Macedonian Sarrisa

[Aryaman2]

Aryaman, can you recommend a book on the mechanics of late medieval and early modern pike combat? I have the impression that the early Swiss were rather less cautious, but maybe they were the exception.

I can´t recommend you any modern book on the subject, the more informative is to read the drill manulas published since the last 16th century, and the battle drawings from the early 17th century.
As for the early Swiss, I think you are right, we don´t have descriptions of columns of pikemen moving at a run into the attack in later periods, as we have about the Swiss, able to overrun an enemy camp in a surprise assault.

[Paralus]

As for diffrences between the army of Alexander and Hellenistic armies, it has to be taken into account that the Army of Alexander was not at any time more than half Macedonian. According to Diodorus the landing force of of Alexander had just 12.000 Macedonian infantry, and not all would be phalangite, so the phalanx in all made less than half the army´s infantry. The composition would be more similar in a Seleucid army, while in the army of Philip V most of the infantry was phalanx and the cavalry was rather weak.

Don't know that I'd agree with all of that - especially the last. What leads you to believe that Philip was "weak" in cavalry? By the time of Crocus Field he could count on not only the Macedonian cavalry but the Thessalian too. I don't think that materially changed under his son. Nor do I think that simply because Alexander commanded it that went from "weak" to great.

There were most likely 15,000 Macedonians in the invasion army leaving some 5 - 6,000 active Macedonians soldiers for Antipater. There will have been reserves available who were not as yet on active duty.

It is likely that some 5-6,000 Macedonians arrived as fresh draughts over the first years of the war in the East - prior to the army brought by Amyntas in 332.

Alexander made certain his Macedonian contingent did not fall too low. These were the troops upon which all hinged. Indeed it is probable that between 334-331 an attested minimum of 9,000 (and more likely 12,000) will have gone east.

[Paullus Scipio]

Inaki wrote:-

According to Diodorus the landing force of of Alexander had just 12.000 Macedonian infantry, and not all would be phalangite

...but this does not take into account the Macedonian advance force, aproximately 10,000 strong, which contained Macedonians as well as mercenaries - so there was at least one taxeis, 2,000 strong already in Asia, and the advance force contained 5 Taxeis of 2,000 plus the Hypaspists, also 2,000 strong ( later expanded to 3000).

[Aryaman2]

Don't know that I'd agree with all of that - especially the last. What leads you to believe that Philip was "weak" in cavalry? By the time of Crocus Field he could count on not only the Macedonian cavalry but the Thessalian too. I don't think that materially changed under his son. Nor do I think that simply because Alexander commanded it that went from "weak" to great.

At Cynoscephalae Philip had 23.500 infantry and just 2.000 cavalry, that low proportion I was thinking of when I said he was weak in cavalry.

[Paullus Scipio]

...I think you are at cross-purposes, guys. ?

[Paralus]

...I think you are at cross-purposes, guys. Inaki was talking about Philip V(221-179 BC) who fought Rome , but Paralus is thinking (mistakenly) of Philip II, (359-336 BC) Alexander's father......

Yes indeed. Apologies. Wrong Philip.

At Cynoscephalae Philip had some 16,000 phalangites, seven thousand "lighter armed" and 2,000 cavalry. Rather light indeed. As well, his Greek "allies" had deserted to the Romans - especially Nabis of Sparta. This bloke, having married his sons off to Philip's daughters to seal the alliance, accepted Argos as his plaything from Philip (marvellous reward for its steadfastness) and promptly allied himeslf with Rome.

The army that took the field against Falmininus was not that with which he began the campaign. As I wrote in an earlier post, this was no fourth century Macedonian levy. Several had deserted already after the botched attempt to contain Flamininus' landing and more, one suspects, will have done so given the abject refusal of the Thebans and other Greeks to join the fray.

Philip - like other Macedonian "successors" before him - would bet the lot on the one decisive encounter. Like Lysimachus, Antigonus and Antiochus III, he was no Philip II or Alexander and nor were his troops of the calibre of those two.

One phalanx was successful, the other...well we know how it ended up - cut to pieces engendering a mass surrender. That later, unknown in Alexander's time and Philip II (except for the defeat in the Sacred War c353), would become something the Macedonians would reprise - with gusto - at Pydna as they deserted Perseus.