Hippeis, not Hippies

[Polinik]

...

My main point is that despite constant drill and training (which of course others - notably Thebes and Makedon) later concentrated on; the very nature of the Spartan rearing - i.e. the agoge had to count for something. The Spartiate wasn't just well-trained, drilled, equipped and disciplined. He was devoted to the art of warfare, hardship, and standing his ground. Their failings were rarely due to lack of courage or vigour, discipline or skill - usually other factors (like facing an enemy who didn't want to fight in a conventional manner). They were of course keenly aware that fighting the same opponents regularly was a mistake since those opponents would learn by witnessing. This was something that initially at least was avoided if at all possible. If they made serious mistakes they were macro rather than micro. There was a reluctance to innovate even after the lessons of Iphikrates, Epaminondas and Phillip II. However, I'm lost for a term that describes the Spartiate soldier who was so superior to other fighting men (who hadn't devoted every hour since they were 7 to military pursuits) if we can't describe them as elite. What was the point of all that decades-long training if any other state could match her standard troops with their own (who didn't devote their lives accordingly)?

You cannot generalise about these things. In the case of any Spartan army in the field - it depends upon what period we are talking about, and what composition we are observing. It is also self-evident that other powers came to recognise the value of dedicated soldiering as time went on, and then Sparta was far from alone in having crack troops. Other armies had always had brave and tough fighters - barbarians like Persians, Carthaginians, Italians, Kelts, Thrakians - other Hellenes like Thebans, Makedonians, Argives, Epeirotes etc. However, generally none of them had devoted their male population entirely to warfare as Agesilaos II aptly demonstrated with his tradesmen speech.

Excelent point.

I apologize also because I will wander off a little. I must add only that I feel it is very wrong to speak of Spartans in general, not noticing the huge differences in this city before and after the great earthquake.

All of the "elite",fearsome and (almost)invincible reputation,which was justified,and had strong support in system of the city, was earned in times before and at Persian wars...Earthquake not only destroyed the city and irreplaceable number of people,it changed the mind set of the new generation citizens and the army. Soon into Peloponnesian wars Spartans became just another city state which lived off it's earlier glory...that was the time time when they abandoned the hero image, and showed great attention and desire for cosmetic uniformity in various things,clothes,hair,beard,shields and God know what other "symbols of Sparta" we know of today..all completely pointless, and irrelevant to the art of war -- which they seems to forgot somewhere along the way.

So if we talk about Spartan army being elite or not(or anything else concerning this city), we must be precise of the period. The latter post earthquake Spartans frankly did not do anything to earn the "elite" reputation. And all those "Spartans were known for" things derive from earlier times.

But their ancestors being elite is no myth.Why? "Ghostmojo" explained I will just add the practical stuff- Agoge system,as being perfect idea, is copied into every special force today, in some more radical than in others....and those people kill with teeth and act like beasts after a year or two. And more than decade of brutal(watch my signature for a little illustration) training will make you an elite for sure,and more.And that is what wins the battle,one man multiplied by thousands..Tactic is only tool for winning battle,but it all comes to bravery,strength and spirit of each man.All city states had warrior men,but Sparta made them on purpose,and had army made entirely of true "brainwashed" if you wish, warriors who loved that ideal.

All best

"I don’t think lack of courage was an issue. That said, homoioi were men and as such suffered all the foibles. Their courage deserted them on the odd occasion they were faced with certain defeat and death (Sphacteria, Tegyra and Leuktra for example). The famous Spartan “reluctance” to go to war also says much. When image (mirage) is all, the best way to preserve it is not to unnecessarily test it."

This is, I have to say, completely wrong way of thinking. What you said applies when you are weak and want to artificially preserve your image. But when you are strong and you know it,test is welcome.
Are you familiar with someone who is very good boxer,or wrestler for example..Does he go around fighting people.All of the people I know would do almost anything to avoid fight.If it came to it,they would set an example with brutal efficiency...That is the point.

[Paralus]

I will just add the practical stuff- Agoge system,as being perfect idea, is copied into every special force today, in some more radical than in others....and those people kill with teeth and act like beasts after a year or two. And more than decade of brutal(watch my signature for a little illustration) training will make you an elite for sure,and more.And that is what wins the battle,one man multiplied by thousands..Tactic is only tool for winning battle,but it all comes to bravery,strength and spirit of each man.All city states had warrior men,but Sparta made them on purpose,and had army made entirely of true "brainwashed" if you wish, warriors who loved that ideal.

Tactics – or the ignoring of them – will get you beaten every time no matter the quality of troops involved. Put yourself in the wrong position with the wrong “battle plan” and you’re just as dead as the city state “amateurs”.

The ancients clearly considered that the “Lycurgan” system had been in place for centuries just as they clearly thought it all the result of a (largely) mythical Lycurgus. This is a common topos in ancient writing. In actuality the “upbringing”, by the time of the Persian wars, was likely only generations old but had, in the minds of fifth century writers, been in place since “ancestral times”.

The real difference between ancient armies – as today – was the “free willingness” to kill and to be quite comfortable doing so. Armies possess numbers but the numbers of individuals that fit that description are not large. Alexander III of Macedon’s veterans were, by his campaign’s end, very adept at this: it had near become a way of life. The agoge was designed to produce just that.

This is, I have to say, completely wrong way of thinking. What you said applies when you are weak and want to artificially preserve your image. But when you are strong and you know it,test is welcome.
Are you familiar with someone who is very good boxer,or wrestler for example..Does he go around fighting people.All of the people I know would do almost anything to avoid fight.If it came to it,they would set an example with brutal efficiency...That is the point.

I totally disagree with that. The “strong” do not deliberately seek opportunities to display their strength. That is the purview of the weak of personality. Boxers are compelled to “test” themselves by the nature of the “sport” and so are not an apt comparison.

The “reluctance” of Sparta to tilt at war was, apparently, well known in antiquity. This is not a result of the fact that Spartans were cowardly or craven. This is the result of a conservative mindset that well knew its aims and limitations. To mangle Dirty Harry’s immortal line: “a city’s got to know its limitations”. The Spartan reputation for courage and efficiency in war was well known and, on occasion, enough by itself to win the day. Sparta well knew that to test that too often was to tilt at ultimate defeat.

Paul Mac has highlighted the battles above and Mantinea (418) is the case study. Too many forays into war would eventually produce a showdown in which Sparta’s real prize (hegemony over the Peloponnese) would be the wager on the bookmaker’s battlefield. In the event Alcibiades contrived for that to be wagered and defeat will have ended Sparta’s reputation earlier than otherwise.

Agesilaos might have the accusation of teaching his rivals how to fight levelled at him. That is a furphy in my mind as I wrote above. If he failed it was in gambling all on what history knows as Leuktra. He constantly connived and finally contrived to have Thebes isolated on the battlefield. Victory at Leuktra will have been his crowning achievement. Spartan tactical ineptness let him down terribly and the ultimate wager (Sparta’s hegemony) was pocketed by the bookmaker.

[Ghostmojo]

... The “reluctance” of Sparta to tilt at war was, apparently, well known in antiquity. This is not a result of the fact that Spartans were cowardly or craven. This is the result of a conservative mindset that well knew its aims and limitations ...

It was also the continuing recognition that Spartan militarism was not essentially aimed at expansion or foreign adventures (at least not before 400 [size=85:21eur7eb]BC[/size]). Initially the need for a male warrior society was to preserve and protect the hard-won greater Lakedaimonian territory in the southern Peloponnese and their particular socio-political establishment. They had subdued Messenia; annexed Kythera; acquired various fringe areas on the Lakonian/Argolid/Arkadian borders; and created a series of client states in Elis, Arkadia and elsewhere to keep things settled as much as possible. Part of that conservatism was seemingly accepting that the boundaries of their immediate spheres of activity and influence were quite enough. They largely concerned themselves with affairs in Peloponnesos and were always reluctant to venture north of the Isthmus of Korinth.

... I must add only that I feel it is very wrong to speak of Spartans in general, not noticing the huge differences in this city before and after the great earthquake.

... Earthquake not only destroyed the city and irreplaceable number of people,it changed the mind set of the new generation citizens and the army. Soon into Peloponnesian wars Spartans became just another city state which lived off it's earlier glory...that was the time time when they abandoned the hero image, and showed great attention and desire for cosmetic uniformity in various things,clothes,hair,beard,shields and God know what other "symbols of Sparta" we know of today..all completely pointless, and irrelevant to the art of war -- which they seems to forgot somewhere along the way.

So if we talk about Spartan army being elite or not(or anything else concerning this city), we must be precise of the period. The latter post earthquake Spartans frankly did not do anything to earn the "elite" reputation. And all those "Spartans were known for" things derive from earlier times ...

It is an interesting diversion to discuss the earthquake of 464 [size=85:21eur7eb]BC[/size]. I'm not so certain we can be sure how devastating the losses were. The ancient sources may have exaggerated the loss of life, although it was certainly severe. The idea of Arkhidamos II leading the army out of the city to safety is also a curious story. You don't just form an orderly series of units and march during an earthquake - you tend to take to your heels! Sparta as a city was spread out and lacked masses of large storeyed buildings and who knows for certain were the army was stationed? Clearly the events were significant enough to create tremendous confusion and destruction, and presented an opportunity the Helots could not resist. Ultimately, the way Sparta dealt with offers of help - particularly from Athens, did much to sow mistrust between former allies of the Persian Wars. It obviously had its effect upon available and generational manpower, but I'm not certain how great it was.

... I too can “learn” by witnessing: I might perform Michael Jackson’s dance routines because I’ve witnessed them many a time. No one would want to see the result though ...

I would!!! :lol: Please post a link to youtube ... :wink:

[Polinik]

Tactics – or the ignoring of them – will get you beaten every time no matter the quality of troops involved. Put yourself in the wrong position with the wrong “battle plan” and you’re just as dead as the city state “amateurs”.

Of course.No one said it did not matter,alongside with bravery(although it is a whole specter of virtues but let's call them simply bravery) tactics win. But when you brake down the tactic,the disciplined phalanx and the war "know how technology" you get to the individual quality of each man that builds up the phalanx. Spartan polemarch would not have the same results if he was given the same number of people from some other state. So "tactic" is possible because of the quality of every single man involved.

The second part of your post until end we seem to speak the same thing...
"The “strong” do not deliberately seek opportunities to display their strength" It was my point exactly.So I'm not sure you understood me but we do agree there.

Again, I think we should not get into trap of putting for example Anaxandridas, Cleomenes's and Leonidas's Sparta with Pleistonax's and Pausanias's Sparta.Those are two different worlds. Leuktra,Mantinea etc say nothing to me about Spartans that most think of,because the ideal and Lycurgus dream was decades dead until then,even if it officially existed(debatable).


@Ghostmojo
I think there is not a single percent of plausibility for commander to organize and lead army out of the crumbling city. But it does not matter...It did not even have to be 20 000 dead to bring down the system. The earthquake probably made great damage in the city,villages...inflicted heavy loses in the army etc...but what is most important is that it certainly made irreplaceable damage to the system,the very core,the strongest part of their society.Just imagine what had to happen for slaves to fell they could rebel after centuries,and you get the idea of devastation Sparta suffered...Both mental and physical. And it officially marked the end of an era of perfect military society,end that probably begun soon after Persian wars generation of hoplites,ephors etc died.

Now I have to run.

Take care

All best

[Kineas]

Davidson (Courtesans and Fishcakes Davidson) presents some pretty decent evidence for the Hippeis tradition in Crete, where the best, brightest, strongest and handsomest of the "Young Men" were apparently selected to fill the ranks of the "Hippeis" and have a special place in battle--possibly the front rank.

I'm not with my books, but I seem to remember someone (Xenophon?) stating hat Olympic victor were automatically included in this body of men at Sparta--which certainly makes it seem as if it was run on the Cretan model.

But to me--and I'm not a Lakonia-phile--it seems to to me "un-Spartan" for the king to have a "bodyguard" like some tyrant. An elite warband of the best and handsomenest to fight beside him--sure. But a "Royal Bodyguard" somehow sounds at odds with the "idea" of Sparta--Sparta, the home of "anti-tyranny."

[Paralus]

... I too can “learn” by witnessing: I might perform Michael Jackson’s dance routines because I’ve witnessed them many a time. No one would want to see the result though ...

I would!!! :lol: Please post a link to youtube ... :wink:

You wouldn't: trust me on this.

I believe the last time such a demonstration was given it was poolside on the Gold Coast in the early hours of the day... morning. Despite the descriptions of the very few awake onlookers, I was walking to my room.

Paul Mac might have a recollection...

The second part of your post until end we seem to speak the same thing...
"The “strong” do not deliberately seek opportunities to display their strength" It was my point exactly.So I'm not sure you understood me but we do agree there.

Indeed Polinik, indeed: my bad as the kids would say. I realised late yesterday but was too buggered to do anything about it (another Macedonian "symposium" on Saturday night).

[Paullus Scipio]

Paraluswrote:

Paul Mac might have a recollection...

....alas not....but I did wake up with bits of rice in my hair ! ( In old Rugby days my mates reckoned it was a good night out if you couldn't remember anything, and woke with bits of rice in your hair.....it meant you'd had a skinful, then gone for a curry, and fallen asleep face down in your plate in the wee small hours of the morning.....)

Ya know, Paralus, I'm sure we hit on something deeply insightful on the subject of Alexander that night - if I could only remember what it was.... !!!!! :? roll: :wink:

[Paullus Scipio]

Kineas wrote:

I'm not with my books, but I seem to remember someone (Xenophon?) stating hat Olympic victor were automatically included in this body of men at Sparta--which certainly makes it seem as if it was run on the Cretan model.

Not I ! Plutarch's tale of the Olympic Spartan wrestler who refused to be bribed to "throw" a match is almost certainly apochryphal/very doubtful.

Paul Mac wrote:

Stefanos wrote:

The king had two bodyguards in battle that they were either Olympic champions or Pythian Champions

...is there any other reference for this, other than the anecdote you refer to, since most commentators seem to agree that the hero of it would simply be sufficiently prominent as to be chosen for the Hippeis, rather than literally 'beside the King'. What would happen if there were more than two Olympic/Pythian/Other Games Champions in Sparta at the time ? Would an Olympic champion necessarily make a good bodyguard ?

In addition, Stefanos is incorrect on two counts, firstly the anecdote is NOT in Plutrach's "Moralia", but rather in his "Life of Lykurgos."( XXI) and secondly there is NO mention of Pythian games.

Paul Bardunias wrote:

Which flank of Agiselaos did Kyniska guard?

( sister of King Agesilaus, who as owner, won the four-horse chariot race in 396 and 392 BC )
...and....

I recently read a chapter in one of Powell's spartan titles about Spartans and the olympics. There was a table that showed almost all of the olympic victors in the last quarter of the 5th c were winners only of chariot racing. Since the winner of chariot races were not even the fellow driving, but the person who bred and trained the horses, this does not speak well for the qualification of a bodyguard! Perhaps someone knows more about the list of victors than was in this one chapter I found.

Since Spartan "Olympic Champions" were distinctly lacking, other than wealthy horse owners, even if the story is not apochryphal, the custom must have died out by the 5 C. Other problems with this nice yarn are that we don't hear of any such 'Olympic Champion Guards' when 'those around the King' are referred to in our sources, and what happened if others 'qualified' at the next Olympics? Were the two guards changed every four years? And in the 5 C, when there was a dearth of winners, did the old ones go on until doddery old age and death? Nice moral story, but almost certainly untrue.....

Kineas wrote:

But to me--and I'm not a Lakonia-phile--it seems to to me "un-Spartan" for the king to have a "bodyguard" like some tyrant. An elite warband of the best and handsomenest to fight beside him--sure. But a "Royal Bodyguard" somehow sounds at odds with the "idea" of Sparta--Sparta, the home of "anti-tyranny."

Xenophon, that most knowledgeable of writers about Sparta calls the bodyguard of Agesilaus "Doruphoroi"/lit:Spear-Carriers (Xen. Hell. IV.5.9 )- exactly the same word used earlier of Tyrant's body guards ( e.g. Hdt [I.59]- the word is used in this context frequently by many writers), but elsewhere he tells us that on one occasion this bodyguard consisted of 50 'volunteers' - friends, advisors, senior officers and their relatives as 'adjutants', and see also those killed around Cleombrotus at Leuktra, so your hunch about 'elite warband' is likely correct for classical times.... :wink:

Davidson (Courtesans and Fishcakes Davidson) presents some pretty decent evidence for the Hippeis tradition in Crete, where the best, brightest, strongest and handsomest of the "Young Men" were apparently selected to fill the ranks of the "Hippeis" and have a special place in battle--possibly the front rank.

...It is correct that there was a "Hippeis" tradition among their fellow Dorians in Crete, and that both originated in a select band of horse-owning aristocratic young men - but there the similarity ends. Once Sparta became 'democratic' and the 'Homioi'/equals ran the place, that disappeared with the aristocracy, and the 'Hippeis' became the 'cream' of the young Spartan 'Homioi' hoplites, selected by merit ( as per Xenophon's constitution of the Lakedaemonians) - see earlier refernces in the thread. Another Dorian tradition in common was the 'syssistia'/ common meals or messes.

[Kineas]

Whoa, there, Xenophon! That's exactly what Jameson argues was the case on Crete,a s well--the cream of the young men chosen and called "hippeis" and he has several dozen nice pieces of evidence--including a series of quotations on just how they were chosen. And I think that it goes without saying that Lykurgus went to Crete and came back with his notions of running Sparta--yes? And that any "leveling" in Sparta was merely an agreement among all the "barons"--they're all aristocrats, aren't they? Just exactly like Crete, in fact. They have serfs, they do no work, they hunt all day, they have formalized "relationships" with religious overtones...

I knew you'd make me look this up--it's in Herodotus, I think. The whole Olympic champion automatically included--in something. I have to find it. It's not what I'm researching right now!

Oh well. Sparta.

[Paullus Scipio]

Howard/Ghostmojo wrote:

This always comes down to what the composition of a Spartan army was. In many cases the Lakedaimonian-led army was an amalgam of other troops. Rarely was a Spartan-led army dominated numerically by actual Spartiate (or even Spartan) troops.

….quite right, Howard – and therein lies the weakness of the ‘statistical’ approach of my earlier post. You have put your finger straight on it. Most ‘Spartan” armies were in fact ‘Allied Peloponnesian’ armies, with often only a ‘Mora’ or two of true Spartan troops, and sometimes just led by ‘Homioi’ Officers….

If we look at battles that involved a majority of Spartans, we have Plataea ( all six Morai ) – but there they didn’t engage any other hoplites, only lighter armed Persians.

First Mantinea is really the only time when we see ‘just’ the Spartan army in Action. All six Morai, plus a seventh of Brasideoi/Neodamodeis – just under 8,000 Spartans in all, with the youngest and oldest left ‘out of battle’, plus 2-3,000 Peloponnesian allies, mainly Tegeans. The enemy coalition was of a similar number, and the battle was nearly lost by Agis’ last minute manoeuvres not being carried out in time. Both right wings routed their foes, but the Spartan right-wing/centre retained its cohesion, swung through 90 degrees and swept across the battlefield whilst their foes broke up – drill, discipline and cohesion prevailed and turned what was heading for a loss into a narrow win.

At the Nemea, some 6,000 Lakedaemonian Hoplites ( 5 Morai plus Hippeis) and 600 cavalry were present, with 7-,10,000 allies, 300 Cretan mercenary archers, and 400 Elian slingers. As at Mantinea, a ‘right hook’ won the day, this time against a larger enemy.

Agesilaus at Coronea only had One and a Half Morai, and so doesn’t count as ‘majority Spartan’.

Sphacteria, Lecheum and Tegyra were all heavy defeats of purely Spartan Morai

Then we have Leuktra ( 4 Morai plus Hippeis – almost 5,000 Spartans plus allies ) – a major disastrous defeat.

Next, the “Tearless Battle” at the fork in the Eutresia/Melea road probably involved 3-4,500 Spartans – perhaps as many as four and a half Morai/nine Lochoi – the enemy broke immediately and suffered heavy losses to some 2,000 Celtic and Iberian mercenaries sent from Syracuse.

Second Mantinea ( 3-4,000 Spartans in an army of 20,000 aprox ) was in any event a draw.

So taking only ‘Spartan majority’ battles we have two wins ( First Mantinea and Nemea), maybe three if you count the “Tearless Victory” non-battle; against four pretty disastrous losses ( Sphacteria, Lecheum, Tegyra and Leuktra).

Taking only major ‘pitched battles’ we have Mantinea and Leuktra – a Spartan win/loss ratio of 50-50 !!

My main point is that despite constant drill and training (which of course others - notably Thebes and Makedon) later concentrated on; the very nature of the Spartan rearing - i.e. the agoge had to count for something. The Spartiate wasn't just well-trained, drilled, equipped and disciplined. He was devoted to the art of warfare, hardship, and standing his ground. Their failings were rarely due to lack of courage or vigour, discipline or skill - usually other factors (like facing an enemy who didn't want to fight in a conventional manner).

Our sources tell us that individually, a Spartan soldier was no better or worse than any other Hoplite ( see Demaratus’ comments ante for example) – they were not ‘Martial Artists’ in any sense of the word. Indeed their failure to win any Olympic wrestling events in Classical times was due to the fact that they refused to employ, and frowned upon, teachers, believing matches should be won by courage and not technique. They didn’t enter the’ Pankration’ because it could involve ‘tapping out’ – yielding. The ‘agoge’ was not martially oriented – I notice that ‘unarmed combat’ and ‘super weapons proficiency’ are never mentioned - but rather focused on obedience and discipline and drill. The Spartan ‘Art of Warfare’ did not involve producing the proverbial “Team of Champions” but rather “The Champion Team” which is superior every time. It was ‘in Phalanx’ that the Spartans were so formidable.

There was a reluctance to innovate even after the lessons of Iphikrates, Epaminondas and Phillip II.

I don’t think this can be true….it is likely that in their ‘Great days’ in the sixth century, when they conquered Messenia, their ‘professionalism’ meant they were the innovators when it came to Phalanx warfare – let it not be forgotten they were the only Greek poleis to completely conquer another state ( Messenia), although that occurred as the Phalanx was evolving, and of course their Military System – from Homioi to Helots – preserved Laconia inviolate for hundreds of years.

Nor were they as militarily ‘conservative’ as many commentators make out. The very next campaigning season after Sphacteria, we learn that Sparta hired Thracian ‘peltasts’, and we often hear of their increasing use under Spartan leadership – Brasidas, Derkylidas and Agesilaus to name but three. That same year (424 BC) they hired several hundred Cretan bowmen, and raised a force of 400 cavalry of their own. ( They weren’t oblivious to the advantages of cavalry, obtaining them earlier from their Allies of more ‘horsey’ peoples such as Boeotians, Locrians and Phocians whenever they could – having learnt about cvalry in the Plataea campaign). By 394 they were also hiring specialist slingers from the Magriainians,Litvians and Amphidolians. They were also the first Greeks to use Celtic and Iberian mercenaries.Let us not forget too that Agis and Cleomenes in the third century, in the age of Alexander's successors were prepared to radically alter the very fabric of Spartan society, and also revolutionise the army by arming 'in the macedonian fashion' ( admittedly being the last Greek state to do so - understandable given it couldn't be done without the radical social reform.)

However, I'm lost for a term that describes the Spartiate soldier who was so superior to other fighting men (who hadn't devoted every hour since they were 7 to military pursuits) if we can't describe them as elite. What was the point of all that decades-long training if any other state could match her standard troops with their own (who didn't devote their lives accordingly)?

…but that’s just it – individually, Spartan soldiers weren’t particularly superior – as our sources tell us. The point was that without all the hours of drill, and the discipline and obedience to orders ( which even then broke down on occasion under the stress of combat – First Mantinea and Sphacteria and Lecheum being cases in point), they were NOT better than other armies, except that they were full-time soldiers versus part-time militia..
It was the degree of training as units which was the secret of their success, which was recognised and emulated by other states raising full-time soldiers of their own. Not to mention the rise of the mercenary, that other full-time soldier ( whose disadvantage was that they couldn’t get together ‘en masse’ to drill, generally being sent off as ‘penny packet’ garrisons.)
In fact, just how much time the ‘Homioi’ spent training, and how often ‘lochoi’, ‘Morai’ and the Army got together to drill is debateable……

Modern soldiers too follow the full-time military life, often for twenty years or more, but they are not ( except for a very few) in any way "elite"....





Polinik/Aleksander wrote:

All of the "elite",fearsome and (almost)invincible reputation,which was justified,and had strong support in system of the city, was earned in times before and at Persian wars...

That is indeed arguably correct, since Sparta’s ‘Great Days’ of conquest etc lay in the seventh and sixth centuries, before any history was written….. see above.

The latter post earthquake Spartans frankly did not do anything to earn the "elite" reputation.

…also an arguable proposition, since their hegemony in the Peloponnese was under threat from that time on, and they eventually lost it…….

[PMBardunias]

And I think that it goes without saying that Lykurgus went to Crete and came back with his notions of running Sparta--yes?

I think most would agree that "Lykurgus" is an amalgamation of a series of law-givers. That said...

Just exactly like Crete, in fact. They have serfs, they do no work, they hunt all day, they have formalized "relationships" with religious overtones...

Crete and Sparta have very close ties all through history and share a variety of cultural elements not seen in the same form elsewhere in greece. The question of which way the influence goes is a tricky one. The fact that the Cretan hippeis still rode horses led one ancient author to assume they were the originators (yes I forget his name). But many of the shared elements are thought to have come to Crete from the mainland. Thessalians share some social elements, which may indicate they came down from the north or emerged over and over with the same social settings. Beyond Crete, there is the notion that the Spartan system shares features of the Phoenician/Carthaginian system and even the warrior caste of Egypt. This would require a new thread or two.

Paul Bardunias wrote:
Which flank of Agiselaos did Kyniska guard?

Yes, one of my snider moments that I am less than proud of in retrospect! (though still a valid criticism)

[Paullus Scipio]

Whoa, there, Xenophon! That's exactly what Jameson argues was the case on Crete,a s well--the cream of the young men chosen and called "hippeis" and he has several dozen nice pieces of evidence--including a series of quotations on just how they were chosen. And I think that it goes without saying that Lykurgus went to Crete and came back with his notions of running Sparta--yes? And that any "leveling" in Sparta was merely an agreement among all the "barons"--they're all aristocrats, aren't they? Just exactly like Crete, in fact. They have serfs, they do no work, they hunt all day, they have formalized "relationships" with religious overtones...

I knew you'd make me look this up--it's in Herodotus, I think. The whole Olympic champion automatically included--in something. I have to find it. It's not what I'm researching right now!

Oh well. Sparta.

...I don't think we are in disagreement here...as Paul B. remarks above, there was considerable cross-fertilisation between Spartans and Cretans, who shared a common 'Dorian' heritage - but similarities are not the same and it is unsafe to push those similarities to far.......The Cretan reference is from Ephorus via Strabo X.4.18, quoted in this thread earlier by "Spartan JKM" on 18 Nov. Ephorus is apparently a little confused - saying that the Spartan 'Hippeis' "no longer kept horses", whereas in fact the Spartan 'Hippeis' were no longer drawn from the 'Horse owning class' - who still existed in Sparta in the form of richer 'Homioi' who were obliged to provide horses for the cavalry.
So don't waste time looking up Herodotus! ....or Plutarch's 'Moralia' for the 'Olympic Champions anecdote! ( see my post above)

[PMBardunias]

There was a reluctance to innovate even after the lessons of Iphikrates, Epaminondas and Phillip II.

This almost a cliche, but it doesn't really stand up to the evidence. To what Paul M-S posted I would add the great success of Agiselaos' horse and light troops in Asia and back home. The most important thing to consider in this context is that the other poleis were "innovating" specifically to counter a percieved Spartan superiority in the status quo. If the Spartans lagged in their response to the strategems of other poleis in negating their superiority, surely they took no longer than the other states took to initially counter the Spartans.

It is in this context that Agiselaos "schooled" the Thebans, perhaps as Napoleon did his opponents in europe. Any tactic can be countered if it becomes obvious. Sometimes the less inspired Spartan leaders appear to almost be fighting the battle according to a playbook and are less than flexible. Saddly this was probably not written as Vegetius suggests, but was the sort of thing that was passed around and discussed in phiditia. Note that the "mistake" at Tegyra is exactly the opposite of the "mistake" Agiselaos makes in Xenophon's eyes at Coronea's second phase. It would be interesting to know if Xenophon omits reference for that reason.

As a comparison, think of the innovation of Phillip II. It surely originates as a means of countering the superiority of hoplites over the lighter troop types available to the Macedonians in large numbers. Thus there is no impetus for Greek states to have come up with sarissaphoroi on their own or to swiftly follow suit when they appear.

I think it should be borne in mind here, that we should not call Spartan troops 'elite', in the sense of modern commandos or SAS or other 'supertroops'.

More like "elite" in the sense of a championship team, lets say paddlers, who excel because they know how to move as a group and predict the behavior of their companions. But I do think that "elite unit" covers this more than implying a group of individual Ubermenschen. Think of that American olympic basketball "dream team" that lost so baddly because they were all prima donnas. True elite units don't act that way.

Maybe in the case of other states Paul - but surely not with Sparta? Given that the homoioi were effectively elite-type troops compared with other Greek rank-and-file, and arguably the Hippeis were only marginally better than the average very good Spartiate (in relative terms); I see no particular use for such a unit in the way you suggest. After all, the Spartans did not pioneer this shock tactic that Pelopidas used to Epaminondas' advantage.

First, we have no reason to believe they did not in fact pioneer the shock tactics of Epaminondas. They may have been quite able to do so without the amateur's need for added depth. Second, Spartan units were a veneer of Spartiates backed by non-citizens as we discussed elsewhere. The true worth of the Hippeis might be that they were the all Spartiate unit, and thus should not be dispersed along the front. This would make the Sacred band a double analogy as it developed. Initially akin to the "cutting edge" of Spartiates along the battle-line, then later analogous to the all Spartiate Hippeis.

I don’t think lack of courage was an issue. That said, homoioi were men and as such suffered all the foibles. Their courage deserted them on the odd occasion they were faced with certain defeat and death (Sphacteria, Tegyra and Leuktra for example).

As pericles noted, Spartiates were driven by fear- hence the shrine to Phobos attached to the Ephorate's mess. It was a fear not of death, but of the Law and shame in the eyes of their peers and the very real loss of social standing that entailed. In this there is a very good analogy to Japanese soldiers in WWII. Expected not to surrender, they often broke easily when they were captured for they had no preperation for the event and were driven by shame at their survival to even turn on their own. Spartiates were not expected to lose by their society, so when loss was eminent, the shock to their courage was all the greater.

Both of the former two might easily have sacked Sparta and made a “settlement” in the manner of Doson. Far easier – and far less costly in manpower – was to partition off Spartan agrarian holdings, whilst a supine Sparta watched, to other not disinterested Peloponnesian states

Simply drivel :roll: We've been over this before. Even Doson did not fight his way into Sparta. Both Epameinondas and Pyrrus tried hard to take the city.

Diodours XV

But Agesilaüs, who had been left on guard and had learned only shortly before from the Cretans all about the enemy's plan, straightway p185devoted his utmost energy to the care of the city's defence. 3 He placed the oldest children and the aged on the roofs of the houses and instructed them from there to defend themselves against the enemy if he forced a way into the city, while he himself lined up the men in the prime of life and apportioned them to the obstacles in front of the city and to the approaches, and, having blocked all places that could offer passage, he awaited the attack of the enemy. 4 Epameinondas, after dividing his soldiers into several columns, attacked everywhere at once, but when he saw the disposition of the Spartans, he knew immediately that his move had been revealed. Nevertheless he made the assault on all the positions one after the other, and, though he was at a disadvantage because of the obstacles, closed in a hand-to hand combat. 5 Many a blow he received and dealt and did not call off the zealous rivalry until the army of the Lacedaemonians re-entered Sparta. Then as many came to the assistance of the besieged and night intervened, he desisted from the siege.

Plutarch Agiselaos

For when the Mantineans changed their allegiance,82 revolted from Thebes, and called in the Lacedaemonians to help them, Epaminondas, learning that Agesilaüs had marched out from Sparta with his forces and was approaching, set out by night from Tegea, without the knowledge of the Mantineans, and led his army against Sparta itself. He passed by Agesilaüs, and came p97within a little of suddenly seizing the city in a defenceless state.83 4 But Euthynus, a Thespian, as Callisthenes says, or, according to Xenophon,84 a certain Cretan, brought word to Agesilaüs, who quickly sent on a horseman to warn the people in Sparta, and not long after he himself also entered the city. Soon after his arrival the Thebans were crossing the Eurotas and attacking the city, while Agesilaüs defended it right vigorously and in a manner not to be expected of his years. 5 For he did not think, as on a former occasion, that the crisis demanded safe and cautious measures, but rather deeds of desperate daring. In these he had never put confidence before, nor had he employed them, but then it was only by their aid that he repelled the danger, snatching the city out of the grasp of Epaminondas, erecting a trophy of victory, and showing their wives and children that the Lacedaemonians were making the fairest of all returns to their country for its rearing of them. 6 Archidamus, too, fought among the foremost, conspicuous for his impetuous courage and for his agility, running swiftly through the narrow streets to the endangered points in the battle, and everywhere pressing hard upon the enemy with his few followers.85 But I think that Isidas, the son of Phoebidas, must have been a strange and marvellous sight, not only to his fellow-citizens, but also to his enemies. 7 He was of conspicuous beauty and stature, and at an age when the human flower has the greatest charm, as the boy merges into the man. Naked as he was, without either defensive p99armour or clothing, — for he had just anointed his body with oil, — he took a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other, leaped forth from his house, and after pushing his way through the midst of the combatants, ranged up and down among the enemy, smiting and laying low all who encountered him. 8 And no man gave him a wound, whether it was that a god shielded him on account of his valour, or that the enemy thought him taller and mightier than a mere man could be. For this exploit it is said that the ephors put a garland on his head, and then fined him a thousand drachmas, because he had dared to hazard his life in battle without armour.

Rhipsaspides! :
Polyaenus

10 Epaminondas once attempted to gain control of Lacedaemon by a night attack, while the Lacedaemonian forces were absent. But Agesilaus, who had been informed of this plan by deserters, entered the city after a forced march with a body of troops; and after preparing to receive the enemy, he drove them back with great loss. Amidst the confusion, many of the Theban soldiers, who had been routed in the night and were being vigorously pursued by the Lacedaemonians, threw away their shields. When Epaminondas observed this, in order to conceal their disgrace, he ordered the troops to hand over their shields to the keepers of the baggage, and to follow their general with only their swords and their spears. This earned him the gratitude of those who had thrown away their shields; and in return for that act of favour, they were most alert from then on in executing his commands.

Taking a city was very difficult at this date- surely Spartan women had as many roof tiles as their Argive peers. I'm willing to entertain the thought that Alexander was nuts enough to keep at it despite the losses and take Sparta if he had done so...if...

[Paralus]

To what Paul M-S posted I would add the great success of Agiselaos' horse and light troops in Asia and back home.

Troops hired by necessity: Sparta was not about to supply the “Agamemnon” of the early fourth century and supposed “liberator of the Hellenes of Asia” with the army Archidamus. Agesilaos had to make do with what he could hire; Xenophon’s formerly “criminal” mercenaries at a pinch.

Whilst I would not argue with Paul Mac’s “innovations”, it is well to remember that much of this hiring and use of differing troop types was facilitated by victory in the Peloponnesian war and, more so, Sparta’s stretching of an ever thinning resource.

Allied to this is the restructure of the Peloponnesian League, along the lines of the Athenian Empire it supplanted ironically enough, whereby members could contribute money in lieu of troops. Thus Sparta hired her troops increasingly.

First, we have no reason to believe they did not in fact pioneer the shock tactics of Epaminondas. They may have been quite able to do so without the amateur's need for added depth.

Now that, I believe, to be amongst your “snider” moments.

This will not be a debate about othismos and, in any case, the "amatuers" clearly won the day over the jaded and juiced "pros"...

As pericles noted, Spartiates were driven by fear- hence the shrine to Phobos attached to the Ephorate's mess. It was a fear not of death, but of the Law and shame in the eyes of their peers and the very real loss of social standing that entailed. In this there is a very good analogy to Japanese soldiers in WWII. Expected not to surrender, they often broke easily when they were captured for they had no preperation for the event and were driven by shame at their survival to even turn on their own. Spartiates were not expected to lose by their society, so when loss was eminent, the shock to their courage was all the greater.

Whilst that may have some basis in fact it is an exculpation worthy of Xenophon at his best. As you feel free to quote from Plutarch, so shall I (well though I know it to be a life of no consequence to Xenophon – aside from 367/6):

Pel. 17.3-4:
The onset being made on both sides particularly where the commanders themselves stood, in the first place, the Lacedaemonian polemarchs clashed with Pelopidas and fell; then, when those about them were being wounded and slain, their whole army was seized with fear and opened up a lane for the Thebans, imagining that they wished to force their way through to the opposite side and get away. But Pelopidas used the path thus opened to lead his men against those of the enemy who still held together, and slew them as he went along, so that finally all turned and fled.

Ibid 23.4:
At this time, however, since the phalanx of Epaminondas bore down upon them alone and neglected the rest of their force, and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness, their courage and skill were so confounded that there was a flight and slaughter of the Spartans such as had never before been seen.

In the first two “divisions” (mora) are confronted by the “Sacred Band and a few horsemen”. Their answer to Pelopidas’ onslaught is to part and allow the Thebans to “escape”. In the end they are routed and flee the field. The second is self explanatory.

In both instances the Spartans are fleeing not because they were never expected to lose and so this was a shock, nor was it due to fear of shame. It was fear of imminent death – pure and simple – just as any other mortal man.

Both of the former two might easily have sacked Sparta and made a “settlement” in the manner of Doson. Far easier – and far less costly in manpower – was to partition off Spartan agrarian holdings, whilst a supine Sparta watched, to other not disinterested Peloponnesian states

Simply drivel :roll: We've been over this before. Even Doson did not fight his way into Sparta. Both Epameinondas and Pyrrus tried hard to take the city […] Taking a city was very difficult at this date- surely Spartan women had as many roof tiles as their Argive peers.

You might have left off the quotes and simply gone onto the latter statement. And it is not "simply drivel": Sparta indeed watched as first Epaminondas and then Philip carved up what had been "ancestral" Spartan territory and parcelled it out to disliked or even hated enemies.

Taking cities was indeed a difficult matter. More so with a conglomerate army and time constraints (that saw Epaminondas fined if I recall). There simply was no reason to engage in a street by street battle if it was not necessary. The surprise attack failed and so the result was to geld Sparta and depart leaving the Peloponnese divided into blocks with Theban favouring governments (aside from Corinth).

Philip II, with even more pressing time constraints and money problems, stitched up just that little more and for exactly the same reasons. Both he and his son had other matters they wished to attend to and the cloak of Greek revenge propaganda would not be dealt any favours by razing either Sparta or Athens (a city Philip was exceptionally careful with).

The statement with respect to Doson is simply fallacious. Doson did not have to “fight his way into Sparta” because he had already done that in destroying her resistance at a sideshow called Sellasia. There were no Spartan forces left to resist Doson and there was no octogenarian Agesilaos to rally women to its defence for the great Spartan patriot and King, Cleomenes, had scarpered to Egypt in its aftermath to meet a very ignominious end.

One might just as well claim that Philip never "fought his way into" Thebes after Chaeronea or Alexander into Babylon after Gaugamela or Persepolis after the “Persian Gates” encounter. For that matter, the Spartans never "fought their way" into Athens after Aegespotami either: the Athenians let them in.

A wonderful life is the sophist's....

[PMBardunias]

Troops hired by necessity: Sparta was not about to supply the “Agamemnon” of the early fourth century and supposed “liberator of the Hellenes of Asia” with the army Archidamus. Agesilaos had to make do with what he could hire; Xenophon’s formerly “criminal” mercenaries at a pinch.

The point is not why he needed the troops, but how he trained them and how he used them. The idea that Spartans were somehow unfamiliar with the innovative uses of peltasts and cavalry is simply not true. Interestingly, the way Agiselaos raises quality cavalry in Asia, by allowing rich men to buy their way out of service by providing horses and men in their stead, is the same system that Xenophon blames for the low quality of the cavalry at Leuktra.

This will not be a debate about othismos and, in any case, the "amatuers" clearly won the day over the jaded and juiced "pros"...

That is the whole point of the added depth- to allow the amateurs to stand up to a better trained and more cohesive phalanx. If you are the more cohesive phalanx, you don't need the depth. Note this transcends othismos, since it would hold true no matter the benefit of depth.

In both instances the Spartans are fleeing not because they were never expected to lose and so this was a shock, nor was it due to fear of shame. It was fear of imminent death – pure and simple – just as any other mortal man.

Men don't flee simply from a fear of death. Were that the case, men would never charge in the first place. What causes a rout is a perception that your side is losing, spawned by disorder within the ranks. This feeling of hopelessness is what does an army in and causes an "every man for himself" mentality that is the death of armies. Because Spartans were expected to win and usually did in major battles, when they are being beaten, especially at their own game, the shock to their morale is perhaps greater than to an Argive who runs away like his father did or an Athenian who is fighting with a new aspis because some Thracian is sledding down a mountain with his old one.

You might have left off the quotes and simply gone onto the latter statement. And it is not "simply drivel": Sparta indeed watched as first Epaminondas and then Philip carved up what had been "ancestral" Spartan territory and parcelled it out to disliked or even hated enemies.

A very different thing than the scenario you presented: "Both of the former two might easily have sacked Sparta"

There simply was no reason to engage in a street by street battle if it was not necessary. The surprise attack failed and so the result was to geld Sparta and depart leaving the Peloponnese divided into blocks with Theban favouring governments (aside from Corinth).

I agree completely with that statement, but it is a fact that Epameinondas tried, not once, but twice, to assault Sparta and failed both times because he got his butt kicked.

I forgot to include Xenophon in the earlier list of quotes. Heres what happened when Epameinondas unsuccessfully probed Sparta during the first Theban invasion (what is the greek word for Spanking?):

[30]
Now when, in its onward march, the army of the enemy came opposite Amyclae, at this point they crossed the Eurotas. And wherever the Thebans encamped they at once threw down in front of their lines the greatest possible quantity of the trees which1 they cut down, and in this way guarded themselves; the Arcadians, however, did nothing of this sort, but left their camp behind them and turned their attention to plundering the houses. After this, on the third or fourth day of the invasion, the horsemen advanced to the race-course in the sanctuary of Poseidon Gaeaochus by divisions, the Thebans in full force, the Eleans, and all the horsemen who were there of the Phocians, Thessalians, or Locrians.
[31] And the horsemen of the Lacedaemonians, seemingly very few in number, were formed in line against them. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians had set an ambush of the younger hoplites, about three hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndaridae,1 and at the same moment these men rushed forth and their horsemen charged. The enemy, however, did not await their attack, but gave way. And on seeing this, many of the foot-soldiers also took to flight. But when the pursuers stopped and the army of the Thebans stood firm, the enemy encamped again.

And his second attempt- italics for emphasis:

[11]
Now when Epaminondas had arrived within the city1 of the Spartiatae, he did not attempt to enter at the point where his troops would be likely to have to fight on the ground-level and be pelted from the house-tops, nor where they would fight with no advantage over the few, although they were many; but after gaining the precise position from which he believed that he would enjoy an advantage, he undertook to descend (instead of ascending) into the city.
[12] As for what happened thereupon, one may either hold the deity responsible, or one may say that nobody could withstand desperate men. For when Archidamus led the advance with not so much as a hundred men and, after crossing the very thing1 which seemed to present an obstacle, marched uphill against the adversary, at that moment the fire-breathers, the men who had defeated the Lacedaemonians, the men who were altogether superior in numbers and were occupying higher ground besides, did not withstand the attack of the troops under Archidamus, but gave way.
[13] And those in the van of Epaminondas' army were slain, but when the troops from within the city, exulting in their victory, pursued farther than was fitting, they in their turn were slain; for, as it seems, the line had been drawn by the deity indicating how far victory had been granted them. Archidamus accordingly set up a trophy at the spot where he had won the victory, and gave back under a truce those of the enemy who had fallen there.
[14] Epaminondas, on the other hand, reflecting1 that the Arcadians would be coming to Lacedaemon to bring aid, had no desire to fight against them and against all the Lacedaemonians after they had come together,2 especially since they had met with success and his men with disaster; so he marched back as rapidly as he could to Tegea, and allowed his hoplites to rest there, but sent his horsemen on to Mantinea, begging them to endure this additional effort and explaining to them that probably all the cattle of the Mantineans were outside the city and likewise all the people, particularly as it was harvest time.

This is not a shrewd assessment of the cost of taking Sparta and a decision to simply bypass it. This is a clear attempt to take it and an ignoble defeat followed by a quick rationalization that they did not need to take the city afterall.

The statement with respect to Doson is simply fallacious... One might just as well claim that Philip never "fought his way into" Thebes after Chaeronea or Alexander into Babylon after Gaugamela or Persepolis after the “Persian Gates” encounter. For that matter, the Spartans never "fought their way" into Athens after Aegespotami either: the Athenians let them in.

Um...yes, that was my point exactly. Phillip did not fight his way into Thebes. By this logic, Hannibal "might easily have sacked Rome." Clearly beating an army in the field and having a polis handed to you by the remaining faction of its citizens is not the same as taking a city by storm. Doson did not take the city of Sparta by assault.