinkered but the plan was well set.

Phlilip had only sent a small expeditionary force to incite the Ionian cities into rebellion. This was not the force of Alexander crossing the Hellespont of which we have details. Alexander commenced his campaign 2 years after his father's death making all the tactical decisions himself. Was he influenced by his father? Of course he was, is there any commander who gained his knowledge and experience alone, with no one to provide him experience with? Alexander decided on what forces to take with him, what forces to leave back, what mercenaries and allies to take with him and of course he had, as I already mentioned, to decide how to use this army. Philip never had an army of this composition, so any tactical and strategical decisions Alexander made from them on, were his and his alone. It is the job of the C-in-C to listen to his consultants and then take the decisions. I cannot really say where Napoleon would have been without the likes of Davout, Soult or Ney, all less in general competence than Bonaparte but invaluable in their sectors of action. It is Alexander who was in charge and if we are to judge from the immediate future, he was often highly critical of the suggestions of his staff. Unless we believe that other commanders did not have their advisors or that good human resource management is not also a characteristic of a great commander.

The first part of that is incorrect. Parmenion – Philip’s “only general” – was the second highest ranking officer in the army. His son (Philotas) commanded the Companion Cavalry and another the Hypaspists whilst Cleitus commanded the Ile Basilikoi: the most important commands in the army. Parmenion's son in law commanded a battalion of the phalanx as did a son of Andromenes. The claim that "many of his generals were his and not Philip's" in the invasion army in no way stands scrutiny. That would certainly come later in what appears strongly, if in retrospect, as a purge of the old guard. Certainly by India we have “Alexander’s men” and those who became such (Coenus, Craterus for example) in control.

Which troops did the army of invasion have that Philip did not that may have needed special attention?

First of all there was no such thing as a "strategos" in the Macedonian army. There were many subordinate commanders who took part in the war councils and were trusted with various tasks and responsibilities. Parmenion was of course not Philip's "only general", nor was he Alexander's. And his son was one of Alexander's, not Philip's. You are trying to find parallels were there are none. What we are calling "Generals", as I already mentioned in my initial position is nothing more than "subordinate commanders". And of all these, of course Parmenion stood out for his ability, experience and loyalty. And among these able men, some were old guard (like Antigonus and Cleitus the Black) and others belonged to the Young Guard (Hephaesteon, Philotas or Perdiccas).

Apart from the Macedonian pezetairoi, the phalangites and the hypasists, the Macedonian psiloi and toxotai and the Macedonian Companion cavalry, Alexander had to use and coordinate Agrianians, Paeonians, Thracians, Southern Greek infantry and cavalry. Actually the Macedonians in his army were only a minority (12.000 pezetairoi, some 2.000 etairoi and a number of light troops). Had Alexander any experience in commanding such non-homogenous armies? Maybe yes, maybe not. We know that Philip had Greek allies at Cheronea but their role in the battle is completely unknown. What we do know is that Alexander took these men and was able to competently marshal them all the way to India. And what does it really matter? Are you proposing that Alexander just sit back and enjoyed the ride up to Hydaspes? That this war machine operated on its own, just because half of it was well-oiled by Philip? I guess that there is little parthenogenesis in most army compositions.

[Macedon]

Replying to Robert's and Paul's objections, why isn't the assurance of supplies a virtue attributed to the commander?

I wasn't speaking about the virtue of the commander, but rather against the remark that "Alexander had to overcome many more challenges than Hannibal and Pyrrhus put together", which i think is hardly fair to say.

Sure, you could say that, had Hannibal been a better commander, he could have overthrown the Carthage state, have become king and then have destroyed Rome.
But carthage was no kingdom, as macedon was, and where Alexander could inherit a position, power and prestige of a royal house, Hannibal could not.

Again, I don't think that this reflects on either of them as a commander, but it's unfair to say that Alexander had more challenges. Different, but by no means more.

Now Phyrros.. wasn't he a despot?

If you think that Alexander did not have to face as many challenges in his career as a commander as Hannibal or Pyrrhus, do make an analogous post. I think that you will find that the word "challenges" is very broad and in order to talk about how many there were you have to find how many diverse conditions he had to manage. Alexander's career is only more filled with challenges because he covered many more miles, crossed more mountains, deserts and rivers than both and had to fight against more kinds of enemies (not necessarily sronger, just more). You can argue that managing to overcome one huge problem is more important than overcoming three less difficult ones, but I only discussed number not difficulty, which would be extremely hard to judge objectively. And Alexander may have inherited a kingdom, but Hannibal also enjoyed almost total control over Hispania. I doubt that anyone would disagree with the fact that Hannibal's dominion was certainly more rich and populous than the Macedonia of Alexander. Hannibal assembled a huge army.. it was a pity he inly could get through the Alps with a fraction of it. So, again,we see Hannibal starting his war with a terrible disaster he alone was responsible of. Don't get me wrong, I truly admire Hannibal and consider him a better tactician than Alexander himself, but a commander has to have many more virtues and merits than just being able to marshal his armies on the field of battle.

[Macedon]

You inveterate bloody homoioi you...Intrigued you didn't suggest the arch imperialist Agesilaos.

Not me, but the humble citizens of Samos. Many do not know that the Samians made Lysander a God after he liberated them. They sang hymns and had festivals in his honor. Clearchus of Heraclea enjoyed the same treatment. The Thasians offered Agiselaos Godhood and he flat refused them!

Right! good job P.B.

As I said, for a Greek o become a God even in his lifetime was not unheard of. Was it morally acceptable? This is a different discussion.

[PMBardunias]

The Persian response - supplying a fleet to Conon and Pharnabazus, a trial run for Egypt - stopped the Spartan's trashing of their alliance obligations dead in the water.

As for alliance obligations, if Tissaphernes met his treaty obligations, the war would have ended before our extand version of Thucydides!

This was the point of my earlier post. Darius attempted the same tactic against Alexander. He ran a naval campaign against Alex's rear and funded military revolt in Crete and the Peloponessus (but for Demosthenes Athens too). Faced with a similar revolt, Agiselaos ran home at the height of his power in response to a summons from his people. Alexander appointed a subordinate to face the naval challenge and left Antipater with a scratch force to face the various revolts. It goes to show the difference in character between the men and their position within their states. Note, I am not saying which course of action was better. Clearly, the Spartans probably overreacted and sided with caution, while Alexander tossed the dice and relied on offense against the naval bases in Phoenicia to curb the naval threat. Alex was also well served by Antipater in a way that Hannibal was not by his subordinate generals when on their own- and if we consider Cleonymus as convincing Pyrrhus that Sparta would fall, him too.

As for marching as far as he wanted, he did not do that prior to his recall (alternately raiding and making treaties with either satrap - something the King put an abrupt end to) and the fate of the 10,000 is salutary.

He marched wherever he wished, plundering all the while. Had he been an unbalanced empire builder, he could have marched east or south and very little could have stopped him from "liberating" various Satraps or peoples- and liberating others from their money..

[Paralus]

Paralus wrote : But nothing near what his father faced. To use an Athenian comparison, Alexander succeeded Pericles whereas Philip found himself in the position of Conon post Aegespotami.

No, the challenges faced by Alexander were far more diverse than those faced by Philip. Philip might have organized a powerful Macedonian state and had he lived more, he might have done everything Alexander did and more. Yet, he died before being able to realize his Eastern campaign and so the comparison must be made accordingly.

And so in fifty-six words the work of Philip is consigned to an Alexandrian prologue of Justinian dimensions.

Comparisons, as is often said, are odious but one really wonders just what Alexander might have done if he were in Philip’s thoroughly unprepossessing position of 359. Philip died having achieved absolutely everything necessary for an Alexander to attempt what he did do.

When the great conqueror was being born his father was busy elsewhere dealing with a league that had used Macedon as a plaything; one whose territory was there to be taken piecemeal in return for the temporary support of the current monarch. Already he’d put an end to Bardyllis’ ambitions and the Paeonians’. All the while dealing with the “pretenders” supported by Thrace and Athens. His reign would see the constant development of the Macedonian forces – including the expansion of the “institution” of the hetairoi.

By the time Philip died he’d not only created the Macedonian State he’d established the Macedonian Empire in Europe. Greece was a lackey – legalistic comforts of Hellenic League aside – at the bidding of its master as subsequent events rammed home.

Alexander, no matter the achievement of his conquering, created little; certainly nothing like his father. For conquering is simply what he did: defeat the current regime and assume its position even whilst re-appointing its administrators so as to expedite more conquering.

How do you come to this conclusion? The most powerful state in Europe? Why not Carthage or Rome? Unchallenged on the battlefield? Why? Because Philip won at Cheronea?

Indeed because Philip won at Chaeronaea. Rome is not to be considered and Carthage is not, I’m afraid, in Europe. Macedon had trashed the best infantry available at Chaeronaea and was supreme. She was, as Philip walked into the theatre, unchallenged by any power.

Alexander and Antipater also had to fight against European opponents, so there were forces who doubted the Macedonian military might.

Alexander had to settle those who “were meditating a change of policy” in the north before he left. This was due, naturally, to the succession. What occasioned the Illyrians (and the unrest in Greece) was the “pothos” that Arrian says seized Alexander to cross the Danube – for no strategic purpose – and gut the Getae. Why? Because they’d collected at the river in case he attempted to cross. Others, later, would learn this was simply an invitation. They were there and, funnily enough, so were Alexander’s ships that had come up the Danube. So Alexander emboldened enemies to the south with an unnecessary excursus into the lands of the Getae because of his “pothos” (cf certain Indian tribes and the Arabs mentioned in earlier posts).

Antipater is, I’m afraid, an entirely different matter. With Greece “seething” Alexander continued to drain Macedon of its manpower for his eastern campaign. Amyntas had just left with yet another draft of Macedonian troops, mercenaries, et al when Memnon, seemingly, poked a Thracian ants’ nest too hard and rebellion was in the air. Whilst the Old Rope sorted this the Peloponnesians took their planned chance. Antipater was not in anything like the position of Philip at Chaeronaea and to compare it is to compare apples and oranges. By the time we get to Lamia that is apples and pits.

Of course he was at the battles and of course he led his army. But, he is not attested, even in those passages, to fight at the head of the cavalry or fight hand to hand. He always is in full tactical control of the situation somewhere among the lines. His "leading"his army does not imply his rushing against an enemy. All this has nothing to do with the image of Alexander fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents, being the target of thrusts, storming walls, as we later hear in Asia...

The logic behind that is that, somehow, Alexander suddenly developed this “fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents, being the target of thrusts” as a result of landing in Asia. I’m afraid that’s plain nonsense.

In the quotes presented Alexander is, like his father, leading the hypaspists. One suspects he is hiding out back when he leads “the agema and the hypaspists” at the enemy. The notion that he has to somehow be on horseback at “the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents” to be heavily involved is a topos from the anabasis. Does one think he’s leading his infantry agema and the hypaspists on some parade drill? This is the king’s position on foot as much as in the ile basilikoi on horseback.

Claiming that this is different because it “has nothing to do with the image of Alexander fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents” is, I’m afraid, horse-s..hair-splitting.

There are only two opportunities for Alexander to “storm cities” in Greece before he heads to his appointment with “madness” in Asia: Pelium and Thebes. At the first he was absolutely outmanoeuvred and had to rethink matters totally. At the second he is described as waiting for Thebans – Philip’s to be sure – to come to their senses (the Macedonian army surrounds the city). When they do not Alexander is described as “presenting himself now in one place now in another” as the city is taken.

Phlilip had only sent a small expeditionary force to incite the Ionian cities into rebellion. This was not the force of Alexander crossing the Hellespont of which we have details. Alexander commenced his campaign 2 years after his father's death making all the tactical decisions himself. Was he influenced by his father? Of course he was,

That “small” force was some 10,000. It is doubtful – in the extreme to my mind – that Alexander changed anything greatly at all. The army he inherited – yes I know you dislike that but fact is, I’m afraid, fact – was his father’s and commanded by his nobility. Whilst Alexander could – and did – eliminate any and all threats to his regnal position, he could hardly do so within the army. Acclaimed, at Antipater’s instigation, he bought Parmenion and secured the loyalty of the current command. Suggestions that he made any major changes to an invasion underway (via the expeditionary advance force) and the Macedonian army should remain just that: suggestions. Alexander needed the support of the barons; he could ill afford to begin wholesale necking and replacement of same.

First of all there was no such thing as a "strategos" in the Macedonian army. There were many subordinate commanders who took part in the war councils and were trusted with various tasks and responsibilities. Parmenion was of course not Philip's "only general", nor was he Alexander's. And his son was one of Alexander's, not Philip's. You are trying to find parallels were there are none. What we are calling "Generals", as I already mentioned in my initial position is nothing more than "subordinate commanders". And of all these, of course Parmenion stood out for his ability, experience and loyalty. And among these able men, some were old guard (like Antigonus and Cleitus the Black) and others belonged to the Young Guard (Hephaesteon, Philotas or Perdiccas).

Semantics are of no interest: call them what you will. Alexander’s securing of the “non-general” Parmenion is plain (my reference was to Philip’s famous quote). Deprecate the position of the other “hegemones” as you will but Parmenion’s family had the gonads of the army plain and simple.

Philotas was older than Alexander and a syntrophos of Amyntas Perdikka. If there is any historicity to the story told by Plutarch, Alexander can have harboured little love for him. Subsequent events clearly support that lack of love. Alexander’s man? I think not. Hephaestion is irrelevant: he holds no position of any merit until he commands the agema of the hypaspists at Guagamela. Again, the bulk of the hegemones are, in no way, “Alexander’s men” until after 331 when they inexorably rise to the top. Rising at the expense of which house?

Alexander had to use and coordinate Agrianians, Paeonians, Thracians, Southern Greek infantry and cavalry. Actually the Macedonians in his army were only a minority (12.000 pezetairoi, some 2.000 etairoi and a number of light troops). Had Alexander any experience in commanding such non-homogenous armies? Maybe yes, maybe not. We know that Philip had Greek allies at Cheronea but their role in the battle is completely unknown.

And so we touch on that which has been ignored all this time: the poor attestation of Philip’s campaigns. You see we no longer possess the histories of period. We do not possess an Arrian for his time and so make do with an abridged Reader’s Digest of those histories via Diodorus.

Anyone who seriously conceives of 24,000 or more Macedonian infantry at Chaeronaea needs to seriously rethink matters. Philip is hardly to have denuded Macedon of infantry whilst he campaigned to the south. Taking a majority, he will also have taken those liable to make trouble: Illyrians, Thracians, Paeonians, etc just as his son did. He also made great use of mercenaries. Suggestions that the Agrianians were only used by Alexander are only that: the relationship described in Arrian clealr existed under Philip.

As for the southern Greek infantry (the “League” infantry), they were never trusted with front row seats it seems.

What we do know is that Alexander took these men and was able to competently marshal them all the way to India. And what does it really matter? Are you proposing that Alexander just sit back and enjoyed the ride up to Hydaspes? That this war machine operated on its own, just because half of it was well-oiled by Philip? I guess that there is little parthenogenesis in most army compositions.

*Thud* The sound of the ‘keeper’s gloves taking the cricket ball.