04-27-2007, 05:40 PM
Great stuff!
Forgive me if I repeat myself, not to mention by bout of prolixness, with all the upcoming jumbled information; I a pasted a lot of prior material of mine, and added some new stuff.
About Hannibal, Paul, I doubt he was a megolomaniac (comparitively); nothing in his conduct suggests any pathological behavior. His insistence that Carthage make peace after Zama is not the conduct of a fanatic, but a realist. He could have supervised a defence of the city and taken many, many Romans with him before Carthage would have inevitably fallen. In my opinion, Hannibal possessed no attributes of delusionary greatness, and I don't think he was obsessed with achieving things just for the sake of merely achieving them, like Alexander and Napoleon etc.
Rich, in my opinion, you are overlooking the intracies of Hannibal's situation, and that he had to make decisions in the exigencies of moments which allowed no deep reflection of sitting around. I think Paul just hit the nail on the head:
Polybius, whose account of the affair surrounding the fate of Saguntum is, seemingly, a little nebulous right at the juncture when he purports the issues of cause and effect and war-guilt, there is no reason to doubt it when he tells us Hannibal sent to Carthage for instructions (Book 3.15), and after Rome declared war, in which Carthage itself rejected Rome's ultimatum, there is no reason for anyone to think Hannibal was not justified in believing his state would support him (even if not with unanimity in the governing body), in what was the biggest conflict she would face.
Hannibal was not some condottiere like John Hawkwood or Albecht von Wallenstein; he was a general in the service of Carthage. A unique aspect of Carthage was separation of power between the governing body and its strategos (viz., in this case, Hannibal had a free hand and plenty of arbitrary power, but he couldn't impose war on his government, etc.).
Sure, if Hannibal had received more help from his allies in Pella, Carthage, Syracuse and/or Carthage itself, Rome likely would have succumbed to too much pressure. The shock waves that would have filtered through northern Italy upon Hasdrubal Barca's arrival in 215 B.C., or those in the south in response to a landing of a Macedonian army at Brundisium or Tarentum (probabaly never in the cards), would have been too much for Rome to overcome, as her allies would have wavered throughout Iberia and the southern (even northern, notbaly Etrurian and Umbrian communities) lands of Italy to the point which would have tipped the balance in Carthage's favor. But she probably would have won in the long run, even if temporarily defeated, and even if not until long after Hannibal's death. But I don't believe Hannibal was ever rash or assumed things foolishly. As Helmuth von Moltke the Elder stated,
[size=85:1a2uj0at]"No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is compelled...to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted."[/size]
Hannibal knew all too well that both friction and unfolding events could force alterations of his immediate plans to every scenario, but the only way Rome could be seriously weakened to ensure Carthage's prosperity was to strike at Italy and detach her from her main source of strength - her allies. He never wavered from that. What escapes much acknowledgement is that his strategy was working more than in a minor or 'annoying' capacity: in 209 B.C., twelve of the thirty Latin colonies were bled white, probably something fostering, and finally caused by Hannibal's destruction of a Roman army near Herdonea the year before. These were the Latin colonies - the largest and most important to Rome's war cause, with the most surrounding territory. They were strategically planted years before on important sites to supply Rome with money and men for war, among other administrative things. Let's be clear: these colonies had no interest for Hannibal's cause, but he came to Italy to enervate exactly this - Rome being deprived of her economic and manpower pool. The steadfast loyal eighteen are alleged to have stated they pick up the slack, but given their locations in the 'firing zones' (the recalcitrant twelve were located in the 'inner ring', aiding Rome more directly), this is unlikely. For one to state Hannibal 'underestimated' Rome's resolve will simply not do (IMHO, of course), albeit the results could supprt such a verdict. He beat them to a pulp like no other has done to another in history and ultimately lost (except for probably the Soviets in WWII). He either compelled them to fight him in battle, in which he knew he carried an advantage, or their people would suffer; if so, those people would forsake themselves from Roman hegemony, being they could not be sufficiently protected. This is where Fabius was not such a 'good guy', and Varro was. We'll discuss that assessment soon. Moreover, serious disaffection began to spread the following year in the north, among the allies in Umbria and Etruria (Livy, Book 27.9, 27.21, 27.24, and 28.10).
Following Livy from Book 22.58, the manner in which he addressed the Roman prisoners after Cannae, and the treaty with Philip V of Macedon (Polybius Book 7.9), Hannibal never envisaged the destruction of Rome, which seems, in retrospect, the only way Rome was not going to dominate the Mediterranean. Actually, according to Polybius, the treaty with Philip V does not mention the specificity of a Macedonian landing in Italy, nor a Carthaginian one in the Greek lands. It seems a Carthaginian fleet did arrive in Greek waters (Livy Book 27.30), but very late to help significantly. It seemed that Philip would hopefully benefit from Rome's preoccupation with Hannibal in Italy, thus giving him a free hand in Illyria, while Hannibal no doubt hoped that Roman forces would be diverted to Greece, thus dissipating Rome's naval strength which was guarding the sea approaches in Sicily and Italy. Rome simply had the reserves to meet the challenges. But what is not emphasized is that by 207 B.C., Philip had gained the edge in the Greek theater against the Roman-Aetolian-Pergamunian alliance. This sate, whose political institutions formed very strong bonds of nationhood, didn't come to dominate the Western World because she was even slightly passive.
Not just with her brusque rejection of Hannibal's embassy after Cannae, but indeed Rome's whole history suggested she would never negotiate (this is hindsight, of course), even from a seemingly inauspicious situation. As I wrote on another thread, I think Hannibal's subtleties were simply wasted on such a determined people. But he couldn't have known it until the huge test was applied. One issue, that 'Hannibal made Rome the imperial aggressor she became' is not tenable, IMHO; when war broke with him, they were a nascent international power (Sicily became the first province from which tribute was exacted, and her conduct over Sardinia exemplifies such 'bullying' policies). Moreover, why would Roman envoys be in Saguntum, yet with no subsequent material help afforded to Saguntum when hostilities blew?
The basic causes, as Polybius saw it, of the 2nd Punic War were the 'wrath' of the House of Barca, the unjustified seizure by Rome of Sardinia, and the confidence of Carthage to embark on war after Rome's warnings to Hannibal over Saguntum due to the threat he posed with his increasing buildup in the Iberian Peninsula, which was wrought efficaciously by the Barcine faction the past near two decades. Remember, it was Rome who declared war, or 'admonished' it, if you will.
I state that Rome's seizure of Sardinia was unjustified simply because at first she seemed to behave quite fairly (a somewhat ambiguous term under such circumstances); when the mutiny of 241-238 B.C. reached Sardinia, the Romans refused the mutineers' offer to hand over the island. The Senate also refused the submission of Utica (Polybius 1.83), also in revolt against Carthage, a little later. Appian tells us that Rome even used her good offices to bring an end to the Mercenary War, as she allowed Carthage to hire mercenaries in Italy (History of Sicily and the Islands 2.3). But when Carthage began to prepare for the re-subjugation of Sardinia, Rome took a turn and declared war, as she felt Sardinia too close to her western shores for a foreign power to have suzerainty over. That's understandable, but Carthage was in no position to fight in the wake of the Mercenary War. Polybius tells us that a second offer was accepted by Rome from the mutineers to offer the island to her, and by 238 B.C. Rome regarded control of the island necessary for the security of Italy (Polybius. But Carthage was also compelled to pay a further indemnity to restore peaceful relations, as Polybius told us in Book 1.88
However, Polybius seemed to feel that Rome's seizure of Sardinia was a cynical disregard for anything but her own interests (3.15), an attitude which clearly pervaded over to Iberia, though his narrative is a little loose. Remember, Polybius never quite achieved the objective style of Thucydides. Perhaps nobody ever has, but Thucydides did record a great conflict which was fought between people with more in common with each other (and who allied admirably with each other when faced with the greatest threat to Greece) than Rome and Carthage. At the risk of being guilty of 'picking and chossing' in favor of Hannibal, I feel Polybius must be questioned in asserting, Book 3.15,
[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts, as men are wont to do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion. How much better would it have been for him to demand from the Romans the restitution of Sardinia, and at the same time of the tribute which they had so unjustly exacted, availing themselves of the misfortunes of Carthage, and to threaten war in the event of refusal! But as it was, by keeping silent as to the real cause and by inventing a non-existing one about Saguntum, he gave the idea that he was entering on the war not only unsupported by reason but without justice on his side..."[/size]
Violent anger, Polybius? Hannibal always sought policy before any significant action, and this is where Appian can possibly, and rarely, be chosen over Polybius for veracity. Appian tells us that Hannibal demanded the Saguntines and his tribal allies (probably the Edetani and/or Sedetani, both of who lived near Saguntum) discuss their differences with each other (Roman History, Iberia Book 2.10). But Appian also tells thinks the hostility was a pretext for Hannibal to foment the war against Rome. But why would Hannibal wish for them to conciliate each other, if he indeed needed a pretext for going to war? What if they had came to terms amid discussions, even if Hannibal admonished his allies to not come to any agreement? Answer to the latter - no pretext would be extant anymore. On the other hand, however, Hannibal was a master of double-standards (especially of bluffing his enemies etc.), thus maybe he wanted to give the semblance of playing 'good politics', yet, indeed, furtively told his tribal friends to continue aggressive actions against the Saguntines.
Did Hannibal violate any treaty(ies) by taking Saguntum? Livy and Appian certainly think so, but their patriotic rhetoric has to be taken with caution, and in this case, an issue of causation and justification in the greatest war Rome ever fought, they seem to be wrong. They imply that Hannibal attacked a Saguntum, a 'free city', and that the city was north of the Ebro (Livy Book 21.2 and Appian Iberia 7), but a simple glance at the map belies this, and Polybius' silence that a clause that secured the 'freedom' of Saguntum from the Ebro covenant (a little different by definition than a formal treaty) should be more readily accepted, in my opinion, that such a clause never existed. I think by Livy's and Appian's time, it was realized that geography was against them and they were trying to justify Rome's actions with other reasons.
Actually, it's more than just implying: this is Appian's statement from his Roman History, Iberia,
[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...The Saguntines, a colony of the island of Zacynthus, who lived about midway between the Pyrenees and the river Iberus, and other Greeks who dwelt in the neighborhood of Emporia and other Spanish towns, having apprehensions for their safety, sent ambassadors to Rome..."[/size]
Livy also states the same thing (Book 21.7). But this is probably nothing more than a fable, due to the resemblance of the two colonies' names. Saguntum, which is now Sagunto, was almost cetainly a native settlement, though a Greek admixture was very possible, and they certainly had a commercial relationship with the Massiliotes (of modern Marseille). The coins of Saguntum bear the name Arseken (or Arse), which perhaps influenced Livy's claim that some of Saguntum's roots lay in the Latium colony of Ardea (Book 21.7).
Livy says Saguntum was exempt from the Ebro Covenant, Book 21.2,
[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...Owing to the marvellous tact he had shown in winning over the tribes and incorporating them into his dominions, the Romans had renewed the treaty with Hasdrubal. Under its terms, the River Ebro was to form the boundary between the two empires, and Saguntum, occupying an intermediate position between them, was to be a free city..."[/size]
As we know, the probable basic nature (we don't have details) of the agreement in c. 226 B.C. between the Senate and Hasdrubal 'the Handsome', Hamilcar's successor, basically, was that Hasdrubal agreed not to cross the Ebro for warlike purposes (Polybius 2.13). The Ebro is clearly a good 80 miles north of Saguntum, and neither Hasdrubal nor Hannibal ventured anywhere near the river before 218 B.C. Actually, Carthaginian activities never passed north of the Jucar, which lay a little south of Saguntum. One would think this is the river Rome should have imposed her boundary terms on Hasdrubal (depending what her actual interests at the time when the 'treaty' was drawn up), but the river mentioned in the accounts is clearly the Iber, and no other river over or under Saguntum carries a similar name, thus eliminating any excuses, even specious ones, for Rome.
Let's clear something up with regards whether Hannibal violated the treaty of Lutatius in 241 B.C., which stipulated that Rome's allies should be free from Carthaginian aggressive involvement, and vice versa, coupled with much indemnity. Saguntum was not on the list of Sicilian allies at the time, but Polybius tells us that the treaty included 'future' allies, specifically saying a clause providing for future allies was not needed. This is the type of thing that leaves open opportunity for much discord, but a 'careful' reading of Polybius shows he was not presenting Rome's case at the time, but what they claimed afterwards (Book 3.29). Carthage could easily argue that 'future allies' needed to be mentioned in 241 B.C., or at least sometime thereafter before an event, such as the Ebro/Saguntum contention, took place. Regardless, it doesn't significantly matter because the spirit of the Ebro covenant nullified anything the treaty of 241 B.C., as far as Carthaginian actions in Iberia were concerned, may or may have not stipulated. Think of a new contract drawn up; a prior one is now meaningless, in terms of legality.
So we can probably forget the treaty of Lutatius, as far as trying to claim Hannibal violated anything there, other than shrewdly maneuvering for war. Unfortunately, the Ebro covenant cannot be related chronologically to Rome's alliance with Saguntum with complete accuracy, and even its validity was questioned, as the Carthaginians claimed they never ratified it within the Suffete. It was an agreement between Hasdrubal and the Roman Senate. It was probably ratified in Rome, and they regarded it as legally binding on both parties. They may have a point here, as the Suffete didn't disavow Hasdrubal who made it, or Hannibal, who, according to the Romans, transgressed it. The one issue that should be understood is that the Ebro covenant, probably, and from Rome's perspective, was not so much that it imposed any serious restriction on Hasdrubal, but that the Carthaginians, by accepting it, recognized Rome's right to interfere in Iberia; this may be why Carthage later denied that it was valid on the grounds that their government didn't ratify it (Polybius 3.21). Some allege Hasdrubal had no choice to accept the covenant, as he was in the weaker position - a member of the conquered state from 15 years earlier. This is slightly credible, but the basic Carthaginian attitude could very well have been that the Ebro Covenant defined the spheres of influence between Rome and Carthage and, as they wouldn't cross north of the Ebro in arms, Rome could not interfere south of the Ebro. Most likely, Hasdrubal saw that Rome was tied up with real threats far away. But that wasn't specifically mentioned, and neither was Saguntum; Polybius makes no mention of Saguntum in his accounts of the covenant (Book 2.13, 3.6, 3.15 and 3.29), unless we include his claim that Hannibal violated the agreement by attacking Saguntum (Book 3.30). But when the covenant occured, he specifically tells us in Book 2.13,
"...Accordingly, after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts..."
This seems to create a problem with his comment that it was 'a good many years' before Hannibal's time that Saguntum entered into relations with Rome (Book 3.30). If so, Saguntum, an important ally with a vital strategic point, would surely have been mentioned and provided for. We also do not know the exact nature of this alliance. Was it a foedus (formal alliance) or merely a deditio in fidem (a throwing oneself upon the protection of) on the part of Saguntum? Polybius uses the term symmachia (alliance), and Livy describes the Saguntines as socii (allies). Whatever, it is safe to assume that an alliance did exist.
What is probable (forgive all the garrulousness; I feel compelled to emphasize that everything is conjectural) is that the Romans, facing Gallic and piracy troubles (in the Adriatic), were content to leave Hasdrubal free to extend his Iberian domain up to the Ebro. How this affected Rome's alliance to the Saguntines depends on when they actually formed an alliance. If the alliance was extant in time before the treaty with Hasdrubal, then, just like the treaty from 241 B.C., the alliance was annulled by the terms of this new agreement, assuming Livy and Appian are erroneous with their claims of Saguntum being mentioned, which I doubt it was, even though Polybius isn't free of errors, as he seems to contradict himself throughout his accounts, presumably in an inadvertent manner, with the location of the river, whether it was north or south of the Ebro.
Now, if the alliance with between Rome and Saguntum was formed after the covenant with Hasdrubal in c. 226 B.C., then she had no legal grounds to interfere in an area where she in effect recognized Carthaginian control, at least how Carthage saw it. Thus whichever time-frame is correct with the Saguntine/Roman alliance, Rome had no legal ground to restrain Hannibal from attacking Saguntum (assuming we follow Polybius). Whether or not Hannibal had been gearing for war as a child with Rome, he certainly was prepared in 218 B.C.
The Ebro Covenant may have been nothing more than 'polite' fiat (decree) handed down by the Romans, and because of the distance from Rome's 'serious' theaters at this time from Spain, they couldn't impose upon Hasdrubal this limit if he wanted to cause a fuss. the Ebro was far from Carthaginian activity and interests at the time, thus they probably figured he wouldn't object. It can be assumed, loosely, the Romans would not feel free to cross south of the Ebro in arms. But they may have had one eye on Spain for the future, and were going to stir up trouble more furtively. It should be considered that Rome must have known she was opening a bone of contention for the future by accepting Saguntum as a protectorate (or whatever form the alliance was); the city was situated right next to Carthage's sphere of domination.
The 2nd Punic War was testament of Rome's great quality of a martial state. But they could have been fiddling around in Saguntum with the prime task of undermining Punic power in Iberia, and eventually driving them out. If so, it worked, but Hannibal delayed things for along time. But perhaps at first Rome was merely considering the interests of their friends in Massilia; it was them that had a reason to safeguard the self-governing position of Saguntum: we don't have any direct evidence, but they had established colonies along the east coast of Spain, such as Rhode and Emporium (Rosas and Ampurias). But they had also established settlements much further south, at Hemeroskopeion (modern Denia) and Akra Leuke (modern Alicante) - both which were located between Saguntum and New Carthage, along the modern Cosat Blanca. It can be assumed that these colonies of Massilia had by Hannibal's time fallen under Punic domination, thus the Massiliotes' trade was undermined and they had a griveance with Carthage. Maybe they had a significant hand in helping Rome dig her claws into the Iberian Peninsula.If so, they would not have been wholly unjustified, as their other footholds were threatened by Carthaginian hegemony.
Hannibal doubtless carried a strong enmity for Rome, and he was determined to fight in Italy to break her growing empire, but we shouldn't believe Roman historiography that he was a pathological fanatic. None of his actions support any claim he carried an 'inveterate' hatred (Polybius 3.86) of them. To reiterate, the story of Hannibal's 'oath' may be apocryphal, like possibly so many good stories, such as Maharbal's exhortation after Cannae, Hannibal's famous meeting with Scipio in Ephesus in c. 190 B.C. A boy does not necessarily carry childhood vows into adult life, especially when the man in question insisted Carthage make peace after Zama (Polybius 15.19); this hardly suggests a fanatic, and the 'oath' story 'Hannibal critics of his jump on was told by Hannibal himself to Antiochus III (Polybius Book 3.11-12), in the context of trying convince the King of Syria of his undying hatred of Rome, to procure the Syrian king's material help to attack Italy again. It clearly worked, as far as gaining Antiochus III's trust (though Rome got to the Near East before Italy could ever be invaded again). The words are worth putting up,
"...Of the fact that Hamilcar, although he died ten years before the beginning of the Second Punic War, contributed much to its origin many evidences can be found; but the anecdote I am about to relate suffices, I think, to confirm this. At the time when Hannibal on his final defeat by the Romans had left his native land and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, who saw through the project of the Aetolians, sent an embassy to Antiochus, wishing to be fully aware what the king's purpose was. The legates, as they saw that Antiochus was lending an ear to the Aetolians and was disposed to go to war with Rome, paid many attentions to Hannibal, wishing to make Antiochus suspicious of him, as in fact they succeeded in doing. For as time went on, the king's mistrust of Hannibal grew ever more strong; and it fell out on one occasion that they came to have a talk about the alienation which had been secretly growing up between them. In the course of the conversation Hannibal defended himself on various grounds, and at length, being at a loss for further arguments, resorted to the following. He said that at the time when his father was about to start with his army on his expedition to Spain, he himself, then nine years of age, was standing by the altar, while Hamilcar was sacrificing to Zeus. When, on the omens being favourable, Hamilcar had poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites, he ordered the others who were attending the sacrifice to withdraw to a slight distance and calling Hannibal to him asked him kindly if he wished to accompany him on the expedition. On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans. He begged Antiochus, then, now he knew this for a fact, as long as his intentions were hostile to Rome, to rely on him confidently and believe that he would have in him his sincerest supporter, but from the moment he made peace and alliance with her he had no need to wait for accusations but should mistrust and beware of him; for there was nothing he would not do against the Romans. Antiochus, listening to this, thought he spoke genuinely and sincerely and in consequence abandoned all his former mistrust..."
Saguntum was attacked after warnings for them to stop molesting local tribes friendly to Hannibal. One could ask why would they risk war with Hannibal over a territorial dispute, who had just 'cleared the decks' in Iberia for a possible war with Rome, but they could very well have assumed Rome would protect them. Moreover, it seems likely Roman agents were stirring up the pro-Roman faction in the city, and we do know many leading pro-Carthaginians were executed (Polybius 3.15), and the Saguntines refused Hannibal's wish for them to state their case regarding the quarrel with the local tribes in question (again, probably the Edetani or Sedatani), if we can sustain Appian (History of Spain 2.10). Polybius tells us the executed leaders in Saguntun were 'leading citizens', but it's a safe assumption they were Carthaginian apologists, or against Rome's involvement.
Hannibal's actions in Iberia do not necessarily confirm any notions of 'calculated' and personal revenge against Rome. However, by staying clear of Roman attention, perhaps, his campaigns, in part, could have reflected a 'clearing of the decks' to commit to war with Rome, but I feel this scenario is less likely. What is certain is that war with Rome, again, was a strong possibility (nothing is ever 'inevitable'), and the Barcids would simply be ready this time (after all, it was a painful dose of reality how Rome endured once both sides reached breaking points of exhaustion), which does indeed mean that the 'Barcid Empire' involved enhancing Carthaginian military might. John Rich is correct, IMHO, that this would only be necessary 'unless with a view to a possible renewal of the war with Rome', in his fine article titled The Origins of the Second Punic War (p. 18 of the book The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, pp. 1-37 comprises the whole article). However, Rich's concludes with Polybius that Hannibal and his father had always hoped for a second chance against Rome, and I feel Rich is a little more eloquent than convincing. The Barcids were soldiers, thus they were hardly appalled to war, but the 'wrath of Hannibal' - in terms of a pathological hatred which drove Hannibal's every thought - is almost surely belongs to a later Roman tradition to justify their errors at the time (c. 220-218 B.C.), most notably in geography!
An integral element of the strategy which Hannibal unleashed depended on the Celts of the Po Valley, and this was not feasible before 225 B.C. Hannibal's campaigning of 221-220 B.C., which included a staggering victory over a confederated tribal army of some 100,000 men (perhaps an exaggerated number from Polybius) on the Tagus River in central Spain, may have been getting his Iberian house in order for war with Rome, but could just as likely been the continuation of the empire-building begun by his father and brother-in-law. Hannibal, like Hasdrubal didn't go anywhere near the Ebro from his succession to the declaration of war by Rome in 218 B.C. (or acceptance of war by Carthage). Hannibal was not his father; he never committed any alleged actions of terrible cruelty which were gratuitous. What Marcus Marcellus did the people of Casilinum upon their surrender (Livy Book 24.19), after which Fabius reputedly agreed with them that their lives were to be spared if they left the city (Marcellus cut them down when they did), what Nero did to the body of Hasdrubal Barca or Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' exceeds anything Hannibal did in terms of 'cruelty' or 'treachery' beyond the 'reasonable' measures of war. I am in total agreement with Marshal's previous assessment of the standards of the times.
That Hannibal killed Italians who refused to continue with him to Africa, or that he slaughtered deserters of Syphax' once in Africa army comes from Livy, Appian and Diodorus, but not mentioned by Polybius. In this period we lose Polybius again, but from the others such serious charges should still be treated with critical caution. He garrisoned the few towns still holding out in Bruttium, and killing many of his soldiers now showing refusal to go with him, would have been very impolitic; his Bruttians would surely not agree to do such a thing, and there is no mention that they specifically were forsaking him to join Rome. Secondly, there was still hope of ultimate victory, albeit a very slim hope by this time. He was in desperate need of horsemen once in Africa. Maybe he did kill deserters and took their horses, but the fact he was provided with riders from Tychaeus and Mazaetullus (Vermina, Syphax' son, didn't come to Carthage's aid until after Zama), some 3,000 of them, and the fact he only had, at most, 4,000 total cavalry at Zama, means he was clealry depleted of both riders and horses.
Moreover, Polybius says, Book 3.33,
"...Hannibal, who was wintering in New Carthage, in the first place dismissed the Iberians to their own cities hoping thus to make them readily disposed to help in the future; next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent; in the third place he took precautions for the security of Africa, adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Africa to Spain, and vice versa, binding by this measure the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty..."
Taking these words at face value, Hannibal was a sober calculator and planner, and he possibly had not made completely up his mind about an invasion of Italy until after the Roman declaration of war, though we can guess that was the most suitable option under the augmenting conditions. But maybe not; I'll get to the other option.
Anyway, Rich, he probably arrived in Africa in 203 B.C., with some 15,000 men at most (no horses could be transported), of which only a handful were his 'Old Guard'. To throw out a number, they may have numbered some 4,000. They clearly formed the front ranks of his third line at Zama, as Polybius states they levelled their spears to prevent fugitives from the first two defeated lines to enter from the front, indicating they were indeed his African spearmen (not pikes).
Hannibal did offer terms to the Saguntines. This from Livy Book 21.12,
"...The conditions were that restitution should be made to the Turdetani, all the gold and silver should be delivered up, and the inhabitants should depart with one garment each and take up their abode wherever the Carthaginians should order them. As Alco insisted that the Saguntines would not accept peace on these terms..."
Hannibal horribly sacked Turin upon descending into the Po Valley, and slaughtered the inhabitants only after they rejected his appeals; this is ghastly, but not gratuitous, as their elimination would serve a larger startegic end. The Gallic tribes of the Upper Po didn't hesitate to join his alliance after the destruction, along with her people, of Turin, as the act was one of effective terror, as well as the securing of his rear from interference as he advanced. Why should the Saguntines be offered clemency to men who, in desperation, either fought to the death or set fire to their homes and burned themselves alive, along with their wives and children? Sure, Hannibal's terms probably meant slavery, but their actions do not merit leniency, he probably concluded. They were killing themselves anyway. There are many other examples, but as Theodor Mommsen tells us in his History of Rome, Book 3, Ch. 4,
"...the Romans charged him with cruelty, the Carthaginians with covetousness; and it is true that he hated as only Oriental natures know how to hate, and that a general who never fell short of money and stores can hardly have been other than covetous. But though anger and envy and meanness have written his history, they have not been able to mar the pure and noble image which it presents. Laying aside wretched inventions which furnish their own refutation, and some things which his lieutenants, particularly Hannibal Monomachus and Mago the Samnite, were guilty of doing in his name, nothing occurs in the accounts regarding him which may not be justified under the circumstances, and according to the international law, of the times; and all agree in this, that he combined in rare perfection discretion and enthusiasm, caution and energy. He was peculiarly marked by that inventive craftiness,..."
Why should he have backed down to Roman demands with Saguntum? The Romans surely would have interfered further into Iberia, as all her actions before and after suggest. Hannibal's reaction probably does not have anything to do with a notion of 'revenge', but merely to his position being threatened by Rome. Why should he tolerate this? Why should Carthage tolerate it? Saguntum had appealed to Rome, and if he kowtowed to their demands, what next, once word got out he was acquiescing to Roman demands, something Carthage had done before? New Carthage's appeal to Rome? Gades? Utica? It is very ironic with regards to the attitude of the Romans and Carthaginians; it seems the Romans were somewhat the imperialistic bullies, but the Carthaginians, not a martial people, but traders and middlemen, exacted heavier tribute from her subjects, treating them somewhat like cash cows out to pasture. Hannibal's 'aggression' at the onset of the 2nd Punic War was a superb example of attack is the best form of defence. In the long run, a defensive war would be ruinous, given Rome's manpower reserves and resources; even a drawn war would not weaken Rome's power. The only way to overcome Rome was to cut her away from those resources, which included the manpower from her allies, and this entailed fighting in Italy. In Hannibal's eyes, Carthage's very survival was at stake, and in this he proved to be all too correct. War is the ultimate test, the terrible event in which one risks all against fates. Hannibal was too complex an individual to be understood from a single incident that occured when he was a little boy; his war with Rome had even much deeper roots.
Capua and Tarentum were won over because of the politic attitude displayed to many of their citizens, as well as to those throughout Italy, who fought at Trasimene and Cannae, and it was the Romans who were displaying a gratuitous level of cruelty. These incidents were where his stratey was bearing fruit. Hannibal was bred for war, and cruelty and war are inseparable. From personal avarice he is certainly free. I hope nobody puts much stock in what Massinissa claimed, according to Polybius. Hannibal never used money for personal ends, and he was very much a tribal chieftain in the sense that he learned form his father how to gain the loyalty of mercenary troops, as well as others who a made up his polyglot army. But his manner of command was truly unique, not only impressed upon him by his father's tenacity and cruel discipline, but also the patient, reasonable and cautionary level of self-controlled diplomacy exhibited by Hasdrubal, his older brother-in-law. As for charges layed upon him of 'cruelty', he was a general who had to make war pay for itself - to feed, clothe, and provide for his army, of which the prospect of booty was a major incentive for an army largely composed of mercenaries. How could he show any scruples, when opposed by the indigenous peoples, when his army had to be sustained in a foreign land, with but only scanty quantities of supplies to be expected (at least at in the first years). He knew full well, once in Italy beyond the Po Valley, he couldn't be substantially be re-supplied or re-enforced. Part of his grand strategy was to fight Rome with her own resources against her. His entire plight was a huge gamble, and he nearly pulled it off. But staying in Spain would have been a more foolish option. Brian Caven's assessment that that would have been wiser is convicingly countered by professor J. F. Lazenby.
Hannibal knew the Romans were resilient and carried a fight-to-the-death attitude, but we must excuse him for thinking even they had a breaking point; immediately after Cannae, as Adrian Goldsworthy put in a certain perspective, they were beaten but didn't have the sense to realize it. We can also admire Rome for her indomitableness, but at the time her decision to not even come to the table with Hannibal was more obstinate than any decision he ever made; nobody could have predicted that supreme moments of the upcoming war; the Carthaginians' egregious failure in not ridding Spain of the beleaguered 9,000 or so Roman legionnaires holding the Ebro line was paramount; Catalonia would invaluably serve as a base of operations for the crucial upcoming campaign. Bomilcar not even attempting to fight the Romans, who had a smaller fleet off Cape Pachynon (SE tip of Sicily) was abysmal. The issue with Muttines would never have happened in the Roman (or Mongol) chain of command, at least in the mid-Republic. The Romans barely broke a sweat in successfuly (and prudently) playing the Greeks off each other, thanks largely to the Anatolians. Hannibal cannot be blamed for assuming Philip V could have diverted Rome's forces at least a little more than the miniscule degree he did.
But perhaps Hannibal was decided about invading Italy before he took Saguntum. Alliances have not, throughout history, ever been unyielding, and treaties have always left room for discord if the parties at a later date, in this case, a couple of decades, are in the mood. In Iberia, for example, plenty of allies of both Rome and Carthage forsook one or the other when one side seemed to gain the intiative. This is why the Scipio brothers' expedition into the Iberian interior ended in disaster. I guess it just comes down to how people, including us here on RAT in the 21st century, interpret things. They have always been questioned with time, and some have always thought treaties were sanctioned by time, as the political climate changes etc. Thus the statute of limitations within our laws (I know - it does not apply to everything). The fact that Roman annalists committed the topographical errors regarding the proximity of the Ebro River, and the fact they never lifted a finger to help Saguntum once the city came under siege does not favor their justifications, and, possibly, Hannibal called what was merely a bluff on their part. They had issues to attend to in Illyria and Cisalpine Gaul, but Polybius' figures concerning Roman resources in 225 B.C. suggest they could have spared ships and troops to help the Saguntines.
My view is that the legal technicalities are too loose to define with certainty as to whether Rome or Carthage, under the actions of Hannibal, was morally responsible for the war's outbreak. The Roman claims to justifiably intervene on Saguntum's behalf do not seem substantial, but Hannibal's attack upon the city was unjust unless the Saguntunes were indeed guilty of aggression against his allies. Unfortunately, this is something we cannot answer 2,226 years later, at least as to who was the aggressor. But the legal aspects of this question probably concern Carthage and Saguntum more than Carthage and Rome. There are two important questions:
1) Why did Hannibal discard the Roman ultimatum surrounding Saguntum?
2) Why did the Romans make such an issue over Saguntum?
The 1st question is easier to assess. If Hannibal had backed down to Roman demands, there is little doubt that Roman interference in the Punic sphere of influence on the Peninsula would not end there; this would have merely been the thin edge of the wedge, and Roman meddling into Spain would open any Iberian community which simply didn't favor Carthaginian suzerainty (a situation which Hannibal was hoping to effectuate in Italy against Roman suzerainty). If the Roman challenge, though very dangerous, was not taken up it would not only do irreparable damage to Punic prestige among the Iberians who did favor their authority, an authority skillfuly assimilated by Hasdrubal, but also, in one swift blow, ruin 20 years of work, which began with Hamilcar, which necessitated Carthage's revitalization after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. Hannibal's attitude is understandable even if his preparations for war with Rome were not shaped by a war of revenge.
The 2nd question is not as clear (in my view). Carthaginian activity in Iberia didn't threaten Roman interests at the time (unless one wants to count her interests as digging their claws in a land for imperialistic objectives for the future), let alone her security. The envoys sent to ask Hamilcar about his intentions seemed content of his 'expalnation', that his build-up was primarily to swiften the payments of the war indemnity from the 1st Punic War. There is nothing to suggest that Saguntum refused to acknowledge Punic hegemony upon Hasdrubal's accession. Their allaince with Rome was no doubt influenced from the mutual friendship between them and Rome with the Massiliotes. Though Rome did not help Saguntum, she did in 211 B.C., when in a better position to do something, restored the survivors from Hannibal's siege to the city, and punished those tribes in question with whom they had originally quarreled (Livy 24.42). The most powerful factor in Roman eyes may be that, as an imperially minded state, she wanted to become embroiled in Iberia. The poor people of Saguntum simply got caught in the crossfire
Hannibal certainly orchestrated, in a shrewd manner, things to incur Rome's ire. He knew war was very likely, and recognized the folly of leaving Saguntum astride his rear lines, that he planned to carry the war into Italy. This supports one case that he did indeed decide to attack Italy before Rome declared war. By Rome's declaring war, he would now be justified in crossing the Ebro and attacking their lands. The Roman bluff over Saguntum, if that's what it was, was not completely unreasonable. They never thought the impending war could be fought on Italian soil, and they perhaps figured that the succession in 221 B.C. of a new, young general seemed a suitable moment to apply pressure to the Carthgainians (much like perhaps the Greeks' attitude following Alexander's succession), whose new found prosperity in Iberia certainly merited some concern, if not a direct threat. If so, and though they couldn't have foreseen what was to happen, they couldn't have made a bigger mistake. But they stood firm in the long run.
From probably May to November, 219 B.C., the Saguntines withstood a ferocious siege, but finally fell to Hannibal. In his famous (but turgid) epic poem of the 2nd Punic War, Silius Italicus states the Roman declaration of war came before Saguntum fell (Punica, Book 2. 391); Italicus drew from Livy and Virgil, the former for historical research, the latter for a poetic model.
Now, with all that pro-Hannibalic opining, it should be understood that no man is infallible, and just because something 'favors' Hannibal from pro-Roman writers, doesn't necessarily mean it is so, from the logic of why would they say something in his favor; and just because something is pro-Roman from our original sources, doesn't unilaterally and automatically mean it is colored or even outright false. We have to look at each situation and decide what may mean what, and read betwen the lines. We'll never come to incontrovertible conclusions.
There's plenty more to cover!
Thanks, James
Forgive me if I repeat myself, not to mention by bout of prolixness, with all the upcoming jumbled information; I a pasted a lot of prior material of mine, and added some new stuff.
About Hannibal, Paul, I doubt he was a megolomaniac (comparitively); nothing in his conduct suggests any pathological behavior. His insistence that Carthage make peace after Zama is not the conduct of a fanatic, but a realist. He could have supervised a defence of the city and taken many, many Romans with him before Carthage would have inevitably fallen. In my opinion, Hannibal possessed no attributes of delusionary greatness, and I don't think he was obsessed with achieving things just for the sake of merely achieving them, like Alexander and Napoleon etc.
Rich, in my opinion, you are overlooking the intracies of Hannibal's situation, and that he had to make decisions in the exigencies of moments which allowed no deep reflection of sitting around. I think Paul just hit the nail on the head:
Quote:What you say here still depends on the underlying assumption that Hannibal's decision to go to war was unnecessary. My contention is that, if we look at the course of the Punic Wars and the history of Rome's rise to dominance in Italy, it is apparent that there are only two ways to deal with Rome; destroy her or be destroyed by her...True, but that wasn't as evident until much later, when Carthage could not make war outside of its walls, and thus could be physically destroyed. Hannibal certainly knew they were as resilient as anyone, but he wasn't foolish to assume they could easily be broken. Gosh, there's so much about Hannibal we could go over. How about I go over the beginning, In Spain, for now?
Polybius, whose account of the affair surrounding the fate of Saguntum is, seemingly, a little nebulous right at the juncture when he purports the issues of cause and effect and war-guilt, there is no reason to doubt it when he tells us Hannibal sent to Carthage for instructions (Book 3.15), and after Rome declared war, in which Carthage itself rejected Rome's ultimatum, there is no reason for anyone to think Hannibal was not justified in believing his state would support him (even if not with unanimity in the governing body), in what was the biggest conflict she would face.
Hannibal was not some condottiere like John Hawkwood or Albecht von Wallenstein; he was a general in the service of Carthage. A unique aspect of Carthage was separation of power between the governing body and its strategos (viz., in this case, Hannibal had a free hand and plenty of arbitrary power, but he couldn't impose war on his government, etc.).
Sure, if Hannibal had received more help from his allies in Pella, Carthage, Syracuse and/or Carthage itself, Rome likely would have succumbed to too much pressure. The shock waves that would have filtered through northern Italy upon Hasdrubal Barca's arrival in 215 B.C., or those in the south in response to a landing of a Macedonian army at Brundisium or Tarentum (probabaly never in the cards), would have been too much for Rome to overcome, as her allies would have wavered throughout Iberia and the southern (even northern, notbaly Etrurian and Umbrian communities) lands of Italy to the point which would have tipped the balance in Carthage's favor. But she probably would have won in the long run, even if temporarily defeated, and even if not until long after Hannibal's death. But I don't believe Hannibal was ever rash or assumed things foolishly. As Helmuth von Moltke the Elder stated,
[size=85:1a2uj0at]"No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is compelled...to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted."[/size]
Hannibal knew all too well that both friction and unfolding events could force alterations of his immediate plans to every scenario, but the only way Rome could be seriously weakened to ensure Carthage's prosperity was to strike at Italy and detach her from her main source of strength - her allies. He never wavered from that. What escapes much acknowledgement is that his strategy was working more than in a minor or 'annoying' capacity: in 209 B.C., twelve of the thirty Latin colonies were bled white, probably something fostering, and finally caused by Hannibal's destruction of a Roman army near Herdonea the year before. These were the Latin colonies - the largest and most important to Rome's war cause, with the most surrounding territory. They were strategically planted years before on important sites to supply Rome with money and men for war, among other administrative things. Let's be clear: these colonies had no interest for Hannibal's cause, but he came to Italy to enervate exactly this - Rome being deprived of her economic and manpower pool. The steadfast loyal eighteen are alleged to have stated they pick up the slack, but given their locations in the 'firing zones' (the recalcitrant twelve were located in the 'inner ring', aiding Rome more directly), this is unlikely. For one to state Hannibal 'underestimated' Rome's resolve will simply not do (IMHO, of course), albeit the results could supprt such a verdict. He beat them to a pulp like no other has done to another in history and ultimately lost (except for probably the Soviets in WWII). He either compelled them to fight him in battle, in which he knew he carried an advantage, or their people would suffer; if so, those people would forsake themselves from Roman hegemony, being they could not be sufficiently protected. This is where Fabius was not such a 'good guy', and Varro was. We'll discuss that assessment soon. Moreover, serious disaffection began to spread the following year in the north, among the allies in Umbria and Etruria (Livy, Book 27.9, 27.21, 27.24, and 28.10).
Following Livy from Book 22.58, the manner in which he addressed the Roman prisoners after Cannae, and the treaty with Philip V of Macedon (Polybius Book 7.9), Hannibal never envisaged the destruction of Rome, which seems, in retrospect, the only way Rome was not going to dominate the Mediterranean. Actually, according to Polybius, the treaty with Philip V does not mention the specificity of a Macedonian landing in Italy, nor a Carthaginian one in the Greek lands. It seems a Carthaginian fleet did arrive in Greek waters (Livy Book 27.30), but very late to help significantly. It seemed that Philip would hopefully benefit from Rome's preoccupation with Hannibal in Italy, thus giving him a free hand in Illyria, while Hannibal no doubt hoped that Roman forces would be diverted to Greece, thus dissipating Rome's naval strength which was guarding the sea approaches in Sicily and Italy. Rome simply had the reserves to meet the challenges. But what is not emphasized is that by 207 B.C., Philip had gained the edge in the Greek theater against the Roman-Aetolian-Pergamunian alliance. This sate, whose political institutions formed very strong bonds of nationhood, didn't come to dominate the Western World because she was even slightly passive.
Not just with her brusque rejection of Hannibal's embassy after Cannae, but indeed Rome's whole history suggested she would never negotiate (this is hindsight, of course), even from a seemingly inauspicious situation. As I wrote on another thread, I think Hannibal's subtleties were simply wasted on such a determined people. But he couldn't have known it until the huge test was applied. One issue, that 'Hannibal made Rome the imperial aggressor she became' is not tenable, IMHO; when war broke with him, they were a nascent international power (Sicily became the first province from which tribute was exacted, and her conduct over Sardinia exemplifies such 'bullying' policies). Moreover, why would Roman envoys be in Saguntum, yet with no subsequent material help afforded to Saguntum when hostilities blew?
The basic causes, as Polybius saw it, of the 2nd Punic War were the 'wrath' of the House of Barca, the unjustified seizure by Rome of Sardinia, and the confidence of Carthage to embark on war after Rome's warnings to Hannibal over Saguntum due to the threat he posed with his increasing buildup in the Iberian Peninsula, which was wrought efficaciously by the Barcine faction the past near two decades. Remember, it was Rome who declared war, or 'admonished' it, if you will.
I state that Rome's seizure of Sardinia was unjustified simply because at first she seemed to behave quite fairly (a somewhat ambiguous term under such circumstances); when the mutiny of 241-238 B.C. reached Sardinia, the Romans refused the mutineers' offer to hand over the island. The Senate also refused the submission of Utica (Polybius 1.83), also in revolt against Carthage, a little later. Appian tells us that Rome even used her good offices to bring an end to the Mercenary War, as she allowed Carthage to hire mercenaries in Italy (History of Sicily and the Islands 2.3). But when Carthage began to prepare for the re-subjugation of Sardinia, Rome took a turn and declared war, as she felt Sardinia too close to her western shores for a foreign power to have suzerainty over. That's understandable, but Carthage was in no position to fight in the wake of the Mercenary War. Polybius tells us that a second offer was accepted by Rome from the mutineers to offer the island to her, and by 238 B.C. Rome regarded control of the island necessary for the security of Italy (Polybius. But Carthage was also compelled to pay a further indemnity to restore peaceful relations, as Polybius told us in Book 1.88
However, Polybius seemed to feel that Rome's seizure of Sardinia was a cynical disregard for anything but her own interests (3.15), an attitude which clearly pervaded over to Iberia, though his narrative is a little loose. Remember, Polybius never quite achieved the objective style of Thucydides. Perhaps nobody ever has, but Thucydides did record a great conflict which was fought between people with more in common with each other (and who allied admirably with each other when faced with the greatest threat to Greece) than Rome and Carthage. At the risk of being guilty of 'picking and chossing' in favor of Hannibal, I feel Polybius must be questioned in asserting, Book 3.15,
[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts, as men are wont to do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion. How much better would it have been for him to demand from the Romans the restitution of Sardinia, and at the same time of the tribute which they had so unjustly exacted, availing themselves of the misfortunes of Carthage, and to threaten war in the event of refusal! But as it was, by keeping silent as to the real cause and by inventing a non-existing one about Saguntum, he gave the idea that he was entering on the war not only unsupported by reason but without justice on his side..."[/size]
Violent anger, Polybius? Hannibal always sought policy before any significant action, and this is where Appian can possibly, and rarely, be chosen over Polybius for veracity. Appian tells us that Hannibal demanded the Saguntines and his tribal allies (probably the Edetani and/or Sedetani, both of who lived near Saguntum) discuss their differences with each other (Roman History, Iberia Book 2.10). But Appian also tells thinks the hostility was a pretext for Hannibal to foment the war against Rome. But why would Hannibal wish for them to conciliate each other, if he indeed needed a pretext for going to war? What if they had came to terms amid discussions, even if Hannibal admonished his allies to not come to any agreement? Answer to the latter - no pretext would be extant anymore. On the other hand, however, Hannibal was a master of double-standards (especially of bluffing his enemies etc.), thus maybe he wanted to give the semblance of playing 'good politics', yet, indeed, furtively told his tribal friends to continue aggressive actions against the Saguntines.
Did Hannibal violate any treaty(ies) by taking Saguntum? Livy and Appian certainly think so, but their patriotic rhetoric has to be taken with caution, and in this case, an issue of causation and justification in the greatest war Rome ever fought, they seem to be wrong. They imply that Hannibal attacked a Saguntum, a 'free city', and that the city was north of the Ebro (Livy Book 21.2 and Appian Iberia 7), but a simple glance at the map belies this, and Polybius' silence that a clause that secured the 'freedom' of Saguntum from the Ebro covenant (a little different by definition than a formal treaty) should be more readily accepted, in my opinion, that such a clause never existed. I think by Livy's and Appian's time, it was realized that geography was against them and they were trying to justify Rome's actions with other reasons.
Actually, it's more than just implying: this is Appian's statement from his Roman History, Iberia,
[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...The Saguntines, a colony of the island of Zacynthus, who lived about midway between the Pyrenees and the river Iberus, and other Greeks who dwelt in the neighborhood of Emporia and other Spanish towns, having apprehensions for their safety, sent ambassadors to Rome..."[/size]
Livy also states the same thing (Book 21.7). But this is probably nothing more than a fable, due to the resemblance of the two colonies' names. Saguntum, which is now Sagunto, was almost cetainly a native settlement, though a Greek admixture was very possible, and they certainly had a commercial relationship with the Massiliotes (of modern Marseille). The coins of Saguntum bear the name Arseken (or Arse), which perhaps influenced Livy's claim that some of Saguntum's roots lay in the Latium colony of Ardea (Book 21.7).
Livy says Saguntum was exempt from the Ebro Covenant, Book 21.2,
[size=85:1a2uj0at]"...Owing to the marvellous tact he had shown in winning over the tribes and incorporating them into his dominions, the Romans had renewed the treaty with Hasdrubal. Under its terms, the River Ebro was to form the boundary between the two empires, and Saguntum, occupying an intermediate position between them, was to be a free city..."[/size]
As we know, the probable basic nature (we don't have details) of the agreement in c. 226 B.C. between the Senate and Hasdrubal 'the Handsome', Hamilcar's successor, basically, was that Hasdrubal agreed not to cross the Ebro for warlike purposes (Polybius 2.13). The Ebro is clearly a good 80 miles north of Saguntum, and neither Hasdrubal nor Hannibal ventured anywhere near the river before 218 B.C. Actually, Carthaginian activities never passed north of the Jucar, which lay a little south of Saguntum. One would think this is the river Rome should have imposed her boundary terms on Hasdrubal (depending what her actual interests at the time when the 'treaty' was drawn up), but the river mentioned in the accounts is clearly the Iber, and no other river over or under Saguntum carries a similar name, thus eliminating any excuses, even specious ones, for Rome.
Let's clear something up with regards whether Hannibal violated the treaty of Lutatius in 241 B.C., which stipulated that Rome's allies should be free from Carthaginian aggressive involvement, and vice versa, coupled with much indemnity. Saguntum was not on the list of Sicilian allies at the time, but Polybius tells us that the treaty included 'future' allies, specifically saying a clause providing for future allies was not needed. This is the type of thing that leaves open opportunity for much discord, but a 'careful' reading of Polybius shows he was not presenting Rome's case at the time, but what they claimed afterwards (Book 3.29). Carthage could easily argue that 'future allies' needed to be mentioned in 241 B.C., or at least sometime thereafter before an event, such as the Ebro/Saguntum contention, took place. Regardless, it doesn't significantly matter because the spirit of the Ebro covenant nullified anything the treaty of 241 B.C., as far as Carthaginian actions in Iberia were concerned, may or may have not stipulated. Think of a new contract drawn up; a prior one is now meaningless, in terms of legality.
So we can probably forget the treaty of Lutatius, as far as trying to claim Hannibal violated anything there, other than shrewdly maneuvering for war. Unfortunately, the Ebro covenant cannot be related chronologically to Rome's alliance with Saguntum with complete accuracy, and even its validity was questioned, as the Carthaginians claimed they never ratified it within the Suffete. It was an agreement between Hasdrubal and the Roman Senate. It was probably ratified in Rome, and they regarded it as legally binding on both parties. They may have a point here, as the Suffete didn't disavow Hasdrubal who made it, or Hannibal, who, according to the Romans, transgressed it. The one issue that should be understood is that the Ebro covenant, probably, and from Rome's perspective, was not so much that it imposed any serious restriction on Hasdrubal, but that the Carthaginians, by accepting it, recognized Rome's right to interfere in Iberia; this may be why Carthage later denied that it was valid on the grounds that their government didn't ratify it (Polybius 3.21). Some allege Hasdrubal had no choice to accept the covenant, as he was in the weaker position - a member of the conquered state from 15 years earlier. This is slightly credible, but the basic Carthaginian attitude could very well have been that the Ebro Covenant defined the spheres of influence between Rome and Carthage and, as they wouldn't cross north of the Ebro in arms, Rome could not interfere south of the Ebro. Most likely, Hasdrubal saw that Rome was tied up with real threats far away. But that wasn't specifically mentioned, and neither was Saguntum; Polybius makes no mention of Saguntum in his accounts of the covenant (Book 2.13, 3.6, 3.15 and 3.29), unless we include his claim that Hannibal violated the agreement by attacking Saguntum (Book 3.30). But when the covenant occured, he specifically tells us in Book 2.13,
"...Accordingly, after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts..."
This seems to create a problem with his comment that it was 'a good many years' before Hannibal's time that Saguntum entered into relations with Rome (Book 3.30). If so, Saguntum, an important ally with a vital strategic point, would surely have been mentioned and provided for. We also do not know the exact nature of this alliance. Was it a foedus (formal alliance) or merely a deditio in fidem (a throwing oneself upon the protection of) on the part of Saguntum? Polybius uses the term symmachia (alliance), and Livy describes the Saguntines as socii (allies). Whatever, it is safe to assume that an alliance did exist.
What is probable (forgive all the garrulousness; I feel compelled to emphasize that everything is conjectural) is that the Romans, facing Gallic and piracy troubles (in the Adriatic), were content to leave Hasdrubal free to extend his Iberian domain up to the Ebro. How this affected Rome's alliance to the Saguntines depends on when they actually formed an alliance. If the alliance was extant in time before the treaty with Hasdrubal, then, just like the treaty from 241 B.C., the alliance was annulled by the terms of this new agreement, assuming Livy and Appian are erroneous with their claims of Saguntum being mentioned, which I doubt it was, even though Polybius isn't free of errors, as he seems to contradict himself throughout his accounts, presumably in an inadvertent manner, with the location of the river, whether it was north or south of the Ebro.
Now, if the alliance with between Rome and Saguntum was formed after the covenant with Hasdrubal in c. 226 B.C., then she had no legal grounds to interfere in an area where she in effect recognized Carthaginian control, at least how Carthage saw it. Thus whichever time-frame is correct with the Saguntine/Roman alliance, Rome had no legal ground to restrain Hannibal from attacking Saguntum (assuming we follow Polybius). Whether or not Hannibal had been gearing for war as a child with Rome, he certainly was prepared in 218 B.C.
The Ebro Covenant may have been nothing more than 'polite' fiat (decree) handed down by the Romans, and because of the distance from Rome's 'serious' theaters at this time from Spain, they couldn't impose upon Hasdrubal this limit if he wanted to cause a fuss. the Ebro was far from Carthaginian activity and interests at the time, thus they probably figured he wouldn't object. It can be assumed, loosely, the Romans would not feel free to cross south of the Ebro in arms. But they may have had one eye on Spain for the future, and were going to stir up trouble more furtively. It should be considered that Rome must have known she was opening a bone of contention for the future by accepting Saguntum as a protectorate (or whatever form the alliance was); the city was situated right next to Carthage's sphere of domination.
The 2nd Punic War was testament of Rome's great quality of a martial state. But they could have been fiddling around in Saguntum with the prime task of undermining Punic power in Iberia, and eventually driving them out. If so, it worked, but Hannibal delayed things for along time. But perhaps at first Rome was merely considering the interests of their friends in Massilia; it was them that had a reason to safeguard the self-governing position of Saguntum: we don't have any direct evidence, but they had established colonies along the east coast of Spain, such as Rhode and Emporium (Rosas and Ampurias). But they had also established settlements much further south, at Hemeroskopeion (modern Denia) and Akra Leuke (modern Alicante) - both which were located between Saguntum and New Carthage, along the modern Cosat Blanca. It can be assumed that these colonies of Massilia had by Hannibal's time fallen under Punic domination, thus the Massiliotes' trade was undermined and they had a griveance with Carthage. Maybe they had a significant hand in helping Rome dig her claws into the Iberian Peninsula.If so, they would not have been wholly unjustified, as their other footholds were threatened by Carthaginian hegemony.
Hannibal doubtless carried a strong enmity for Rome, and he was determined to fight in Italy to break her growing empire, but we shouldn't believe Roman historiography that he was a pathological fanatic. None of his actions support any claim he carried an 'inveterate' hatred (Polybius 3.86) of them. To reiterate, the story of Hannibal's 'oath' may be apocryphal, like possibly so many good stories, such as Maharbal's exhortation after Cannae, Hannibal's famous meeting with Scipio in Ephesus in c. 190 B.C. A boy does not necessarily carry childhood vows into adult life, especially when the man in question insisted Carthage make peace after Zama (Polybius 15.19); this hardly suggests a fanatic, and the 'oath' story 'Hannibal critics of his jump on was told by Hannibal himself to Antiochus III (Polybius Book 3.11-12), in the context of trying convince the King of Syria of his undying hatred of Rome, to procure the Syrian king's material help to attack Italy again. It clearly worked, as far as gaining Antiochus III's trust (though Rome got to the Near East before Italy could ever be invaded again). The words are worth putting up,
"...Of the fact that Hamilcar, although he died ten years before the beginning of the Second Punic War, contributed much to its origin many evidences can be found; but the anecdote I am about to relate suffices, I think, to confirm this. At the time when Hannibal on his final defeat by the Romans had left his native land and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, who saw through the project of the Aetolians, sent an embassy to Antiochus, wishing to be fully aware what the king's purpose was. The legates, as they saw that Antiochus was lending an ear to the Aetolians and was disposed to go to war with Rome, paid many attentions to Hannibal, wishing to make Antiochus suspicious of him, as in fact they succeeded in doing. For as time went on, the king's mistrust of Hannibal grew ever more strong; and it fell out on one occasion that they came to have a talk about the alienation which had been secretly growing up between them. In the course of the conversation Hannibal defended himself on various grounds, and at length, being at a loss for further arguments, resorted to the following. He said that at the time when his father was about to start with his army on his expedition to Spain, he himself, then nine years of age, was standing by the altar, while Hamilcar was sacrificing to Zeus. When, on the omens being favourable, Hamilcar had poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites, he ordered the others who were attending the sacrifice to withdraw to a slight distance and calling Hannibal to him asked him kindly if he wished to accompany him on the expedition. On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans. He begged Antiochus, then, now he knew this for a fact, as long as his intentions were hostile to Rome, to rely on him confidently and believe that he would have in him his sincerest supporter, but from the moment he made peace and alliance with her he had no need to wait for accusations but should mistrust and beware of him; for there was nothing he would not do against the Romans. Antiochus, listening to this, thought he spoke genuinely and sincerely and in consequence abandoned all his former mistrust..."
Saguntum was attacked after warnings for them to stop molesting local tribes friendly to Hannibal. One could ask why would they risk war with Hannibal over a territorial dispute, who had just 'cleared the decks' in Iberia for a possible war with Rome, but they could very well have assumed Rome would protect them. Moreover, it seems likely Roman agents were stirring up the pro-Roman faction in the city, and we do know many leading pro-Carthaginians were executed (Polybius 3.15), and the Saguntines refused Hannibal's wish for them to state their case regarding the quarrel with the local tribes in question (again, probably the Edetani or Sedatani), if we can sustain Appian (History of Spain 2.10). Polybius tells us the executed leaders in Saguntun were 'leading citizens', but it's a safe assumption they were Carthaginian apologists, or against Rome's involvement.
Hannibal's actions in Iberia do not necessarily confirm any notions of 'calculated' and personal revenge against Rome. However, by staying clear of Roman attention, perhaps, his campaigns, in part, could have reflected a 'clearing of the decks' to commit to war with Rome, but I feel this scenario is less likely. What is certain is that war with Rome, again, was a strong possibility (nothing is ever 'inevitable'), and the Barcids would simply be ready this time (after all, it was a painful dose of reality how Rome endured once both sides reached breaking points of exhaustion), which does indeed mean that the 'Barcid Empire' involved enhancing Carthaginian military might. John Rich is correct, IMHO, that this would only be necessary 'unless with a view to a possible renewal of the war with Rome', in his fine article titled The Origins of the Second Punic War (p. 18 of the book The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, pp. 1-37 comprises the whole article). However, Rich's concludes with Polybius that Hannibal and his father had always hoped for a second chance against Rome, and I feel Rich is a little more eloquent than convincing. The Barcids were soldiers, thus they were hardly appalled to war, but the 'wrath of Hannibal' - in terms of a pathological hatred which drove Hannibal's every thought - is almost surely belongs to a later Roman tradition to justify their errors at the time (c. 220-218 B.C.), most notably in geography!
An integral element of the strategy which Hannibal unleashed depended on the Celts of the Po Valley, and this was not feasible before 225 B.C. Hannibal's campaigning of 221-220 B.C., which included a staggering victory over a confederated tribal army of some 100,000 men (perhaps an exaggerated number from Polybius) on the Tagus River in central Spain, may have been getting his Iberian house in order for war with Rome, but could just as likely been the continuation of the empire-building begun by his father and brother-in-law. Hannibal, like Hasdrubal didn't go anywhere near the Ebro from his succession to the declaration of war by Rome in 218 B.C. (or acceptance of war by Carthage). Hannibal was not his father; he never committed any alleged actions of terrible cruelty which were gratuitous. What Marcus Marcellus did the people of Casilinum upon their surrender (Livy Book 24.19), after which Fabius reputedly agreed with them that their lives were to be spared if they left the city (Marcellus cut them down when they did), what Nero did to the body of Hasdrubal Barca or Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' exceeds anything Hannibal did in terms of 'cruelty' or 'treachery' beyond the 'reasonable' measures of war. I am in total agreement with Marshal's previous assessment of the standards of the times.
That Hannibal killed Italians who refused to continue with him to Africa, or that he slaughtered deserters of Syphax' once in Africa army comes from Livy, Appian and Diodorus, but not mentioned by Polybius. In this period we lose Polybius again, but from the others such serious charges should still be treated with critical caution. He garrisoned the few towns still holding out in Bruttium, and killing many of his soldiers now showing refusal to go with him, would have been very impolitic; his Bruttians would surely not agree to do such a thing, and there is no mention that they specifically were forsaking him to join Rome. Secondly, there was still hope of ultimate victory, albeit a very slim hope by this time. He was in desperate need of horsemen once in Africa. Maybe he did kill deserters and took their horses, but the fact he was provided with riders from Tychaeus and Mazaetullus (Vermina, Syphax' son, didn't come to Carthage's aid until after Zama), some 3,000 of them, and the fact he only had, at most, 4,000 total cavalry at Zama, means he was clealry depleted of both riders and horses.
Moreover, Polybius says, Book 3.33,
"...Hannibal, who was wintering in New Carthage, in the first place dismissed the Iberians to their own cities hoping thus to make them readily disposed to help in the future; next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent; in the third place he took precautions for the security of Africa, adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Africa to Spain, and vice versa, binding by this measure the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty..."
Taking these words at face value, Hannibal was a sober calculator and planner, and he possibly had not made completely up his mind about an invasion of Italy until after the Roman declaration of war, though we can guess that was the most suitable option under the augmenting conditions. But maybe not; I'll get to the other option.
Anyway, Rich, he probably arrived in Africa in 203 B.C., with some 15,000 men at most (no horses could be transported), of which only a handful were his 'Old Guard'. To throw out a number, they may have numbered some 4,000. They clearly formed the front ranks of his third line at Zama, as Polybius states they levelled their spears to prevent fugitives from the first two defeated lines to enter from the front, indicating they were indeed his African spearmen (not pikes).
Hannibal did offer terms to the Saguntines. This from Livy Book 21.12,
"...The conditions were that restitution should be made to the Turdetani, all the gold and silver should be delivered up, and the inhabitants should depart with one garment each and take up their abode wherever the Carthaginians should order them. As Alco insisted that the Saguntines would not accept peace on these terms..."
Hannibal horribly sacked Turin upon descending into the Po Valley, and slaughtered the inhabitants only after they rejected his appeals; this is ghastly, but not gratuitous, as their elimination would serve a larger startegic end. The Gallic tribes of the Upper Po didn't hesitate to join his alliance after the destruction, along with her people, of Turin, as the act was one of effective terror, as well as the securing of his rear from interference as he advanced. Why should the Saguntines be offered clemency to men who, in desperation, either fought to the death or set fire to their homes and burned themselves alive, along with their wives and children? Sure, Hannibal's terms probably meant slavery, but their actions do not merit leniency, he probably concluded. They were killing themselves anyway. There are many other examples, but as Theodor Mommsen tells us in his History of Rome, Book 3, Ch. 4,
"...the Romans charged him with cruelty, the Carthaginians with covetousness; and it is true that he hated as only Oriental natures know how to hate, and that a general who never fell short of money and stores can hardly have been other than covetous. But though anger and envy and meanness have written his history, they have not been able to mar the pure and noble image which it presents. Laying aside wretched inventions which furnish their own refutation, and some things which his lieutenants, particularly Hannibal Monomachus and Mago the Samnite, were guilty of doing in his name, nothing occurs in the accounts regarding him which may not be justified under the circumstances, and according to the international law, of the times; and all agree in this, that he combined in rare perfection discretion and enthusiasm, caution and energy. He was peculiarly marked by that inventive craftiness,..."
Why should he have backed down to Roman demands with Saguntum? The Romans surely would have interfered further into Iberia, as all her actions before and after suggest. Hannibal's reaction probably does not have anything to do with a notion of 'revenge', but merely to his position being threatened by Rome. Why should he tolerate this? Why should Carthage tolerate it? Saguntum had appealed to Rome, and if he kowtowed to their demands, what next, once word got out he was acquiescing to Roman demands, something Carthage had done before? New Carthage's appeal to Rome? Gades? Utica? It is very ironic with regards to the attitude of the Romans and Carthaginians; it seems the Romans were somewhat the imperialistic bullies, but the Carthaginians, not a martial people, but traders and middlemen, exacted heavier tribute from her subjects, treating them somewhat like cash cows out to pasture. Hannibal's 'aggression' at the onset of the 2nd Punic War was a superb example of attack is the best form of defence. In the long run, a defensive war would be ruinous, given Rome's manpower reserves and resources; even a drawn war would not weaken Rome's power. The only way to overcome Rome was to cut her away from those resources, which included the manpower from her allies, and this entailed fighting in Italy. In Hannibal's eyes, Carthage's very survival was at stake, and in this he proved to be all too correct. War is the ultimate test, the terrible event in which one risks all against fates. Hannibal was too complex an individual to be understood from a single incident that occured when he was a little boy; his war with Rome had even much deeper roots.
Quote:I actually find the traditional view of Hannibal being schooled from childhood to hate Rome as the type of thing that gets made up as part of the legend...Indeed, and the 'oath' story, Polybius was told, came from Hannibal himself (Polybius, Book 3.11), who only told the story later to Antiochus III, and on top of that, only in the context of trying to persuade the Hellenic king of Syria to believe he hated the Romans enough to trust him with command of an army to invade Italy again. Who told Polybius, I wonder? Perhaps one of the Aetolians with whom he would have been acquainted with while he and they, presumably, where in exile in Italy following the final defeat of Macedon (viz., as of 168 B.C.). maybe Nicander of Trichonium; Nicander was in touch with Antiochus III the same time as was Hannibal, and probably was the direct source for Polybius' accounts of events in Greece amid Rome's involvement there, notably the Aetolians' deliberations for peace in 191 B.C., which Livy tells us about in more detail (Ab Urbe Condita, Book 36.29). But it must remain speculative, as Polybius doesn't tell us concretely (see professor Frank W. Walbank's monumental Historical Commentaries on Polybius, Vol. 1, pp. 314-315, and his Philip V of Macedon, the footnote on p. 279).
Capua and Tarentum were won over because of the politic attitude displayed to many of their citizens, as well as to those throughout Italy, who fought at Trasimene and Cannae, and it was the Romans who were displaying a gratuitous level of cruelty. These incidents were where his stratey was bearing fruit. Hannibal was bred for war, and cruelty and war are inseparable. From personal avarice he is certainly free. I hope nobody puts much stock in what Massinissa claimed, according to Polybius. Hannibal never used money for personal ends, and he was very much a tribal chieftain in the sense that he learned form his father how to gain the loyalty of mercenary troops, as well as others who a made up his polyglot army. But his manner of command was truly unique, not only impressed upon him by his father's tenacity and cruel discipline, but also the patient, reasonable and cautionary level of self-controlled diplomacy exhibited by Hasdrubal, his older brother-in-law. As for charges layed upon him of 'cruelty', he was a general who had to make war pay for itself - to feed, clothe, and provide for his army, of which the prospect of booty was a major incentive for an army largely composed of mercenaries. How could he show any scruples, when opposed by the indigenous peoples, when his army had to be sustained in a foreign land, with but only scanty quantities of supplies to be expected (at least at in the first years). He knew full well, once in Italy beyond the Po Valley, he couldn't be substantially be re-supplied or re-enforced. Part of his grand strategy was to fight Rome with her own resources against her. His entire plight was a huge gamble, and he nearly pulled it off. But staying in Spain would have been a more foolish option. Brian Caven's assessment that that would have been wiser is convicingly countered by professor J. F. Lazenby.
Hannibal knew the Romans were resilient and carried a fight-to-the-death attitude, but we must excuse him for thinking even they had a breaking point; immediately after Cannae, as Adrian Goldsworthy put in a certain perspective, they were beaten but didn't have the sense to realize it. We can also admire Rome for her indomitableness, but at the time her decision to not even come to the table with Hannibal was more obstinate than any decision he ever made; nobody could have predicted that supreme moments of the upcoming war; the Carthaginians' egregious failure in not ridding Spain of the beleaguered 9,000 or so Roman legionnaires holding the Ebro line was paramount; Catalonia would invaluably serve as a base of operations for the crucial upcoming campaign. Bomilcar not even attempting to fight the Romans, who had a smaller fleet off Cape Pachynon (SE tip of Sicily) was abysmal. The issue with Muttines would never have happened in the Roman (or Mongol) chain of command, at least in the mid-Republic. The Romans barely broke a sweat in successfuly (and prudently) playing the Greeks off each other, thanks largely to the Anatolians. Hannibal cannot be blamed for assuming Philip V could have diverted Rome's forces at least a little more than the miniscule degree he did.
But perhaps Hannibal was decided about invading Italy before he took Saguntum. Alliances have not, throughout history, ever been unyielding, and treaties have always left room for discord if the parties at a later date, in this case, a couple of decades, are in the mood. In Iberia, for example, plenty of allies of both Rome and Carthage forsook one or the other when one side seemed to gain the intiative. This is why the Scipio brothers' expedition into the Iberian interior ended in disaster. I guess it just comes down to how people, including us here on RAT in the 21st century, interpret things. They have always been questioned with time, and some have always thought treaties were sanctioned by time, as the political climate changes etc. Thus the statute of limitations within our laws (I know - it does not apply to everything). The fact that Roman annalists committed the topographical errors regarding the proximity of the Ebro River, and the fact they never lifted a finger to help Saguntum once the city came under siege does not favor their justifications, and, possibly, Hannibal called what was merely a bluff on their part. They had issues to attend to in Illyria and Cisalpine Gaul, but Polybius' figures concerning Roman resources in 225 B.C. suggest they could have spared ships and troops to help the Saguntines.
My view is that the legal technicalities are too loose to define with certainty as to whether Rome or Carthage, under the actions of Hannibal, was morally responsible for the war's outbreak. The Roman claims to justifiably intervene on Saguntum's behalf do not seem substantial, but Hannibal's attack upon the city was unjust unless the Saguntunes were indeed guilty of aggression against his allies. Unfortunately, this is something we cannot answer 2,226 years later, at least as to who was the aggressor. But the legal aspects of this question probably concern Carthage and Saguntum more than Carthage and Rome. There are two important questions:
1) Why did Hannibal discard the Roman ultimatum surrounding Saguntum?
2) Why did the Romans make such an issue over Saguntum?
The 1st question is easier to assess. If Hannibal had backed down to Roman demands, there is little doubt that Roman interference in the Punic sphere of influence on the Peninsula would not end there; this would have merely been the thin edge of the wedge, and Roman meddling into Spain would open any Iberian community which simply didn't favor Carthaginian suzerainty (a situation which Hannibal was hoping to effectuate in Italy against Roman suzerainty). If the Roman challenge, though very dangerous, was not taken up it would not only do irreparable damage to Punic prestige among the Iberians who did favor their authority, an authority skillfuly assimilated by Hasdrubal, but also, in one swift blow, ruin 20 years of work, which began with Hamilcar, which necessitated Carthage's revitalization after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. Hannibal's attitude is understandable even if his preparations for war with Rome were not shaped by a war of revenge.
The 2nd question is not as clear (in my view). Carthaginian activity in Iberia didn't threaten Roman interests at the time (unless one wants to count her interests as digging their claws in a land for imperialistic objectives for the future), let alone her security. The envoys sent to ask Hamilcar about his intentions seemed content of his 'expalnation', that his build-up was primarily to swiften the payments of the war indemnity from the 1st Punic War. There is nothing to suggest that Saguntum refused to acknowledge Punic hegemony upon Hasdrubal's accession. Their allaince with Rome was no doubt influenced from the mutual friendship between them and Rome with the Massiliotes. Though Rome did not help Saguntum, she did in 211 B.C., when in a better position to do something, restored the survivors from Hannibal's siege to the city, and punished those tribes in question with whom they had originally quarreled (Livy 24.42). The most powerful factor in Roman eyes may be that, as an imperially minded state, she wanted to become embroiled in Iberia. The poor people of Saguntum simply got caught in the crossfire
Hannibal certainly orchestrated, in a shrewd manner, things to incur Rome's ire. He knew war was very likely, and recognized the folly of leaving Saguntum astride his rear lines, that he planned to carry the war into Italy. This supports one case that he did indeed decide to attack Italy before Rome declared war. By Rome's declaring war, he would now be justified in crossing the Ebro and attacking their lands. The Roman bluff over Saguntum, if that's what it was, was not completely unreasonable. They never thought the impending war could be fought on Italian soil, and they perhaps figured that the succession in 221 B.C. of a new, young general seemed a suitable moment to apply pressure to the Carthgainians (much like perhaps the Greeks' attitude following Alexander's succession), whose new found prosperity in Iberia certainly merited some concern, if not a direct threat. If so, and though they couldn't have foreseen what was to happen, they couldn't have made a bigger mistake. But they stood firm in the long run.
From probably May to November, 219 B.C., the Saguntines withstood a ferocious siege, but finally fell to Hannibal. In his famous (but turgid) epic poem of the 2nd Punic War, Silius Italicus states the Roman declaration of war came before Saguntum fell (Punica, Book 2. 391); Italicus drew from Livy and Virgil, the former for historical research, the latter for a poetic model.
Now, with all that pro-Hannibalic opining, it should be understood that no man is infallible, and just because something 'favors' Hannibal from pro-Roman writers, doesn't necessarily mean it is so, from the logic of why would they say something in his favor; and just because something is pro-Roman from our original sources, doesn't unilaterally and automatically mean it is colored or even outright false. We have to look at each situation and decide what may mean what, and read betwen the lines. We'll never come to incontrovertible conclusions.
There's plenty more to cover!
Thanks, James
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."
James K MacKinnon
James K MacKinnon
