Spartan Mora regiments at Battle of Plataea

[Paullus Scipio]

Paul B. wrote:

Here's a figura from Figueira:

...an interesting summary, but it includes a couple of assumptions that don't really hold up under close scrutiny, namely the "re-organisations". Also there is a distortion of what the sources actually say with reference to Xenophon's 'Constitution'. The table comes from Figueira's "Population patterns in Sparta" - a fine study, though I don't agree with all his conclusions....as here. The table really needs to be read in conjunction with the main article, for there, Figueira is more accurate....

"The mora was commanded by a polemarch who
directed 4 lokhagoi, 8 pentakontieres, and 16 enomotarkhioi and in contrast
to Thucydides, Xenophon knows of the mora and its polemarch, but he
has doubled the number of lokhagoi and halved the number of enomotarchiai
As he describes this order of command as a Lycurgan (i.e.,
traditional) one, it was presumably in place during the Corinthian War,
in the period of Xenophon's active career as an officer.
Xenophon, however, does not give us an order of battle, but a chain of command..."

There are a few things to note here:
1. the table shows the Army "halved", but there's no explanation for this, and note, although there are 'half as many' 'enomotia', there are twice as many 'lochoi'
2. In a footnote, Figueira acknowledges that the difference could be textual error - as I referred to earlier in the thread...
3.Note that here the 'orbat' is supposedly the 'traditional' one according to Xenophon - meaning there has been NO change - this makes it all the more likely that a textual error/corruption has occurred since it is plain in Xenophon elsewhere that the Mora consisted of two 'lochoi'.....
4. Figueira's reason for the change is that the 'new' orbat needs fewer Homioi officers ( largely due to half as many enomotarchs) from a declining Homioi population, but then he has to 'explain away' two surplus 'lochagoi!' ( because after Leuktra there are the same 12 'lochoi' as before, instead of the 24 here - ANOTHER change?)....this just does not seem likely and is rather forced....
5. On the "Occam's razor" principle, the simplest explanation is surely the most likely...... as I have noted, a phalanx is a phalanx is a phalanx - tactically, it fights largely as a single unit, and its sub-divisions are not crucial, therefore no need to change them - and no Greek state does to our knowledge. If we accept that Thucydides is correct for his detailed explanation of the 'lochos' organisation, and that there is a textual error in the 'Constitution' we need go no further.....the Spartan Army consisted of 6 Mora, 12 Lochoi,8 pentekostyes,32 enomotia with 40 men each if all age-classes were called up, for a total of 7680 Hoplites plus 300 Hippeis, which ties in beautifully with Herodotus' "8,000", the selection of the 300 for Thermopylae and the force at Plataea, the known manpower of other city-states....in short, everything ! As Lazenby points out, this organisation also fits the Spartan Army at the time of the "Battle of the Champions" against Argos in the sixth century ,if forces of 300 are obtained by One 'enomotia' being drawn by lot from each of the 12 'lochoi'.
No need for "re-organisations", or un-necessary complexities at all. Again I agree with Lazenby, when he points out that the Spartans were a "conservative" people and unlikely to continually "tinker" with something as fundamental to their State as The Army and its proud Traditional 'Morai'. Again one has only to point to modern resistance to Military re-organisation in another Traditional Army such as Britain's....the proposed disbandment of the Ghurkas, amalgamation of units etc being a case in point, to realise why the last thing to change would be the structure of the Phalanx....

The above organisation, then, is the most likely for the 'Spartan' Army at Plataea 5,000 strong, with the 'perioikoi' brigaded separately as "allies" and together they form the Lakedaemonian Army, 10,000 strong at Plataea. PHEW! D lol:

[Paullus Scipio]

It is entirely possible that the perioici were deputed to “homeland defence” – anything is possible given the equivocal nature of the source material. There seems – mostly – to be a regiment or two of the army generally left at home (or at least those above 35) with whom they might have been deployed. Certainly you would not leave the city’s defence in the hands of helots and perioici alone.
...with this I would agree...though I assume 'above 35' is approximate, and varied on occasion.
The unequivocal evidence comes down to times of crisis for Sparta: the Athenian occupation of Pylos and the battle of Plataea. In both instances Sparta is clearly described as mustering the perioici as part of the army to confront the crisis.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Sparta musters an army of invasion at the Isthmus (as with Plataea). Thucydides, at 2.11.1, has Archidamus address his generals with the following words:

‘Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are not without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we march.

“We have never marched out with a larger force than the present” is, one thinks, Thucydides’ method of conveying the size of this force. Just how large it was it not readily attainable but, if the above is true, one needs to go back to Plataea to find a comparison. All Thucydides tells us just what the muster was for this force at 2.10.1:

...the quotation seems to be in reference to the time of the 'elder men' and their 'fathers' - i.e. "living memory"

The several states were ready at the time appointed and assembled at the Isthmus; the contingent of each city being two-thirds of its whole force.

This would, indeed, correspond to what we know of the Plataean army. I would suggest that it most likely counted Perioici amongst the Lacedaemonian two thirds.
...it probably doesn't matter, since the result is the same in terms of numbers, but the fact that the Spartans and their Allies formed a single phalanx on this as on other occasions, is no evidence that "allies" served in the Spartans own cherished 'Morai' - any more than British and Australians served in the same 'regiments', although part of the same 'division'/Army in WW2 - or Americans and British served in the same units during the Normandy invasion, though forming one army....

Be that as it may, clearly, Mantinea in 418 was the gravest crisis Sparta had faced since the Persian invasion. Alcibiades, giving note of his abilities, has not only roused Argos to action but has also detached League allies from Sparta and put them into the field. A loss on the field here will have occasioned Sellasia-like results. And, like Sellasia, I rather suspect that the Spartans will have mobilised as many of her resources as possible. To my mind that would include periocic hoplites.

...given Kinadon's (exaggerated) remarks that 'perioikoi' hated 'Spartiates' and would "eat them raw", clearly there was a prospect of treachery in any 'internal' war in the peloponnese, as indeed ultimately happened among Sparta's allies after Leuktra. As I alluded to earlier, there are reasons to think that, as a rule, 'perioikoi' were not co-opted to serve in the peloponnese against peloponnesian enemies prior to Leuktra...indeed, the nature of the relationship may have been that 'perioikoi' were only obliged to serve "in defence of Lakedaemon" against external enemies or something similar.....
The other possibility here is the use of the term “allies”. At the time of the King’s Peace prior to Leuktra Agesilaos insisted on Sparta’s right to sign on behalf of the allies – included in this was the legal nicety of the periocic “cities”. So to Xenophon describing the return of the army after the calamitous defeat at Leuktra an army that (at 6.4.17) included “those who were forty years beyond the minimum military age”:

And proceeding with very great difficulty, since they were withdrawing at night and in fear and by a hard road, they arrived at Aegosthena in the territory of Megara. There they fell in with the army under Archidamus. And after waiting there until all the allies had joined him, Archidamus led back the whole army together as far as Corinth; from there he dismissed the allies and led the citizen troops back home.

Again, given desperate situation indicated by the call up, I’d think it highly likely periocic hoplites were part of Archidamnus’ force if not the original force under Kleombrotus.

It is just possible that the perioici are referred to as “allies” this being the legal nicety Epaminondas so enraged Agesilaos about.

...I would agree that this is possible, and that 'perioikoi' were technically 'allies' of Sparta, and your point is well made that Agesilaus was infuriated that Epaminondas/Thebes insisted that they should sign on behalf of all the Boeotians - thus equating Thebes 'recent' dominance of Boeotia with Sparta's 'ancient' dominance/pre-eminence in Lakedaemon. In addition, Agesilaus acceding to this would have 'legitimised' the Thebans control of the Boeotian cities - when their policy was to 'uphold' the independence of cities such as Plataea and Thespiae......
In which case, 'perioikoi' being 'allies', they would not have been serving in the Spartan 'Morai' ( see above) nor continually being mentioned separately ( as at Sphacteria and post-Leuktra), and were they 'integrated' into the Spartan Army rather than serving alongside as Allies, why did Agesilaus not point out this major distinction - that 'perioikoi' were part of the Spartan Army/state, but Boeotians weren't part of the Theban Army/state ? This failure to state an obvious difference argues strongly that 'peroioikoi' served alongside as allies in the same way as Boeotians served alongside Thebans.....
As to the formulaic "dismissed the allies and led the citizen troops back home", it is attractive to consider that 'perioikoi' were lumped in as 'allies' and not distinguished, but then it becomes necessary to explain this:

Xenophon varies his formulaic "dismissal" phrase and this time he dismisses "the Spartans to their homes and the Perioikoi to their various cities" (XH VI.5.21), whereas before the defection of the Peloponnesian allies, there is no mention of perioikoi in connection with campaigns against peloponnesian enemies. Further support for this idea, although there can be no certainty, is that in a campaign against the Argives in 391, Agesilaos " disbanded the army of his allies and led the citizen army back to Sparta" (XH IV.4.19 ).Another example is after a campaign against Phleious in 379, he "allows the Allies to disperse and led his own troops back to Sparta" (XH V.3.25)........ presumably only Spartan troops would return to Sparta. In both cases against Peloponnesian enemies, no 'perioikoi' are referred to.

Here, for once, the 'perioikoi' ARE referred to, and the explanation may be that on this occasion ( after Leuktra ), the only 'allies' left are 'perioikoi'.......
At all events, all these expressions differentiating citizen troops from allies/perioikoi clearly suggest they served in separate units....

[PMBardunias]

In fact, virtually all modern armies, and for hundreds of years, have followed this system pioneered in Sparta. The Officers, and also the senior N.C.O's invariably "mess" ( eat and socialise) in separate 'syssitions'/messes from the men.

A common mistake for those who've seen the elephant is to assume that all large quadrapeds are elephants! hock: This situation is not so clearly analogous to the modern officer/GI split. It would be more like a group of officers asked to lead men who had been officers, perhaps superior officers, who were subsequently busted in rank. This would be an akward system at best. The modern "officer class" began as just that, a seperate class, practically a different species, endorsed by God. It is a common trope of novels that an officer who comes up from the ranks is not good for morale- poor Richard Sharpe. The reverse is surely as true. Men who have been kicked out of the officer's club or whose father's were, are less likely to follow happily.

The line of reasoning you describe above might well hold true for enfranchised helots and even Periokoi who might strive for service just as strongly as African- and Native- Americans did or any of the Colonial troops raised by England.

[Paullus Scipio]

I was not trying to push the analogy too far - merely pointing out that you and Howard were wrong to think that troops who hadn't passed the 'agoge', or were not members of a syssition would have any difficulty serving under/with those who had......another analogy might be that soldiers who have not been educated at West Point/Sandhurst/Duntroon don't have difficulty serving with those who have....and who eat/socialise in different 'messes'/'syssitions'...that on the contrary, such a system promotes discipline, which was just as true in Sparta as now. Sparta's 'edge' was its trained, disciplined, drilled Hoplites, who were no better as individuals than other men. Placing strangers/'perioikoi' in the ranks in time of war would have instantly negated all those advantages

Nor were the non-Homioi Spartan men - the vast majority, be it noticed - made up of 'busted officers'. 'Hypomeiones'/inferiors were not all ex-Homioi, or of Homioi descent....far from it. Most of them were all the trades/workers that went to make up any city's population - but like English yeomen, they were in a position to regularly train, led by the Officer Class/Homioi. Your definition of the modern "officer class" would doubtless be how 'Homioi' saw themselves... lol:

You may be right that those of the 'Hypmeones' who were 'failed Homioi' did resent the oh so superior Homioi - Kinadon was clearly one such, but that he was a rarity is shown by the uniqueness of the episode.....

I don't think your analogy of 'colonials' holds true at all.....the distinctions were of classes, not colonies - a closer one might be of 17-19 C Europe where "everyone knew their place" and the upper classes led the lower ones.....

[Ghostmojo]

Hi Paul M - my own support of Paul B was largely in reference to the mixing (in whatever fashion) of Spartiatoi and Perioikoi within brigades (and also the former's probable feelings of superiority), however, I was not insisting the latter would necessarily have the same issues in reverse (although they may have done). I am accepting the fact that it may or may not have happened and tried to accommodate the reasons for this. The weight of the argument in favour of perioikic supplementing is, however, stronger to me. This discussion has largely been about the configuration of the phalanx in relation to declining Spartiate figures. Other aspects such as the power of the Kings have also crept in. It is all good and enjoyable discussions though, from which we learn and re-evaluate our understandings and perceptions.

Oh and yes - you are right - I have never seen military service. I am simply not the kind of person who could ever happily take orders from anybody on a regular unquestioning basis :lol: . I have known people who have been in various parts of the British armed forces (including relatives) and am well aware of the deeply conservative nature of their traditions. Look at the Royal Marines - their history goes back (in one shape or another) to not long after interregnum England had ceased being a republic with the restoration. The Red Coat itself (still worn ceremonially by some units) goes back to Cromwell's New Model Army! I can easily understand deeply held patterns of belief and behaviour in a military context - just as in any other facet of human life.

... The bottom line from your post appears to be that Herodotus categorically tells us the King's power was paramount in war ( i.e. he could over-rule the Ephors/Gerousia/Assembly of Sparta...or put another way, "had the final say".) Diodorus/Ephorus account of Leonidas' actions would appear to confirm this. Apparently Cartledge does not accept this, on the basis of Herodotus' account of the power struggle between Cleomenes and Demeratus?... perhaps you could elaborate briefly on his reasoning?

Sorry Paul I'm not quite following that :?

...this seems like an attractive idea at first sight, but alas, there are a number of major objections to it. Firstly the 'Constitution' tells us that the King's power was paramount in war, so he had the power to mobilise as many as he thought necessary...

I think his primacy in this area mainly became apparent outside Lakonian borders. The King/s would surely have discussed the size of forces required with the Gerousia and Ephors and then the latter issuing the age call-up. I can't say whether the King/s (or selected Army commander King alone) could over-rule the larger body. I am inclined to think not, for all the reasons/references I mentioned earlier. How do you view the issue of the Karneia limiting the mobilisation of the full regular army?

[PMBardunias]

I was not trying to push the analogy too far - merely pointing out that you and Howard were wrong to think that troops who hadn't passed the 'agoge', or were not members of a syssition would have any difficulty serving under/with those who had......

I think my original intent became blurred. I was refering solely to Hypomeiones, men who, but for a Kleroi of sufficient income, would be Spartiates. Many of these would still be estate holders, but garner an income insufficient to pay the dues of a Phiditia.

that on the contrary, such a system promotes discipline, which was just as true in Sparta as now.

This is only true when each class "knows its place." This was clearly not the case with many Hypomeiones, who would have striven to rise to the rank of citizen (Or not, I imagine that being a Hypomeiones had its advantages as well).

Sparta's 'edge' was its trained, disciplined, drilled Hoplites, who were no better as individuals than other men. Placing strangers/'perioikoi' in the ranks in time of war would have instantly negated all those advantages

My point exactly, and since the Syssitia were the basis for enomotia, I see no easy way to insert "lesser" men into the files. A wise fellow once told me that to understand hoplites you need to think Files- they are Filophilic. Thus I think homogeneous files, or half files, makes more sense to me.

Nor were the non-Homioi Spartan men - the vast majority, be it noticed - made up of 'busted officers'. 'Hypomeiones'/inferiors were not all ex-Homioi, or of Homioi descent....far from it. Most of them were all the trades/workers that went to make up any city's population

Then wouldn't they have to have stood with the potters, etc. in that famous little tirade by Agiselaos? Clearly many of them were like Cinadon- doing many of the same things as Spartiates, but disenfranchised.

- but like English yeomen, they were in a position to regularly train, led by the Officer Class/Homioi.

If estate holders as I suggest, sure. If potters and bakers probably not, surely no more than potters and bakers elsewhere.

Your definition of the modern "officer class" would doubtless be how 'Homioi' saw themselves...

If I may be so bold, and I will, don't worry, I think this is a fundamental misunderstanding of how Spartiates saw themselves. They were very aware that as nobility went, they were nouveau riche. It was subservience to the Law that made them noble, and this status was much more fluid than the modern god-given nobilty as seen in premodern europe. Thus your "nobility" could be lost so easily through a variety of circumstances. It is really much more like membership in a club or a fraternity.

You may be right that those of the 'Hypmeones' who were 'failed Homioi' did resent the oh so superior Homioi - Kinadon was clearly one such, but that he was a rarity is shown by the uniqueness of the episode.....

That rarity was ready to eat the Spartiates raw! The "reforms," of Lysander, who as a Mothakes may have had something to offer the lower classes in addition to opening up the royalty, had to be squelched because of the widespread support that was expected for them. The duplicitous way in which the Spartiates siezed Cinadon proves their fear of a mass uprising if he were able to rally. That the Spartans were really quite good at keeping a lid on the pot should not be taken for a lack of simmer.

I don't think your analogy of 'colonials' holds true at all.....the distinctions were of classes, not colonies - a closer one might be of 17-19 C Europe where "everyone knew their place" and the upper classes led the lower ones.....

You do not declare war annually on the lower classes (though we do declare war on poverty just about every year). The Perioic relationship was something more like that of Scotland with England a few centuries back (complete with Skiritai highlanders), while the relationship with the helots was perhaps like that of the English with their Irish subjects at the same time- back in the days when the Irish were sent to Barbados in a serfdom that paved the way for how African slaves would be "managed." Obviously I run the risk now of pushing an analogy too far, but it is telling that there was very little in the way of opened revolt and meaningful collusion with foreign powers against England in this period. And both Irish and Scotts made up such a high percentage of the army. These, rather than plain old Pommies are a better model for Periokoi and Helots.

[PMBardunias]

Hey all, I just came across an interesting passage in Xenophon's Hellenica:

5.3.8

[8] When the Lacedaemonians heard of this affair, it seemed to them as they deliberated that they must send out no small force, in order that the pride of the victors might be quenched and that the efforts already made might not go for nothing. Having come to this conclusion, they sent out Agesipolis, the king, as commander, and with him, as they had sent with Agesilaus to Asia, thirty Spartiatae. [9] There followed with him also many of the Perioeci as volunteers, men of the better class, and aliens who belonged to the so-called foster-children4 of Sparta, and sons of the Spartiatae by Helot women, exceedingly finelooking men, not without experience of the good gifts of the state. Furthermore, volunteers from the allied states joined the expedition and horsemen of the Thessalians, who wished to become known to Agesipolis, while Amyntas and Derdas took part with even greater eagerness than before. Under5 these circumstances it was that Agesipolis marched against Olynthus.

These "foster children" were kids of influential Xenoi, usually Periokoi who went through the Agoge. These are distinct from the Mothakes who were the bastard children described above.

Then there is this a bit further on:

Agesilaus devised a scheme to meet this9 situation. [17] Whenever any Phliasians came out of the city either from friendship or kinship with the exiles, he instructed the latter to form common messes of their own with such of the new-comers as were ready to undertake the army training, and to supply money enough for provisions; he also urged them to provide arms for all these people and not to hesitate to borrow money for this purpose. The exiles accordingly carried out his injunctions, and showed as a result more than a thousand men in splendid condition of body, well disciplined, and extremely well armed; so that the Lacedaemonians finally said that they had need of such fellow-soldiers.

[Paralus]

How do you view the issue of the Karneia limiting the mobilisation of the full regular army?

I won’t answer for Paullus Scipio “and other scholars”. In any case the Karneia was – ostensibly – the reason for the limited call up for Thermopylae. The Hyakinthia was the festival involved with the army of Plataea.

Herodotus, after the Athenians depart to Salamis, relates them sending envoys to Sparta to “upbraid” the Lacedaemonians for their lackadaisical attitude. His phraseology (9.7.1) indicates that the Hyakinthia was simply a nice cover story and that the real reason for their failure to move was the incomplete Isthmus wall:

The Lacedaemonians were at this time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, and their chief concern was to give the god his due; moreover, the wall which they were building on the Isthmus was by now getting its battlements.

Herodotus seems to write from an Athenian perspective – it is due to the Athenian ships that Greece is saved; the other Greeks are always pictured as wanting to run away and the Spartans are forever awaiting the supposed wall. Xenophon, in his description of the destroyed Spartan mora in the Corinthian war, makes it absolutely clear that had the army marched out prior to the Hyakinthia, the Amyklaeans will have had to return for the festival. It likely was no “cover story”.

The wall has always been a source of fascination. It seems to take forever to build and is possibly not ever finished (though Kleombrotus, after an eclipse, leads away from the Isthmus the "army that built the wall"). One never hears of it in the constant to-ing and fro-ing of Athens and Corinth afterwards. Diodorus gives the beginning and end points but, if this is correct, it is situated south of the “slipway” the ancients used to transport ships across the Isthmus. At 9.12.1 there is the infamous Argive “courier” who makes his way to Mardonius to inform him of the fact the Spartans have mobilised: he, seemingly, finds no wall. Perhaps it was finished and deserted?

[hoplite14gr]

Nobody is sure about the Isthmus wall in the Classical Period.
The only wall remains survivng are : fountains from the Period of Justinian (6 th cent A.D.) and wall remnants from the 15th century wall Examili.
The name gives an indication of its lenght (six roman miles)

Personally I belive that most fortifications of the classical perios would be haphazzard field works

Kind regards

[Paralus]

Personally I belive that most fortifications of the classical perios would be haphazzard field works

Kind regards

That would certainly describe the ramshackle ditch and pallisade that failed to keep out Epaminondas. Herodotus, though, describes a serious fortification made of stones, bricks, sand bags and having battlements. Increasingly it appears that it might not have been constructed at all or, at least, nothing like the way Herodotus describes it.

The fortifications of Athens, Megara, Corinth and other cities strike one as somewhat more than "haphazzard". Remnants of Athens' "long walls" survive; it is intriguing that absolutely nothing of Herodotus' battlement adorned Isthmian wall do not - or that it is never mentioned after the Spartans march into Boeotia.

[hoplite14gr]

Sorry I would have better clatified that the Isthmos fortification was mostly (not all) haphazzard fortification.
The easiest constraction would be a ditch eith earth and palishade probalby incorporating Corinthian garisson outposts/watchtowers and the stone fence used for olivegroves up to this day. Some parts were of better construction likevcitywalls. It would have been expensive to maintain so it was left to ruin.

Established urban centers were well fortified. No argument here.

As I said in previous post, the first proper fortification was made by Byzantines and the whole fortification was finally dismantled by an Ottoman army in 1460.

Kind regards

[Paullus Scipio]

Ghostmojo/Howard wrote:

Sorry Paul I'm not quite following that . I was generally trying (although not perhaps succeeding) to suggest I didn't agree entirely with this earlier comment of yours:

Paullus Scipio wrote:
...this seems like an attractive idea at first sight, but alas, there are a number of major objections to it. Firstly the 'Constitution' tells us that the King's power was paramount in war, so he had the power to mobilise as many as he thought necessary...

I think his primacy in this area mainly became apparent outside Lakonian borders. The King/s would surely have discussed the size of forces required with the Gerousia and Ephors and then the latter issuing the age call-up. I can't say whether the King/s (or selected Army commander King alone) could over-rule the larger body. I am inclined to think not, for all the reasons/references I mentioned earlier. How do you view the issue of the Karneia limiting the mobilisation of the full regular army?

I would agree with you about consultation etc....certainly Spartan Kings weren't absolute monarchs in the sense of more 'barabaric' Kings such as those of Makedon - who themselves weren't 'absolute' until Alexander, or of earlier Greek Tyrants. However, the 'Constitution' and Diodorus' anecdote together make it clear the Kings had the last word.... even if , as one suspects, the ephors put this about after the event as an excuse, it would still have to be true that the King had the last word to be credible. I was hoping you might summarise Cartledge's reasons for denying this, apparently based on the earlier conflict between Cleomenes and Demaratus ?
As to religious festivals such as the Karneia ( in the case of Thermopylae) and the Hyakinthia ( Plataea: delay in marching against Mardonius; Lecheum:Amyklaians given leave to attend at home) and the delay due to having to wait for the full moon before setting off (Marathon) are all rather convenient to Sparta's plans ( as is Pausanias' sudden change of omens at the battle of Plataea when the Tegeans attack without orders), and Herodotus hints that the Athenians at least thought this was all a little too co-incidental, the Spartans were thought a very conservative and religious people.

I would agree with Paralus, on the examples of Lecheum ( allowing leave to return home in the middle of a war!? ) and Marathon ( a forced march , by the Spartans, in 3 days of 130 miles or so.. arriving just too late) that these were genuine enough. But a religious people have many religious festivals, and there will always be one conveniently to hand should a religious people need an excuse for a particular action.

[Ghostmojo]

We agree and accept that the Spartan kings were not anything remotely approaching an autocratic monarch. In fact many commentators, even in ancient times, disputed if they were really kings at all (given their limited and prescribed powers). However, they were a form of advanced constitutional monarchs and the hereditary nature of their positions; the charisma that surrounded them; their divine roots; the ceremony that surrounded their deaths; the policy about who rose and who remained seated in their presence, and indeed who was even allowed to touch them; all points towards the accepted trappings of royalty. But having said all of that, the state still firmly stipulated their existence as the monthly exchange of oaths between both kings and ephors indicates, and the nine-yearly watching of the heavens for signs of kingly wrongdoing emphasises. That, and the periodic expulsion of kings who had become too big for their Spartan sandals.

I suppose it depends just how much weight you attach to this last word, and at which particular point (historically and specifically) you choose to emphasise it. I don't think Cartledge's objections are solely based upon the Kleomenes/Damaratos affair - the other examples of a king being seemingly instructed/appointed/directed by a power base apart from himself (although possibly including himself) indicate supporting reasons. As I say there are the recorded examples of the assembly and or ephors apparently directing events with Kleombrotos I against Thebes in 371 [size=85:244ejpq7]BC[/size]; King Pausanias against Athens; and even the highly autocratic Kleomenes I against Athens in 510 [size=85:244ejpq7]BC[/size].

Agesilaos II could possibly be the closest thing Sparta ever produced approaching a pan-Hellenic uber-leader - marshalling support throughout the Greek world for his activities in Asia Minor, but even he was subject to recall. Ultimately the Kings' assured place in things was secured by the 'Lykourgan' balanced system. Sparta's unique timocracy/timarchy which combined elements of monarchy, oligarchy, theocracy and even democracy; prescribed the kings' role as largely military - but they also had judicial, limited bureacratic and considerable religious importance. As with many aspects of the Spartan mirage - I think this dyarchic imperative as military arbiter was nominal at best even if it really existed in practical reality. One of the reasons for the continuence of the two houses was to prevent one or other becoming too powerful - and since the Agiads and Eurypontids were usually at odds with each other - if a king was final arbiter; which one was it and who selected him?

[PMBardunias]

the Athenians at least thought this was all a little too co-incidental, the Spartans were thought a very conservative and religious people.

Perhaps a good analogy, and one that aapealed even to the ancients, is between Sparta and Israel. Modern Israel is obviously a religeous state. Its reason for being and definition of who qualifies for citizenship is religious based. They have a plethora os state holidays all of which are strictly followed. But most isrealis are completely secular in thier private beliefs. There is a core of ultra-religious groups who function to ensure that everyone else at least seem to follow the religious precepts- through guilt as much as legislation. My guess is that the same was true in Sparta based on what I percieve as often cynical use of oracles and festivals.

Agesilaos II could possibly be the closest thing Sparta ever produced approaching a pan-Hellenic uber-leader

Enter Paralus- stage left...

As with many aspects of the Spartan mirage - I think this dyarchic imperative as military arbiter was nominal at best even if it really existed in practical reality. One of the reasons for the continuence of the two houses was to prevent one or other becoming too powerful - and since the Agiads and Eurypontids were usually at odds with each other - if a king was final arbiter; which one was it and who selected him?

This is true, but there are many monarchies where Kings had the last word technically, but were elected by a lower body. Kings in renaissance Poland and even Holy Roman Emporers. Weren't the 5 Ephors attached to the king in the field specifically to act as a break on his power? It might be instructive to compare the poer of the King with the power of the Nauarchs, who held a simlar command.

[hoplite14gr]

Not all five ephors. One of them as Polemarch or at least someone close to them.
Plus the king could have his way as long as it was successfull militarilly but they could find faultat the peace treaty!
Kind regards