11-30-2006, 08:10 PM
It was a strategic victory for the Romans I'd say. Roman warfare was quite different from let's say hellenistic warfare. They didn't necessarily search for a big decisive battle.
In greek, hellenistic conflicts decisions were sought in one decisive battle. The wars between the Seleucids and the Lagides are some good examples for that. The battles weren't even fought to the bitter end because each side needed the mercenaries and professional soldiers so it was quite common that the phalanx of one side just lifted their sarissae when they thought the battle to be lost and everyone returned home. This changed when the Romans first entered the east because of their willingsness to make a victory decisive by destroying as much of the enemy as possible and by actually destroying the enemy's land, towns whatever. Roman warfare was quite modern in that aspect and when you look at HOW the Romans fought their wars you will see that their main goal always was a strategic victory much more than a victory on a specific battlefield. The building of camps, fortresses, streets, engineering were as, if not more important than fighting a battle.
This didn't really change, of course equipment changed and each enemy and area required different operations but in general the way the army operated during the empire stayed the same.
it can be found in Caesar, although he often accepts or forces battles much more than other Roman commanders would.
best examples for Roman warfare are Tacitus description of Germanicus campaign and Josephus Judaean war. to sum it up: systematically destroying the countryside and important settlements, secure important places, if the enemy offers battle and you feel secure accept it, if you don't, hit him where he can't protect his property or people and stay on the safe side yourself (some ppl like Crassus or Varus neglected that and got defeated). The Romans really started this kind of warfare after their defeats in the 2nd punic war when they realized that they can win the war even without being able to beat Hannibal in the field. They took the war to Spain and Africa.
Ok this might all seem a bit far-fetched and has nothing to do with the actual Parthian campaign but imho there's always ONE concept behind most Roman operations and once you see it from that perspective it gets much clearer. Why risk a battle if you can defeat the enemy in other ways without losing as many soldiers?
So what Germanicus did was use the strenght of the Roman army: engineering, secured supply, speed and transport to devastate the Germanic areas.
Vespasian and Titus did the same. They knew the Judaeans are not able to offer battle so they devastated and captured their strongholds without which they couldn't resist.
Traian knew where the strenght of his army lay. Speed, engineering, heavy infantry and heavy cavalry to protect them. and he knew that the enemy was able to harrass his army while marching but not to offer battle or seriously harm his army as long as he could defend his supply line (something Antonius had failed in). So as long as he manages to keep his army together he could march through Parthian lands, sack, destroy and devastate without too much trouble.
Septimius Severus did the same 80 years later.
and although it is a later period, equipment had changed and we have the Sassanides instead of the Parthians I would suggest to read Ammianus account of Iulianus Parthian war. He did the same as Traianus and Severus had done except that his 2nd column failed in meeting up with him (rather some kind of betrayal than his fault), the strange decision to burn the supply ships and to take another route and the tragedy of Iulianus death which led to the failure of the operation. but still I don't think Traian's campaign 200 years earlier was carried out in a much different way.
In greek, hellenistic conflicts decisions were sought in one decisive battle. The wars between the Seleucids and the Lagides are some good examples for that. The battles weren't even fought to the bitter end because each side needed the mercenaries and professional soldiers so it was quite common that the phalanx of one side just lifted their sarissae when they thought the battle to be lost and everyone returned home. This changed when the Romans first entered the east because of their willingsness to make a victory decisive by destroying as much of the enemy as possible and by actually destroying the enemy's land, towns whatever. Roman warfare was quite modern in that aspect and when you look at HOW the Romans fought their wars you will see that their main goal always was a strategic victory much more than a victory on a specific battlefield. The building of camps, fortresses, streets, engineering were as, if not more important than fighting a battle.
This didn't really change, of course equipment changed and each enemy and area required different operations but in general the way the army operated during the empire stayed the same.
it can be found in Caesar, although he often accepts or forces battles much more than other Roman commanders would.
best examples for Roman warfare are Tacitus description of Germanicus campaign and Josephus Judaean war. to sum it up: systematically destroying the countryside and important settlements, secure important places, if the enemy offers battle and you feel secure accept it, if you don't, hit him where he can't protect his property or people and stay on the safe side yourself (some ppl like Crassus or Varus neglected that and got defeated). The Romans really started this kind of warfare after their defeats in the 2nd punic war when they realized that they can win the war even without being able to beat Hannibal in the field. They took the war to Spain and Africa.
Ok this might all seem a bit far-fetched and has nothing to do with the actual Parthian campaign but imho there's always ONE concept behind most Roman operations and once you see it from that perspective it gets much clearer. Why risk a battle if you can defeat the enemy in other ways without losing as many soldiers?
So what Germanicus did was use the strenght of the Roman army: engineering, secured supply, speed and transport to devastate the Germanic areas.
Vespasian and Titus did the same. They knew the Judaeans are not able to offer battle so they devastated and captured their strongholds without which they couldn't resist.
Traian knew where the strenght of his army lay. Speed, engineering, heavy infantry and heavy cavalry to protect them. and he knew that the enemy was able to harrass his army while marching but not to offer battle or seriously harm his army as long as he could defend his supply line (something Antonius had failed in). So as long as he manages to keep his army together he could march through Parthian lands, sack, destroy and devastate without too much trouble.
Septimius Severus did the same 80 years later.
and although it is a later period, equipment had changed and we have the Sassanides instead of the Parthians I would suggest to read Ammianus account of Iulianus Parthian war. He did the same as Traianus and Severus had done except that his 2nd column failed in meeting up with him (rather some kind of betrayal than his fault), the strange decision to burn the supply ships and to take another route and the tragedy of Iulianus death which led to the failure of the operation. but still I don't think Traian's campaign 200 years earlier was carried out in a much different way.
RESTITVTOR LIBERTATIS ET ROMANAE RELIGIONIS
DEDITICIVS MINERVAE ET MVSARVM
[Micha F.]
DEDITICIVS MINERVAE ET MVSARVM
[Micha F.]
