10-01-2021, 02:12 PM
Re; Legio IX (9 th) HISPANA and the Quintus Petellius Cerialis (QPC) ambush by Boudicca. I have been as guilty as anyone by previously stating that 2,000 heavy Infantry were killed. Now, having recently completed a combat estimate (yes - another) on this topic that figure should not be taken as a routine fact. I am not going to go through all criteria this approach has shown, though I think it is important to scrutinize some findings.
Due to the critical time factor and urgency, no competent CO would not want such a delay in marching to Camvlodvnvm. Neither would QPC. He would only have used the nearest major Roman garrison to Camvlodvnvm, which of course was Legio IX HISPANA and that was split in two at Lindvm (Lincoln) and Longthorpe by modern Peterborough. The largest portion (and camp) was based at Lindvm, securing the northern border against the powerful and unstable Brigantes (which had already revolted once before). As for the option of marching directly south from there to Camvlodvnvm with his full Legio, it would require at least 1 day’s preparation before it started out and from Lindvm to Camvlodvnvm was 135 miles away - 6 days of forced marching? Could Camvlodvnvm survive for another week. The answer was probably not. No CO of any note could sanction such a delay, and neither could QPC. Plus, what if the Brigantes actively joined in the revolt and attacked the depleted garrison? That would mean the loss of the entire north. Although QPC was reckless, it was too large a risk to take. He had to leave his main forces behind at Lindvm and use his next available force nearest Camvlodvnvm some 41 miles further to the south - the Vexillation camp of Longthorpe. This contained both Legio Infantry and an Auxilia ‘Alae Quingen’ cavalry Wing. QPC would have led from the front and would have immediately sent a warning order (Wg O) via courier to Longthorpe to ensure that the Vexillation column would be ready and waiting to deploy once he arrived. QPC would then have ridden hard, south from Lindvm with his 120 strong Legio cavalry bodyguard to rendezvous (RV) with them.
As for the holding density of a base/marching-camp this is entirely dependent on which source you read. However, based on analysis I estimate that each hectare (HA) contained enough accommodation space for 1 Legio Cohort or a fifth of an Auxilia Alae (it is common sense that a horse and its accoutrements requires 4 or 5 times more space than an infantryman).
Before the ambush Longthorpe was 350 m x 290 m. 25 Acres (10 HA) and so was capable of housing 4 Cohorts of Legio IX with a 512 strong Auxilia cavalry Wing split into 16 ‘Turmae’ - troops. A combined total of 2,400 men. QPC also could not leave the garrison completely devoid of troops and so would have had to leave a minimum of 1 Legio Cohort behind to remain as a caretaker garrison for camp defence.
So 3 Legio Cohorts of 480 men is 1,440 Heavy Infantry. Legio IX HISPANAs own cavalry formation was 120 men with the Auxilia Alae gives us a total of 532 cavalry and a total combined force of approximately 1,952. However, although Tacitus states only the heavy Legio infantry were destroyed there must also have been losses amongst the cavalry (it was an ambush after all).
We know though archaeology that directly after the ambush Longthorpe was hastily reduced due to casualties to 200 m x 220 m. 11 Acres (4.5 HA). With the caretaker Cohort occupying 1 HA, it leaves 3.5 HA for the cavalry survivors.
We also know from Tacitus that when the revolt was finally over, some 2,000 Legionaries had to be drafted in from Germania as Battle Casualty Replacements (BCRs in modern military parlance) along with 8 Auxilia Infantry Battalions and 1,000 cavalry. Many experts state that the majority of these were for Legio IX HISPANA. Though GSP must have suffered at least 300 Legio and Auxilia dead when assaulting Mona with 300 more wounded. Tacitus also informs us that 200 Legionaries or Auxilia were sent to Camvlodvnvm, where along with its small garrison (say another 100) were massacred. If 1,440 Legio infantry were killed in the ambush plus about the 400 Tacitus tells us that GSP lost in the final battle with 500 or so wounded (Legio and Auxilia) and with others killed in isolated locations, the final butchers bill for the whole of the Roman army was at least 2,140 killed along with 800 wounded at a rough estimate. Probably a quarter of whom died or were unfit for further service. The BCRs total 3,000 for the whole campaign and not just for Legio IX . So Legio IX could not have 2,000 dead. The math's simply do not add up.
QPC, on his first major independent command appointment would have viewed the revolt as a blessing from Jupiter itself. Camvlodvnvm, despite Londinivm’ s rapidly growing importance as a trading post, still held meaning. It was the first Colonia Rome had established in the province - it had to be defended at all costs. The person who successfully did so would be guaranteed to be awarded laurels and instant glory. His senior commander was many miles away on Mona giving him unlimited freedom of movement in his actions. It would be a disgrace not to seize opportunity. QPCs appetite for risk was greater than his superior and that is the root cause of the events that followed. He was overconfident that no one would attack his column. This arrogant attitude would have been disseminated down the chain of command to his whole force. They thought themselves invincible. As for the ambush location, it is a good help if you have actually taken part in ambushes (and taught them). Despite the difference between ancient and modern, the principles remain the same. So again, with head on the block, the QPC ambush is not where many state it is. That, though is for another day.
Due to the critical time factor and urgency, no competent CO would not want such a delay in marching to Camvlodvnvm. Neither would QPC. He would only have used the nearest major Roman garrison to Camvlodvnvm, which of course was Legio IX HISPANA and that was split in two at Lindvm (Lincoln) and Longthorpe by modern Peterborough. The largest portion (and camp) was based at Lindvm, securing the northern border against the powerful and unstable Brigantes (which had already revolted once before). As for the option of marching directly south from there to Camvlodvnvm with his full Legio, it would require at least 1 day’s preparation before it started out and from Lindvm to Camvlodvnvm was 135 miles away - 6 days of forced marching? Could Camvlodvnvm survive for another week. The answer was probably not. No CO of any note could sanction such a delay, and neither could QPC. Plus, what if the Brigantes actively joined in the revolt and attacked the depleted garrison? That would mean the loss of the entire north. Although QPC was reckless, it was too large a risk to take. He had to leave his main forces behind at Lindvm and use his next available force nearest Camvlodvnvm some 41 miles further to the south - the Vexillation camp of Longthorpe. This contained both Legio Infantry and an Auxilia ‘Alae Quingen’ cavalry Wing. QPC would have led from the front and would have immediately sent a warning order (Wg O) via courier to Longthorpe to ensure that the Vexillation column would be ready and waiting to deploy once he arrived. QPC would then have ridden hard, south from Lindvm with his 120 strong Legio cavalry bodyguard to rendezvous (RV) with them.
As for the holding density of a base/marching-camp this is entirely dependent on which source you read. However, based on analysis I estimate that each hectare (HA) contained enough accommodation space for 1 Legio Cohort or a fifth of an Auxilia Alae (it is common sense that a horse and its accoutrements requires 4 or 5 times more space than an infantryman).
Before the ambush Longthorpe was 350 m x 290 m. 25 Acres (10 HA) and so was capable of housing 4 Cohorts of Legio IX with a 512 strong Auxilia cavalry Wing split into 16 ‘Turmae’ - troops. A combined total of 2,400 men. QPC also could not leave the garrison completely devoid of troops and so would have had to leave a minimum of 1 Legio Cohort behind to remain as a caretaker garrison for camp defence.
So 3 Legio Cohorts of 480 men is 1,440 Heavy Infantry. Legio IX HISPANAs own cavalry formation was 120 men with the Auxilia Alae gives us a total of 532 cavalry and a total combined force of approximately 1,952. However, although Tacitus states only the heavy Legio infantry were destroyed there must also have been losses amongst the cavalry (it was an ambush after all).
We know though archaeology that directly after the ambush Longthorpe was hastily reduced due to casualties to 200 m x 220 m. 11 Acres (4.5 HA). With the caretaker Cohort occupying 1 HA, it leaves 3.5 HA for the cavalry survivors.
We also know from Tacitus that when the revolt was finally over, some 2,000 Legionaries had to be drafted in from Germania as Battle Casualty Replacements (BCRs in modern military parlance) along with 8 Auxilia Infantry Battalions and 1,000 cavalry. Many experts state that the majority of these were for Legio IX HISPANA. Though GSP must have suffered at least 300 Legio and Auxilia dead when assaulting Mona with 300 more wounded. Tacitus also informs us that 200 Legionaries or Auxilia were sent to Camvlodvnvm, where along with its small garrison (say another 100) were massacred. If 1,440 Legio infantry were killed in the ambush plus about the 400 Tacitus tells us that GSP lost in the final battle with 500 or so wounded (Legio and Auxilia) and with others killed in isolated locations, the final butchers bill for the whole of the Roman army was at least 2,140 killed along with 800 wounded at a rough estimate. Probably a quarter of whom died or were unfit for further service. The BCRs total 3,000 for the whole campaign and not just for Legio IX . So Legio IX could not have 2,000 dead. The math's simply do not add up.
QPC, on his first major independent command appointment would have viewed the revolt as a blessing from Jupiter itself. Camvlodvnvm, despite Londinivm’ s rapidly growing importance as a trading post, still held meaning. It was the first Colonia Rome had established in the province - it had to be defended at all costs. The person who successfully did so would be guaranteed to be awarded laurels and instant glory. His senior commander was many miles away on Mona giving him unlimited freedom of movement in his actions. It would be a disgrace not to seize opportunity. QPCs appetite for risk was greater than his superior and that is the root cause of the events that followed. He was overconfident that no one would attack his column. This arrogant attitude would have been disseminated down the chain of command to his whole force. They thought themselves invincible. As for the ambush location, it is a good help if you have actually taken part in ambushes (and taught them). Despite the difference between ancient and modern, the principles remain the same. So again, with head on the block, the QPC ambush is not where many state it is. That, though is for another day.
