Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Hanny]

However, the sources we have for the period - sources that you yourself have cited - tell us that the main crop was sown in the autumn:

You clearly have not read or not understood what i have posted, as they include refernces to natural cycle, replaced and or in conjucture with newer methds, spring as being the principle emmer crop cycle after a build up of winter manure to effect in 1 cent AD, and to autumn using spelt being the principle crop cycle in later centuries, and i further pointed you towards how different callender systems and crop cycles can produce crops to fit into a time line. Emmer sring and spelt autumn which dominates in 3 and 4th century in NWE but not earlier here for example http://www.butser.org.uk/Cereal%20Yields...Option.pdf

An autumn sowing season makes perfect sense of the notes in Tacitus that the revolt began in late summer (late in the Roman campaign season) and the Britons were away in autumn (planting season). As I've said, if they were away for a spring planting season then the revolt must have either begun or continued throughout the preceding winter.

autumn sowing makes sense if its the year before, when P is in Angelsey, it makes no sense otherwise. Tactitus records in chronology P actions, he then says, "While he was thus occupied, the sudden revolt of the province​7 was announced to Suetonius."

The problem with all of these complex calculations of logistics, supply, deployment etc is that they rest on unverifiable assumptions. We do not know how much food or water a Roman soldier was issued per day, we do not know the exact size of the force Paulinus led from Anglesey, we do not know the formation or deployment for the final battle. Even a small error in the estimates can expand into a gross miscalculation.

Sigh you keep ignoring what we do know, we do know the principle formation was the boar head, from which we can adduce the rest of the army frontage, we do know you gave number values and a timeline, from which i have shown its highly improbale to work as written.

We know the weight of food and water ration as we are told what it comprises, we are told its emmer wheet to make the bread of the legions and its porridge from. Sure i could be out with assumptions and calcs, as i said i used a high end carry weight of 15 days, P was expecting to go Anglsey at 120 miles and fight there, so carried what he considerd he needed, as it turned out he ends up fighting 300 miles from his base of supply, and did not know he would have to do so, so did not carry more with him, but they show in broad terms that your timeline is militarily impracticle, and contradicts to much of the evidence we have.

Instead, I think we should begin with the textual evidence as we have it:

i. Paulinus marched an expeditionary force from Anglesey and reached London before Boudica's forces could advance from Colchester.

ii. He 'saved the province with rapid movement' (Agricola, 16)

So I think we would be better figuring out how this might have happened than trying to calculate how it would have been impossible!

Removing the impossible leaves the possible to chose from.

As for logistics: in AD359 Julianus Caesar led a springtime expedition against the Franks with each of his soldiers carrying 17 days rations 'about their necks' (Ammianus Marcellinus 17.9.2); he previous says that this 'this hard-tack (as they commonly call it)' was carried 'on the backs of his willing soldiers,' (ibid 17.8.2) - so no mules needed.

As i referenced earlier the legions can carry different amounts with them, 15 is a high end lets be sure we can do what i want to do. So all you have to do is explain why your campaign 6 days march away, now requires 60 days, and then how a Roman can carry enough to go to Angelsey in 60 days and then on to godmanchster on it without starving to death or not being able to lift its ration weight on day one.

Hard tack is bucellatum, in Feeding the Roman Army The Archaeology of Production and Supply in NW Europe, we have its recipe, emmer wheet and barley.

Ammianus Marcellinus 17.9.2
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/R...n/17*.html
For he could not leave until the grain supply was brought up from Aquitania during the mild summer season, and after the breaking up of the cold weather and frost. 2 But as careful planning is victorious over nearly all difficulties, he turned over in his mind many various possibilities; and this at last he found to be the only one, namely, without waiting for the height of the season, to fall upon the savages before he was looked for. And having settled on his plan, he had the grain allowance for twenty days taken from what was to be consumed in the winter quarters, and baked up to serve for some time; he put this hard-tack (as they commonly call it) on the backs of his willing soldiers, and relying on this supply he set out under favourable auspices (as he did before), thinking that within the fifth or sixth month two urgent and inevitable campaigns might be brought to completion.


So he wont wait for the summer crops, but takes it from the winter stocks and issues 20 days hard tack, to allow him to operate for 2 months, how will 20 days hard take supply an army for two month?, is the rest of what was required on mules.....

But things go south, and in no time and he has to re build 3 forts and put 17 days grain into the forts leaving the legion to starve and they mutiny, principly from poor logistical planning.

Ammianus Marcellinus 17.9.2
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/R...n/17*.html
1 Julianus Caesar rebuilds three fortresses on the Meuse that had been destroyed by the savages, and is assailed with insults and threats by the soldiers, who are suffering from hunger.

1 So, as everything was proceeding in accordance with his prayers, he made haste with watchful solicitude to put the well-being of the provinces in every way on a firm footing; and he planned to repair (as time would permit) three forts situated in a straight line along the banks overhanging the river Meuse, which had long since been overthrown by the obstinate assaults of the savages; and they were immediately restored, the campaign being interrupted for a short time. 2 And to the end that speed might make his wise policy safe, he took a part of the seventeen days' provisions, which the soldiers, when they marched forward on their expedition carried about their necks, and stored it in those same forts, hoping that what had been deducted might be replaced from the harvests of the Chamavi. 3 But it turned out far otherwise; for the crops were not yet even ripe, and the soldiers, after using up what they carried, could find no food anywhere; and resorting to outrageous threats, they assailed Julian with foul names and opprobrious language, calling him an Asiatic,​57 a Greekling​58 and a deceiver, and a fool with a show of wisdom.

A better example from this later period is https://www.amazon.co.uk/Nisibis-War-Def...1526782065

In 507 Joshua the Stylite chronicler recorded the events of the Roman-Persian War of 502-507. During the 501-502 campaign two Roman armies, totaling 52,000 men, were operating in the vicinity of Edessa. The army bakers were unable to make sufficient biscuits for the combined force so the commissary-general Appion ordered the people of Edessa to make the biscuits (bucellatum) for the army at their own cost with 630,000 modii of grain. One modii, was approximately eight dry quarts, fed a contubernium (tent group or squad) of eight soldiers for one day. The grain recorded could feed 52,000 men for approximately 90 days and weighed 10,080,000 pounds or 5,040 tons. Joshua only takes note of the grain made into biscuits. A document from 360 lists individual daily rations in a garrison at the equivalent of three pounds of bread, two pounds of meat, two pints of wine and 1/8 pint of oil. If one adds the grain and fodder for the cavalry horses and fodder for the draft animals to the tonnage required to feed the army for 90 days totals are doubled to a minimum of 10,080 tons. When these logistical planning factors are applied it becomes apparent that a besieging army of 50,000 men must either capture a fortified city within 90 days or pack up and march home. If the army’s operation exceeded the 90- day limit, it starved. During the 359 Campaign, Ammianus claims the Persians left 30,000 dead in the Roman province. The siege lasted 73 days and the maneuvers before the siege were between 15-30 days. Shapur’s total operation lasted between 90-100 days. Most of the deaths would have been caused by starvation and related diseases.

Suetonius Paulinus could easily have drawn 17 days marching rations for his expedition from that allocated to his full campaign force in Wales. (In fact, this might explain why the troops left in Wales were unable to march quickly to reinforce him, i.e. he had taken a portion of their alloted campaign rations with him!)

Sure he could, 20 days ration only means your carrying 100lbs on your back and why not take massive amounts on your back when your going to attack angelsey 120 miles away, or look at the entrails and know your going to need x and not y 3 months later. His base of supply has a min of a years supply for a Legion, so thats 4015000 lbs so taking 17 days worth, which is 5% taken on the Legions back ( now its twice the normal amounht on your back and your still punching out your 18mpd for weeks on end0and leaves plenty and now you say he does not even take the Legion with him, despite giving us that he has the whole legion plus aux in Anglsey in Sept.

17 days would get Paulinus down to Godmanchester, or to London, where he could have resupplied from the granaries there. His men could have partially topped up supplies at forts and towns along the route, without having to exhaust them completely. As for water, they could have done what the British army did in South Africa during the Boer War - a two-pint (1.2 litre) canteen issued to every man, for all purposes, to be replenished as and when possible on the march. Water carriers could fetch water from any rivers, wells, streams and springs along the route.

It would be tough, but it would work.

I already explained your views on logistics do not acord with reality, your posting history shows a solid understanding of most things, but logistics seems to be a soft spot in your reading, the grain in roman fort towns granaries is insuffiecent, if it was you lose 10% to 20% a day getting it loaded and your march rate drops when you want it to increase, you also seem to want march all day every day, mules require a rest day every 7, a Roman rested every 3 to 4 days when marching, so when you calculate what you want the march rates to be and what humans and animals are capable of doing you find your would work, becomes imposible to work.

How tough kinda intrested me so...


Ok 17 days on the backs of the legion, is now 100 lbs, using the A Hitler school of logistics, lets not concern our selves with logistical reality, the campaign time will just have to change to conform to what i want to do.

September 3rd 198 miles to Godmanchester, arrives September 13th.
14th leaves for london at 56 miles arrives 16th.

Total days 13, 19.5 mpd, every day.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/1603388/Medical effects of a loaded march of one day with results in a 24% injury rate for traing for TAB, average sick days lost per injury 2.

Using current US medical data we get 90 injuries per 000s man hours injury rate, from troops carrying 70 to 100+lbs during rucks, therfore a legion has had 3611 on sick call, half requiring hospsitalization for more than day by end of march, half with severe blisters and slight sprains etc and by day 13 has lost 1800 as left behind as unable to march and catch up.

So behind his TAB is a lot of people wondering how to catch up, which makes me wonder if P did not re align his supply net but simply extended it from Wroxeter to Menai, and then onwards to Godmancheter and beyond, so a 300 odd mile supply line behind him, that he knows is secure as falling out provides the garrisons to secure his Loc and los. Instead of a 120 mile supply net for his needs, he could instead create a 300 mile supply net that can give him perhaps half his needs, therby forcing him to get a conclusion or be forced back along the supply chain towards more supplies etc.

Two problems with compressing it all into a single year, first is tacitus records  it as a 2 season event,

Are we getting confused here?  What do you mean by 'season' - season of the year or campaigning season?  If the former, I could agree with you that that is a possibility.  Depending on when one thinks the revolt started, it could be spring/summer or summer/autumn, even autumn/beginning of winter.  It could equally be within a single season, however.  If you mean the latter, there is no chance.  All the indications are that it was a relatively short affair.  Carroll, in the article that you cited, suggests that the revolt started at the beginning of May and that the final battle took place five weeks later.  That said, as I indicated before, I have no difficulty in believing that the revolt started in one year and that, after the defeat of the rebels, the aftermath extended into the following year.

No confusion on my part.

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Vindex: Interesting you should mention Sandhurst because I wrote to the library asking for assistance with the water needs of 18/19Century cavalry units etc.. I reasoned that if anyone had that information ....  Didn't get a reply.

Try instead, the Defence Academy,  https://www.da.mod.uk/contact-us/ if you have clearence your looking for those involved in simulations https://www.da.mod.uk/news/wargames-and-simulation/ and validation models.