Hippeis, not Hippies

[PMBardunias]

Why would early 20th century translators, etc., be bias in favor of the Spartan royal bodyguard on such a vast scale, so as to emend the original texts because they intrinsically desire the Hippeis to be presented in a way which glorifies them out of (relative) proportion? That was a rhetorical question. Mistakes are not always a result of some agenda behind them. But I disagree.

You misunderstand my use of the word "bias". There is no implication of a sinister laconophilic aggenda. I am simply stating that early translators mistakenly translated Hippeis as "Royal Guard," based on the scanty evidence we have been discussing here that places them near the King at a few battles and probably influenced as well by a knowledge of later Macedonian practice. This mistake was then propogated into future translations. Thus the translation was biased by precedent towards "guard" and away from something like "picked men."

[Paralus]

As for terms of "bodyguards", the term doryphoroi most certainly applies as "bodyguard" - at least in the time of Philip II and before. This is likely a result of a disparaging bent in its usage based on the previously noted (by Paul Mac if I recall) identification of this word with the 'retinue' of tyrants as it appears the Macedonians utilised somatophylakes to describe their guards. Thus Philip II possessed the armed guard of other tyrants.

It is this usage that confuses the identification of members of the various guards of the Macedonian kings. In fact the word somataphylake is just as often utilised in its simple descriptive fashion as it is in denoting the "seven" or, for that matter, the royal hypaspists. I too have not noted somatophylake in use with respect to Spartan kings.

Let us not embark upon a close look at the use of hetairoi....

[hoplite14gr]

Heteroi literaly are companions - might be bodyguards might not.
Doryphoroi translates as spearbearers but if memory serves my right it denotes bodyguard in the Hellenistic Era.
Still I cannot recole this term with a spartan king
Personally I am satisfied with the two parstatae acting as protectors of the royal personage in Sparta.
They were enough to guard him in battle with Thermopylae and Lefctra being exceptions.
Thermopylae is the only recorded case were exception is made to the formig of the Hippes from "less distinguished men" who have sons.

Kind regards

[Paullus Scipio]

Stefanos wrote:

Still I cannot recole this term with a spartan king

...Xenophon refers to the Spartan King Agesilaus' bodyguard as 'doryphoroi' ( Xen. Hell. IV.5.8 )....see my post 20 November.

Thermopylae is the only recorded case were exception is made to the formig of the Hippes from "less distinguished men" who have sons.

This is incorrect - there is no mention of "less distinguished men", nor that the 300 were Hippeis at all. See my post just a few above here 26 Nov.

...this has already been discussed There was never any question of 'replacement'.Herodotus simply says;
"The three hundred whom he brought on this occasion to Thermopylae were chosen by himself, all fathers of living sons"....
He didn't take the Hippeis ( chosen by the Hippagretae), or 'replace' anyone, but simply selected 300 men with living sons - none of whom could have been under 30, hence not Hippeis ( assuming the story is not simply Legendary Hindsight)

[hoplite14gr]

"less distinguished men" was my expression and does not mean bad or inefficient.
If the Hippagreatae had considered for example 500 good men, they had to draw a line somewhere for the 300 number to be established and filled.
That left some good men out. Some of the original 300 might not have children yet, or only daugters (even dead babys considering the period's infant mortality rate).
So Lonidas ordered those with living sons and he had good men with whom to substitute the orginal choices.
The anecdote with the Spartan who told his nagging wife to shut up because a "better man" filled his place gives a hind in their attitude
A unit of 300 hoplites was at the immediate disposal of the general in every Greek city. Sparta was no exception. It simply happened that their "logadae" were called Hippeis
probably because in the Geometric period they were composed from the equestrian class.


You re right of 'doryphoroi' ( Xen. Hell. IV.5.8 ) as bodyguards but no number is given so they might well be the two parastatae.

Kind regards

[Ghostmojo]

Why was it that Leonidas I felt the need to replace those hebontes that had not yet had sons (from the 300 he took with him to Thermopylai) with older chaps who had? Why did he look to the 300 (Hippeis) in the first place? Why didn't he just take his own personal 100, if indeed he only had 100 personal guards? Why didn't he just select another 300 altogether without there needing to be any mention of the Hippeis? Why is there this mention of this replacing one set of guys for another? Does this not suggest that on this occasion at least (and possibly others as Ariobarzanes implies) it had been decided the Hippeis were to be his guard (as another important civic and honourable function for them)? Subsequently, greater consideration was given to the possibility that these particular guys might not return - and the relevant families really needed to be allowed to continue to flourish. Or is it just that he was selecting another 300 in imitation of the Hippeis because the figure 300 was significant? In any event it all comes back to the apparent need to replace (childless) like with (family men) like. That's the point surely?

...this has already been discussed There was never any question of 'replacement'.Herodotus simply says;"The three hundred whom he brought on this occasion to Thermopylae were chosen by himself, all fathers of living sons".... He didn't take the Hippeis ( chosen by the Hippagretae), or 'replace' anyone, but simply selected 300 men with living sons - none of whom could have been under 30, hence not Hippeis ( assuming the story is not simply Legendary Hindsight)

My Penguin copy of The Histories says exactly the same thing Paul (obviously) - but I am attempting to read between the lines. You may think this might be an unprofitable waste of time, but indulge me: the key words being "on this occasion"; "were chosen by himself"; and "all fathers of living sons". The 'occasion' (Thermopylai) suggests or implies (to me) perhaps, that there may be a deviation from usual practice. The usual practice might have been to commandeer the Hippeis. The reference to his own involvement in the selection also suggests/implies perhaps again a variation on the normal (i.e. Hippagretai selecting the Hippeis) with the king specifically stepping in, in irregular fashion. Finally, the fact that it is even mentioned that they were all fathers again might just be suggesting that H wanted us to be aware of the difference this time. Of course you might argue I am reading to much into this (which of course I am) but surely it is as much about what we are not told as what we are - we have to try and fill in the gaps ourselves. All of this is complete speculation of course - but it is not completely out of the question as a reasonable hypothesis. If such a proposition were the case, Leonidas would indeed have been accompanied by a Royal Bodyguard - but not the Hippeis per se, but Hippeis replacements of the correct number. It is really the aristocratic origins of the Hippeis as an equestrian class - i.e. wealthy, priviledged social strata - that makes me think they may have had a natural peer group relationship with senior members of that class - most notably the kings.

There is still the issue as to whether this 100 doryphoroi of yours were incorporated or not, overlooked or discarded or whatever etc. Anybody any views on their role at Thermopylai, 1st Mantineia, Leuktra or anywhere else for that matter?

Finally, one has to wonder as to why have a separate body of 300 men - not arrayed/organised numerically as with the other Spartan regiments - but standing on the battlefield in some important manner (near the king) but not acting as a bodyguard. Why bother? Why not just disperse these men amongst the ranks of the other morai? The king would have to be part of a reasonable sized unit to offer any degree of protection/support. Two Olympian champions would not have been enough in my opinion. Whether the true figure would have been 100 or 300 or whatever ... well, I agree/admit it is becoming a circular argument.

When they appeared at Leuktra and suffered accordingly - had not anybody thought to replace their ranks with Spartiates who already had kids (based upon previous experience) especially as dwindling homoioi manpower had started to become a pertinent issue by then? Wasn't it absolute madness to send these 300 guys into battle knowing their family lines might be wiped out in one fell swoop, given how few Spartiates there were anyway (or did they really think the Thebans would be a walkover)?

Why was it only at Thermopylai that this offspring issue (both meanings of the word) was deemed an important consideration (when population figures were not such a problem at that late archaic/early classic period)?

...I think you have answered your own question. The whole 'fathers only' thing is likely to be Legend.
Even if it did occur (uniquely) at Thermopylae, there was no reason to repeat it ( nor, arguably, did dwindling numbers allow such a luxury - every Homioi was needed) for the Spartans were marching to 'just another battle' which they fully expected to win.

If we hang upon Herodotos' words about the Leonidian task force selection - then surely we have to accept all of it, don't we? However, I agree that perhaps this particular discussion has reached an impasse regarding wringing anything more out of the available and quotable ancient sources. I take your point about every man to the pumps at Leuktra, however.

[PMBardunias]

My Penguin copy of The Histories says exactly the same thing Paul (obviously) - but I am attempting to read between the lines. You may think this might be an unprofitable waste of time, but indulge me: the key words being "on this occasion"; "were chosen by himself"; and "all fathers of living sons". The 'occasion' (Thermopylai) suggests or implies (to me) perhaps, that there may be a deviation from usual practice.

Perhaps the deviation is that they were "chosen by himself." If I recall, the wording when Agiselaos goes off to Asia is that he "asked for" and was "granted" 30 spartiates. and above I cited:

Hellenica 5.3.8
Having come to this conclusion, they sent out Agesipolis, the king, as commander, and with him, as they had sent with Agesilaus to Asia, thirty Spartiatae.

Why not "he took" as opposed to "they sent"?

Finally, one has to wonder as to why have a separate body of 300 men - not arrayed/organised numerically as with the other Spartan regiments - but standing on the battlefield in some important manner (near the king) but not acting as a bodyguard. Why bother? Why not just disperse these men amongst the ranks of the other morai?

This I think is answerable. Xenophon tells us that the Sacred Band was initially wasted by being dispersed along the front ranks of the army. They became a potent force when brought together into a single unit. It is easy to overlook how even small frontages along the line of battle could be decisive. Think how truly small the frontage of the Thebans at 50 ranks deep were.

[Ghostmojo]

Finally, one has to wonder as to why have a separate body of 300 men - not arrayed/organised numerically as with the other Spartan regiments - but standing on the battlefield in some important manner (near the king) but not acting as a bodyguard. Why bother? Why not just disperse these men amongst the ranks of the other morai?

This I think is answerable. Xenophon tells us that the Sacred Band was initially wasted by being dispersed along the front ranks of the army. They became a potent force when brought together into a single unit. It is easy to overlook how even small frontages along the line of battle could be decisive. Think how truly small the frontage of the Thebans at 50 ranks deep were.

Maybe in the case of other states Paul - but surely not with Sparta? Given that the homoioi were effectively elite-type troops compared with other Greek rank-and-file, and arguably the Hippeis were only marginally better than the average very good Spartiate (in relative terms); I see no particular use for such a unit in the way you suggest. After all, the Spartans did not pioneer this shock tactic that Pelopidas used to Epaminondas' advantage. The Hippeis were the best of the best - but the rest were also perhaps the rest of the best?

The Theban Sacred Band was created to be a specific elite unit. It was there to raise the game of the whole Theban army it is true. I suppose you could argue the Hippeis did this with the rest of the Spartan regiments, but I think they differ in their origination. I suspect the Hippeis' origins and continuance were part of the Spartan social stratification which clearly extended to the army - at least initially. I think their role on the battlefield also was symbolic.

[Paullus Scipio]

Howard/Ghostmojo wrote:

Given that the homoioi were effectively elite-type troops compared with other Greek rank-and-file, and arguably the Hippeis were only marginally better than the average very good Spartiate (in relative terms); I see no particular use for such a unit in the way you suggest. After all, the Spartans did not pioneer this shock tactic that Pelopidas used to Epaminondas' advantage. The Hippeis were the best of the best - but the rest were also perhaps the rest of the best?

I think it should be borne in mind here, that we should not call Spartan troops 'elite', in the sense of modern commandos or SAS or other 'supertroops'. Spartan soldiers were no better, man for man, than any others.

Consider the words of Demaratus, exiled king of Sparta, to Xerxes when explaining why, despite this fact, Sparta would still, even alone and outnumbered, resist Xerxes...
Herodotus VII.97

And I do not profess that I am able to fight either with ten men or with two, nay, if I had my will, I would not even fight with one; but if there were necessity or if the cause which urged me to the combat were a great one, I would fight most willingly with one of these men who says that he is a match for three of the Hellenes. So also the Lacedemonians are not inferior to any men when fighting one by one, and they are the best of all men when fighting in a body: for though free, yet they are not free in all things, for over them is set Law as a master, whom they fear much more even than thy people fear thee. It is certain at least that they do whatsoever that master commands; and he commands ever the same thing, that is to say, he bids them not flee out of battle from any multitude of men, but stay in their post and win the victory or lose their life.

In other words, they were no better or worse than others, but their constant training and drill made them a disciplined body, obedient to their leaders, which could act together as a single phalanx better than others.

Consider also, later, that in a probably apochryphal story of Epaminondas, he urged his men to wrestle "friendly" bouts with the Spartans occupying the Theban Cadmeia/acropolis so that they would see Spartans were no better fighters than them.

Consider also that in the 'Battle of the Champions' Herodotus (I.82) tells us that the 300 picked from each army, Spartan and Argive, fought each other to a bloody draw....

That in the 5C BC, when Sparta was at it's military peak they won around 50% of their battles ( c.f. Athens 69% success rate).....though this is a little misleading ! They won 80 % of major battles - also misleading, see below, ( 470 BC Tegea; 464 BC Dipaea; 457 BC Tanagra 1; 423 BC Lyncestis; 422 BC Amphipolis; 418 Mantinea 1; 404 BC Porus and 403 BC Halae Marsh) but only 37% of minor ones and skirmishes ( Athens won 68% of major ones, and 69% of minor ones)....

Of these ONLY 1st Mantinea involved the Spartan army in strength.

That in the 4 C BC they won only one clear-cut victory ( Nemea 394 BC) . Coronea was a technical win ( the Thebans recovered their dead under truce - but were elated that they had broken through the Spartans twice), but more of a draw - but there was only one Spartan 'Mora' present, and the initial struggle was arguably decided by the Cyrean mercenaries ( digression: Plutarch refers to fifty 'volunteers/friends of King Agesilaos who acted as his 'bodyguard' on this occasion. )

Four years later, at Lechaion, a Spartan 'Mora'/brigade was heavily defeated by Athenian peltasts.

Leuktra (371 BC) was a significant defeat, of course, with the death of King Cleombrotus, and the subsequent loss of Messenia destroyed Spartan power forever.

At the "Tearless Battle" in 368 BC, the Arcadian and Argive foes apparently fled before the clash, and there was no real battle.... (Xen Hellenica VII.1. Plutarch 'Life of Agesilaos' XXXII.3)

At second Mantinea (362 BC ) the Spartans were once again on the verge of defeat but were saved only by the death of Epaminondas.

In all this, we have only two decisive victories against other hoplites - 1st Mantinea (418 BC)- almost lost by King Agis' manoeuvring blunder, but superior drill allowed outflanking and 'rolling up' of the enemy line, at some cost. The Battle of Nemea (394 BC)was the same - a right flank manoeuvre, product of superior drill.

All in all, a pretty dismal record if the Spartans really were an 'elite' army. It seems, despite their professionalism at drill and manoeuvre etc, the idea of Spartans being an 'elite' army was a total myth !!

[Paralus]

Tegyra - an unequivocal loss by two Spartan "divisions" - went missing in that list.

Tanagra might best be described as a draw. Both Diodorus and Pausanias describe two encounters - occasioned by the treachery of the Thessalians. Pausanias (1.29.9) has the Argives winning as night comes on:

The Athenians regarded the insult as intolerable, and on their way back made an alliance with the Argives, the immemorial enemies of the Lacedaemonians. Afterwards, when a battle was imminent at Tanagra, the Athenians opposing the Boeotians and Lacedaemonians, the Argives reinforced the Athenians. For a time the Argives had the better, but night came on and took from them the assurance of their victory, and on the next day the Lacedaemonians had the better, as the Thessalians betrayed the Athenians.

The defection of the Thessalians is corroborated by Thucydides who describes the encounter as a single clash. Given the negotiation of a four month truce - which I don't see any reason to decry - it likely was a draw; both sides having had enoughfor the time being and the Athenians allowing (under the truce) the Spartans to march home via the formerly blocked Ithsmus. Such a truce facillitated the invasion by Athens some two months later when the Boeotians were defeated.

The bitter nature of the fighting is indicated by M&L no 35 which records the Argive losses at 400 (40%!!). That may well indicate that two encounters did indeed take place: the Argives doing the better in the first - as Pausanias and Diodorus indicate - and "copping some" in the second whn matters were brought to a close.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paralus wrote:

Tegyra - an unequivocal loss by two Spartan "divisions" - went missing in that list.

Actually, I only listed Spartan 5 C BC "victories".....Tegyra (375 BC) was of course a minor battle where Pelopidas (Sacred Band, 300, plus cavalry) got caught by two Spartan 'Morai', ( 1,000- 1,800 or so ) after a failed attempt at a 'coup de main' to seize Orchomenus whilst its Spartan garrison were away in Locris.....Pelopidas burst through the Spartan phalanx line and escaped....

Tanagra might best be described as a draw. Both Diodorus and Pausanias describe two encounters - occasioned by the treachery of the Thessalians. Pausanias (1.29.9) has the Argives winning as night comes on:..........The defection of the Thessalians is corroborated by Thucydides who describes the encounter as a single clash. Given the negotiation of a four month truce - which I don't see any reason to decry - it likely was a draw; both sides having had enoughfor the time being and the Athenians allowing (under the truce) the Spartans to march home via the formerly blocked Ithsmus. Such a truce facillitated the invasion by Athens some two months later when the Boeotians were defeated.

The bitter nature of the fighting is indicated by M&L no 35 which records the Argive losses at 400 (40%!!). That may well indicate that two encounters did indeed take place: the Argives doing the better in the first - as Pausanias and Diodorus indicate - and "copping some" in the second whn matters were brought to a close.

Well, two day ( Diodorus and Pausanias) or single battle ( Thucydides) Tanagra (457 BC) was certainly not a decisive win, and might best be described as a strategic "draw" ( Ephorus via Diodorus) with a 'technical' win by the Spartans, who held the field and doubtless raised a trophy....
The four month truce suited Sparta ( they could go home and celebrate their 'triumph', satisfied with inflicting heavy losses on Argos, revenge for their loss at Oenoe (461 BC - a minor loss by Sparta) and also the Athenians, who could now attack Boeotia without risk of Sparta intervening, thanks to the truce - just two months later an Athenian army under Myronides ( see current Issue of "Ancient Warfare" magazine) invaded Boeotia.

....But I think all this re-inforces my point, does it not ?? D

[Paralus]

I wasn't actually challenging the point - adding to it.

I'd hesitate to unequivocally equate Diodorus with Ephorus. That is a common practice with books 18-20 where, for Greek affairs, Diodorus is painted as almost a mirror of Hieronymus. I very much doubt that is the case.

In any case, Tegyra was a defeat for the Spartan force involved and there is no reason to doubt that the Thebas "erected a trophy" on the field as the Spartans fled. The fact that Xenophon chooses to completely ignore that it ever ocurred would frank the account of Plutarch.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paralus wrote:

In any case, Tegyra was a defeat for the Spartan force involved and there is no reason to doubt that the Thebas "erected a trophy" on the field as the Spartans fled. The fact that Xenophon chooses to completely ignore that it ever ocurred would frank the account of Plutarch.

....Indeed, in Plutarch's account (Life of Pelopidas XVII.4 ), the Spartans open their line, expecting the Thebans simply to try to escape, and then fall on their flank, but Pelopidas uses this sundering of their line....

17 So, then, as the Thebans entered the district of Tegyra on their way back from Orchomenus, the Lacedaemonians also entered it at the same time, returning in the opposite direction from Locris, and met them. As soon as they were seen marching through the narrow pass, some one ran up to Pelopidas and said: "We have fallen into our enemies' hands!" "Why any more," said he, "than they into ours?" 2 Then he at once ordered all his horsemen to ride up from the rear in order to charge, while he himself put his men-at?arms, three hundred in number, into close array, expecting that wherever they charged he would be most likely to cut his way through the enemy, who outnumbered him. Now, there were two divisions/Morai of the Lacedaemonians, the division consisting of five hundred men, according to Ephorus, of seven hundred, according to Callisthenes, of nine hundred, according to certain other writers, among whom is Polybius. 3 Confident of victory, the polemarchs of the Spartans, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, advanced against the Thebans. The onset being made on both sides particularly where the commanders themselves stood, in the first place, the Lacedaemonian polemarchs clashed with Pelopidas and fell; 4 then, when those about them were being wounded and slain, their whole army was seized with fear and opened up a lane for the Thebans, imagining that they wished to force their way through to the opposite side and get away. But Pelopidas used the path thus opened to lead his men against those of the enemy who still held together, and slew them as he went along, so that finally all turned and fled. The pursuit, however, was carried but a little way, for the Thebans feared the Orchomenians, who were near, and the relief force from Sparta. 5 They had succeeded, however, in conquering their enemy outright and forcing their way victoriously through his whole army; so they erected a trophy, spoiled the dead, and retired homewards in high spirits. ........ But this battle first taught the other Greeks also that it was not the Eurotas, nor the region between Babyce and Cnacion,( tributaries of Sparta's Eurotas river) which alone produced warlike fighting men, but that wheresoever young men are prone to be ashamed of baseness and courageous in a noble cause, shunning disgrace more than danger, these are most formidable to their foes.

translation: courtesy of Bill Thayer's 'Lacus Curtius' site.

Indeed it seems they did raise a trophy, claiming the 'technical' victory....and destroying the "Myth" of Spartan 'superiority'.... D

[Ghostmojo]

... All in all, a pretty dismal record if the Spartans really were an 'elite' army. It seems, despite their professionalism at drill and manoeuvre etc, the idea of Spartans being an 'elite' army was a total myth !!

This always comes down to what the composition of a Spartan army was. In many cases the Lakedaimonian-led army was an amalgam of other troops. Rarely was a Spartan-led army dominated numerically by actual Spartiate (or even Spartan) troops. However, I never said they were infallible or undefeatable, and it is certainly true that innovative tactics (Iphikrates, Pelopidas & Epaminondas etc.) got the better of them; and of course leadership was often a factor with brave - but not necessarily talented (Agis II, Kleombrotos I) king/generals in the field. Thermopylai itself is a classic example of how troops can fight - eventually being overwhelmed by sheers numbers - but not for the lack of skill, superiority in arms, bravery and tenacity - or indeed elite status. I also never said any Spartan army was 'elite', for all the reasons we are discussing about the actual make-up of a 'Spartan' army.

In the case of the Battle of the Champions, I feel this was before the period of typical Spartan training was established - also a period when Argos was arguably the equal in challenging Sparta for primacy of the Peloponnese.

My main point is that despite constant drill and training (which of course others - notably Thebes and Makedon) later concentrated on; the very nature of the Spartan rearing - i.e. the agoge had to count for something. The Spartiate wasn't just well-trained, drilled, equipped and disciplined. He was devoted to the art of warfare, hardship, and standing his ground. Their failings were rarely due to lack of courage or vigour, discipline or skill - usually other factors (like facing an enemy who didn't want to fight in a conventional manner). They were of course keenly aware that fighting the same opponents regularly was a mistake since those opponents would learn by witnessing. This was something that initially at least was avoided if at all possible. If they made serious mistakes they were macro rather than micro. There was a reluctance to innovate even after the lessons of Iphikrates, Epaminondas and Phillip II. However, I'm lost for a term that describes the Spartiate soldier who was so superior to other fighting men (who hadn't devoted every hour since they were 7 to military pursuits) if we can't describe them as elite. What was the point of all that decades-long training if any other state could match her standard troops with their own (who didn't devote their lives accordingly)?

You cannot generalise about these things. In the case of any Spartan army in the field - it depends upon what period we are talking about, and what composition we are observing. It is also self-evident that other powers came to recognise the value of dedicated soldiering as time went on, and then Sparta was far from alone in having crack troops. Other armies had always had brave and tough fighters - barbarians like Persians, Carthaginians, Italians, Kelts, Thrakians - other Hellenes like Thebans, Makedonians, Argives, Epeirotes etc. However, generally none of them had devoted their male population entirely to warfare as Agesilaos II aptly demonstrated with his tradesmen speech.

The myth, mirage, propaganda or whatever you wish to call it - about Sparta as a place of military prowess - lingered for a great deal of time, even well into her long drawn out period of decline. It was sufficient to make the likes of Epaminondas, Pyrrhos and even Phillip II think twice about Sparta being a walkover (even though they all came close to testing that proposition). It was sufficient even for the Romans to take note - with one much later emperor wishing to have his own Spartan (and Makedonian) totem units, and earlier contestants making use of Spartan troops in their internal struggles.

However, I recognise we have wandered off the subject a little here - as inevitably happens ... but this has been a great thread though, stretching as it has to four pages, and Paul B is to be commended for initiating it 8)

[Paralus]

Their failings were rarely due to lack of courage or vigour, discipline or skill - usually other factors (like facing an enemy who didn't want to fight in a conventional manner). They were of course keenly aware that fighting the same opponents regularly was a mistake since those opponents would learn by witnessing. This was something that initially at least was avoided if at all possible.

I don’t think lack of courage was an issue. That said, homoioi were men and as such suffered all the foibles. Their courage deserted them on the odd occasion they were faced with certain defeat and death (Sphacteria, Tegyra and Leuktra for example). The famous Spartan “reluctance” to go to war also says much. When image (mirage) is all, the best way to preserve it is not to unnecessarily test it.

The notion that others would learn by witnessing is, I think, an exaggeration (Plutarch's famous anecdote). If, as has been suggested in this thread, the real difference was constant training and drilling (a notion I do not disagree with), Agesilaos taught the Thebans very little. I too can “learn” by witnessing: I might perform Michael Jackson’s dance routines because I’ve witnessed them many a time. No one would want to see the result though. Others may have “witnessed” the results of constant training and drill when on the field of battle but the only way to learn from it was to adopt that self same constant training and drill. There was no secret about Spartan training and drilling in antiquity.

You cannot generalise about these things. In the case of any Spartan army in the field - it depends upon what period we are talking about, and what composition we are observing.

In the Classical period and down to the close of the fourth century, I do not think it matters: Spartan armies were, in tactics, unchanging. The only clearly preserved battle descriptions of Spartiate armies show them doing exactly what they trained to do: phalanx evolutions – standard to them – on the field that result from their constant training and drilling. There is no real evolution in tactics displayed.

The myth, mirage, propaganda or whatever you wish to call it - about Sparta as a place of military prowess - lingered for a great deal of time, even well into her long drawn out period of decline. It was sufficient to make the likes of Epaminondas, Pyrrhos and even Phillip II think twice about Sparta being a walkover (even though they all came close to testing that proposition).

Epaminondas had no real desire to immerse himself in the manpower draining exercise of holding and running the Peleponnese. Ditto Philip II. Pyrrhus is a different case: antiquity’s example of attention deficit syndrome had his own issues. Both of the former two might easily have sacked Sparta and made a “settlement” in the manner of Doson. Far easier – and far less costly in manpower – was to partition off Spartan agrarian holdings, whilst a supine Sparta watched, to other not disinterested Peloponnesian states. The competing power blocks, with suitable Theban / Macedonian sympathisers in government, then look after the rest.

Such a policy has its dangers – as subsequent history shows – but it most certainly allowed Epaminondas to get on with more pressing matters (until 362) and definitely facilitated Macedonian lebensraum in the east.