Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[John1]

"In conclusion, this geographical area is the location of the battlefield. The application of combat logistics excludes all other possibilities."

Still keeping your neck on that block then......  

https://boudiccaslostbattlefield.com/main-article/

615,677

[Renatus]

come back to me when you have 40 years militray experience of siting weapons, tactics, fieldcraft and ISTAR (look it up) as well as 10 operational deployments and 4 wars including being on Regional Command South HQ in Afghanistan at the height of the conflict where I was again witness to how generals (we had 5 in all) think.

I think we can do without this sort of thing.

[Hanny]

A couple of months ago and new to this, I directed people to my website Boudiccaslostbattlefound.com. The replies ranged from factual to petty. This was my first attempt at web work and yes a number of silly mistakes have been dealt with. However, I must reply to the few comments. Firstly, I used a combat estimate for my findings, the whole purpose of which is to give options/assumptions. This point has completely been missed by those who read it. This is a novel way of locating the battlefield. As for the comment the maps do not show what I mean - then yes to some degree. Though this is purely because I do not wish to pay for it. If your IT skills are better then mine then go and look at the actual proper maps. Again, the many points in the doc have been missed and if I have to resort to 'shouty' capitals to make them then so be it. One point I did make is the ground is all - the ground is everything. The 2 locations I stated by Bicester match all the historical criteria. Though I admit I should have come down on my favorite. Other people seem to be going around in endless circles on this subject. I have the location - come back to me when you have 40 years militray experience of siting weapons, tactics, fieldcraft and ISTAR (look it up) as well as 10 operational deployments and 4 wars including being on Regional Command South HQ in Afghanistan at the height of the conflict where I was again witness to how generals (we had 5 in all) think.

come back to me when you have 40 years militray experience of siting weapons, tactics, fieldcraft and ISTAR (look it up) as well as 10 operational deployments and 4 wars including being on Regional Command South HQ in Afghanistan at the height of the conflict where I was again witness to how generals (we had 5 in all) think.

I think we can do without this sort of thing.

Especially since none of that is of any relevance.

---

What is relevant is using 272 imperial miles from Anglesey to London, and using 24 Roman miles a day (18 imperial miles) marching speed to establish a time line, and so get it wrong from the very start, or that the Romans were using whistles in combat when there is no litany or textual evidence that they were us d.

[Robert Vermaat]

A couple of months ago and new to this, I directed people to my website Boudiccaslostbattlefound.com. The replies ranged from factual to petty. This was my first attempt at web work and yes a number of silly mistakes have been dealt with. However, I must reply to the few comments. Firstly, I used a combat estimate for my findings, the whole purpose of which is to give options/assumptions. This point has completely been missed by those who read it. This is a novel way of locating the battlefield. As for the comment the maps do not show what I mean - then yes to some degree. Though this is purely because I do not wish to pay for it. If your IT skills are better then mine then go and look at the actual proper maps. Again, the many points in the doc have been missed and if I have to resort to 'shouty' capitals to make them then so be it. One point I did make is the ground is all - the ground is everything. The 2 locations I stated by Bicester match all the historical criteria. Though I admit I should have come down on my favorite. Other people seem to be going around in endless circles on this subject. I have the location - come back to me when you have 40 years militray experience of siting weapons, tactics, fieldcraft and ISTAR (look it up) as well as 10 operational deployments and 4 wars including being on Regional Command South HQ in Afghanistan at the height of the conflict where I was again witness to how generals (we had 5 in all) think.

Dear Martyn,
[moderator comment ON]

That reply is neither helpful, nor is it civil.

You may have a great deal of experience in the military (and we thank you for your service!), but as every military historian (and I suspect a good deal of your generals as well) will be able to tell you, that experience is of limited use when it comes to ancient warfare. Your tactics are not their tactics. Your logistics are not their logistics. Your weapons are not their weapons. Your mind is not their mind. 

Now I am not saying that you are wrong about your favoured location of the battle (I am no expert in matters Boudicca but I suspect the end the archaeologist's spade will have the final say if at all), but telling people here that their opinions are worthless simply because they are not military etc is neither here nor there. Your opinion is yours, but telling people off because they do not agree with you is not only foolish but plain rude.

If your point "has completely been missed by those who read it" then I suggest that you have failed to explain it properly. Should you wish to do that on this forum I suggest that you are more civil in future. 

[Moderator comment OFF]

[Nathan Ross]

This is a novel way of locating the battlefield.

Hi Martyn - I've now read your whole piece (thanks for removing the caps!), and I congratulate you on a thorough and detailed presentation. I too think Alchester played a part in this campaign, although more as a potential last resort for Paulinus than a battle location, and that Akeman Street was important too.

Several people here have attempted reconstructions of the campaign, leading to a proposed battle site, based on logistics, march speed and distance, chronology, even seasons and timing of messages to Rome and reinforcements to Britain. It does seem the best way of doing it - precisely such a consideration led to Webster's (faulty, I think) identification of Mancetter as the site.

One thing that any strategist or general must do is pay very close attention to available intelligence. In our case this is difficult, as we have only one dubious report (Tacitus) partly corroborated and partly contradicted by an even more dubious one (Dio). In the circumstances, with so much information missing or unclear, I would not say that we can be certain about any of this. All we can do is make guesses.

With regards to Tacitus's intelligence, though, it seem to me that you have changed the order of events quite dramatically, and I do not know why. Your ordering, upon which you base your campaign chronology, appears to be as follows:

1. Iceni turn on Roman moneylenders and Catus Decianus flees to Gaul.

2. People at Colchester ask for help and are sent 200 men (by whom though?).

3. Cerealis and IX Hispana march from Longthorpe and are ambushed and destroyed.

4. Paulinus launches his attack on Anglesey.

5. Colchester is sacked by the rebels.

6. Paulinus learns of the revolt, breaks off his operations in Wales, and rushes down to London.

The rest of the movements and counter-movements proceed from there.


However, Tacitus's text (all we have to go on for this stage of the revolt) puts these events in a different order:

1. Iceni discontent, threats to Colchester, Catus Decianus sends 200 men from London.

2. Paulinus completes his conquest of Anglesey, hears of trouble with the Iceni, and marches immediately.

3. Iceni attack and besiege Colchester. The city falls after three days. Decianus, hearing of this, flees to Gaul.

4. Cerealis, marching to relieve the city, is defeated and flees with his cavalry.

5. Paulinus, having marched south, arrives at London.

6. He evacuates London, falls back to an undisclosed location, and some time later fights his battle


Placed in that order, then, how do these events alter your estimated chronology?

(also, Tacitus tells us that Paulinus had 'nearly 10,000 men' at the battle - i.e. fewer than ten thousand. You have expanded this to 'anywhere from 10,000 to 15.000', which seems a considerable overestimate. I'm guessing this is because your 'faux' is 1.25kms wide?)

One point I did make is the ground is all - the ground is everything. The 2 locations I stated by Bicester match all the historical criteria.

One thing we've learned over the many years of this thread is that any number of locations can be made to fit Tacitus's criteria! They are notoriously inexact, impossible to measure and very difficult to compare with any degree of accuracy. On the face of it, a location in high or hilly ground seems most obvious - that would make the line of the Chilterns the most suitable field for investigation, I believe.

[Hanny]

While we are all back viewing this thread I'd like to ask a question related to finding evidence of the battle site.

First, some background figures and thoughts.

Taking Tacitus' figure of 80,000 British dead (which may, or may not, be reasonable) then we have on the battle field:

80,000 dead  = 4853 metric tonnes of bodies = 728 metric tonnes of skeletal material and 2.5 million teeth. Rather stark figures! (Figures are approximations).

4853 tonnes of bodies suggests that the Romans probably left them on the field - too much work to do otherwise unless the Romans used captives to burn and/or bury the dead. And we know Suetonius was keen to suppress the tribes after the battle, even campaigning during the autumn, possiby winter, months. So it seems most likely the bodies were left to rot. If Tacitus' figure is close to reality then this mass of bodies must be one of the largest ever left on a battlefield at anytime and anywhere - surely it must be the largest in the UK? If so, what happens next?

The bodies decay and are scavenged over 1-2 years to leave a mass of scattered bones and teeth - 728 tonnes of them!

The local people might want to remove the remains for religious/social/respectful reasons or the farmers want access to the land. But, collecting 728 tonnes is still a huge task and, equally so, burning and/or burying them. Taking a pragmatic view it might seem more likely that the farmers simply put their cattle/horses/sheep onto the land. The beasts would disturb, distribute, disarticulate, fragment by shattering and bury the fragments by pushing them into the soil. The land would be slowly reclaimed.

Nature and physics would continue to operate on the fragments over the 2k years - chemical dissolution, bioturbation (worms, cattle etc.), frost heave, rain runoff, ploughing and gravity. Over time the fragments would be further fragmented and transported - for example down-slope - such that, like sediments eroded from an outcrop, they would collect in topographic dips, meandering stream beds or down-slope field boundaries. Size is now millimetre and smaller. Of course, much would still be buried on the battlefield but at least some of that huge mass might accumulate as I describe. And 2.5 million teeth are more robust than bone - they may be preferentially transported to the gravitational lows and stratified.

So, finally, to the question which I have tried to have answered by other means but failed:

Do you know of any references/papers/annecdotes/finds related to the finding, or study, of human micro-skeletal/teeth material in a battlefield context?

Just to be clear - I'm not seeking information about mass graves, burials or the more usual findings of macro-skeletal parts, but the micro-skeletal residue of fragmented skeletons.


As a point of interest, there may have been 80 metric tonnes of metal left on the field by the British dead. The assumption is that averaged over the various types of weapons (sword, spear point, axe, adze, various farming and forestry implements), the metal in transport gear (horse and wagon harness etc.) and that carried by warriors and wagons for domestic use (pots, pans, fire tripods etc.) that each of the 80,000 would have 1kg of metal. It seems reasonable to assume that this metal might have been:

a) collected by the Romans and transported elsewhere for recycling (ingots or new implements),
B) melted down on the battlefield and then transported (need a lot of charcoal),
c) stored in military barracks,
d) issued, in part, to tribal allies as a reward.

The crucial point is that the mass of metal would not remain on the field for archaeologist's to find and tracing the likely metal-working sites is just about impossible. Of course, there may be metal that was trampled into the field, and may be found, but the bulk would surely have been collected and removed.

Regards, Steve Kaye

To kill 80000 persons in 6 hours requires each front rank man to kill a person every 20 seconds, this rate of death infliction was not matched in the first hours of the Somme with 15 rands a min shoulder arms, 600 rand a min MG and so on, so a casualty infliction rate of that order is unlikely to have occurred here.Then add in 50 mins to do rank relief every 15 mins and your at 7 hours for the battle making it one of the longest in antiquity.

[Hanny]

The following might be of macabre interest.

Volume of 1 dead body = 0.203 cubic metres.
80,000 bodies = 16,294 cu metres = 6.5 olympic-sized swimming pools or 182 London double-decker buses.

No allowance made for crushing.

Considering that the margins of grave pits have to be dug wider than the required volume, to prevent collapse, then that is a lot of digging by a lot of people! And, of course, in many parts of Britain you would soon find yourself quarrying into chalk or limestone.

Of course, we can consider burning before burial but I can't find good figures on how much wood is required to consume a body but, we can all appreciate it must be a lot ("a lot" is euphemism an "absolutely enormous amount").

I suggest that these figures indicate that burial or burning of the dead is very unlikely, and that they were left to rot on the battle field.

Does anyone have, or know of, battle sites where the disposal figures are known?

regards, Steve Kaye

PS - I am allowed out into polite society occasionally but please don't report me to matron - she'll confiscate my slippers again.

Bodies of the almost exterminated 300 Theban Sacred band we’re found, at Chaoronea.

re water rates, as water was not the standard ration but a mixture of wine and water, did you allow for the admixture of wine etc when doing your water rates from local water sources?, as well as the 17 days stock they started with, so the Posca wine ration decreases water requirment by 25%, and why uses 21 century loaded March water ration, rather than Roman water ration weight?. Uk WW2 dessert water ration was 2.5 ltr a day for instance.

[Hanny]

Firstly, from London Paulinus was retreating. Therefore Rule Number 2 of Campaigning in Russia applies: when retreating don't withdraw back down the road you used to advance (ask Napoleon). That's just one reason why I don't think P. took Watling Street.

Secondly, Boudica and the tribal leaders knew that once they started this bloody rebellion they had to destroy P. quickly. Therefore, B. must follow P. as rapidly and directly as possible, catch him and destroy his force. To fail in that task, or foolishly return home beforehand, is to hand yourself and your family members a death sentence. The rebels understood that if P. escaped with his force to units in the west then he would return, probably in the Spring, possibly earlier and ruthlessly destroy their homelands. "I shall return", General MacArthur, Corregidor, March 1942: and he did, with a vastly superior force and vanquished his enemy. That is what P. would have been thinking and the Brits knew it!

First, Napoleons logistics for Russia were determined by the roads, these roads went through population levels that did not allow living of the land by the number of men moving over them, hence the greatest loss of life was getting their in summer from attritional effects. But every musket rnd and and supply came over them so when he retreated back along the same line of supply he moved onto his supply line, just as in this case, back along the route he knew was safe and towards supply and reinforcements and Romans were hindered by 000 of civilians trying to evacuate and clogging up the roads, slowing March rates.Roman options were limited to the road net and its need to protect non coms.

Second there was little time pressure on the celts, it was all on the Romans who were chased to ground and forced to fight at 20 to one odds against. The celts  strategically had the central position, so they were well placed to defeat in detail the Romans,  defeating elements of 9th legion and turning on the next legionary force, both  battles had number odds no Roman army had ever won at  before If we take the numbers as accurate, the one not wanting to fight was P.Major cities with grain stored till next harvest came in gave the celts all the grain supplies they required when taken, 70000 dead Romans meant around 20,000 tons of grain were in the grain silos so The celts had what they needed short term.

[Hanny]

Water, a sluggish stream 2.5 metres wide and a metre deep, 310,000,000,000 Litres a day pass along a any fixed point of it to be drawn off for use. Livy tells us a maniple had 3 dedicated aquatores whose only job was to bring water to the Legions.Then there is rainfall, Roman used rainfall to supplement water stores in the field, H Geta who fought here also gives us how he used rainwater to supply his command in N Africa before coming to Britain.

[Crispianus]

To kill 80000 persons in 6 hours requires each front rank man to kill a person every 20 seconds, this rate of death infliction was not matched in the first hours of the Somme with 15 rands a min shoulder arms, 600 rand a min MG and so on, so a casualty infliction rate of that order is unlikely to have occurred here.Then add in 50 mins to do rank relief every 15 mins and your at 7 hours for the battle making it one of the longest in antiquity.

I think the figures are a problem there, at three men a minute or 180 per hour, and assuming 25% of the force or 2,500 Romans were in contact at any given moment, in six hours the romans would have inflicted 450,000 casualty's in other words they would have wiped out the entire Celtic force.

For 80,000 deaths to occur 13,333 have to die per hour, if 25% of the roman force is in combat at any given time, assuming that is 2500 men, then each man in combat would need to kill or disable 5.3 enemies per hour or one about every 10 minutes, assuming 20 % or 2,000 engaged it would be 6-7, at 15% it would be 8-9, at 10% it would be 13+ per hour, but the fewer men engaged the more rested they are, and therefore the more capable of continuing the struggle.

I would agree that the total both for time and numbers seem unrealistic, except perhaps againt a confused and broken enemy who were unable to escape easily and spent the majority of the day being slaughtered, but even that isnt strictly true since if the figures are to be believed then the majority of the Celtic force escaped (according to Crummy*/Dio 230,000 Celts took part so 150,000 survived to tell the tale, or about 34% casualties)...


As to physical evidence for that you need to find the site.... 

I think the only similaritys between the first day of the Somme and Boudicca's last, is that in both cases they underestimated the enemy, I should add as well with the exception of the Somme, that I dont take any of these figures at all seriously.

*"City of Victory" P.Crummy, is a good read and he makes some good points on numbers.

[Hanny]

My point was not to expect to look for the kind of scale he was listing as it’s unlikley to be at that scale to be found.

Ultimately we lack enough data to answer most of the questions in this thread which I’ve not fully read , I’m not even sure it’s all happening in one campaign season, but we do know that Romans fought 10 ranks deep, and there was 15 cohort equivalents present, which gives 720 in contact at any point in time to do the killing, so the rate of death can be adduced to fairly good number per hour in contact.2500 in contact is less reliable as Romans did not fight that way.

What is a stand out is the extreme outcome, much like Midway, combat models could not replicate the historical outcome, so the models were changed to allow for the statistically improbability event, this battle is just like that event, the outcome is way outside combat model prediction.

I’ll add Crummy to my to do list, ta for the pointer.

[Renatus]

we do know that Romans fought 10 ranks deep, and there was 15 cohort equivalents present,

Where is this coming from?  I see nothing of it in Tacitus or Dio, nor six hours for that matter.

[John1]

Regarding numbers, 240, 000, or 10% of the population of Brittania, seems way too high. 

Regarding contact period, 6 hours seems a short period for a killing orgy.

Regarding method, I was thinking maybe 50% of casualties were at a distance, i.e.  archers, sling stones, ballistas, scorpios, kitchen sink etc..... The topographical description suggests to me a dense mass of Brits being pelted from above. It'll be a nightmare to find evidence if a large proportion of that material was rough hewn stone.....  that would be an economic way to dispatch all comers in relative safety and fits the description for me..... did I mention the ridge top stone quarries at Church Stowe? Maybe geology is a re-provisioning factor that needs to go into the matrix along with perched water tables (I suspect no support from the mudstone and chalk candidates - too soft)

[Hanny]

we do know that Romans fought 10 ranks deep, and there was 15 cohort equivalents present,

Where is this coming from?  I see nothing of it in Tacitus or Dio, nor six hours for that matter.

It’s the maths of the frontage of the cohorts, the max deployment is all the cohorts in line abreast, prob the battle was fought not like that but we are after the max deployment frontage, so 15 cohorts each with 48 man frontages, and it’s an example of how long they then take to inflict the reported losses.

---

Regarding numbers, 240, 000, or 10% of the population of Brittania, seems way too high. 

Regarding contact period, 6 hours seems a short period for a killing orgy.

Regarding method, I was thinking maybe 50% of casualties were at a distance, i.e.  archers, sling stones, ballistas, scorpios, kitchen sink etc..... The topographical description suggests to me a dense mass of Brits being pelted from above. It'll be a nightmare to find evidence if a large proportion of that material was rough hewn stone.....  that would be an economic way to dispatch all comers in relative safety and fits the description for me..... did I mention the ridge top stone quarries at Church Stowe? Maybe geology is a re-provisioning factor that needs to go into the matrix along with perched water tables (I suspect no support from the mudstone and chalk candidates - too soft)

Reducing battle length time to normal battle length runs into the problem of generating even higher casualty rates per hour.50% casualties to all missile fire is a very high number, why bother with hand to hand if missile fire was that effective, Dupoy combat models don’t give antiquity that kind of lethality.Are there archers present?.

What may be of use is determining the prob Roman battle frontage, they picked the battlefield so they prob made sure the flanks were secure but still gave the celts the impression they could use the number advantage they had, there will also be 10k legion Fort close to this geographical feature, so using sat technology your looking for a feature wide enough for that deployment, orientated towards London, close to a Roman road and however many days march from London you work it out to be.So a large Fort in an unexpected location and close to a geographical feature that fits would be what your looking for.

[Crispianus]

My point was not to expect to look for the kind of scale he was listing as it’s unlikley to be at that scale to be found.

Ultimately we lack enough data to answer most of the questions in this thread which I’ve not fully read , I’m not even sure it’s all happening in one campaign season, but we do know that Romans fought 10 ranks deep, and there was 15 cohort equivalents present, which gives 720 in contact at any point in time to do the killing, so the rate of death can be adduced to fairly good number per hour in contact.2500 in contact is less reliable as Romans did not fight that way.

What is a stand out is the extreme outcome, much like Midway, combat models could not replicate the historical outcome, so the models were changed to allow for the statistically improbability event, this battle is just like that event, the outcome is way outside combat model prediction.

I’ll add Crummy to my to do list, ta for the pointer.

Sure, I can see the problem, one casualty every 3 minutes , you should also consider though its likely that more then just the front rank would be engaged particularly since their in close order, I would consider the first two ranks at least as the other 90% have in their possesion pilums etc.
I dont consider a battle lasting 6 hours to be realistic in any case as it sounds to me more a slog then slaughter and it doesn't read* that way for me at least.
I also think if there was significantly less then 10,000* that Tacitus would likely have said so, less men more glory, of course you can also increase the numbers of the enemy to compensate for a much more glorious victory...
But I would guess it has to be believable to contemporary readers, so just imply a huge force and give a lot of dead.

Tacitus* "for some there are that record that almost 80,000 Britons fell"

Pure speculation, but consider 80,000 is the size of the effective Celtic force not including voyeurs and the 34% casualties is realistic, with 2,000 Romans of a force of 10,000 in contact at any one time, they would "only" have to inflict about 13 casualties per man over the course of an hour, or an average of 2-3 for the entire formation.

I live for the day when the battle site is rediscovered...

*"Roman Britain" A Source Book. S.Ireland. Very usefull.