How Effective were Spears Against Cavalry?

[Nathan Ross]

maces... seems to have been a new, separate topos, connected to the phenomenon of the cataphracts.

Two appearances of this same 'club' (which I take to be an improvised thing, or variety of things, rather than a regular weapon) in different battles, as described by different authors seems a little slender a basis for the establishment of a 'topos'! That a blunt instrument is effective against an armoured man seems not implausible - should we not first consider that these incidents might be based on reality before consigning them to the dross of literary invention? ;-)

in my view there is far less reporting in them than you seem to allow, and much more literary convention.

All ancient texts use rhetoric, allusion, convention and invention to some degree, and all should be questioned. The panegyric form in particular indulges in learned wordplay and deliberate obscurity, alongside blatant propagandising. There is a certain school of source criticism which delights in finding tropes and quotes all over the place, and reducing all ancient literature to the friction of sterotypes rubbing together - this is clever, often ingenious and sometimes useful, but it can also be extremely reductive.

I would rather assume that unless a source can be demonstrated false, then we have to at least consider that it might be based on reality, however unlikely it may seem to be in our own opinion.

This is, of course, far from a cast iron dogma!

As a slightly wayward example - imagine that our only surviving source for the battle of Balaklava was Tennyson's poem The Charge of the Light Brigade. Clearly this is a literary work, full of heroic allusions, a sort of 'battle piece' in verse (Plunged in the battery-smoke / Right thro' the line they broke / Cossack and Russian / Reel'd from the sabre stroke...)

We could recognise the artistry, and acknowledge that the reality must have been somewhat different, but could we assume that because of this the charge itself never happened?

[Nathan Ross]

According to Goldsworthy The Roman Army they could catch them because the Parthians, swollen with confidence after the defeat of Crassus, were convinced the legionaries would flinch as soon as they would make a charge towards them, and found out too late that they wouldn't.

Incidentally, there are several different accounts of this same battle (Gindarus). Besides Plutarch and Cassius Dio, there are the following:

The defeat was not inflicted without a stratagem on the part of the general, who, under a pretence of panic, allowed the enemy to approach so close to the camp that he prevented them from making use of their arrows by depriving them of room to shoot.
Florus, Epitome, II.XVIII

Ventidius, when fighting against the Parthians, would not lead out his soldiers until the Parthians were within five hundred paces. Thus by a rapid advance he came so near them that, meeting them at close quarters, he escaped their arrows, which they shoot from a distance.
Frontinus, Stratagema, II

Both of these imply that it was Parthian horse archers attacking the Roman position, and against whom the Romans made their counter-charge, not cataphracts (unless the latter were also armed with bows, of course...)

The Florus quote, interestingly, seems to contradict Goldsworthy's reading of the battle - rather than 'not flinching', the Romans deliberately feigned panic, thereby drawing the Parthians into an improvident attack. A tactic, in fact, not unlike the one mentioned by Nazarius, hmm...

In the same book, Frontinus describes what seems to be a different battle between Ventidius and the Parthians:

Ventidius... posted eighteen cohorts at the side of the camp in a hidden valley, with cavalry stationed behind the infantry. Then he sent a very small detachment against the enemy. When these by feigning flight had drawn the enemy in hot pursuit beyond the place of ambush, the force at the side rose up, whereupon Ventidius drove the Parthians in precipitate flight and slaughtered them.
(Stratagema, Book II)

Again, as in Zosimus' description of Emesa in 272, we have infantry attacking the flank of a cavalry force disordered by a provoked pursuit.

The action of topoi, perhaps? Or a suggestion that these kind of tactics were frequently used to defeat cavalry?

;-)

[koechlyruestow]

Ofcourse not! But it is very possible ...

[Domen]

That a blunt instrument is effective against an armoured man seems not implausible

Yup. Especially in the Ancient Era.

Only the technological development of the High Middle Ages made these weapons less efficient:

Crushing blunt weapons - the type of blunt weapons, designed to destroy enemy light and medium armour (chain mail, brigandine, karacen armour, laminar armour, etc.), without causing open wounds, but with a result of extensive internal injuries, which would effectively eliminate the enemy from combat. (...) Introduction of the rigid plate armour in the late Middle Ages reduced efficiency of existing crushing weapons. This in turn led to increased work on the development of crushing weapons.

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Actually Ancient armour provided better protection vs cuts and thrusts than vs such crushing blows, which aimed not at piercing or cutting armour into flesh but at inflicting internal injuries.

There were also blunt weapons which combined crushing and piercing blows (below we can see Medieval club-designs, including a Morning Star - a response to technological improvement of armour):

[Domen]

That a blunt instrument is effective against an armoured man seems not implausible

Crushing blunt weapons - the type of blunt weapons, designed to destroy enemy light and medium armor (chain mail, brigandine, karacen armour, laminar armour, etc.), without causing open wounds, but with a result of extensive internal injuries, which would effectively eliminate the enemy from combat. (...) Introduction of the rigid plate armour in the late Middle Ages reduced efficiency of existing crushing weapons. This in turn led to increased work on the development of crushing weapons.

[Macedon]

The action of topoi, perhaps? Or a suggestion that these kind of tactics were frequently used to defeat cavalry?

;-)

I would here add Plutarch's account of the battle of Tigranocerta where Lucullus attacked the cataphracts of Tigranes, who stood on a certain hill. According to him,the cataphracts did not withstand the attack nor did they countercharge but fled through their own infantry, putting it in disorder and surrendering the victory to the Romans. (Plut. Lucullus, 28.3-4)

Other infantry "charges" examples against any type of cavalry :

Polyaenus also talks of a Persian cavalry attack against 10,000 Greek mercenaries of Orontes who moved a short distance towards the advancing cavalry (Polyaenus mentions only 3 steps), whereupon the cavalry of Autophradates immediately took to flight, thinking that the Greeks were charging them. (Polyaen. 7.14.3.)

and let's not forget the attack of Caesar's 4th line reserve at Pharsalus.

Of course, actual melee would be rare, but if no tactical provisions had been taken for such a case, it could lead to cavalry actually leaving the field.

[Domen]

You "forgot" about the participation of Thracian-Gallic cavalry in that combined cavalry-infantry charge against the exposed flank and rear of cataphracts, who were at the foot of a hill (28.2-3):

"But when he saw that the mail-clad horsemen, on whom the greatest reliance was placed, were stationed at the foot of a considerable hill which was crowned by a broad and level space, and that the approach to this was a matter of only four stadia, and neither rough nor steep, he ordered his Thracian and Gallic horsemen to attack the enemy in the flank, and to parry their long spears with their own short swords. (Now the sole resource of the mail-clad horsemen is their long spear, and they have none other whatsoever, either in defending themselves or attacking their enemies, owing to the weight and rigidity of their armour; in this they are, as it were, immured.)"

And it is also worth mentioning that infantry cohorts charged down the hill, as they first climbed that hill, and only then - after shouting "The day is ours" - charged downwards towards the Armenians.

Plutarch immediately goes from describing Lucullus ordering his Thracian and Gallic cavalry to charge cataphracts' exposed flank, to describing the two cohorts climbing up the hill and then charging downwards towards the Armenians - he doesn't mention what was the Gallic and Thracian cavalry doing in the meantime. Looks like Thracian and Gallic cavalry engaged the cataphracts from the flank for some time and meanwhile two cohorts charged their rear, shouting "The day is ours". Being surrounded from two or three sides by Gallo-Thracian cavalry and 2 cohorts, the cataphracts panicked and routed.

A "hammer & anvil" tactics, but here used against cavalry, by a mixed cavalry-infantry force.

Thracian-Gallic cavalry was used as an anvil and 2 cohorts charging down the hill, as a hammer. If you want to use a "hammer & anvil" tactics vs cavalry, your anvil needs to be fast enough.

Otherwise it would be hard to explain how could infantry be able to catch up with cavalry, and also how was it possible that Roman infantry managed to climb up the hill and then charge downwards, without even being noticed by the Armenians (they didn't react to this maneuver, so they clearly didn't notice it). But the Armenian horsemen were stuck in a fight against Thracian and Gallic cavalry, which is why they did not see the Roman cohorts climbing the hill and then moving down it on time. And when, while fighting against the Roman "anvil", they finally saw the "hammer" running at them from the top of the hill and yelling, it was already too late for any counter-measures to repulse the Roman charge. Especially, that they were already engaged in combat against those Gallic and Thracian horsemen.

Being under such a surprise attack, the cataphracts panicked and started to run away.

attacked the cataphracts of Tigranes, who stood on a certain hill.

Read it again, please... - the cataphracts stood at the foot of a hill, not on a hill :!:

OTOH, it was Roman infantry who stood on that hill (after climbing up to the top of it).

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If we already speak about the "hammer & anvil" tactics:

A good example of using it against infantry, by a combined infantry-cavalry force (in such case infantry had to play the role of an anvil, and cavalry - of a hammer) was the battle of Panium. At Panium (200 BC), Seleucid cataphracts charged and smashed the Ptolemaic phalanx, working as such hammer.

There were also battles in which cavalry worked as both hammer and anvil.

At Kircholm (1605), winged hussars charged both the front and the flanks of enemy pikemen.

[Robert Vermaat]

attacked the cataphracts of Tigranes, who stood on a certain hill.

Read it again, please... - the cataphracts stood at the foot of a hill, not on a hill :!:
OTOH, it was Roman infantry who stood on that hill (after climbing up to the top of it).

Macedon mentions the battle of Tigranocerta where cataphracts supposedly stood on top of a hill.
Peter mentions the battle against the Parthians of Mount Gindarus where Parthian cavalry charged up a hill.

Not the same, or am I missing something?

[Macedon]

We are not discussing anything. I just added 3 examples of infantry attacking cavalry and nothing else. Peter is just commenting, arguing with himself about whatever he thinks his point is.

[koechlyruestow]

Nathan Ross wrote:
The action of topoi, perhaps? Or a suggestion that these kind of tactics were frequently used to defeat cavalry?


:wink:

It seems to me all literature, all topoi, have a connection to reality. Just not necessarilly the reality the text refers to. Sometimes a topos is plausible, sometimes its uncongruousness stands out a mile, in other cases it is not so easy to discern. Frontinus wanted to add authority to his stratagems by claiming with more or less plausibility a historical precedent. Thank you for referring to him.

Here is another of legionaries charging Parthian cataphracts from the battle-field, Plutarchus' Antony 39. Anthony tries to surprise the Parthians by making his army move off in column in front of their crescent battle array, as if to retreat, and then orders his men to charge. The Roman cavalry is received and repelled, but as soon as the legionaries approach the Parthians they turn and flee, peppering the Romans with the Parthian shot.

A typical Roman "victory" over an Iranian army: the Romans charged and their opponents fled, suffering hardly any casualties. Only once the Romans had been so reckless as to allow for an all out pursuit, and that led to the extermination of Publius' cavalry. When the Romans wisely retreated, the Iranians were soon back again, harassing them with a hail of arrows. Usually, the Romans only succeeded inflicting severe casualties when they reached the huge mob of foot servants the Iranians took with them on their campaigns. The Roman cavalry was usually inferior in both numbers and quality to the excellent oriental cavalry.

Oh. and Plutarchus Anthony 44: The Roman legionaries forming up in kneeling testudo as the Parthians start shooting at them, and as the Parthians laid aside their bows, grabbed their lances and recklessly charged the legionaries, the latter sprang up, attacked and routed them, cutting down the horsemen that could not get away in time.

Robert Vermaat wrote:

Well, actually I do not remember, but I could have sworn you added something about the Battle of Tigranocerta, but I no longer see it. Am I mistaken, Robert?

[Domen]

Eduard - I suggest you copy-paste (quote) the actual excerpts, rather than describing them.

Because what Macedon wrote above proves, that short description of what the source says, written by some forum user, can often considerably differ from the actual source...

And I have not enough time for this discussion to search for every excerpt you mention.

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BTW - yesterday I've bought a new book "Amida 359" from the Polish "Historical Battles" series written by Tomasz Szeląg and the author describes there the tactics and composition of the Sassanid army from the 4th century (basing also on some books which I already have - such as "Sassanian Elite Cavalry" by Farrokh or Wilcox's "Rome's Enemies (3)", but also on books which I don't have like Woźniak's "Armie starożytnej Persji"). He quotes Ammianus Marcellinus and Marcellinus confirms that the Sassanids relied on the bravery of their heavy cavalry shock charges in most battles. The author says that heavy cavalry (such as the Savaran) were deployed in the first line of the battle and usually in the center (while light cavalry on both flanks). Infantry and war elephants were deployed behind the heavy cavalry.

Apart from "regular" heavy cavalry units, there were also elite ones - such as the Zhayedan (the Immortals - 10,000 heavy cavalry), Royal Guards - the Pushtighban (between 1,000 and 6,000 strong regarding its heavy cavalry component) and also the Gyanavspar / Peshmerga (elite heavy cavalry unit consisting of chosen horsemen who showed extraordinary bravery in previous battles).

[koechlyruestow]

Sorry Peter, no can do. I collect these passages on paper from the books with the original text next to the translation (for instance the Loeb series and the Belles Lettres series), to make sure I agree with the translation (or to dispel an doubts, such as Marja Erwin's doubt about the korunè and ropalon).

I wanted to talk about what I found in Seyfahrt's translation of Ammianus, but since you are so short of time - I am sorry to hear that - I will tactfuly desist. :wink:

[Domen]

"Hussar lances were longer than enemy pikes, thus they were killing enemy infantrymen before horses could even crash into standing people, creating gaps in enemy lines. Overthrown and collapsing Swedish or Muscovite infantry could then be destroyed or dispersed."

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

But again if I may comment, this is not a description of the horses charging into the standing infantry,
But rather the riders using a longer lance to pick off the infantry from outlet side the pikes reach!

[Domen]

Uhm... This is a description of cavalry charging standing infantry and killing them with impact of long lances strikes, so that they are no longer standing but lying on the ground and dead.

Cataphracts were also armed with rather long lances, by the way. Surely longer than gladius.

Lance in general was a weapon used by large percentage of all shock cavalry in history.

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Another fragment of cavalry charging (and defeating) close ordered infantry in close combat:

From the military report of Brigadier General Skarżyński, commander of the Reserve Cavalry Division, to the Commander In Chief, HQ in Miastków, written on 03.04.1831.

"Colonel Dembiński reporting: Seeing enemy infantry of the left wing forming squares*, I went with order from divisional commander to the head of our column. Along the road on the right side I gathered the 4th Squadron (Cpt. Zylewicz), moved it left and soon charged against that Russian battalion, which opened fire to the 4th Squadron. When only the 3rd Squadron formed in a battle formation, it also charged that infantry and surrounded them (...). General Skarżyński reporting: Our cavalry battalion [two squadrons mentioned above - Peter] quickly and bravely charged that infantry, despite shrapnel fire and rain of musket bullets. The enemy even for quite a long time fought against our cavalry in a square formation in close combat with use of bayonets, but in the end the entire enemy infantry force which was on the right side of the road was killed or surrendered."

*Note: in original report word "carré" was used when describing enemy infantry formation (square).

Sources:

http://ebuw.uw.edu.pl/dlibra/plain-content?id=94975

http://mazowsze.hist.pl/files/Rocznik_Mi...-s7-29.pdf

Events described above took place during the battle of Dębe Wielkie on 31.03.1831.

Report of the charge was written on 03.04.1831 as we can see - a few days after the battle. Fragments of the report quoted above were also published in a newspaper later, in 1831 (see the first link).